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 I see trees of green, red roses too 
 I see them bloom for me and you 
 And I think to myself, what a wonderful world 
 
 I see skies of blue and clouds of white 
 The bright blessed day, the dark sacred night 
 And I think to myself, what a wonderful world 
 
 The colours of the rainbow, so pretty in the sky 
 Are also on the faces of people going by 
 I see friends shakin' hands, sayin' "How do you do?" 
 They're really saying "I love you" 
 
 I hear babies cryin', I watch them grow 
 They'll learn much more than I'll ever know 
 And I think to myself, what a wonderful world 
 Yes, I think to myself, what a wonderful world 
 
 Oh yeah 
 
 Louis Armstrong 
 
(George Weiss / Bob Thiele) 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis is a theoretical exercise which relies on the Strategic Relational Approach 
to analyze the broad social processes of change and to deliver a critical account of the 
contingent contemporary transformations in Mexico. By engaging in an exercise of 
process-tracing, this thesis aims to examine critically key features of social change, 
challenging economic deterministic accounts, and ignoring social and political 
circumstances. Its focus is on the application of theories of change to illuminate broad 
trajectories of reform. By presenting a theoretically informed empirical narrative of 
contemporary transformations in Mexico, it is possible to enhance the insight into the 
particular processes of commodification, democratization and integration. Moreover, 
the varied and combined paces, depths and strengths of these transformations provide 
an excellent opportunity to understand and assess the importance of tendencies and 
countertendencies in play. By referring to the analytical tools of structure and agency, 
material and ideational elements, all within specific locations of time and space the 
contingency of processes of change is recognized. The restoration of agency is a 
crucial element for an analysis of the socially embedded processes of 
commodification, democratization and integration. By relying on the accounts of 
political economists and economic sociologists, it can be shown that the processes are 
deeply political and non-determinate. Therefore, alongside constraints, they also offer 
windows of opportunity which encompass a broader social and political spectrum and 
possibilities of transformation. Since different modes of governance are not 
necessarily incompatible with each other, the account offered here focuses on the 
state, the market and networking, as well as their complementary roles, which are not 
reducible to determinisms or inevitability of any sort.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis aims to provide a critical political analysis of the processes of social, 
political and economic change in Mexico since the late 1970s and early 1980s. It aims 
to illustrate the explanatory power of a philosophically consistent, theoretically 
informed and empirically grounded account. Examining those processes is of 
relevance because their incessant reproduction and transformation reshapes the 
intrinsically dynamic and complex conditions in which we, as individual members of 
a society find ourselves. It is a key claim of this thesis that we, as actors, play a 
central role which influences the course of events as they are played out in their 
historical contingency. It is therefore of the utmost importance to have a balanced, 
flexible and powerful analytical perspective which permits the continuous 
reassessment of the relationship and interactions between structures and agents.   
 
Since the dynamic interaction between actors and the conditions which surround them 
brings different patterns of change and continuity, it is vital to acknowledge the 
contingent character of the social, political and economic systems. Their inherent 
unpredictability cannot be properly gauged by merely contrasting states of affairs in a 
static way, for this would mean having only a partial picture. Without claiming 
universalistic aspirations, the theoretical lenses we adopt need to be able to follow the 
fluidity of the actors’ interactions, at both the intertwined and interwoven material 
and ideational levels. Being able to follow the succession of events and associated 
phenomena of our concern is thus a basic precondition of understanding the trends 
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and identifying the centrality of actors to social processes of change. Agents who 
exercise their relational power, as well as a capability to influence the course of 
events, do not exist in a vacuum. The intentionality of the actors, their selection of 
strategies, and the definition of their goals and agendas is informed by ideas. 
Intangible as they are at first glance, ideas are not disconnected from the material 
world, as they are followed and pursued by situated actors in context. We must seek 
to develop a theoretical account which is sensitive to the importance of, potential 
causal and constitutive role of, ideas in shaping social dynamics.       
 
Furthermore, not only must we be capable of giving due attention to specific time and 
space references, we must also recognize the fluidity of processes. We must, then, 
adopt a historical approach. The usefulness of this resides in helping to situate not 
only the transformations of social activities, but also the recognition that further 
change is a real possibility. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a consistent theory 
that can inform the interaction of domestic and international contexts, and which at 
the same time holds a broad analytical focus which can incorporate factors of 
relevance to the analysis.       
 
Bearing those considerations in mind, the selected theoretical tool is the Strategic 
Relational Approach (Hay, 2002c, 1996; Jessop, 2002, 1990b). The challenge of 
tracing the processes of social change resides in what this theory is capable of 
delivering. In order to display the explanatory power of this theoretical approach, this 
research principally emphasises its application to a specific case. In particular, it is 
illustrated by referring to the contemporary transformations in Mexico by means of 
process-tracing. The relevance of selecting this country reflects two main 
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considerations. The first one is that, for a number of years, Mexico, along with certain 
other developing countries, has not only undergone, but in some instances also has 
led, a series of critical transformations over a broad social, political and economic 
spectrum. Thus, it is of vital significance to be able to analyze and understand what 
the depth, reach, strength and trajectories of the processes are. Since they have not 
been generated spontaneously or anonymously, the restoration of agency is vital to 
our understanding of the social processes of change. Furthermore, the approach must 
follow the agencies whose activities are embedded in society.   
 
Therefore, it is a central claim that, for Mexico, the series of economic reforms are 
not limited to the soundness of macroeconomic variables or institutions. The socially 
embedded character of economic activities evidences that they are important elements 
situated in a broader social and political context. Hence, the daily experiences of most 
of the population that confronts alleged obedience to economic symbolism inattentive 
of social reality must be carefully analyzed. Such a trend is identified here as a 
continuous process of commodification, as the analysis presented here is aware of the 
socially embedded character of economic activities. Another key process which 
deserves consideration is an authentic and inclusive process of democratization which 
goes beyond a merely poll exercise. This must open up further opportunities for social 
change by reaffirming the political character of enhancing objectives. Moreover, 
political as their features are, it is also argued that the processes of integration means 
much more than increasing trade and investment flows. Clearly, if the embeddedness 
of the economic activities is acknowledged, the landscape of integration reveals 
political and social characteristics pointing towards the potential for forging a 
community which might take decades to emerge.   
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The second reason is that the Mexican experience provides an opportunity to 
transcend the original Eurocentrism of the Strategic Relational Approach, as it allows 
us to engage in analysing social processes of change within a rather different context. 
Furthermore, such an opportunity is one not to be missed, as it delivers insightful 
perspectives which challenge conventional explanations. The informed accounts of 
the processes of commodification, democratization and integration, discuss not only 
the current state of affairs, but also unfinished tasks and challenges ahead, such as the 
perennial postponement in addressing the various symptoms and manifestations of 
inequality. Since the theoretical focus is on the broad trajectory of the reform 
processes, limits of space prevent a descent into mere microanalyses of specific 
issues. Rather, the intention is to deliver an account which contributes towards re-
politicizing agendas often simply taken for granted, while highlighting the contingent 
nature of the processes involved.  
  
The arguments presented in this thesis are organized in the following way. The 
opening chapter attempts a theoretical process-tracing exercise on the interaction 
between the State and the market. Special attention is placed on the way in which the 
historical trajectory of the State’s political and economic developments has varied. 
The account developed is both theoretically informed and illustrated by Mexico’s 
trajectories of reform. The current trends towards the commodification both of 
economic activities and the roles of the State are developing tendencies which are not 
exempt from countertendencies. Although social, political and economic 
contradictions are mediated through crises, they are sorted in two broad and 
distinctive ways. In the first of these, major changes involve a decisive intervention of 
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the State in which a new trajectory might be imposed; whereas in the second one, 
some minor moments of crises are solved and negotiated in the pursuit of softer 
transformations, by adaptation and reformist strategies. This theoretically informed 
account, whilst drawing on concepts developed for an understanding of State 
development in Europe, is illustrated by referring to the contemporary Mexican 
experience. While corporatism and import substitution industrialization involved 
processes of decommodification of economic activities, the outwardly oriented 
economic model meant a modification of the State’s trajectory toward practices 
associated with processes of commodification.            
 
Chapter Two aims to identify the factors which trigger social change, and what makes 
such possible, by adopting the Strategic Relational Approach. The argument opens by 
presenting a critical analysis of rational choice institutionalism for understanding the 
process of change. It is immediately followed by a section which argues that the 
identification of power immanent in all social relations represents the core factor for 
explaining the open-ended social processes of change. Furthermore, since social 
processes entail social changes, it is recognized that the interactions among ideational, 
material, structural and agential elements within time and space are crucial. For, it is 
argued that neither political, nor economic trends determine the outcomes of 
processes, because public and private functions and activities can play 
complementary roles of one another. It is also stressed that the internal appropriation 
of change contributes to the incremental, punctuated and evolutionary character of 
social change. 
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Chapter Three argues that the contemporary efforts of the Mexican government to 
enhance the scope of commodification are by no means unproblematic. The elevation 
of economic over social priorities is a strong political act that needs to be assessed 
and challenged. Therefore, as resistance to the politics of economic determinism plays 
a prominent part in the analysis, the argument begins with a critical examination of 
the role which some orthodox neoclassical economic ideas have played, as an ideal 
dimension capable of influencing specific contexts. This is followed by a discussion 
of the problematic emphasis of neoclassical economic orthodoxy. It precedes an 
examination of the World Bank’s influential position, as evidenced in the ideas and 
concepts about the role that it promotes for the State in contemporary economic 
affairs. Emphasis is also placed on the institutional frameworks and how they interact 
with economic agents such as firms. In so doing, attention is paid to the role of crises 
and innovation in the economic activities embedded in broader social relations. Due 
to the importance of power and causal relations for understanding the processes of 
social change, I use the Strategic Relational Approach to analyze them in the last 
section. 
 
The aim of Chapter Four is to explore some of the current economic imperatives and 
polarizing results in contemporary Mexico. After analyzing the influence of 
neoclassical orthodoxy in the re-design of that country’s economic agenda, it is 
argued that a key problem has been the growing patterns of inequality. Since the 
commodification experience of the economic restructuring has been outwardly 
oriented, it has had limited social impact. The development of endogenous 
institutional links has not been emphasized as strongly as the outwardly oriented 
policies. It is also argued that, for a large proportion of firms, the lack of patterns of 
 7
innovation has left them unable to create and sustain innovative pushes to reinvigorate 
the domestic market. By taking it for granted that economic growth would be 
delivered more or less equitably once economic restructuring was implemented, the 
outcome of government programmes has fallen short of expectations. Rather, the 
emergence of widening inequalities and polarization suggests that markets need to be 
considered as embedded within broader social processes.   
 
Making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, Chapter Five pays attention to 
social interactions and causal relations which enable me to trace patterns of 
punctuated evolution and to highlight the transformations associated with crises. 
Since ideal types serve to highlight key characteristics in specific phenomena, 
processes and actors, some features of ideal types for the State and the transition from 
one type to another are also discussed. In particular, attention is paid to the Keynesian 
Welfare National State ideal type and to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National 
Regime ideal type. For, it is contended, that, the specific features of those ideal types 
could be of great help in broadening the debate on economic restructuring and 
political reforms in countries such as Mexico. Moreover, the approach provides an 
insight into the endogenous features of social change and stresses the importance of 
networking for a strategic agenda as well. For the never-static dynamics of the 
processes of change, the role of situated agents in context is fundamental, as it injects 
and acknowledges the contingency of the conditions that surround them.     
 
A key claim of Chapter Six is the need for re-politicizing the processes of social 
change in Mexico, while critically examining economic imperatives as self-induced 
enforcement mechanisms. Focusing on the socio-political dimensions of the process, I 
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undertake an analysis of the nature of Mexican authoritarianism and features of the 
democratization processes currently under way. It is emphasized that if the latter is to 
succeed, we need to be aware of the broad transformative effects which it entails. 
Therefore, the challenge for a more egalitarian and democratic society must be 
undertaken without delay. As the theoretical approach suggests, network governance 
could be of great help in drawing up a more democratic agenda, which may open up 
further possibilities of transformation.   
 
Chapter Seven engages in a discussion about the broad international context of 
globalization and regionalism, seeing them as socially embedded, neither 
deterministic nor economically-driven, trends, which are open to political 
contingency. In addition, I present an analysis of the first generation of economic 
reforms associated with the Washington Consensus and also of the institutional 
emphasis of the second generation of reforms of the post Washington Consensus. It is 
argued that there is a missing social and political dimension of the two generations of 
economic reforms that emphasize, firstly, macroeconomic variables and, secondly, an 
institutional agenda. Though their emphases vary and complement each other, no set 
of reforms acknowledges the vital political character of the situated actors in context, 
as both generations of reforms orientate towards harmonization of policies.    
 
Finally, the aim of Chapter Eight is to highlight key tendencies and countertendencies 
within which the contemporary processes of social change in Mexico can be situated. 
In particular, the chapter takes a closer look at the Mexico-US relationships, the 
emerging markets and the financial crisis of the mid 1990s, because they have been 
crucial in shaping current dynamics. Moreover, acknowledging the consistency in the 
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narrow terms in which the North America Free Trade Agreement is designed should 
not prevent action to tackle its omissions and deficiencies. Challenges ahead include 
reducing the widening gaps of inequality on the one hand and the forging of a strong 
sense and idea of community on the other. They are needed for deeper and more 
consistent integration. Lastly, it is argued that NAFTA’s shallow model, should it be 
exported to the Americas, exposes the Free Trade Area of the Americas’ smallest and 
weakest economies to a situation in which trade and investment might flow, whereas 
inequalities and polarization might worsen.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
Re-Interpreting Historic Transformations in Mexico: an Alternative Account 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most frequently recurring and important issues in the Political Economy 
agenda has been, and will remain, the role of the State in the economic realm, on the 
one hand, and the way in which economic policies and their instrumentation affect the 
public sphere, on the other. An enormous spectrum of different theoretical positions 
has already been produced.   
 
Debates on the diminishing capabilities of the State in the face of forces such as 
globalization and regionalization emphasize the role of emerging actors such as 
multinational firms, or of economic activities. They tend to stress the growing 
interaction of both actors and factors, especially in economic affairs, adverse with 
their effect on State capacities (cf. Ohmae, 1990 and 1996; Strange, 1996). Yet, 
whenever the analysis comes from a more comprehensive historical perspective; the 
picture changes quite dramatically (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Held, McGrew, 
Goldblatt, and Perraton, 1999). Making use of a critical approach, it becomes more 
evident that the historical trajectories of the roles and functions performed by the 
State can be traced. Such trajectories show patterns which a single synchronic and 
static analysis is unable to provide.  
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According to Hay, analytical strategies of the processes of political change over time 
can be synchronic, comparative static, and diachronic. A synchronic analysis focuses 
“…attention on the structure of social or political relations at a specific instant…” 
(2002c, 144). Comparative statics is an aggregated variant of the synchronic 
approach, since it “…compares and contrasts synchronic analysis conducted at 
different moments in time…” (2002c, 146). It focuses on various points in the 
development of the phenomenon under study. Finally, in diachronic analysis, the 
developmental path and the pace of change are treated as empirical issues, without 
assuming that the development of the system can be broken into different parts or 
stages. The emphasis for this last analytical strategy is on tracing and charting the 
interaction of causal tendencies.     
 
Comparative statics approaches, which entail making a comparison at different times, 
or diachronic perspectives, which emphasize the process and causality of change over 
time, make for a better account of the complex, unpredictable and fluid ever-changing 
dynamics of social change than does synchronic analysis (Hay, 2002c). This is 
important since assessing the capacity of the State under globalization and 
regionalism must be process-traced over time, in effect ruling out synchronic analysis.  
 
The Strategic Relational Approach is capable of such process-tracing. It treats as 
merely analytical distinctions the strategic action of the actors, on one side, and the 
strategically selective context within which it is formulated and upon which it 
impacts, on the other side. Moreover, not only does the Strategic Relational Approach 
recognize that structure and agency are interwoven and interact dialectically in 
practice, it also acknowledges the dialectical relationship between the material and 
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the ideational spheres. This approach is based on a realist philosophical position.1  
(Jessop, 1990b; Hay, 1996, 2000b, and 2002c).   
 
Although the State is influenced both internally and externally to various degrees as a 
permeable structure and flexible agency, the leverage or incidence which some 
specific actors and factors possess is clearly greater than others. Equally, the actions 
at both domestic and international levels significantly affect outcomes. These actions 
are taken into account by the actors in context and trigger responses, which in turn 
influence decision-making processes.  Thus, the structural context and the situated 
agent dialectically interact, on the one hand defining a strategically selective context 
and on the other being affected by the courses of actions chosen by strategic actors.      
 
This study is orientated not only according to the process tracing approach, but also in 
line with the third wave of globalization literature. The first wave of globalization 
literature heralded the end of the Nation-State amidst the increasing hypermobility of 
capital, since globalization is an economically homogenizing driving force. The 
second wave analysts were sceptical about these claims and argued that the Nation-
State remained intact and that national sovereignty is untouched, due to the 
persistence of regional and national variations. Now the third wave authors stress the 
existence of globalization tendencies and counter-tendencies. They focus on the 
contingent and convergent nature of globalization and its differentiated impacts in 
different contexts (cf. Hay and Marsh, 2000; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, 
1999).    
 
                                                 
1 The differences between the ontological and epistemological positions of positivism and realism are 
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The aim of this thesis is not only to trace historical trajectories, but to identify 
processes and countertendencies, actors, factors, issues at stake, agendas and also 
characteristics of change and stability. In other words, deterministic accounts are 
those which see globalization as a causal variable or indeed, an end-state or 
inexorable process, are avoided. 
 
Broadly speaking, the contemporary State has tended to be analyzed in socio-
political, legal, or economic terms (cf. Cerny, 1990; Jessop, 1990b, and 2002; Hay, 
1996; World Bank, 1997b). One of the main concerns of political and economic 
analysts is the role of the State and the way in which economic flows shape and are 
shaped by the interaction of States and markets. The emphasis on globalization has 
highlighted the ostensible need for the State to follow sound economic fundamentals. 
Neoclassical economists and the Bretton Woods organizations embrace the view that 
macro-economic stability relies on monetary policies of low rates of inflation and 
balanced current accounts, control of fiscal policies and public finances and a floating 
exchange rate, among other variables. The effect of specific economic inputs, 
however, does not guarantee specific outcomes, as the latter are not pursued in 
standard or identical ways. The contingent convergence of tendencies and policies 
correspond to the persistence of national variation (Hay, 2000a).  
 
It is important to notice that there seems to be almost an imperceptible, if not quite 
absent, dialogue between political accounts and economic ideas regarding the 
articulation of the role of the contemporary State in Bretton Woods organizations and 
neoclassical economics. Yet, if policy implementation is to be successful, it is 
                                                                                                                                            
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.   
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imperative that feedback mechanisms should be in place to link the top levels of the 
bureaucratic elite down to the bottom of grass roots society. There is hardly any 
dialogue and political accountability about the content of such policies and the 
populations in whose interest they are ostensibly pursued. Alternative proposals to 
neoclassical economic rationality are simply ignored.  
 
One of the reasons that there is a lack of two-way communication between 
sociological and political ideas on one side and economic models on the other, lies in 
the basic founding assumptions of these disciplines and their fields of study. It is to 
them that I now turn. Firstly, a very brief description is given of the broad political 
realm which this thesis encompasses. It is followed, secondly, by a short description 
of the assumptions of the market economy. 
 
The argument of this chapter is presented in the following way. Firstly, it makes 
explicit a broad concept of politics and power, which is complemented by the 
subsequent description of market economy assumptions. Once the economic and 
political elements are clarified, I spell out the processes of change, paying particular 
attention to the phenomena associated with State crises and to the punctuated 
evolution of the State. In order to illustrate this, two contending periodizations of the 
State in Mexico are analyzed, before presenting a theoretical map based on the 
Strategic Relational Approach, and its account of the periodizations of the trajectory 
of the State in Mexico. The analysis starts with the 1910 revolution, tracing crises and 
major changes, while the corporatist period, from the 1930s up to the 1970s, features 
stronger continuity. The structural change and punctuated evolution of the State 
becomes more evident in the imposition of a new State trajectory since the late 1970s 
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and early 1980s. The final section summarises both the theoretical account of the 
Strategic Relational Approach and the illustration of the Mexican case.   
 
 
THE POLITICAL REALM  
 
A broad understanding of politics aims to avoid minimalist and parochial debates. 
Politics is understood here as the common axis to all human activities permeated by 
cooperation and conflict and the concern about the way in which resources are used, 
produced, and distributed (Leftwich, 1984). Understood in this way, politics is all-
encompassing. Its study, therefore, must incorporate a wide spectrum of inputs, 
interactions and consequences. Since human agency injects indeterminacy and 
contingency into all the levels of social, political and economic systems, an 
interdisciplinary approach and process-focused study is required. This is clearly to be 
preferred to a limited perspective of the operation of power by exclusively 
governmental agencies (Hay, 2002c).    
 
Process tracing does not imply historical determinism. It provides a comprehensive 
account of the intertwined and interwoven tendencies and countertendencies of 
stability and change which are encountered in their everyday reproduction by social 
structures and agencies alike. According to some criticisms, analysing long 
trajectories and trends oversimplifies the extremely rich and varied spectrum of actors 
and factors, structures and agencies, opportunities and constraints which all interact in 
specific situations. To overcome this problem the analysis could be complemented by 
specific case studies for which more detailed analysis might be required. There is no 
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incompatibility at all between process tracing and diachronic analysis because they 
complement each other. Indeed, the terms are essentially interchangeable. 
 
Instead of a reductionist approach to politics as confined to government, the Strategic 
Relational Approach prefers an encompassing understanding of politics as processes 
which include not only the public realm, the governmental sphere and the State, but 
also the private sphere, affairs beyond the reach of the government, and society 
broadly considered. Thus, politics is an arena for Aristotle’s political animal, 
concerned with the distribution of societal power. Central to this thesis is the core 
notion of the political, which encompasses a sense of every collective social activity 
in all human groups, independently of their organization and categorization. In other 
words: 
 
…politics comprises all the activities of co-operation and conflict, within 
and between societies, whereby the human species goes about organizing 
the use, production and distribution of human, natural and other resources 
(…material and non-material, that people use to further their own ends, as 
individuals or collectively in groups…) in the course of the production 
and reproduction of its biological and social life. These activities are 
nowhere isolated from other features of life in society, private or public. 
They everywhere both influence and reflect the distribution of power and 
patterns of decision-making, the structure of social organization, and the 
systems of culture and ideology in society or groups within it (Leftwich, 
1984, 64-65). 
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It is undeniable that political phenomena cut across an incredible variety of 
relationships between structures and agencies. Moreover, the transformative capacity 
of power, which is linked to its influence, distribution and use, can be traced 
historically. In order to do this better, interdisciplinary approaches capable of 
focusing on a wide spectrum of frameworks are basic flexible analytical requisites 
(Held and Leftwich, 1984). Process-tracing reveals trajectories which may not be 
identified by synchronic and static analyses. It remains fundamental for providing a 
broader analytical map by which to give an account of the fluid and never static 
nature of social change (Hay, 2002c). 
 
Classical and traditional static notions of the State (those of the State as a monopoly 
law maker, as a set of structures and institutions and as the holder of legitimate 
coercive practices) are unable to provide an accurate idea of the interactions and 
scope of the elements involved. By contrast, the Strategic Relational Approach, 
whereby the State is seen as a social fluid structure, does take account of these 
transitions.  Such an approach pays attention to path-dependent strategically selective 
entities, where the crystallization of past strategies privileges current ones (Jessop, 
1990b).  
 
The non-material features and elements of the State are undoubtedly the most difficult 
to identify. In this sense, the State is composed of dynamic social structures.  These 
are in a process of continuous evolution. For the purposes of this study, the Strategic 
Relational Approach is adopted and discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.2 For the 
                                                 
2 The State, as the most complex social structure, has some distinctive features, with its national 
community, its bounded administrative sovereign terrain and its coordinated apparatuses, among the 
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moment, suffice it to say that it acknowledges and incorporates the interaction of 
dialectical processes on the one hand, and suggests the punctuated evolution 
trajectory of the State on the other. Clearly, this is an approach characterised by the 
cumulative nature of often incremental change.3  
 
The analysis of political structures as processes of structural change and punctuated 
evolution takes into account the ongoing and uneven interactions and relationships 
between a wide variety of agencies and structures, on the one side, and the dialectic 
patterns of stability and transformation on the other. The processes of structural 
change and punctuated evolution which the State undergoes can be characterized as a 
complex web of opportunities and constraints. These windows open up a mix of 
problems of choice and control, which are not merely an aggregation of individual 
choices, but ongoing processes at the domestic and at the transnational and 
international levels. According to Cerny, power is one of the main categories used to 
explain how the State works, as well as to explain its links with a broad notion of 
politics. In this sense, the classical Weberian notion of legitimized power is only one 
of the main determinants of the processes of political structural change and the 
punctuated evolution of the State. Furthermore, the pluralist notion of politics as a 
market structure, which provides a ‘structured field of action’ in which people and 
groups compete, is also another determinant of the same processes (Cerny 1990). 
Since power is such a crucial political variable, it is to its identification that I now 
turn. 
                                                                                                                                            
most obvious (cf. Hay, 1996). Chapter Five examines, among other issues, broad social processes, 
change and the State.    
3 In contrast to the analysis of change as phases of equilibrium interrupted by rapid and intense 
transformations, the concept of punctuated evolution focuses on the gradually increasing amount and 
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The exercise of power is not narrowly confined to military might or the use of force. 
Power dimensions embrace not only material and tangible realms, but also non-
material and intangible ones. Furthermore, power is neither a zero-sum game among 
individuals, nor constrained to decision-making, agenda setting and preference-
shaping (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974). Although those are perhaps 
widely used approaches for analyzing government offices’ inputs and outputs, its 
narrow scope and exclusion of the social dimension dramatically limits analysis. Such 
faces of power do not take into account human agency at all. Agency is important 
because it injects contingency into the processes, where the capabilities of some 
actors compel constant redefinitions of social, political and economic scenarios.    
 
Power is socially and structurally evident; however, it is non-measurable and non-
existent in a unitary sense. Social dimensions are permeated by power relations at all 
levels and in all directions. Foucault and Poulantzas have contributed to the analysis 
and understanding of power as immanent in all social relations.4 Although power has 
no specific or privileged origin, nor any a priori essence, it is reproduced and 
exercised in all interactions at all social levels. Consider for instance the State: the 
practices and reproduction of power are mediated through its own institutions and 
organizations in which productive and positive sides are quite evident, not only 
through repressive and negative practices (Jessop, 1990b).   
 
                                                                                                                                            
impact of change. It recognizes that accounts of structure, agency, ideas and material factors are crucial 
for the analysis of change (Hay, 2002c).  
4 However, for Foucault, the omnipresent character of power in all human agency relations assumes 
very different forms, and is exercised in infinite ways; it is also acknowledged as extremely fluid, 
mutable and contingent (Hay, 2002c). The means are diffused through consensual acceptance of 
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Furthermore, as social relationships and interactions continuously shape and are 
shaped dialectically, one of the best and most convenient routes to an analysis of 
power is to explore strategies. Strategies are the way in which agencies relate to each 
other, and also the way in which they relate to their respective contexts or structures. 
Their interaction reflects their choice of strategies and tactics, which, in turn, might be 
constrained by specific circumstances, yet enhanced by various opportunities, 
depending on the context shaped by previous decisions and practices (Jessop, 1990b).        
 
According to this perspective, power can be conceptualized as ‘context shaping’ and 
‘conduct shaping’.5 In these terms some agencies have in essence the means and 
ability to provide the contexts for others and the margins of their action. In other 
words, some actors shape the preferences of, and influence the range of options within 
which, other agencies, both collective and individual, formulate their strategies (Hay, 
2002c, 2000b). Now that the broad understanding of politics and power has been 
spelled out, and since they are further to be discussed in Chapter Two, I attempt in the 
following section to demystify the assumptions of the market economy. 
 
 
THE MARKET ECONOMY  
 
Central to neoclassical economics is the study of the causes of wealth, human action, 
and the optimising of individual decisions. Widely relevant as they seem at first 
                                                                                                                                            
stability, which in turn could be exercised primarily by repression and education, since power and 
knowledge directly imply one another.  
5 Hay’s critique of Lukes focuses on analytical and normative dimensions, since the former author 
points not only to the analysis and identification of power within any given social and political setting, 
but also to the distribution and exercise of identified power (Hay, 1997b; 1999c; 2002c). 
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glance, the assumptions on which the market economy operates consist of a restricted 
set of features. Taking for granted that people are rational individuals committed to 
states of equilibrium is clearly problematic.6 The adoption of an individualistic 
perspective which denies the socially embedded character of human activity is 
misleading and unrealistic. So is the assumption that utility-maximizing behaviour is 
the only ‘rational’ course of action that one can take. Furthermore, by assuming that a 
state of equilibrium is not disrupted, the behaviour of such a gain-seeking individual 
is deprived of the means and capacity to interact with the conditions which surround 
him/her (Lawson, 1997 and 2003).7  
 
There is no reason to disregard the context within which actors are situated and 
assume that the market economy works only for individuals. It works for collectivities 
as well. Both engage, albeit to different extents, in activities of production, 
distribution and exchange. Since a market economy can cater for different habits and 
different behaviours alike, the conditions of imperfect competition and asymmetric 
information are very common, as further discussed in Chapters Two and Three. The 
market economy is not the exclusive domain of utility-maximizing individuals who 
specifically aim for equilibrium. On the contrary, economic activities are important, 
constitutive elements submerged in broader social relations which constitute 
processes followed over time (Lawson, 1997 and 2003).  
 
The perception of human activities as embedded in social practices challenges the 
contemporary consensus of politics as a market place, where the economic emphasis 
                                                 
6 The uncritical acceptance of axioms which are asocial, ahistorical and subject to modelling in 
neoclassical orthodox economic theory is discussed by Lawson, who also argues for a more realistic 
approach to the analysis of economic activities (1997 and 2003). 
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stresses comparative and competitive advantages. The problem with this perspective 
is that these lenses decontextualise and depoliticise the use, production and 
distribution of resources. Deterministic economic rationality has already proved 
extremely costly. Consider the rampant exploitation of natural resources, the 
dismantling of welfare protection and the misleading use of information as a 
commodity. By following an economic rationality centred on the motive of gain, all 
transactions are tuned into money transactions, where everything without exception is 
turned into a commodity, even resorting to the fictitious commmodification which 
takes place in allegedly ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-adjusting’ markets.8 Consequently, 
the unrealistic processes of the commodification of man, nature, knowledge and 
money need to be halted. Unfortunately, it seems that the levels of protection which 
Polanyi described as the second part of the ‘double movement’, parallel to the 
expansion of markets, are even being lowered in accordance with neoclassical 
economic rationale. But this rationality is unsustainable in the long run. For, the 
success of these practices undermines the necessary conditions for the model itself, 
since the fictitious commodities were never produced for sale on the market. 
Nonetheless, they were organized as such, and consequently the continuous expansion 
of the market leads to social dislocations which are in turn, met by counter-
movements seeking the protection of society (Polanyi, 1957). The more neoclassical 
                                                                                                                                            
7 The issue of equilibrium in relation to globalization is discussed in Chapter Seven.  
8 The concept of commodification used here borrows from Polanyi’s commodity fiction: “…labour, 
land and money are essential elements of industry; they also must be organized in markets; in fact 
these markets form an absolutely vital part of the economic system. But labour, land and money are 
obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is bought and sold must have been 
produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them… None of them is produced for sale. The 
commodity description of labour, land, and money is entirely fictitious… Nevertheless, it is with the 
help of this fiction that the actual markets for labour, land and money are organized; that they are being 
actually bought and sold on the market; their demand and supply are real magnitudes; and any 
measures or policies that would inhibit the formation of such markets would ipso facto endanger the 
self-regulation of the system…” (1957, 72-73). 
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economic rationality is put into practice, the more it polarizes wealth, endangers the 
environment and increases social dissatisfaction, benefiting only the few.9   
 
According to Karl Polanyi, the assumptions on which the market economy was based 
are historically inconsistent. Adam Smith pointed to the capacity of man to barter and 
exchange one thing for another, leading to a radical change in the main motivation in 
society, consistent with the birth and consolidation of market society.10  From 
Polanyi’s perspective, the principle of subsistence was replaced by the principle of 
gain. In contrast to contemporary discourses and practices, and using a long term 
historical perspective, economic activities have tended to be submerged in the social 
realm; they have become part of embedded social relationships, not the other way 
around. Therefore, the situation is not as the neoclassical economists and neoliberal 
discourses take for granted. The economy did not shape either political or social 
preferences (Polanyi, 1957). Chapter Three analyses the politics of economic 
determinism and discusses the importance of the philosophical stance of neoclassical 
economics, in contrast to the realist position which is supported in the present thesis.   
 
According to neoclassical orthodoxy, the market economy can only function in so far 
as all goods and services are tradable. If this is assumed, then there is a market for 
everything. Man and nature are in this view considered to be available for sale. In 
short, they are commodified. Money comes into being from the mechanism of 
banking and State finance. As labour, land and money are vital parts of a market 
                                                 
9 Governmental and international programmes aiming to help poor people or specific segments of the 
population face a series of problems. Nonetheless, some may prove more successful than others in the 
short run, where their goal is to protect severely affected segments of the population and endangered 
species. Needless to say, there is no need to wait until catastrophes happen, for it is then too late. 
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economy, they are organized as commodities. To the original consideration of these 
three fictional commodities, knowledge and information can be added.11 The flawed 
commodification of human activity, knowledge, nature and the tokens of purchasing 
power, leads to the consideration that profits can be extracted from them. In this sense 
wages are profits extracted from man, rent is extracted from nature and interest from 
money (Polanyi, 1957). 
 
To compensate, however, for the imperfect commodification of labour, land, 
information, and money, a double movement emerged. The expansion of markets in 
the 19th century was accompanied by the urge to protect society and nature. Because 
the utopia of a ‘self-regulating’ market was evidenced by its social and environmental 
distortions, the protection of the factors of production, labour and land were the main 
functions of State interventionism (Polanyi, 1957). 
 
Since the historical period analyzed by Polanyi, there have been different degrees of 
implementation of the flawed commodification of human activity, knowledge, the 
environment and money. The levels of social protection can be traced historically. 
Broadly speaking, the social policies of corporatist States during the mid 20th century, 
originally intended to take labour out of the market; whereas the dismantling of 
welfare in neoclassical economically oriented States, a few decades later, looked for a 
flexible labour force and commodified human relations. Moreover, it is the case that 
the same State at different periods varies its position with respect to the two poles of 
                                                                                                                                            
10 The notion of ‘homo economicus’ as the rational economic man, which for neoclassical economics is 
the point of departure, came from John Stuart Mill. Thanks to Watson for making this point clearer.  
11 The whole idea of intellectual property rights, patents, brand names and trade marks revolves around 
the commodification of knowledge and information. This is hinted at by Jessop (2002), who reports 
Schiller’s ‘How to think about information’ as his source. 
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more fully comprehensive social protection and minimal welfare. Since there is a 
strong political character in socially embedded human activities, it cannot be argued 
that the selection and implementation of public policies reflect only economic criteria. 
Clearly, political elements are taken into consideration as well, either in an overt or a 
covert fashion.     
 
It is important to note that both Polanyi’s and Smith’s theoretical models are 
parsimonious ideal types, impossible to put into practice in a ‘pure’ form. Influential 
as both of them are, the models have chosen simplicity at the cost of complexity. 
Smith and Polanyi, though embracing contrasting perspectives, developed highly 
abstract and general theories with as few variables as possible, aiming to provide 
broad arguments and wide generality for the sake of further explanation.         
 
Since it is through economic and political processes that social structures face change 
in a dynamic way, attention should be paid to the development of tendencies which 
build up and make change possible, especially through crises. The analysis of these 
elements and factors is the aim of the following section.  
 
 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PUNCTUATED EVOLUTION  
 
Crises are one of the mechanisms by which structural changes and the punctuated 
evolution of the State takes place. In contrast to neoclassical economics or a 
governmental agenda which emphasises economic variables, political stability and 
governance, crises open up windows of opportunity and do not merely constrain. The 
 26
characterization of crises as phases of destruction or rupture alone is at best 
inaccurate, at worst misleading.  
 
Crises are key elements of the processes of change.12 They may be used as crucial 
moments of institutional change to allow an adjustment or modification in the 
trajectory of the State. Nevertheless, they might equally be used for making small 
adjustments which merely ratify the trend or trajectory of the processes of structural 
change and punctuated evolution of the State. All crises are not the same, nor are they 
faced by all States in a similar situation. A range of strategies for addressing their 
causes may range from the total elimination of the main problem as identified, to 
merely discursive strategies. Moreover, there is also the possibility that crises might 
be misperceived and misidentified (Hay, 1996, 1999a). 
 
The processes of structural change and punctuated evolution take place in economic, 
social and political interactions at all levels. Processes are composed by tendencies 
and countertendencies which present a dynamic of ‘punctuated evolution’ evident 
from its trend and trajectory. The outcome of path-dependence and the build-up of 
contradictions result in different windows of opportunity and constraint in which 
some options are preferred to others. Processes are the cascade of iterative and 
cumulative changes identifiable in historical or comparative perspectives. They are 
also the way in which current policies or practices are built, and induce or orientate 
                                                 
12 For Schumpeter crises imply ‘creative destruction’ (1954). Such a notion is to be examined in more 
detail in Chapter Three, and is also an important referent regarding the Mexican experience in Chapter 
Four.  
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towards preferred outcomes and specific goals.13 In this way, the alloy of incremental 
changes gradually becomes the foundation for subsequent ones (Marsh et al., 1999).   
 
As has been already discussed, and is further to be analysed in Chapter Five, the State 
features not only material elements, but also intangible ones, perceived as sites of 
‘strategic selectivity’, which are where the social relation is crucial. In a dialectical 
fashion, the strategies and tactics of the State generate privileges for specific desired 
outcomes, inducing particular courses of action and the practices associated with 
them. Consider for instance the emphasis on low rates of inflation, which, according 
to neoclassical economists, are important for maintaining macroeconomic stability.  
Similarly, the processes of structural change and punctuated evolution of the State are 
the product and crystallization of past choices. Thus, it is a sort of non-neutral, path-
dependent societal ensemble which articulates a broad range of feasible representation 
and intervention activities (Jessop, 1990b). 
 
In addition to the selection of strategies to be used for the international and domestic 
windows of opportunity and constraint, the ever-changing redefinition and 
collaboration amongst social structures becomes evident in the trend and trajectory of 
the practices and actions of the State. For instance, at the beginning of the 21st 
century, the induced priorities in the economic agenda incorporate the reduction of 
transaction costs and the increased use of economies of scale. Nowadays the State is 
                                                 
13 Broadly speaking, the characteristics of the tendencies and countertendencies of continuity are 
associated with interruptions or alterations which differentiate them from an inactive stasis (Marsh et 
al., 1999). For the implementation of ideas, it is acknowledged that even in the face of structural and 
agency constraints, there are always opportunities and alternatives to select from; and, even more 
important, they are selectively created (cf. the thesis of ‘State overload’ and ‘ungovernability’ or out of 
control, unmasked and discarded in the analysis of Thatcherism in Britain; Hay, 1996). For the 
Mexican case, where the technocratic ruling group argue that overloaded political systems are 
ungovernable, see Medina Peña, 1995.   
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outwardly market oriented. Interestingly, after the Second World War the agenda 
considered as a priority the provision of welfare and pointed in a different direction. 
The import substitution model of industrialization implied specific and granted 
additional protection for economic activities and market niches, which was not 
exceptional by any means. A few decades ago the agenda was inwardly market 
oriented, where economic imperatives and discursive fashion played important roles. 
 
The trajectories of structural change show a contemporary historical pattern which 
departs from corporatist practices and welfare policies, towards an increasingly liberal 
orientation of the economy. Since this topic is to be discussed in Chapter Five, suffice 
it to say that Cerny uses the categories of Welfare, Competition and the Residual 
State to qualify differences in the processes of historical transition from one to the 
other (1990, 1995, 1996a, 1997b, 2000b, and 2000c). The move, however, from 
Welfare State, to Competition State, and then to Residual State, has been not a smooth 
one free of contradictions. On the contrary, the historical trends seem to suggest that 
the success of some specific policies and models benefiting specific sectors and 
segments of society ironically undermines the base and legitimacy of the regime. In 
turn, this contributes decisively to promoting, influencing and in extreme 
circumstances triggering change. Such notions are critically examined in Chapter 
Five. 
 
In sum, any specific regime associated with a given period of the punctuated 
evolutionary trend is transitional and leads to another historical phase. In the 
following sections the case of Mexico illustrates this better, since I trace the processes 
of change by means of a theoretical map. Prior to embarking on this analysis it is 
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important to consider what a pair of influential studies say about the contemporary 
periods of the Mexican State. 
 
 
MEXICAN STATE PERIODIZATIONS  
 
It is important to stress the fact that no chronological tracing of Mexican history is 
attempted in this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretically informed 
account of the evolution, adaptation, crises and transformations of the processes of 
structural change in the Mexican State. Amongst the numerous studies of the Mexican 
State which incorporate a dynamic analysis of the changes it has undergone, two in 
particular are worth mentioning. The first one is Luis Medina Peña’s Hacia el Nuevo 
Estado, and the second is Alan Knight’s ‘The Modern Mexican State. Theory and 
Practice.’ Both of them are important and influential. They cover the 20th century 
history of Mexico. Nonetheless, they are not exempt from being problematic, as we 
shall see.     
 
The former, written by a Mexican author, focuses on the period 1920–1994. 
According to his analysis, this period marks the ‘second’ differentiated Mexican 
Nation-State, the previous one having been liquidated by the 1910 revolution. In his 
perspective, the second stage of the State precedes a more contemporary one, still in a 
definitional phase. This is characterized by decentralization priorities and economic 
concerns. According to Medina Peña, the second ‘post-revolutionary State’ featured 
the centralization of power and the strengthening of the institutional structure of the 
regime. Furthermore, his well documented, deep and systematic analysis argues that 
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laws are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for modernizing a society. For 
such a task to be undertaken, the traditional authoritarian State had a role to perform. 
Yet, despite legal and democratic masquerades, the ‘post-Revolutionary State’ was 
unable to represent and appease all social forces. He points out that the early 1980s 
represented the end of the statist project, leaving behind strong economic 
intervention, domestically oriented programmes, public deficits and protected markets 
and creating a vacuum into which was injected neoclassical monetarist policies 
(Medina Peña, 1995). Taking into consideration the semi-cyclical account which he 
gives, if effective federalism and municipal autonomy are to be accomplished, it 
would mean a move towards the intentions of the original 1917 constituents. 
Additionally, this must be accompanied by political reforms which guarantee a real 
balance of power, where the Executive neither overtakes, nor surpasses, the 
Legislative and the Judiciary. More importantly, the punctuated evolution towards 
what he calls the ‘New State’ would require efficiency since markets are not self-
regulating; it would complement the private sector and provide welfare, education and 
services where private actors were incapable of, or not interested in playing such a 
role. Furthermore, international agreements provide the State with a recognition of 
national economic interests (i.e. dispute settlement panels), strengthening the 
triangular diplomacy between firms and States.  
 
Medina Peña’s analysis freezes the Mexican State in its relationships and focuses on 
its relations at specific periods of time. The problem with the synchronic analysis on 
which Medina Peña embarks is that it offers no insight into the processes of change 
per se. The classification of the different characteristics of the Mexican State over 
time in a chronological and hierarchical order implies different States as steps on a 
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ladder. His account fails on the one hand to identify features of continuity and 
discontinuity, and on the other to explain the dynamics of the process of change. 
Continuity and discontinuity are always present in the punctuated evolution of change 
for both actors and the context which provides them with a strategically selected mix 
of opportunities to act and constraints upon action. This is also the context which 
allows them to modify, in turn, albeit with intended and unintended consequences, the 
range of feasible options in the foreseeable future. 
 
The second of the periodizations makes use of a neo-Marxist framework of analysis in 
which on one axis the strength of the State ranges from weak to strong and on the 
other the character of the dominant class ranges between support of, and autonomy 
from itself. According to Knight, these axes serve to develop a figure divided into 
four different quadrants (2001, 182-183). Tracing the ‘relative autonomy’ of the 
Mexican State, Knight starts from the north-west quadrant, the ‘Agent State’, from 
which, following an anticlockwise trajectory, he classifies some presidential terms on 
the south-west quadrant labelled the ‘Nightwatchman State’.14 This one in turn 
precedes the third stage, ‘Stalinism’, in the south-east corner, prior to the very last 
segment, entitled ‘Fascism’, which can be found in the north-east quadrant. His 
account argues that the Mexican State trajectory has come almost full circle, as 
presented in Figure 1.1 below (Knight, 2001). Moreover, he also argues that there has 
                                                 
14 Knight adopts Tilly’s relative autonomy concept in which external and domestic protection rackets 
shelter the State and the people who hold official positions. According to this argument, relative 
autonomy gives the State independent room for manoeuvre and gives the dominant class room to 
pursue its own self-interest (2001).  
For a theoretical critique of this concept, in addition to the distinctiveness of strategic selectivity, see 
Jessop (1990b).       
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been a historical trade-off between the strength and the stability of the State in 
Mexico (Knight, 1993).15  
 
Since Knight is not concerned about the processes of change, what is needed is the 
use of different analytic and theoretical tools more appropriate to an analysis of the 
tendencies and countertendencies of change. The political economy emphasis pursued 
in this thesis stresses social, political and economic processes, while paying attention 
to power relations and flawed commodification processes. The use of political and 
economic variables aims to trace the processes of structural change and the 
punctuated evolution of the State allows the analyst to identify the strategic selectivity 
of the processes privileging certain courses of action over others, on the one hand, and 
the influence of the agents in the context to contribute to its fluid reshaping dynamics, 
on the other. Knight’s analysis is focused on the strength of the State and its ‘relative 
autonomy’ from the dominant class.  
 
Knight’s study makes use of a different theoretical perspective from the Strategic 
Relational Approach preferred in this thesis. It should not come as a surprise, 
                                                 
15 According to Knight, the political continuum and orientation of policies of historic phases in Mexico 
range between two different spectrums. Taking labels from its dynastic periods of colonial history, he 
argues that there has been a historic trade-off between the strength and stability of the State. For 
regimes such as the Porfiriato, the post-revolutionary regimes, and the last few of the 20th century, they 
represent ambitious projects in which a relatively autonomous State tends to dictate or mould social 
patterns by favouring active intervention in civil society. Those periods which make use of an 
aggressive policy towards State-building and economic development are labelled Bourbon (1993).   
The other end of the spectrum is deemed to be relatively more modest and more concerned with the 
maintenance of the current state of affairs. Between the early 1940s and the technocrats of the 1980s, 
especially during the period of import substitution industrialization, and the phase of ‘stabilizing 
development’, a pro-status quo pattern which made use of various mechanisms of political 
subordination and wealth accumulation gained notoriety. Because of the emphasis on control, 
consensus and selective repression, the Mexican governments of that time are labelled Habsburgs 
(Knight, 1993).  
Furthermore, according to this view, the transitions from one type to another are explained in structural 
terms. Once the viability of economic and political conditions were exhausted, the circumstances 
favoured a shift.  
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therefore, that the accounts differ in their assessments, trends, scope and 
periodizations, yet agree on quite broad conceptions.16 Now that the Mexican State 
periodizations of Knight and Medina Peña have been revised, I turn to an analytical 
proposition taking the Strategic Relational Approach to describe the trajectory of the 
State as I see it.     
 
 
Source: Knight, Alan. 2001. “The Modern Mexican State: Theory and Practice”, p. 182.17 
 
 
TRACING THE PROCESSES OF THE STATE  
 
                                                 
16 His scheme clarification disaggregates the historical political practices and characteristics of the 
Mexican State and what he means by the character of the dominant class there, and does not cover the 
legitimacy of the State in Mexico (Knight, 2001).  
FIGURE 1.1 KNIGHT’S MODERN MEXICAN STATE SCHEMA
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In this section, I consider the processes of structural change and punctuated evolution 
of the State, whose power dimension is represented in Figure 1.2 along the horizontal 
axis. The display of State capabilities in the exercise of power is perceived to vary 
during different phases of the historical process. The more evident the political realm 
is in the different roles and status played by the State, the further towards a positive 
sign it can be traced along the political axis. Conversely, the less the perception or the 
display of some actors’ ability to shape the context in which others interact, the closer 
the association which can be made with the negative side of its capabilities.    
 
In Figure 1.2, the flawed market exposure of commodities is considered along the 
vertical axis. A positive sign represents increased commodification; this means 
reduced protection from the market. At the other end of the axis, a negative sign 
means that these four commodities are taken out of the market, granting them an 
increased level of protection. In other words, they are decommodified.  
 
The four quarters divided by the ‘x’ and ‘y’ axes aim to portray the different phases of 
the State’s peacetime structural change and the trajectory of its punctuated evolution. 
As the power axis goes up, I attribute increased leverage from private actors and an 
emphasis on neoclassical economics and practices. As the same axis goes down, I 
attribute corporatist practices and institutions dominating the governmental agenda, 
with Keynesian policies being introduced. Leftwards on the market axis, decline in 
the capabilities of the State point to a minimal or utilitarian role. Rightwards on the 
same axis, the policies and practices of the State are stronger as the axis moves further 
right.   
                                                                                                                                            
17 The names in the schema correspond to relevant presidential terms, as originally highlighted by 
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Several factors can trigger change in the processes of structural change and the 
punctuated evolution of the State. Important political and economic factors need to be 
taken into account. For the political factors, the range of options varies from political 
constraints at one end, to political autonomy at the other. The spectrum encompasses 
the limits of feasible available options. In a similar fashion, for the economic factors 
the wide variety of possible alternatives is comprised between the poles of market 
driven commodification, on the one side, and the politically driven 
decommodification, on the other. Thus, political and economic structures set the stage 
and conditions within which courses of action are strategically selected by the actors 
                                                                                                                                            
Knight.   
FIGURE 1.2 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PUNCTUATED EVOLUTION STATE 
PROCESSES MAP 
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in context. Having explained the analytical axes, I turn, firstly, to some features of 
Mexico and, secondly, to the main periods of contemporary processes of structural 
change and punctuated evolution in the Mexican experience. 
 
   
THE MEXICAN STATE  
 
Even though it is not my aim to supply a complete narrative of recent Mexican 
history, it should suffice here to briefly recall the more hectic 19th century events 
which threatened the nation on the domestic and foreign fronts. Mexico gained 
independence from Spain in 1821 after eleven years of war. Very soon it had annexed 
Central America and drafted two constitutions, in 1824 and 1857. The latter limited 
Church power and broadened individual freedoms. Mexico suffered the secession of 
Texas in 1834 and saw it annexed to the United States in 1845. The following year 
the US declared war on Mexico, subsequently defeating its southern neighbour. The 
1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo legalized the seizure of California, Nevada, 
Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and part of Colorado by the United States. In 1853 the 
Gadsden Purchase acquired some more territory from Mexico for railroad expansion. 
The civil War of the Reform ratified the liberal faction in power led by Benito Juárez.  
They were externally challenged in 1861 by Spanish, British and French forces 
demanding the repayment of debts. After the first two withdrew, the army from 
France fulfilled the threat the year after, and by 1864 had installed a member of the 
Habsburg family as the second emperor of Mexico; but he was finally defeated and 
executed three years later. Due to historical circumstances since the struggle for 
independence, in particular the inheritance of a colonial centralization of power, an 
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independent presidency replaced the colonial viceroyship. The Presidents have 
displayed, accumulated and exercised this in a way which has led to the neglect of 
other branches of government. The legislative and the judicial institutions are weak, 
in transition, and not strong enough to represent a real and effective balance to the 
great executive powers.  
 
The 1910 Revolution started the concentration of shaping power over context and 
conduct now evident in contemporary Mexican social relations. This phenomenon 
was catalyzed via corporatist institutions and courses of action, as I argue below. The 
strength of the government structures and agencies moved towards an increased 
exercise of power. This period can be represented as a downward movement along the 
political axis (see Figure 1.3 below). Whilst a contrasting phenomenon began to be 
observed from the last quarter of that century, a new economic and outwardly 
oriented agenda started to dismantle the inwardly directed one, focused on political 
stability and growth. The strategically selected preferences of democratization, 
political autonomy, decentralization and federalism, have accounted for a 
deconcentration and disaggregation of political power while emphasizing external 
market oriented economic imperatives such as the liberalization of trade and 
divestiture of public enterprises. These phases represent an upward movement along 
the ‘x’ axis in the same figure. They are also further to be analyzed in Chapter Six.     
    
Although the United States of Mexico are, according to its 1917 Constitution, a 
Federal Republic, in practice the high centralization of power and decision making 
distinctive of the Presidency has been the main reason for categorizing it as an 
authoritarian political system, led by a former bureaucratic and nowadays 
 38
technocratic, elite18 (Meyer, 1977; Levy, 1990; Camp, 2003). The exercise of power 
by the President has been fundamental to the reforms and processes of structural 
change and for the path of punctuated evolution which the Mexican State has taken.19 
Consider, for instance, the role and functions of the central bank whose autonomy and 
independence has varied over time.20 Its central goal has been to attract capital 
inflows via investment or credit. It has achieved this in addition to the control of 
monetary policy, the protection of financial stability, the facilitation of payments, 
fiscal recollection and the control and surveillance of instruments such as the money 
supply, interest rates, credit controls and reserve requirements. The need to compete 
for international capital and investment has led to a variation, in some cases wide, in 
its degree of autonomy and independence from commercial banks, the executive, and 
the legislature (Maxfield, 1997).    
                                                 
18 Due to the huge political reservoir of the Mexican president, most of the academic and non-academic 
literature focuses on an agency-centred perspective, adopting a narrow understanding of politics, 
confined merely to the government agenda, institutions and policies. Some Mexican historians have 
analyzed the ‘caudillos’: strong leadership by specific personalities, who have played a crucial role 
throughout Mexico’s historical processes and have come to symbolize the historical phases which they 
ruled. For biographic accounts in which Mexican presidents are portrayed ruling the country as 
absolute monarchs, Krauze’s work best illustrates this view (1997a and 1997b).       
19 The fact that it has varied through time shows that the State does not have power on its own, that it 
merely reflects the power exercised through social relations among agencies and structures, as Jessop 
asserts (1990b). 
20 Since the 1930s, it has been alternatively decreased and increased five times, depending on the 
presidential agenda and the international context. The current scenario is one of central banking 
autonomy and independence from the government and the presidency (Maxfield, 1997).  
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THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION: A MOMENT OF DECISIVE INTERVENTION 
 
The 1910 Mexican social revolution was preceded by crucial moments of crisis. 
During that period there were not only different armed and violent phases, but also 
very important transformations of the political, economic and social systems. The 
very first moment of decisive intervention altered dramatically the trend of the 
process of structural change in Mexico. The challenge of unsatisfied demands for 
democratization and land redistribution triggered the armed and violent phase of the 
revolution. They also opened the window of opportunity to modify economic and 
political practices which have exploited nature and men as commodities. With the 
  
FIGURE 1.3 HISTORICAL TREND OF THE PROCESSES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
OF THE MEXICAN STATE SINCE THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY 
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benefit of hindsight it can be said that Mexican nationals chose at this point to move 
in another direction.   
 
After the convulsions of the 19th century, a Mexican General held power and reigned 
as President for more than thirty years.21 The instrumentation of economic policies 
and practices which he favoured were liberal, benefiting foreign investment. The most 
dynamic economic sectors were extractive industries, export crops and manufacturing 
(Reynolds, 1970). The social revolution which erupted in 1910 allowed, in its 
aftermath, more social and political mobility and it also became a symbol of national 
unity. The chief unattended demands which triggered and fuelled the uprising were 
democracy and land redistribution.22 While its implementation fell short of the 
demands by the most radical factions, the outcome was a moderate one encompassed 
by two Generals from northern Mexico, who ensured political and military victory. 
However, it was Calles alone who became the political leader in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. 
 
The economic growth and development of the pre-revolutionary era was based on 
economic activities, which were inherited not only from the 19th century, but also 
from the period of colonial rule. The agrarian estates (haciendas) provide an example. 
Export crop oriented agrarian estates contributed to the economic growth in the 
period, along with some other outwardly oriented economic activities, such as 
extractive industries and manufacturing. Foreign ownership and control of leading 
                                                 
21 President Porfirio Díaz ruled the country from 1876 to 1911, except for a presidential term between 
1880 and 1884. 
22 Francisco I. Madero proclaimed the Plan of San Luis Potosí and called for revolt against Díaz in 
1910. His ‘sufragio efectivo no reelección’ slogan was a cry for fair elections and a single presidential 
term. Emiliano Zapata’s Plan of Ayala called for major land reform, defending the traditional 
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economic sectors, industries and service provision exploited natural resources, 
making use of the contribution of cheap labour, and of foreign capital and technology 
to expand exports to overseas markets (Reynolds, 1970). The trajectory of the 
processes of the State changed course as broad social relationships were altered, 
together with power relationships. If the role of the State, especially in economic 
activities, during the early 20th century was minimal, after the revolution it became 
more active and started to expand its involvement in economic activities. The armed 
conflict changed the socio-political and economic model. Less commodified practices 
and policies ran parallel to extremely crude confrontations among the different 
factions of the revolutionary movement.23 The cost of the armed conflict was 
economic contraction and hundreds of thousands of people died, either directly in the 
battlefield or indirectly in its aftermath. During the most hectic and violent phases of 
the conflict, which grew to adopt political ethnic and religious features, the 
disruptions of the economic cycle due to the money emissions of the different factions 
took quite a while to recover from.    
 
Given its features of increased levels of political and economic policies and practices, 
the Porfiriato could be mapped in the upper left quarter of Figure 1.3. The scarce and 
imperfect protection from the market granted to the fictitious commodities, on the one 
hand, and the weak interactions between the government structures and institutions 
                                                                                                                                            
communal rights of the peasantry, which were threatened by rising landlord power and commercial 
agriculture.  
23 Some international dimensions and incidents of the revolution went beyond conventional diplomatic 
practices and threats. US Marines occupied Veracruz port in 1914, to put pressure on Huerta, who had 
been responsible for the murder of President Madero the year before. Huerta was formerly supported 
by US Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, but was later distrusted by US President Woodrow Wilson. A 
couple of years later, after Villa briefly occupied the small US border town of Columbus, a punitive 
expedition sent by the same administration entered Chihuahua. This incident after some months of 
fruitless pursuit of Villa, put relations between Mexico and the United States on the verge of a 
diplomatic breakdown and armed conflict (Aguilar Camín, and Meyer, 1993).    
 42
and society, on the other, resulted in a serious political and social fracture. The 1910 
military conflict is an evident feature of the moment of crisis which challenged and 
altered the historical trend of the Mexican State. A new orientation of policies was 
preferred, a new political agenda was set, and new social actors emerged not only 
demanding a change but provoking it themselves. The processes of social structural 
change and punctuated evolution started to move in a different direction, selecting 
more feasible alternatives to be strategically operated. The overall orientation 
changed to something more politically and socially inclusive, in contrast to the 
economic exclusion of the pre-revolutionary period. The goal was to incorporate into 
the system all the main actors and elements which had once been originally outside 
and which represented real challenges to the status quo. Some leading political actors 
perceived and presented the change as embracing the main agencies with corporatist 
and bureaucratic structures. The social relations among the actors and between them 
and the structures of the system started to move in a more fluid and dynamic way. 
Since they became institutionalized, they were also perceived to be more powerful. 
Moreover, labour, land and money, although not taken totally out of the market, were 
granted more comprehensive protection, yet with historical hindsight imperfect 
according to theoretical considerations. Regulatory frameworks, which were 
selectively enforced, proved better in the 1930s than at the turn of the century, when 
they were virtually inexistent. The following section focuses on the cumulative nature 
of the incremental changes which occurred within Mexican corporatism.         
 
 
CORPORATISM: PUNCTUATED EVOLUTIONARY REFORMISM  
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Corportatist policies, and experiences in the Mexican trajectory of the processes of 
structural change can be mapped south of the horizontal axis of power.24 After the 
main clashes among different revolutionary factions were over, the 1917 Constitution 
incorporated the rights of urban labour, and the right of the State to ownership of the 
wealth of the Mexican sub-soil. On the one hand, Article 123 meant an alliance with 
labour, in which the State came to control labour’s demands and offer protection from 
the market in return for political support. This article regulates all contracts of work 
and working conditions within Mexican territory.25 Pre-revolutionary labour demands 
and strikes had been systematically crushed by the government. At the same time, 
Article 27 represented a throw back to the Spanish colonial model which vested the 
ownership of the sub-soil to the Crown. It states the Nation’s inalienable and essential 
ownership of the lands, sub-soil, waters and their wealth. Although the article has 
been modified and some of its original paragraphs repealed, there are explicit 
prescriptions to regulate the ability to acquire domain of the lands and waters of the 
Nation.26 It also contrasts with the model in some other countries such as the US 
                                                 
24 In contrast to the Strategic Relational Account embraced in this thesis, Knight’s perspective of 
Mexican corporatism can be traced in three out of four quadrants of his scheme. It is important to recall 
that he makes use of different variables. They are, firstly, the strength of the State, and secondly, the 
State autonomy of the dominant class. According to his chronological perspective, the Mexican 
corporatism presidential terms start in the Nightwatchman State quadrant, follow through the Stalinism 
quadrant, and end up in the Fascism quadrant (2001).  
25 The sixth title of labour and social considerations of the 1917 Constitution features only Article 123. 
Its opening line stresses everyone’s right to dignified and socially useful work. Several paragraphs are 
devoted to the promotion of social organization and creation of jobs conforming to law. Mexican 
Constitution as of 2001. (Translated by Ron Pamachena). 
http://historicaltextarchive.com/mexico/constitution.html  8th May 2002.  
26 Listed in the first chapter of individual guarantees of the 1917 Constitution, Article 27 explicitly 
reads: “…Lands and waters understood to be within the limits of the national territory belong 
originally to the Nation, which has had and has the right of transmitting their ownership to particular 
persons, thus constituting them as private property. Expropriations may only be (for the reason) of 
public utility, and by means of (compensation)… The Nation will at all times have the right to impose 
on private property the ways of use that the public interest dictates… The Nation has direct ownership 
of all natural resources of the continental shelf and underwater zones around islands, of minerals or 
substances that are in veins, layers, or masses; of beds of ore that constitute deposits naturally distinct 
from the components of the earth, such as minerals from which metals and alloys used in industry are 
derived; of beds of precious stones; of rock salt, and the salts formed directly in sea waters; the 
products derived from the decomposition of rocks when their exploitation requires underground work; 
 44
where the owner of the land also possesses the wealth underneath the surface. The 
closest which this article came to full enforcement was the 1938 nationalization of the 
oil companies.   
 
During the post-revolutionary period the government considered a change in the land 
tenure law and redistribution of land favouring traditional communal land holders and 
small farmers, making the ‘ejido’ quite a distinctive agrarian common property 
feature coexisting with private estates. It is also during this historical period that the 
economic strategies of import substitution industrialization took off; this led the 
inwardly oriented sectors of the economy for some decades until the late 1970s/early 
1980s. 
 
Mexican corporatism was constructed as a distinctive political feature for the 
engagement and control of social groups which set up formal spaces for political 
mobility. Typical of authoritarianism, after the President, the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), the former ruling ‘official’ party, served as an incestuous politico-
bureaucratic link between sectors of society and the government, as is further to be 
analyzed in Chapter Six.27 During the first phase of the corporatist stage, social 
                                                                                                                                            
of mineral beds, or beds of organic materials that are used as fertilizers; solid combustible materials; of 
petroleum and all solid, liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, and of the space situated over the national 
territory, to the extent and terms fixed by international law… (T)he ownership of the Nation is 
inalienable and essential, and the exploitation, use, or enjoyment of these resources by individuals or 
by associations governed by Mexican law cannot take place except by means of concessions granted 
by the Federal Executive according to the rules and conditions which the laws establish…” Mexican 
Constitution as of 2001. (Translated by Ron Pamachena). 
http://historicaltextarchive.com/mexico/constitution.html  8th May 2002. 
27 Formerly Partido Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party PNR), this was an 
institution created by President Calles in 1929 for political arbitrage among committees identified with 
the revolution. Nine years later President Cárdenas restructured the party including four different 
sectors, popular, military, labour and peasantry, and changed its name to Partido de la Revolución 
Mexicana (Mexican Revolution Party PRM). The main purposes were to dilute the power of regional 
leaders and to achieve sexenal autonomy without any interference from former government (Medina 
Peña, 1995).   
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demands were incorporated in the system. Labour and peasants were included: their 
demands for welfare and land reforms were partially met and partially transformed 
into corporatist elements.28 During subsequent stages this strategy proved to be a very 
efficient way to channel their demands through quasi-governmental institutions, 
where the former ruling party and the bureaucracy played a central role in crucial 
demands such as land tenure and redistribution.29 The demands raised by the sectors 
included in the corporatist apparatus were not fully satisfied, raising tensions and 
contradictions within the Mexican corporatist model. Furthermore, the social sectors 
experienced a dramatic decrease in their capability to influence the decision-making 
procedures of the government.  
 
The creation of an ‘institutional party’ in the aftermath of the Mexican revolution, 
signalled not only the beginning of a transition from military to civilian presidents. It 
was also a crucial moment of change which served to construct a lasting model of an 
authoritarian political system organized with the President at its core.30 Furthermore, 
the corporate and bureaucratic structures which characterized the historical trajectory 
of the State in that period focused on the development of infrastructure, for instance, 
roads and irrigation. In addition, the provision of public services and education aimed 
to satisfy basic welfare needs in the population. Nevertheless, the creation of 
                                                 
28 Ever since their inception, organized confederations aimed to be protected and have their demands 
satisfied by the State. However, in practice, they have also proved crucial for political control. The 
most representative and significant ones are the confederations of Mexican labour CTM 
(Confederación de Trabajadores de México), and CROM (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana); 
peasants CNC (Confederación Nacional Campesina), and mixed CROC (Confederación Regional 
Obrera Campesina).   
29 Consider, for instance, the case of the celebrated and promoted nationalism manifested in diverse 
cultural ambits such as muralism; which in addition to its undeniable artistic value, served as an 
additional legitimate source for the presidential governments emphasizing Mexican identity and 
distinctiveness. The political tutelage of millions of peasants and the missional orientation of 
nationalistic education led by Vasconcelos could stand as additional examples (Krauze, 1997a; 1997b). 
30 The President was then the official Chief of State, and Head of government; plus the real, but not 
nominal, leader of the ‘official party’.  
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confederations and their inclusion in the bureaucratic and corporatist organization of 
the political system made a clear contrast with some other international experiences. 
For instance, there was a communist party in Russia before the October revolution 
erupted, whereas in Mexico, apart from the post-facto institutionalization of the 
revolutionary movement, the PRI’s ideological leadership has never been its main 
distinctive feature.    
 
At this time, the international context was experiencing dramatic modifications 
which, in turn, had strong domestic impacts. The economic depression of the late 
1920s exacerbated Mexico’s economic problems, since the markets for Mexican 
exports declined, especially in the United States, bringing income and internal 
demand down with them, because export oriented sectors were among the most 
important and dynamic of the economy. The recovery was inwardly orientated to 
serve the domestic economy, making use of important structural reforms: change in 
asset ownership, preferential taxes to domestically oriented activities, land reforms 
and the nationalization of industries such as railroads and petroleum. The experience 
of those years showed the high cost of overdependence on foreign demand, which 
makes an economy more vulnerable to international scenarios, such as a world 
depression (Reynolds, 1970). 
 
Since the goal of political stability was added to that of economic growth, efforts to 
nationalize asset ownership and to redistribute the benefits from exploiting natural 
resources aimed to provide social equity. Over this period there were quantitative 
increases and qualitative improvements in education, sanitary conditions and general 
standards of living. Additionally, some of Cárdenas’ policies were not out of tune 
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with US President Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. Yet, this was not particularly true 
of the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938, because it affected firms and 
investment from the US. The end of this Mexican presidential term witnessed the 
beginning of the Second World War. The government reoriented its policies 
accordingly, strategically selecting its courses of action to end the demilitarization of 
the political system, on the one hand, and to continue with the promotion of economic 
industrial activities by granting concessions for building infrastructure, on the other 
(Camp, 2003, Medina Peña, 1995). Interestingly, due to the adverse context of 
international economic depression, by the mid 1930s the declining need for 
international creditworthiness afforded greater room for manoeuvre for domestic 
demands, resulting in a reduction in central bank authority (Maxfield, 1997).        
 
Though the authoritarian and hierarchic corporatist structure was meant to prevail for 
the long term, the sectors not included in the corporatist apparatuses have proved 
increasingly influential since the 1940s. Consider, for instance, the business sectors. 
They process their demands through informal channels, via pressure groups.31 
Moreover, the ideological significance of that period has been continuously 
reassessed. The factors and actors which were not included or incorporated in 
bureaucratic institutions have altered and contributed significantly to the evolutionary 
path of the Mexican State development.   
   
                                                 
31 The relationship between the Mexican State and the Church provides another example. Since no 
religious groups were incorporated as corporatist actors, they had to use different methods for placing 
their demands. The anticlerical outcome of the social revolution, a sharp separation between the 
Mexican State and Church, has gradually been reformed. Nowadays they officially recognize each 
other, whereas they did not in the past (Camp, 1997). 
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Water and land tenure were modified from the perception of land and sub-soil as 
private property in the 1857 Constitution to being the property of the nation 
consecrated a few decades later in 1917. Moreover, it was stated that the nation has 
the capacity to grant private concessions attending public interests; the ‘ejido’, or 
communal estate, was also recognized. The most important land redistribution 
programme was undertaken by President Lázaro Cárdenas during the late 1930s; the 
amount of redistributed land and the number of people benefiting compared in his 
regime exceeded similar attempts on the part of all former governments. Other efforts 
to grant some level of protection to the environment were the creation of various 
National Parks, the issuing of laws and regulations, and some financial support 
especially for the ‘ejidos’ or communal estates. Nevertheless, one of the problems 
was that neither the natural characteristics, nor the productivity potential were taken 
into account as the main criteria for agricultural redistribution (Carabias and 
Valverde, 1993).  
 
Regarding the social dimension, with the benefit of historical hindsight it is important 
to acknowledge the progressive, albeit imperfect, extension and universalization of 
citizens’ rights. Moving from the civil sphere, through the political dimension to the 
social realm, the citizenship paradox has ideally promoted egalitarianism in an 
imperfect system; legitimizing inequality in the practices, roles and status of the 
citizens of any Nation-State. Nevertheless, the continuously contested, renegotiated 
and redefined duties and obligations of individuals within civil society to the State, 
and vice versa, has also evolved, incorporating additional stages. The duties and 
obligations have changed from the first stage of individual liberty, freedom and 
autonomy, through a subsequent stage of political representation, to end with social 
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welfare and community participation.32 In this sense, the rights and duties recognized 
in Mexican citizenship could be regarded as the legal outcome of the needs of the 
economic structure and its priorities, on the one side, and collective human agency on 
the other. Although the experience of civil, political and social rights in practice and 
their recognition is still far from ideal, it provides additional evidence of the 
qualitative increase and exercise of context shaping power immanent in the social 
relations. From the social revolution of the early 20th century until the present day, the 
conduct of individual citizens evidence strategically selected examples of feasibility, 
adapting to their changing socio-political and economic circumstances. However, one 
of the main constraints for citizens has been the PRI’s organization in sectors and the 
relationships of its constituency practices with the rest of the State institutions; since 
factional conflict and the manipulation of discourses promotes the idea that 
citizenship implies an autonomous threat to privileged groups from below (Serrano, 
1998).     
  
Broadly speaking, the post-revolutionary Mexican presidential terms before Cárdenas 
can be mapped in the bottom left quarter of the theoretical map presented in Figure 
1.3. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the extent to which the constitutional articles 
and their relaxed enforcement have served to grant workers special protection from 
the market. The bureaucratic and corporatist arrangements provided shelter, however 
limited, for the commodities of nature, labour and money. Additionally, the power 
immanent in all social relations was solidifying and growing stronger as time went on 
from the beginning of the 20th century onwards. It was more evident in the relations 
and interactions among bureaucratic and government agencies, on the one hand, and 
                                                 
32 cf. Hay for an analysis and critique of citizenship in Great Britain after the Second World War 
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between them and the institutional structures on the other.33 The punctuated 
equilibrium of the processes of structural change of the Mexican State reached their 
historical peak in the welfare and corporatist policies and practices in the 1930s, 
signalling a continuation of the punctuated evolution trend. There was no major crisis 
in the social, political and economic realm. Neither was a decisive intervention 
needed. Interestingly, the gradual increases of change could not only be reached 
through crisis, but were inertially accomplished without any major rupture, as I 
discuss in the following analysis of the continuity of Mexican corporatism.   
 
 
CONTINUITY IN CORPORATIST PRACTICES 
 
Following a ‘taking off’ phase during the 1930s, the industrialization of the Mexican 
economy became more evident from the 1940s onwards. From this time onwards, 
agricultural activities no longer commanded the economic growth of the country. The 
emphasis was orientated towards industrial sectors aiming to attract investment, 
domestic in the first stage, and foreign afterwards. Since then, the share of the 
agricultural sector in the economy has been decreasing steadily, despite efforts such 
as the green revolution. The growth of the population, especially in the urban centres, 
was not matched by the domestic supply of agricultural commodities, and by the mid 
1970s the primary sector balance of trade turned to deficit (Carabias and Valverde, 
1993). However, it was industrialization as an economic priority accompanied by 
political stability that made a distinctive appeal to Mexico up until the 1970s. From 
                                                                                                                                            
(1996).   
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the end of the Second World War onwards, the macroeconomic performance of the 
Mexican economy achieved steady rates of growth above five per cent per year. It 
was not only far better than some other Latin American countries, but also superior to 
some other regions of the world. No wonder, then, that the import substitution 
industrialization strategy during that epoch came to be associated with outstanding 
economic performance. The ‘stabilizing development’ economic policies which 
fuelled Mexico’s growth during those years had a political counterpart. This, in turn, 
acted as a political cushion absorbing social pressures. The control and containment 
of demands and benefits basically served the aim of slowing the pace of Mexico’s 
political development, whilst for four decades favouring the growth of the economy. 
In so doing, the stabilization of social structural change was highly celebrated, both 
domestically and abroad (Hansen, 1971). However, the growing inability to satisfy 
social demands and attendant losses of legitimacy were symptoms that not everything 
could indefinitely be accommodated within the corporatist machinery.34 For the 
authoritarian regime the concern for political stability involved reforms and artificial 
pluralism, postponing real democratic practices.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
33 They were not the only dynamic levels or dimensions. The growing and evolving private sectors of 
society which were not originally included in the political system started to develop in the decades to 
follow; they impelled further change to reap increasing benefits and rewards from diverse concessions. 
34 The political stability which characterized the governments made evident the impossibility of 
channelling pressures via corporatist mechanisms when in 1968 students were either killed or 
disappeared in or after a public demonstration in Tlatelolco, Mexico City. Although it was perhaps one 
of the most critical moments of contemporary history for society, the overt repression of the students’ 
movement, parallel to international manifestations in Paris and Prague, signalled not only the 
illegitimacy of the regime, but also society’s inability to pose a real challenge to the government. Some 
years later, after a couple of major earthquakes in 1985 killed hundreds, maybe thousands, of people in 
the capital, the most effective response and organization to rescue bodies and survivors was a social 
initiative, as the size of the problem was clearly beyond the government’s capabilities. Moreover, the 
electoral victory in the 1988 presidential elections of a political group which had left the PRI not long 
before, was fraudulently given to the candidate from the then ruling party. These are among the most 
obvious examples of the inadequate representation of social demands and interests, as mirrored and 
distorted by the ruling bureaucratic and technocratic elite.  
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The industrialization which ensued after the Second World War was based on the 
economic infrastructure inherited from the pre-revolutionary period. This was not 
severely challenged in the aftermath of the revolution. The development of policies 
attractive to national investors and conducive to the productivity of investment in 
general provided the necessary conditions for an inwardly oriented take off. 
Moreover, the revolution had proved useful for a phase of economic growth based on 
an import substitution model. However, the industrialization project was not without 
its deficiencies. Interestingly, the increase in national product, and the unequal 
concentration of economic benefits in the wealthiest sectors of the society were not 
evidence of adequate economic development. It can be said that they were a sign of 
unevenly distributed economic growth, which is not only an economic concern, but a 
social and political one as well. 
 
In the words of González Casanova,   
…democracy exists to the extent that the people share the income, culture 
and power; anything else is democratic folklore or rhetoric” (1970, 194). 
“When speaking of economic development, I implicitly or explicitly think 
of the process of increasing the net national product or the per capita 
product, and also of progress toward a more equitable distribution of the 
national product than in the past…When I speak of economic 
development, I think also in terms of raising the standard of living of the 
population with regard to food, health, clothing and education. Further, 
when speaking of economic development, I am referring to a phenomenon 
which is far broader than the mere growth of the national product or the 
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increase in the standard of living, I am referring to a moral and political 
problem (1970, 3). 
 
The growth in the economy followed a historic pattern of polarization which has been 
severely aggravated during recent decades. The inequitable distribution of income 
was not only a consequence of the industrialization process, which tends to 
concentrate rewards; it was also due to government policies which polarized and 
aggravated this pattern (Hansen, 1971). This proved problematic since the country, 
parallel to its growing import-substitution industrialization, transformed itself from a 
former agrarian society to a growing urban society. The self-sufficiency strategy ran 
alongside a development of its economic relations with the northern neighbour. 
Economic growth necessitated an increased use of land, labour and natural resources. 
Moreover, capital formation became a priority and public investments were partially 
funded by private savings. This in turn enabled the government to acquire total or 
partial ownership of key industries. The result was a combination of economic growth 
and political stability following the depressed conditions of the late 1920s; a 
quantitative rise in overall welfare conditions became more evident during the second 
half of the century (Reynolds, 1970).35   
 
From the 1930s, import substitution industrialization was implemented by the 
selection of mainly domestic, but also foreign, private investment. This was combined 
with public expenditure and planning policies were allowed to evolve from a general 
                                                 
35 In Reynolds’ opinion, the increased input of manpower and materials and more efficient 
employment of previously existing means of production are the two impulses behind not only the 
improvement in Mexican welfare in particular, but the overall growth of the economy as well (1970). 
However, it is also important to acknowledge the ideological and attitudinal factors, both domestically 
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scenario of economic recession, institutional reform and political agitation to one 
favouring political stability and economic growth. In addition, the shift from 
traditional exports towards the internal market was strategically selected, aiming to 
avoid excessive dependence on international economic scenarios, and also attentive to 
domestic demands.36  Amongst the privileged sectors with public funds, protection 
from foreign competition and low interest credit, were those of manufacturing and 
commercial agriculture. Some other activities, such as mining, but the petroleum 
industry, slowed down. Commerce and investment faced restrictions. The overall 
outcome of these strategies was a rise in productivity and exchange, on the one hand, 
and in the levels of welfare on the other. This, in turn, was reflected in qualitative 
changes in Mexican foreign trade, since value added commodities started to increase 
their share in the balance of trade (Reynolds, 1970).37   
 
Interestingly, it is during this period that two different and contrasting strategies for 
the role of the central bank were selected in turn. The increased need for international 
creditworthiness and central bank autonomy in the mid 1950s followed the 
presidential preference for central bank independence. However, this did not last long. 
In the early 1970s, central bank independence was reversed by another administration 
(Maxfield, 1997). The strongest tendency of the period remained southward of the 
power axis in Figure 1.2, granting imperfect protection from the market.    
 
                                                                                                                                            
and internationally, which also played a role in the strategic selection of the courses of action to choose 
and implement.   
36 The mixture of economic policies basically had to manoeuvre among constraints and opportunities 
presented by labour, investors, society and foreign governments. For instance, as long as real income 
was on the rise, its unequal distribution was tolerated. Unsurprisingly, since this tendency has steadily 
exacerbated, unilateral government action became increasingly problematic.   
37 Though this was perceived as an economic strength, fiscal aspects showed a weaker side, as shown 
by the debt crisis years later during the early 1980s.   
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Environmental damage such as soil erosion, deforestation, pollution and diverse 
contamination followed the government assumption that natural resources were so 
abundant that the ecological cost of economic growth would not threaten the 
environment. But they did. Historic over-exploitation of some resources made 
vegetable and animal species endangered or extinct; these dearest unaccountable 
losses. Important regulatory reforms privileged livestock estates over agricultural and 
forest ones. Jungle and forest surfaces and composition were also adversely affected. 
Changes from agriculture to livestock as food sources, on the one hand, and 
technological intensification aiming to satisfy increasingly urban demands on the 
other, put additional pressure on natural resources. Economic growth carried a high 
environmental cost during this period (Carabias and Valverde, 1993).  
 
In order to develop an adequate and integrated environmental protection strategy with 
the current economic policies and objectives, various elements need to be taken into 
account. There must, among other things, be an adequate combination of a valid legal 
framework and the efforts of non-governmental organizations and public institutions. 
Although these may be considered necessary conditions, they are never sufficient, 
since additional factors, such as growing social awareness about the crucial 
importance of environmental and natural issues must be accompanied by a strong and 
determined political will, plus adequate investment and economic practices, if the aim 
is for real sustainable development (Carabias and Valverde, 1993).  
 
The period of economic industrialization based on an import substitution strategy, 
paralleled with the consolidation and exercise of corporatist policies with 
authoritarian practices, can be mapped in the bottom right quarter of the map 
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presented in Figure 1.3. Since the early 1940s, the political corporate system has been 
stabilised by incorporating diverse sectors into the political apparatus. At the same 
time, it was also the period of stabilizing development when the nationalization of 
important industries such as oil and electricity became the engine of economic 
growth. The emphasis on employment provision and inwardly oriented sectors, the 
growth of infrastructure, education and welfare, could be accounted for as flaws in the 
protection of the market. Broadly speaking, Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ 
accompanied the market expansion, whilst the context and conduct shaping power 
immanent in all social relations also grew significantly. Although it is one thing to 
count the number of new pieces of legislation, and to gauge the extent of government 
protection, its poor or discretionary enforcement is quite another. With hindsight, the 
process of decommodification, in addition to a quantitative and qualitative increase, 
was also perceived and discursively appropriated as a social conquest. The trajectory 
of the processes of structural change and evolution of the State, although punctuated, 
did not bring any major crisis. Therefore, they could be traced as an evolutionary 
trend in which government policies mainly promoted political stability and economic 
growth. In sum, it was a period characterized by reform, continuation and adaptation, 
which lasted until the early 1980s, when a dramatic change imposed from the 
government down decisively modified the trend of the Mexican State, as we shall see 
below.  
 
 
THE IMPOSITION OF A NEW TRAJECTORY SINCE THE 1980s  
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The other dramatic moment of decisive intervention in which a new direction was 
imposed on the trajectory of Mexico’s processes of structural change took place in the 
early 1980s. This time, in contrast with the early 20th century, in which a move 
towards the imperfect exclusion of the market was selected, the transformation was in 
the opposite direction. Contemporary neoclassical economic efforts have been 
orientated towards an increased openness in the economy, implying increased 
commodification. The increase in the ability of some actors to shape the context and 
conduct of others suffered important changes. New actors achieved increasing 
notoriety and their interactions suffered transformations. In the economic sphere, the 
privatization of public enterprises and liberalization of economic sectors and 
economic activities orientating them towards external markets, have been strategically 
selected, as Chapter Four discusses. In the political sphere, the attempts at 
democratization and political autonomy, although historically demanded, have been 
delayed and narrowly delimited to electoral and institutional reforms.38 The real 
challenge for democracy in Mexico comes not with narrow electoral exercises and the 
ballot box, although this is an undeniably important achievement in itself if fairly 
conducted, institutionally independent and respected in its outcomes. González 
Casanova argues that democracy must feature fair sharing of income, culture and 
                                                 
38 The 1910 and 1911 presidential elections were indirect ones (González Casanova, 1970). Since 1917 
all Mexican Presidents have been directly elected. The role and leverage of the military in the 
government has decreased since the beginning of the 20th century. The post-revolutionary Mexican 
presidents held military rank. They not only fought during the revolution of 1910, but incorporated 
many military men in the government. Parallel to their decreased engagement in government affairs by 
the 1940s, education and bureaucratic experience have become key variables for the people appointed 
to head posts (Camp, 2003). This is clearly evidenced by the bureaucrats affiliated to the PRI, the 
political organization party which ruled Mexico for seven decades.  At first, members holding law 
qualifications and bureaucratic experience were mainly recruited from the Ministry of the Interior 
(Secretaría de Gobernación, SEGOB). However, by the 1980s, a network of economists who had 
served mainly at the former Ministry of Economic Planning (Secretaría de Programación y 
Presupuesto, SPP) took over the Presidential office and the main bureaucratic posts (Torres Espinoza, 
1997). 
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power. According to this broader criterion, the democratic goal is still far from being 
fully realised.39 
 
One of the important modifications of the economic restructuring during the early 
1980s was the increased need for international loans matched by a rise in the authority 
and independence of the central bank. However, unlike previous swings towards the 
autonomy of the central bank, during the early 1990s new legislation ratified the 
increase in the central bank autonomy in the direction which had been heralded a 
decade before. The move aimed to attract increasing volumes of portfolio investment 
from international markets, following the recent rise in competition for capital 
inflows. The official goals featured the de-politicization of the central bank governor 
and board appointments; the prohibition against loans to the government to finance 
‘populist policies’; and the securing of financial stability and the peso’s purchasing 
power. This was linked to financial deregulation, reprivatization of commercial 
banks, and the opening of the finance sector to foreign competition, serving an 
increasing amount of short-term debt (Maxfield, 1997). Unfortunately, as Chapter 
Eight shows, the outcome was unexpected. After the financial and banking difficulties 
of the mid 1990s, a huge share of these assets is now in foreign hands.         
 
                                                                                                                                            
It was not until the 1980s that a decentralized institution, the Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal 
Electoral Institute IFE), was specially designed to deal with electoral matters, regulation and 
surveillance, aiming to provide a level playing field for all and every contender (Serrano, 1998).      
39 Democratization and political autonomy reforms, an agenda which the government appropriated 
from the main opposition parties, have reduced the amount of fraud, and have provided the opportunity 
for the first Majors of Mexico City and the first Mexican President elected from opposition parties: the 
former from the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Democratic Revolution Party PRD), and the 
latter from the Partido Acción Nacional (National Action Party PAN). The creation of a decentralized 
civil electoral institution has been one of the crucial elements for providing a level playing field for fair 
and open democratic competition. Another obstacle was the public funding of the political parties. The 
PRI has always benefited both legally and illegally from economic and non-economic resources denied 
to its competitors due to its anomalous status as the former ‘party of the government’.    
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Although some of the elements of the decisive moment of intervention can be 
discerned before the 1980s, the strategic choice of a new series of public policies was 
associated discursively with the 1982 debt crisis. Conventional explanations have 
argued that the import substitution industrialization model and the inward orientation 
of the economic activities was exhausted. The limitations and contradictions of the 
economic policies were clear, but this is not to say there was no alternative. Nor, 
worse, can it justify or excuse the alienation of decision making from society. The 
concentration of power which the corporatist institutions and practices had steadily 
built up throughout contemporary Mexican history benefited society as a general 
trend.   
 
The principal economic factor which triggered the debt crisis in 1982 was an 
excessive borrowing from abroad to finance expansionary policies. The source of the 
Mexican funds depended heavily on oil exports. Chapter Six describes how the 
problem arose when the international price of oil dropped, placing the Mexican 
government in a dire position to face its debt burden. The involuntary moratorium on 
debt payments announced by the government that year served to detonate an 
international debt crisis. The early 1980s’ economic crisis was one of macroeconomic 
fiscal mismanagement. If the external conditions were that foreign sources of credit 
were scarce, interest rates high and terms of trade unfavourable, the domestic context 
was no better. The deterioration of real incomes, inflation, capital flows and 
international reserves represented some of the domestic constraints limiting the range 
of feasible available options for the government (Lustig, 1998). 
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The decisive intervention to tackle the debt problem was a neoclassical economic one. 
The foundations of this change were in the 1976 signing of an International Monetary 
Fund letter of intent. The agreement to correct a balance of payments imbalance six 
years later justified the cutting of public expenditure, lowering of inflation, 
controlling of the exchange rate and the promoting of domestic savings. Needless to 
say, the economic conditionality for the IMF’s loans has historically widened its 
scope. In addition to the neoclassical emphasis on keeping the inflation rate under 
control, and the exchange rate considerations present in the first letters of intent, the 
latest documents contain provisions for privatizing government enterprises and 
modifying changes to the banking system, social security, tax reforms and the like 
(Rosas, 1999; Letters of intent, 1999 and 2000).   
 
The strategically selected neoclassical model of outward orientation and economic 
adjustment featured careful macroeconomic management to correct chronic fiscal 
imbalances, external trade liberalization, market deregulation and the removal of 
ownership restrictions. Such policies were designed to help the economy recover 
quickly. However, the improvement in the macro-economy took much longer than 
expected. Even the control of the inflation rate could not be attained until the late 
1980s.40 Despite declining economic indicators of the ‘lost decade’ and strong private 
sector based policies, the economy did not match original expectations. International 
organizations and some analysts then demanded increased commodification stressing 
the insufficient instrumentation of the conditions of openness in the neoclassical 
                                                 
40 Economic restructuring initiatives in which the Mexican economy was used as a guinea pig, such as 
the Brady Plan, fell short of their goals. In this plan a medium and long term debt and service reduction 
with commercial banks, although agreed, proved unsuccessful in promoting either output growth, or 
capital inflows, or reducing domestic interest rates as effectively as they were supposed to. 
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economic policy. The strategic selection of a prospect of higher integration with the 
US economy even before the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the 
attractive rates of return in the stock exchange; the increased autonomy and 
independence of the central bank from the government; the constitutional reforms of 
land distribution and the increased competition against foreign goods and investors all 
became distinctive features of the strategic selection of Mexico’s processes of 
structural change (Lustig, 1998). 
 
Although Mexico faced another major economic problem in the mid 1990s due to 
macroeconomic financial mismanagement, instead of imposing a new trajectory on 
the processes of structural change of the State, this time it served to ratify the 
neoclassical course of action already under way. The economic difficulties of the mid 
1990s were of a different nature in the early 1980s. By 1994, the fiscal deficit was 
under control, but the level of international reserves was considered low, with the 
country facing outstanding short-term levels of debt. This situation triggered liquidity 
concerns and a self-fulfilling crisis, since the current account deficit was financed by 
capital inflows. An important financial bailout led by the US government was the 
strategy chosen to rescue the Mexican economy (Lustig, 1998). In sum, it represented 
a moment of decisive intervention. However, this time, the result was to keep the 
economic policies on the same track as they had been beforehand, as is argued in 
Chapter Eight.  
 
It is perhaps the economic crises of 1982 and 1994 which best illustrate the flawed 
openness of the economy. International actors and factors played a crucial role on 
                                                                                                                                            
Interestingly, the explanation for the missed goals was that the reforms were not strong enough, 
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both occasions. Increases in the interest rate by the Federal Reserve of the United 
States have always attracted flows from international markets into the US market. 
Even a small but steady increase acted like a magnet for investors from all over the 
world, despite the fact that higher rates of return were on offer in other markets. 
During the early 1980s and mid 1990s, investment outflows followed a rise in 
confidence in the American markets. Moreover, the United States government had to 
contribute public funds to rescue Mexico in those years of economic crises. In 1982, 
they did it to bail out the American commercial banks, which had lent heavily to the 
Mexican government during the oil boom. In the following decade the government of 
the United States had to intervene again to rescue their own portfolio investors who 
had bought bonds and invested in the Mexican equity market. Capital inflows which 
were considered the best evidence of the confidence of international investors in the 
economic restructuring in Mexico proved of dubious virtue, since they need to be 
matched by large reserves to protect against the likelihood of capital flight (Bosworth, 
Collins and Lustig, 1997).  
 
It is interesting to note that there were in play political countertendencies to the 
official economic strategy. While levels of welfare steadily declined, since wages did 
not increase in real terms, they were justified in terms of the need to control inflation. 
This has increased the prevailing rate of commodification of labour. Equally, there 
has been increased commodification of another of Polanyi’s fictitious commodities, 
nature, as imperfect protection of natural resources is on the rise. Important though 
the commitment is to international environmental agreements, it is not very evident 
that nature is being protected from the market. Current reforms are not sufficient to 
                                                                                                                                            
making foreign investors hesitate in their response (Lustig, 1998).  
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reverse environmental degradation. Furthermore, despite improved legislation, the 
protection of the environment has been fragmented and of low priority. The protection 
of nature from market forces has been imperfectly focused and patchily conceived, 
since it is not seen as relevant to the economic policies, strategies and priorities of the 
government (Hogenboom, 1998). 
 
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) reflects a 
narrow approach towards environmental protection, focusing mainly on the US-
Mexican border and industrial pollution.41 Moreover, there is a serious risk that 
Mexico will reproduce the extremely wasteful patterns of consumption of its northern 
neighbour, while pretending to implement stringent environmental norms. Despite the 
importance of achieving full harmonization between Canada, the United States and 
Mexico on NAFTA’s labour standards side agreement, as well as its environmental 
standards side agreement, one of the main difficulties is still the expense of 
implementing such agreements. For, unless the richest members are willing to provide 
financial assistance to achieve compliance, the implementation of the agreement will 
continue to be inadequate.       
 
The core points of the environmental side agreement of NAFTA include the 
prohibition against lowering standards to attract and maintain investment, and giving 
room to manoeuvre to each country in establishing its own controls and complying 
with its international commitments.  Those provisions are also valid for the labour 
                                                 
41 NAFTA’s environmental side agreement considers trilateral cooperation and effective enforcement. 
Supporters of the side agreement argued that ‘free trade’ would prove beneficial to the environment, 
since trade leads to growth, which in turn produces resources for environmental protection. However, 
the socioeconomic effects brought by trade and regional integration are very likely to come after a long 
time and after considerable damage has already been done to the ecology. Trade does not lead to well 
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side agreement. Regarding border pollution, the main concerns include the 
deterioration of ecosystems, the depletion of water resources, the management of 
solid and hazardous wastes and water and air pollution. A number of international 
agreements have been subscribed to and institutions have been created targeting 
mainly the environmental agenda concerning the US-Mexico border.42 The non-
comprehensive approach and narrow focus of the environmental agenda has, however 
been heavily influenced by US concerns and priorities.43 
 
Parallel to a quantitative growth of the population and the economy, there has been a 
deepening of the processes of structural change of the State, and equally of society. In 
other words, the strategic legal and institutional context within which a selected 
course of action must be made has had to respond to changing demands. The formula 
of political stability and economic growth lacked important qualitative elements: 
democracy, autonomy, and development. Authentic democracy, in González 
Casanova’s terms, needs shared, equalled, balanced power, culture and income. 
Economic growth and the electoral victory of a former opposition party are never a 
sufficient condition for claiming that democracy rules in Mexico. In a similar fashion, 
                                                                                                                                            
conceived and implemented environmental policies (Hogenboom, 1998; Belasteguigoitia and 
Guadarrama, 1997).  
42 At the end of the 19th century the International Border and Water Commission (IBWC), was 
established alongside its Mexican counterpart (Comisión Internacional de Límites y Aguas, CILA). 
Both were modified five decades later. Prior to NAFTA, the Border Environmental Cooperation 
Agreement, better known as La Paz Agreement, and the Integrated Border Environmental Plan (IBEP), 
and Border XXI were introduced. NAFTA environmental institutions include the North American 
Development Bank (NADBANK), which helps finance environmental projects along the US-Mexico 
border; the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC), which assesses the technical, 
social and financial feasibility of NADBANK financed assistance projects; and the trinational 
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC), established for studying issues, creating working 
groups and solving problems of common concern (Belausteguigoitia and Guadarrama, 1997; NAFTA 
section 27).  
43 Ever since the very beginning, the proposal for the complementary accords was a reaction to the 
concerns of different social sectors that a free trade agreement amongst the three countries would not 
be reached by dumping on labour and the environment. The US Congress played an important role in 
ensuring that those side agreements would be included if NAFTA was to be ratified.   
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development means an equitable distribution not only of economic wealth, but of all 
of resources, consistent with the understanding of the political realm and power 
analysis discussed above. Democracy and development are priorities as they represent 
both a goal and a challenge.44  
 
The picture of Mexico which emerges at the beginning of the 21st century is one of 
increased but unequally distributed power in the social relations, along with the 
increasing commodification of labour, land, knowledge, and capital. Interestingly, the 
levelling of the electoral field aims for fair elections, the demand which triggered the 
Mexican revolution nearly a century ago. It also opens up a window of opportunity to 
broaden the social agenda, as Chapter Six further argues. The processes of structural 
change can be orientated towards the goal of development, though it is important to 
bear in mind that contexts select but never determine certain strategies and not others. 
It is human agency that injects indeterminacy into social, political and economic 
processes. Since the uneven exercise of power is mainly responsible for the continuity 
of a system which privileges growth, a qualitative change in the relations of power 
becomes necessary. This is especially so if the aim is to achieve qualitative 
development, not only quantitative growth. The challenge, great as it is, needs to be 
decisively approached and tackled since it can no longer be postponed within a 
context of shrinking and already weak market protection.   
 
                                                 
44 For instance, consider the 1988 Presidential election, in which fraud denied victory to a centre left 
coalition, which later became a formal political party. The incestuous relationship between the former 
ruling party and the bureaucracy simply reported a failure in the computing system when its candidate 
was behind in the polls. The proclaimed winner then went on to implement a more aggressive 
programme of privatization of public enterprises, deregulation of markets and liberalization of 
economic activities than his predecessor. Furthermore, this administration negotiated and ratified the 
North America Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada and recklessly delayed, for 
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The processes of structural change of the Mexican State since the early 1980s can be 
mapped in the top right quadrant of Figure 1.3. The strategic selection of neoclassic 
economic policies by recent Mexican administrations has facilitated an increased 
process of commodification. The liberalization, privatization and deregulation 
strategies have altered the flawed protection from the market, which were the 
corporatist policies and courses of action implemented some decades before. Consider 
the paradox of macroeconomic growth, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
deterioration in the standard of living of the biggest segment of the population and the 
increased concentration of wealth in the top deciles. However, it is important to note 
that the context and conduct shaping power immanent in all social relations have been 
crucial factors in the structural change and punctuated evolution of the State. The 
agenda of society is no longer exclusively constrained by government apparatuses and 
incestuous practices, although some of the social initiatives are systematically 
appropriated and imposed from the top down on the rest of the society.    
 
 
REMARKS ON THE STRATEGIC RELATIONAL APPROACH  
 
What makes the Strategic Relational Approach useful for process-tracing analysis, as 
this chapter has demonstrated, is its balanced account of the dialectical interactions 
between structure and agency, on the one hand, and between the material and the 
ideational on the other. It is also able to incorporate empirical starting points, while 
the non-deterministic study of open-ended processes at different levels of analysis 
allows an inclusive conception of politics. The Strategic Relational Approach proves 
                                                                                                                                            
political reasons during its final year in office, adjusting economic variables and policies which 
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useful for analysing social, political and economic change, since contingency is one 
of the most difficult features to study in the Social Sciences. Furthermore, elements of 
national variation can be integrated into the analysis of specific case studies, and the 
theoretical framework of the approach is able to provide a balanced position between 
complexity and parsimony.  
 
It is important to stress that historical considerations could not be left aside either for 
academic analysis or for decision-making purposes. The best decision-making is 
always the best informed one, and historically informed analysis is able to produce 
additional information which is missing from agency-centred and static approaches. 
However, comparative statics or diachronic analyses are better equipped to perform 
analysis of change, elevating complexity above parsimony.  Furthermore, historical 
trends and trajectories are altered, reinvented, modified and established anew every 
day. Since the dynamics of social interaction evolve continuously through windows of 
opportunity and constraint, crises and reforms, the academic study of the social, 
political and economic disciplines does likewise. No static, fixed, or preconceived 
understanding should limit our perception of how the world is or should be. The 
capacity to reinvent oneself is very authentically human. Thus, the social realm is 
always never-ending, as it is always in the making, since human agency opens up the 
multiplicity of factors which constantly interact in the complex, fluid and never static 
social, political and economic realms (Hay, 2002c).      
 
It is also interesting to note that the map proposed here could be useful for tracing not 
only the trajectories or trends of the State but of any social structure. Additionally, its 
                                                                                                                                            
triggered the financial crisis by the end of 1994.  
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use is not restricted to contemporary analysis only, but it could also represent an 
important analytical tool for both theoretical considerations and specific case studies.     
 
The trajectories of the contemporary State as processes of action and structural 
change and punctuated evolution tend to show a ‘U shaped’ pattern, in this case. The 
pattern could be generalized for peacetime States that have experienced a similar 
punctuated evolution from liberal economic policies in an initial phase, through a 
Welfare State or Corporatist stage, to end up with a neo-liberal approach. Along the 
political axis, the moments in which the political power of the State significantly 
increases or decreases, reaching either its zenith or nadir, tend to be associated with 
moments of drastic change or crisis. It is during moments of crisis that new directions 
have been imposed on the trajectories of the State. The eruption of crises and 
subsequent governmental decisive interventions on what the role and status of the 
State is and ought to be, signal both an end of one epoch and a beginning of a new 
one. The crises might or might not be violent. What it is necessary to stress is the 
impact of the transformation. The emphasis of the discourses is on the need and 
justification for a radical shift. 
 
However, along the economic axis, the eruption of crises at peak moments, in which 
the process of commodification of economic activities reaches either a highest or a 
lowest point, tend to be mediated mainly through strategies of adaptation or 
reformism. There might be modifications in the pace or direction of the trajectory. 
Nonetheless, the landing is perceived to be relatively smooth and contained between 
the margins of a certain trend. The breaking point, if any, is not as dramatic as that for 
a crisis along the political axis. This is not to say that the process is exempt from all 
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contradictions. On the contrary, the contradictions which remain unaddressed become 
factors which may among others trigger a stronger and more radical transformation 
later. Unsurprisingly, the main official concern is for political and economic stability 
and the domestic and international discourses are adjusted accordingly.  
 
TABLE 1.1 PUNCTUATED EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 
 
 DIMENSION CHANGE OUTCOME ORIENTATION 
 
 
Political  
 
Power of the 
State 
 
 
Imposition of 
new direction 
 
Decisive 
intervention 
 
 
Violent / Non 
violent 
 
Transformation 
(-) Corporatism / Welfare 
(-) Socio – political preferences 
(-) Authoritarianism and 
political constraints 
------------------------------------- 
(+) Utilitarian role of the State 
(+) Market preferences 
(+) Democratization and 
political autonomy 
 
 
 
Economic 
 
Market 
 
 
 
 
Ratification of 
former 
trajectory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concern for 
Stability 
 
Reformism / 
Adaptation 
(-) Decommodification 
(-) Corporatist agencies 
(-) Welfare policies 
(-) Increased protection from 
markets 
------------------------------------- 
(+) Commodification 
(+) Private actors 
(+) Neo-classical economics 
(+) Decreased protection from 
markets 
 
 
THE ECONOMIC AXIS OF THE MARKET  
 
Whenever the trajectory of structural change and the punctuated evolution processes 
of the State crosses or departs from the market axis, the outcome is better 
characterized as a reformist, soft change. The factors, agencies and structures in play 
opt for stability and the adaptation of policies and strategies. The crisis is more or less 
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contained within certain parameters to avoid spillover or contagion which might 
trigger a more radical transformation.  
 
On the one hand, close to the negative end of the market axis, it is mainly corporatist 
agencies which mediate, participate and become involved in the different phases 
through which the crisis evolves. As the welfare policies can be mapped along the ‘y’ 
axis, the four main commodities, which are either taken out of the market or somehow 
protected from it, do not suffer radical transformation. Furthermore, the general 
processes of structural change and punctuated evolution of the State remain basically 
unaltered, although their specific trajectory may be subject to change. 
 
On the other hand, at the positive end of the vertical axis, the participation of non-
governmental agencies, firms and private actors becomes increasingly evident. The 
neoclassical practices, coupled with the emphasis on sound macroeconomic variables 
and the concern for keeping inflation under control, are used for justifying the 
reduction of governmental intervention in economic affairs. The imperfect and 
incomplete commodification of knowledge, land, money and labour in most cases 
involves the dismantling of welfare fundamentals, and the elimination of subsidies is 
also prioritized to eradicate the eruption of further crises. In some cases, the factors 
which trigger the crisis are described as low paced or flawed liberalization and 
deregulation practices. This, for instance, was the official evaluation of the Mexican 
financial crisis of the mid 1990s. Thus, the prescribed solution for the economic crisis 
approaching, crossing or leaving the ‘y’ axis, reinforces, ratifies, or reassumes the 
overall trajectory of the structural change and punctuated evolution processes of the 
State.  
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 THE POLITICAL AXIS OF POWER  
 
A quite different outcome emerges whenever the trajectory of the State leaves, gets 
close to, or crosses the political axis. Crises which impact upon the power dimension 
of the State are much more likely to effect a radical and transformative outcome. A 
structural transformation of the historical trend can be traced as a dramatic turn 
revealing decisive interventions and institutional changes.  The transformations are 
more evident and the crisis cannot be contained easily. In some cases, the 
transformative effects of hard changes embrace a societal dimension, both from 
bottom up and the top down and the agenda and practice of politics become inclusive. 
 
A trajectory of the processes of structural change and punctuated evolution of the 
State which moves towards the positive end of the horizontal axis is associated with 
the strong exercise of power. This does not imply a material dimension only, but an 
invisible and non-measurable one as well. Whenever decision-makers, most probably 
but not exclusively governmental, cross the horizontal axis of political power; the 
preferences and decisions towards the processes of commodification entail a 
transformation in the political regime. Benefiting from an increasingly authoritarian 
system, the corporatist practices and welfare policies are gradually or dramatically 
reshaped, aiming at institutionalizing market preferences, thus leaving behind social 
concerns. These changes in the structural contexts and in the situated agents and in 
their agendas are clearly crises which need to be addressed sooner or later, since they 
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cannot be postponed indefinitely. Decisive intervention alters the political course and 
route of the State from a welfare project to a liberal one.  
 
On the other side of the spectrum, the negative end of the ‘x’ axis represents weak 
State power relations and capabilities which constrain actors. The trajectory of the 
process of structural transformation from commodified money, information, land and 
labour towards a more inclusive political, social and economic model represents 
another sort of crisis. The transformation, although quite different from the pro-liberal 
one, is nevertheless dramatic in its own way due to the fact that it remedies the lack 
of, reduced or flawed protection of commodities, granting them shelter against the 
market. The eruption of some crises may become quite evident as a bottom-up 
initiative, which may or may not be violent. Increasing numbers of social actors take 
part in the transformation as it incorporates a broader agenda and wider ranges of 
preferences.  
 
 
THE HISTORIC TRANSFORMATIONS IN MEXICO 
 
The non-material dimensions and elements of the State proved crucial for the 
processes of change. The never static dynamic of the dialectical interaction between 
structures and agencies has continuously adapted and transformed itself. After the 
revolution there was a tendency through which the institutions and apparatuses of the 
State were extended. Corporatist practices and modes were modified and influenced 
by the context and agencies of the time. Decades later, by the end of the last century, 
the orientation of economic, political and social policies had changed direction. The 
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rolling back of the State meant a structural transformation which has been going on 
ever since. It is in this context that the promotion of a flexible labour force is adjusted 
and follows economic imperatives and rationality (Hay, 1996; Jessop, 1990b).45 The 
processes and dynamics of social change have made use of reinforcing strategies for 
both corporatism and neoclassical models. Thus, the Mexican State is constantly 
reshaped in all dimensions, evolving in a punctuated fashion. Moments of continuity 
interweave with change and restructuring and, in so doing, they consolidate new 
regimes, favouring new actors and ideational factors and reshaping the context which 
they are embedded in. This dynamic mix evolves endlessly, featuring a cumulative 
and incremental adaptation and change of both structures and agencies, on the one 
hand, and material and ideational dimensions, on the other. The contingent and open 
ended nature of the social and political processes and dynamics shapes the perception 
and information which the strategic actors use for selecting their courses of action. 
This, in turn, triggers intended and unintended consequences from which the actors 
learn and modify the context they inhabit (Hay, 2002c).       
  
Once Mexican macro-economic indicators were on the rise, they created a paradox. It 
was a matter of continuity and change then for import substitution industrialization, as 
it is now for the outwardly oriented economy. The issue became not only to continue 
the promotion of growth, but to change and put into practice mechanisms for 
economic redistribution. With the benefit of hindsight it can be said that the power 
immanent in social relations increased, broadening the context in which actors 
conduct their actions. Additionally, it brought a very important change in social 
                                                 
45 In other words, the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime according to Jessop is a transitory 
phase which replaces the Keynesian Welfare National State (2002). Chapter Five, below, critically 
examines this proposition.  
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conditions, as they took off from a low civil society concentration of power, and high 
presidential concentration of power, to a potentially more balanced scenario of 
political autonomy. The early 20th century social revolution and the punctuated 
evolution of social relations brought significant changes, which permitted social 
participation in economically productive activities to grow. Basically, the unattended 
agenda ignored participation in economic activities, which have not been adequately 
matched on two fronts. Firstly, the inequalities in the redistribution of economic 
benefits have not only been systematically ignored, but, worse, they widened and 
worsened through government policy. Though different government programmes 
have been implemented during recent presidential terms, they have not corrected the 
problems. Palliative strategies reduce pain, but are unable to deal with the causes of 
the problem. Secondly, broader social participation in economic activities has not 
been equalized in the political arena. The typically authoritarian incestuous 
relationship between the former ruling political party and the rest of the government 
apparatus was one of the factors impeding and controlling the rise of broader political 
participation. What used to be a tool for corporatist practices and the control of 
society proved no longer useful as demands could not be adequately satisfied by such 
a mechanism during subsequent years. What is still needed is a citizenship approach, 
fostering civil, political and social individual citizens’ rights and duties vis-à-vis the 
State and free of corporatist and authoritarian bias. 
  
Economic factors such as the fall in private and public investment, the rise of interest 
rates and the elimination of subsidies are elements which account for the crisis in the 
conception, use and protection of nature and its resources. The liberal self-regulating 
economic imperative of the market, which grants scant protection, if any at all, is 
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incapable of providing a counter-balance through specific palliative governmental 
programmes, the creation of institutions and the ratifying of international agreements. 
Although environmental concerns have evolved from a narrow health hazard concept 
to ‘greener policies’, they do not substantially challenge the increased 
commodification of nature. The normative dimensions of some regulations have not 
been adequately translated into an executive dimension, though this is undoubtedly 
required not only for growth, but for sustainable development.  
 
The transformation of the early 1980s, unlike the social revolution of the earlier 20th 
century, was not a bottom up revolution, but a peaceful transformation, imposed from 
government offices down. The technocratic choice of a limited or restricted State 
intervention in economic activities imposed a new legal and institutional framework 
to further reduce the level of protection --imperfect though it was-- granted to the 
fictitious commodities. Basically the main characteristics of the import substitution 
industrialization, which was initiated in the 1930s, have been decisively and steadily 
altered and they are now completely reversed. Although the distinctive features of 
Mexican corporatism have weakened, they have not disappeared, and some of them 
are still present. Decision-making is still quite centralized, due to a legacy of 
authoritarianism and despite humble efforts, the accountability of senior public 
officials is still far from adequate or effective. The emphasis on regulation has 
changed towards liberalization with constitutional alterations being the main goal.46 
The public ownership of enterprises has been dismantled by massive privatization 
                                                 
46 Core constitutional modifications seem to be not as straightforward as they used to be as regards 
minor modifications in previous presidential terms. The composition of political parties in the 
Congress has not given any absolute majority to any party since 1997. Therefore, both the President 
and the political parties somehow need to negotiate in order to reach agreements and to cooperate with 
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programmes, benefiting not only domestic but also foreign investors. Finally, the 
protection of the domestic market has been systematically under attack, privileging an 
outward orientation of economic activities and export promotion.       
                                                                                                                                            
their counterparts if they are interested in getting laws passed. There are very few precedents for this 
situation.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Social Processes of Change 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
As demonstrated so far, the developmental trajectory of the State can be traced along 
political and economic axes. Consequently, the dynamic nature of the relationship of 
social structures and agencies is unquestionable. What this thesis aims to make 
evident is the strong political element in every step, decision, election, choice or 
inaction. Recalling that politics encompasses both the public and the private spheres, 
the intensity of power immanent in all social relations, on the one hand, and the 
degree of commodification of economic activities, on the other, have proved useful 
for tracing a general, albeit imprecise, picture of the tendencies and countertendencies 
in play. It is now necessary to have a closer look at some of the crucial elements 
involved in these processes. Thus, some simple, but at the same time important and 
uncomfortable, questions urgently need to be answered: What triggers social change? 
How does social change happen? What are the factors which make changes evident?  
 
Although neither a definitive, nor a conclusive answer to the question of what triggers 
change is attempted here, an attempt is made to spell out some of the theoretical and 
empirical issues which must characterise the debate. The process-tracing of change 
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needs to be carefully conducted, making use of the Strategic Relational Approach.1 
Suffice here to say broad distinctive features are taken into account; however, it is 
important to stress that it is not the aim of this chapter to provide a detailed typology 
of the features of social change. On the contrary, only a few broad characteristics are 
considered in so far as they may best capture the general tendencies and 
countertendencies of social processes. 
 
The features of change which are analyzed here include two dimensions of change 
which complement each other. Some mainstream literature has dealt with the material 
dimensions of change, whereas the ideational dimension has risen in importance 
during the last few years (cf. Blyth, 1997; Hall, 1989; Hay, 2000b and 2002c; Wendt, 
1992 and 1999). Moreover, material and ideational transformations can range from 
being adaptive and slow-paced to incremental and more radical and rapid change. The 
reformist motion cannot be identified as easily as the crisis moments when in the 
perception of observers the pace and succession of change accelerates. Another aspect 
to consider is how social, political and economic factors interplay and impact upon 
each other. It is the constant repetition of relevant actions and omissions which helps 
to forge path-dependent dynamics. For the repetition of both active and passive 
courses of action contribute towards setting, in the medium and long term, how costly 
                                                 
1 The ontological and epistemological positions which this thesis subscribes to are realist. Suffice it to 
say that the core features of these hold firstly, that there is a distinction between the existence of the 
world out there and our knowledge of it; secondly, that unobservable structures can be acknowledged; 
thirdly, that even though the social phenomena and processes exist, produce, and affect outcomes by 
themselves, they need to be recognised as independent of the perception or discursive construction of 
the observers; and finally, that the understanding which structures is crucial, despite the facilitation of 
a certain set of preferences over others. The reason that structures do not determine outcomes is 
because agencies themselves, always bring contingency and uncertainty into the social processes (cf. 
Lawson, 1997 and 2003; Hay, 2002c; Marsh et al. 1999). However, this is not the same thing as to say 
that the Strategic Relational Approach employed in this thesis is the only theoretical tool capable of 
making those distinctions. Since there is a need to identify the politics of economic determinism, those 
issues are some of the main points to be discussed in Chapter Three. 
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would it be to opt for other alternatives. In other words, as economists assert, 
transaction costs prove crucial.  In addition to these features, their origins, either 
domestic or external, are undoubtedly worth considering, for they can be 
acknowledged as opportunities or constraints for agenda-setting, decision-making, 
preference and context shaping in the eyes of the actors in context.  
 
As a starting point for considering the above questions, it is crucial to make clear 
from the outset the features of the Strategic Relational Approach adopted here. This 
allows us to identify windows of opportunity and constraint which could open up or 
cancel out alternative courses of action, both active and passive. The strategic 
selectivity already introduced in the opening chapter affects both the structures and 
the agencies, due to the fact that the context does not determine the outcomes and nor 
do the agencies always realise their goals. A famous passage, often cited, from 
Marx’s Eighteenth  Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte reads ‘…men make their own 
history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have 
chosen…’ (cited in Hay, 2002c, 117). This influential statement is neatly divided in 
two parts. Apart from the structural limits of action evidenced in the second half of 
the sentence, the first highlights the vital role which actors have in shaping and 
influencing the course of events. The limits to this capacity are also acknowledged, 
since unintended consequences run parallel to the intended goals. Nevertheless, the 
crucial aspect is, without any doubt, the potential and capacity of the agents for 
transforming the context they live in. The dialectical interaction between structures 
and agencies never leaves either unaltered. Their interaction modifies each element. 
Just as members of civil society react to government policies, so the government 
reacts, when social sectors manifest interest or concern in specific issues. 
 80
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the degree of change is never 
uniform as it varies in each specific situation. Therefore, the impact of the 
transformations is uneven, since the capability and resources remain unequally 
distributed in any dialectical interaction or relationship.   
 
 
 
Throughout this work the conception of social, political and economic change is 
perceived to embrace the social system itself as a sequence of interrelated changes. It 
is the succession of various stages over time and the aggregated result of various 
components within the spectrum of potential change. The ever-changing nature of 
social dynamics varies over time and is also case-specific, multidimensional and 
multilevel (Sztompka, 1993). A broad range of possibilities and scenarios takes place 
within the spatio-temporal dimensions, where the material and the ideational spheres 
interact with each other and also with a vast range of structures and agencies. 
Adopting the Strategic Relational Approach helps us to identify the vital elements that 
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FIGURE 2.1 SOCIAL PROCESSES OF CHANGE CRUCIAL INTERACTIONS
Interactions within specific time and space dimensions 
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take part in the punctuated evolution apparent to us.2 For a graphical representation of 
the analytical distinctiveness of this approach, in particular, the material and 
ideational elements which, are made by situated agents in strategically selective 
contexts within specific spacio-temporal locations, see Figure 2.1 above. It is to this 
perspective in more detail that I now turn. 
 
 
THE CORE FACTOR OF CHANGE 
 
The analysis of change has been approached from different angles. One of the most 
widely used, although it is not exempt from controversy, is institutionalism. 
According to this view, institutions provide the rules of any given society. Their main 
purpose is to reduce the margins of uncertainty and to clearly define and delimit the 
boundaries of individuals’ choices (North, 1990a). Before proceeding it is important 
to stress the fact that institutionalism has been used as a generic label for embracing 
analytical approaches with important common characteristics, but also with some 
fundamental differences.3 While for some analysts the sharing of common analytical 
ground could be used as a platform for supplementing and reinforcing the approaches 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996),4 for certain others, although some collaboration might seem 
                                                 
2 Regarding the Mexican case, special attention is given in Chapters Four, Six and Eight of this thesis.  
3 For useful surveys of the subject see Cammack, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hay and Wincott, 
1998; Peters, 1999; and Pierson, 1993. Even though the various analytical spectrums of 
institutionalism have been classified with broad features in mind, it is inevitable that the depth of the 
classification criteria and the focus of the survey highlight different issues. Unsurprisingly, consensual 
views alert us to the fact that it is valid to consider institutionalism as a generic approach; yet this claim 
is attenuated in view of the range of various theorico-methodological positions, strengths and 
limitations between them.   
4 Arbitrary as any classification might be, there seems to be some consensus about the importance of 
the relationship between institutions and behaviour, on one side, and how institutions originate and 
change on the other (Hall and Taylor, 1996). According to these authors three great subdivisions of 
institutionalism are the historical, the rational choice, and the sociological. Nonetheless, to argue that 
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desirable at first glance, its prospects are more limited under closer scrutiny due to 
unavoidably incompatible premises (Hay and Wincott, 1998).5   
 
In particular, one of the fundamental deficiencies of institutionalism is the inadequate 
attention granted to the analytical distinction between structure and agency. This is a 
crucial issue which this chapter aims to clarify. Furthermore, the ontological 
distinctiveness of rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and 
historical institutionalism make any ‘crude synthesis’ of them all impossible (Hay and 
Wincott, 1998).  
 
The acknowledgment that policies are meant to work as producers of specific 
resources and incentives, impacts upon governmental spheres and non-governmental 
ones too. The dialectical interaction between structures and agencies, and between the 
material and the ideational spheres, provides both general and specific feedback, 
which in turn make their way, albeit modified through the processes, towards the 
transformation of State capacities. For instance, Chapter Four and Six below, discuss 
the fact that orthodox economists who served as government officials prioritized 
                                                                                                                                            
rational choice institutionalism is as good as its peers is not to say it is the best way of addressing the 
issue of social change, as will be shown below.   
5 Aware of the caveat that generalizations could lead to conflation among different schools of 
institutionalism, it can be cautiously claimed that shared features of the different institutionalist 
approaches are the consensus on institutions as both formal and informal structural features of society, 
and some concern for stability over time as well. Additionally, the perception that institutions should 
impose some limits to any agential behaviour is crucial, as it requires the sharing of some common 
values and meanings for the actors constrained by the institutions. However, differences amongst 
institutional theories that should not be overlooked are the lack of a consensual definition of what an 
institution is; the sources of preferences of the theories, either exogenous or endogenous; whether 
change is perceived as a part of a static scheme or a disruption of stability; and finally the way in 
which interactions between individuals and institutions shape each other’s behaviour (Peters, 1999).  
Sharing a common ground of institutions as products of human agency, on the one hand, and the 
structure of rules and incentives as a ‘choice of the designers’ which limits the room for manoeuvre 
and shapes the behaviour of the agencies, on the other, a detailed classification lists six different bands 
in the institutionalism rainbow: normative, rational choice, historical, empirical, international, and 
societal (Peters, 1999). 
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economic reforms in Mexico over democratic transformations, in the name of 
stability. 
 
The suggestion that specific incentives derived from policies induce individuals to 
take actions makes those particular policy developments path-dependent. That is, the 
claim that certain patterns of inertia make the only feasible option for individuals a 
very narrow range of choice, is a quite evident, although by no means exclusive, 
characteristic of rational choice institutionalism. Lock-in policy effects are supposed 
to render previously viable alternatives implausible, followed by a somehow passive 
acceptance of previous decisions and courses of action (Pierson, 1993).6 The logic of 
the inevitability of unfettered market compulsion as defended by hyperglobalists is an 
example (Ohmae, 1990 and 1996; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999; Hay 
and Marsh, 2000). Since this argument has been used to justify the unavoidability of 
the priorities of such market-oriented economic strategies as liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation, it is to a closer scrutiny of one of institutionalism that I 
now turn.      
 
Just as different analytical focuses are pursued under the banner of institutionalism, 
rational choice institutionalism, also labelled neoclassical institutionalism, is not a 
uniform perspective in its own right (Gilpin, 2001). There are different exponents and 
research agendas grouped under the rational choice institutionalist label. 
Nevertheless, some consensus arises over the concepts of bounded rationality, and the 
utility maximizing actor realizes his goals more effectively through institutional 
                                                 
6 Even though Pierson’s work is considered representative of historical institutionalism, his notion of 
lock-in policy effects has strong similarities to rational choice institutionalism (1993). It also 
exemplifies how close analytical and theoretical notions could be within the institutionalist approaches.    
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action. However, it does not take long for the goal seeking individual to realise that 
institutions constrain, enable and shape his/her behaviour (Peters, 1999).7 Despite 
discrepancies, one of the most important agreements amongst institutionalists 
concerns what institutions are. For them, institutions are sets of rules, either formal or 
informal, which serve to establish a stable structure within which human interactions 
take place facilitating ‘rational’ conduct. The importance of institutions stems from a 
mix of incentives and transaction costs. Some transaction costs may be increased, and 
some others decreased, in order to favour certain aims and courses of action. It is in 
this sense that the evolution of a society through time is shaped by institutional 
change. Institutions are, then, “…the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally… the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction…” (North, 
1990a, 3). The influential work of the Nobel laureate and author of Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance, seeks to explain how institutions 
create structural incentives which influence and shape the direction of change, 
incrementally modifying the institutional framework in a path-dependent way. In 
other words, North’s view is a structurally directed or induced top-down analysis of 
institutional change, in which the institutional framework is a precondition for the 
performance of an economy. According to his argument, it follows that the addition of 
a large number of economies makes possible mass markets (1990a).8  
 
                                                 
7 It is not difficult to find common assumptions such as rules and sets of incentives as the institutional 
departure point; nor is it hard to find shared problems such as coordination and control of the public 
bureaucracy for rational choice institutionalism, either. Moreover, according to this view, the role 
which incentives and constraints play determines institutions themselves. In this perspective, the 
emergence of institutions follows a structural functionalist logic leaving aside agencies in the 
explanation (Peters, 1999).  
8 The property rights regime developed within the system is considered to be a fundamental set of 
market rules. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that government is the best situated agency to make and 
enforce those rules which propel the function of the market (North, 1990a; Peters, 1999).   
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It is clear that changes in the ideational sphere are qualitatively important, as this 
thesis aims to show. Consider, for instance, the implementation of agreements 
towards a democratic transition, or alternatively, how a reorientation of the economic 
model, policies and strategies is implemented. Suffice it here to say that specific 
governmental policies can deliver tangible benefits to citizens. Medical care, welfare 
and education services, to mention only a few, may result in significant material 
benefits for many people. This gives some economic sectors impetus, both in terms of 
economic gains and losses, growth and a reduction in the provision of material goods 
and of the infrastructure they need to use. Since there is no unique direction of 
change, the material elements and factors interact and influence one another, hence 
both need to be considered.      
 
Even though rational choice institutionalism recognizes that the rules of the game are 
creations of human agency, and builds on the foundation of their choices, gives too 
little weight to the fact that agents are able to trigger social change. Rational choice 
institutionalism in general, and North’s argument in particular, transfigure the agential 
starting point of that approach, by appealing to a deterministic structural logic in the 
end.  Furthermore, North proceeds without even conceding that the choices which 
individuals make modify the contexts which they are in. The farthest this rational 
choice institutional perspective goes is to suggest that organizations can induce 
change (North, 1990a, 73-82). In his view, organizations bind groups of individuals 
by some common purpose to achieve specified objectives. Thus, political, economic, 
social and educational organizations operate in a fluid dynamic of evolution 
influenced by the institutional framework (1990a). Still, this is not the same thing as 
saying that actors, either individual or collective, could be a factor of change 
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themselves. Since power is embedded in all social relations, agencies in context find 
themselves able to modify and influence the structure in which they are situated. In 
other words, power is not exclusively hierarchic and structurally determined all the 
way down from the top (Foucault, 1976, 1977 and 1979). Each situation is case 
specific and dependant on a multitude of factors; nevertheless, each and every agent, 
both individual and collective, has the potential to influence, promote and achieve 
changes at different levels of the structure. Yet, it is of utmost importance to 
acknowledge that all resources are differentially distributed.     
   
There are some important omissions in the rational choice institutionalist analysis and 
conceptualization of change. A striking weakness, especially in North’s work, is the 
lack of explicit mention of power and the way in which it influences social structures 
and agents. For according to Foucault, power is the core factor of social change 
immanent in all social relations. This is schematically shown in Figure 2.2 below. 
Even though, for North, there is an implicit acknowledgement of authority and power, 
it is never spelled out in his famous book. The economic discourse of institutions as 
rules in a society which function to decrease uncertainty and to define and limit the 
set of choices of individuals is clear, as is his model of treating social interactions as 
costs.9 What it is not clear at all, since there is no explicit mention of it in his analysis, 
is the role which authorities play, in particular, and the exercise of power more 
generally in his analysis. Since institutions are treated as the rules of the game, 
crucially supplying the fact that power issues and dimensions are taken for granted 
must be examined, debated and challenged. For institutionalism, rules are given for 
                                                 
9 Measurement and the costliness of enforcement are components of transaction costs. Hence, in turn, 
in addition to transformation costs, they equal production costs. Whenever it is expensive to transact 
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individuals to follow and delimit their feasible choices; although those sets of rules do 
not cancel out alternative courses of action. Furthermore, collective and individual 
agents could identify some rules as incompatible with some of their preferences. 
Hence, actors could exercise their freedom to choose, either by selecting something 
from the menu, or not selecting anything at all. In case no option matches their 
preferences, clearly their demands still need to be satisfied, either through this 
specific channel or through some alternative ones. In this sense, Chapter Five 
highlights the relevance of a mode of governance through networks. 
   
 
Since one of the clear ways in which structural power can be exercised is through the 
production and reproduction of knowledge, this in turn, at least in some academic and 
government circles, has emphasized a concern for stability. This is why it does not 
come as a surprise that some mainstream theories are oriented towards the 
preservation of the status quo. Dominant forms of ideas and knowledge work as an 
instrument for maintaining dominance (Gill, 1997). Nonetheless, it is important to 
                                                                                                                                            
the institutional rules of the game they matter, as they become crucial factors in the performance of 
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FIGURE 2.2 POWER: THE CORE FACTOR OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
   Immanent power in social interactions 
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recall that agents are never powerless, because power is embedded in all social 
relations (Foucault, 1976 and 1977). Moreover, for Foucault power has no privileged 
origin and no a priori essence. It is articulated with discourses and institutions, at the 
same time as it is integrated into different strategies. According to this view, power 
has been characterized as a conjunctural producer of knowledge in all social relations. 
Power and knowledge directly imply one another (Jessop, 1990b; Hay, 2002c). In this 
sense, actors, both individual and collective, have in their own hands the means and 
ability to influence their courses of action to affect particular outcomes.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that a range of different agencies and factors take part 
in the decision-making processes, the definition of the agenda, and the shaping of the 
preferences and contexts (Lukes, 1974). Not only is the enforcement of rules clearly a 
matter of power, but the agenda and the context they are in tell us much about whose 
interests and which actors they are privileging. Rational choice institutionalism goes 
beyond some of the simplistic assumptions of orthodox neoclassical economics and 
perceives the world as a multiple equilibrium market (North, 1990a). Nonetheless, 
incomplete information and poor feedback, on the one hand, and uncertain outcomes 
and changing preferences over time, on the other, are also situations which elude 
simplistic models. It is in this sense that a complex mixture of informal norms, rules 
and formal constraints and their enforcement characteristics, together strategically 
select in preparation for the set choice, although never determining the outcomes.    
 
It is interesting to recall that for rational choice institutionalism, change can be 
reduced to a marginal adjustment in the institutional framework, where the 
                                                                                                                                            
economies (North, 1990a and 1990b).   
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adjustments in relative prices and tastes alter norms and ideologies.10 According to 
this explanation, change is the outcome of innumerable short-term decisions made by 
political and economic entrepreneurs shaping the performance of the institutional 
framework. The way in which those decisions affect the rules of the game could be 
both direct and indirect, incrementally making long-term changes more evident. Since 
the focus of this thesis is on the peaceful processes of change, relevant external 
shocks such as war are not under scrutiny here. In this sense, institutional change is 
one of the two ways in which economies and societies evolve. The other is 
technological change, which could be assigned in turn as a material sphere. For 
rational choice institutionalists the incremental pace of change works to recontract 
and to capture potential gains, shaping the depth and extent of the alterations or 
reforms. In this neoclassical economics-oriented explanation of rational choice 
institutionalism, institutional change appears as the underlying concern for the set of 
hierarchic constraints associated with stability. In a manner consistent with this view, 
the cost of change increases each time according to the strength of the interactions, 
whenever either a minor reform or a radical transformation is attempted (North 
1990a). Hence, path dependence favours repeated courses of action and inaction.     
 
 
SOCIAL PROCESSES ENTAIL SOCIAL CHANGES 
 
In my view, institutional change cannot, and must not be, translated as equivalent to a 
transformation of the State. For the State is a social process always in the making with 
                                                 
10 For some very strict and rigid rational choice institutional frameworks, change is completely alien to 
their explanations, and appears to happen only when institutions have fallen into obsolescence (Peters, 
1999).  
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patterns of punctuated evolution and therefore, its analysis must not be reduced to a 
simple institutional set of rules (see Chapters One and Five). The reforms of 
institutions can however, be accounted as one of the elements of the social processes; 
they might be a necessary, but never a sufficient, condition for a fundamental change 
or reorientation of the State. There are degrees of institutional change which could 
vary from almost insignificant to major ones. Since institutions account only for a 
portion of the non-material elements of the State, a transformation of one of its parts, 
or even some of them do not account for the whole of the social body, especially for 
all of its ideational and material elements.     
 
As it will be evidenced in the following chapters of this thesis, elements of change 
can be addressed in terms of their material and ideational dimensions, and in terms of 
their structural and agential aspects. Yet, the facilitation of some courses of action 
does not guarantee that any expected outcome will occur as intended. There are 
always unintended consequences, because perfect control of all the variables is 
impossible in the real world.  
 
In spite of the similarities in the temporality patterns of social processes, history 
evolves in a punctuated fashion, never repeating itself. On the contrary, the 
contingency of the social interactions and the indeterminacy of the factors at play, 
always leaves the door open for uncontrollable elements. Taking a closer look at the 
discovery of different social processes, their similar characteristics over time are 
always quite revealing of the elements, factors, tendencies and countertendencies at 
play. The detail of the features reveals dissimilarities which must not be overlooked.  
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It is important to stress that the very contingency which agents bring to the social 
processes also represent an important social trigger of change. This agency promoted 
change accounts for elements of variation and indeterminacy impossible to find in 
structural accounts and explanations of change. Moreover, changes move in different, 
sometimes contradictory directions. Multidirectional patterns of punctuated evolution 
cover a more comprehensive spectrum, which, depending on power factors, could 
help determine the depth of the transformation along the political and economic axes, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. Some changes may result in effects which are 
superficial and shallow, whereas some others as might turn out to be deep and 
fundamental transformations.      
 
Even though they are not always easy to identify, the processes of social change are 
facilitated and constrained by very different sorts of power related factors, i.e., 
institutions, individuals, regulators, specific actions, deliberate omissions, 
information, ideas, governments, firms, etc.; all play a role in the ever evolving 
processes of social change. They are case specific and could be exercised both 
directly and indirectly within specific contexts. Additionally, they may embrace the 
whole gamut of material and non material elements and of agency and non-agency 
factors. For instance, the implementation of any specific economic programme brings 
its own economic goal and political target. Consider the promotion of the divestiture 
of public enterprises which has provided resources to economically constrained 
governments, which are at the same time seeking less direct official involvement in 
economic activities.       
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Acknowledging history matters, especially for explaining long-term economic 
change; rational choice institutionalist authors claim that it is possible to assess 
economic performances. Because path-dependent interactions decisively contribute to 
shaping structure-agency and material-ideational interactions at different levels, it 
comes as no surprise that the longer the time periods under scrutiny, the more evident 
patterns of change become. Rational choice institutionalism and historical materialism 
are very different theoretical approaches and their emphasis, concepts, and focus do 
not match. The prescriptions of rational choice institutionalism depart widely from 
those of historical materialism (North, 1990a). Some exponents of rational choice 
institutionalism, aiming for efficiency, clearly tend to favour stability, therefore 
exhibiting a pro-status quo deterministic and structuralist logic (Hay, 2002c).  
 
It is vital to stress the analysis of power as the core factor of change, as this 
acknowledges the fact that social processes entail social change. Before proceeding 
with an analysis of the economic and political nature of change, it is important to 
briefly discuss some important considerations regarding the market axis introduced in 
the previous chapter of this thesis.     
 
 
THE MOVE TOWARDS THE COMMODIFICATION OF ECONOMIC 
ACTIVITIES 
 
Recalling the market axis, or ‘y’ axis introduced in Chapter One, I want to discuss 
here the seminal idea from which the analytical map borrows, as it will prove useful 
throughout this thesis. Due to the fact there is no perfect synchronicity between the 
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economic and political agendas, it comes as no surprise that the expansion of markets 
is matched, albeit at a different pace, by the expansion of social controls. Polanyi 
identified the ‘double movement’ as a social response and attempt to control the 
social polarization and adverse effects of markets in the 19th century (1957). The 
theoretical validity of his argument has led some authors to make analogies between 
the contemporary emphasis on the privatization, deregulation and liberalization of 
economic activities with the European experience of the one hundred years peace. 
The democratic deficit which characterizes the implementation of today’s economic 
agenda is disquieting, because it imposes a vertical and unaccountable set of 
authorities who promote an indiscriminate and unsustainable socialization of costs 
and a privatization of benefits, as will be shown in Chapter Four.11 Opposed to this 
trend, the reconstitution of authentic civil and political society is perceived to spread 
from the grass roots to all social strata, not confining it to the economic sphere of 
production only, but also including and directing efforts towards the economic sphere 
of consumption. The argument stresses that if the contemporary orientation of society 
is to be transformed, the consumption model will define the character of future 
society (Gill, 1997).       
 
In the opening chapter, power and market axes were used to trace the trajectory of the 
State as a social process. The historic trend has shown a pattern which has varied in 
political and economic emphasis over time. Interestingly, the contemporary 
tendencies in Mexico point towards the increasing commodification of economic 
                                                 
11 Instruments for surveillance and manipulation prove efficient for political control and economic 
stability. The contemporary emphasis on markets as the axis of both public and private activities, the 
goal of efficiency, and the profit oriented processes of commodification, have the embedded power 
imprint themselves. The use of ideas, information and knowledge made by actors triggers intended and 
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activities. Economic and financial priorities top the international and domestic 
agendas, as shown in Chapters Four and Eight. However, it is important to recall that 
the emphasis on the expansion of the markets is never disconnected from a ‘double 
movement’ which reconsiders granting social protection in return. Even though it is 
evident that the dialectical interaction of the market and society is not perfectly 
synchronized, it is important to underline that both tendencies and countertendencies 
are never separate from each other, although they follow different dialectical tempos.  
 
Having discussed that power is the core factor of social change, I now turn to develop 
an account of the contemporary orientation of economic priorities. The next section 
carries out an analysis of what the economic role of the State ought to be. In so doing, 
the Strategic Relational Approach will prove useful for examining and studying the 
material and ideational elements, along with the structural and agential ones and their 
mutual interactions.      
 
 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL NATURE  
 
Since the 1970s, there has been a sustained emphasis on neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy. It has become commonplace to negate alternative scenarios, such as the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO), back in the 1970s;12 whilst the burden of 
                                                                                                                                            
unintended consequences, depending on the immediate context in which they are situated and their 
spatio-temporal locations.  
12 The NIEO proposal by the developing nations Group of 77 considered the economic rights and 
duties of the States. Not only was this normative initiative never implemented, but the demands for a 
more equitable economic order which urgently needed attention have been systematically ignored. 
Furthermore, the amount of international aid from the developed economies to the developing ones has 
shrunk without reaching the agreed goals, leaving Israel as one of the most benefited US aid recipients. 
This provides strong evidence of other criteria than economic need in the selection.  
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the oil crisis, and the abandonment of the dollar’s convertibility to gold, are all 
milestones of the post Second World War era. There is a growing recognition that not 
only market failures, but also government failures have some fairly important 
common denominators, such as imperfect information on one side, and incomplete 
markets on the other (Stiglitz, 1989 and 1998b).13 The recognition of the importance 
of these two limitations, along with the ahistorical character of some economic 
models and approaches, has contributed to challenge static, deterministic and 
structuralist analysis (Gilpin, 2001; Stiglitz, 1991).   
 
Regarding the State and market interactions and complementarity, the efficient 
allocation of resources is closely associated with redistributive policies for adequate 
welfare provision. In economists’ jargon, it should be a Pareto efficient scenario. This 
scenario refers to a situation in which some individuals can be made better off, 
without making even one actor worse off. Nevertheless, these Pareto optimal 
situations are in most cases affected by failures on both the public side and on the 
market one, the most frequently recurrent being imperfect information and incomplete 
markets.14 Stating that only under exceptional circumstances are the market and the 
public sector efficient is not the same as saying that this is impossible to achieve, 
                                                                                                                                            
Instead, trade flows rather than economic aid was supposed to be a more viable solution to the 
developing problems. Instead, what the least developed countries have been experiencing is a set of 
pervasive steady and worsening economic constraints which dramatically underline a catastrophic and 
determinist outlook. In most of these cases the social cost is outrageously high, not only affecting 
millions of people, especially the most vulnerable ones, but depriving them of even the most basic and 
fundamental living and sanitary conditions.   
13 According to Stiglitz, the way in which governments should get involved in economic activities 
dictates their role as complements to the market. Undertaking actions which make markets work better 
and correcting market failures, especially for appropriate regulation, social protection and welfare, are 
entwined and complement the activities of the private sector (Stiglitz, 1998a).   
14 Some quite important public and private failures to which the economy is subject comprise 
externalities, monopolies, inequities, rent-seeking and lack of competition, among others (Stiglitz, 
1989, 1994, 1998a and 1998b).  
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especially as regards the redistribution of goods and services (Stiglitz, 1989 and 
1998b).15  
 
More common situations are those in which the State plays a role in correcting market 
failures; and also the other way round, where the markets, via increased competition 
to raise incentives, attenuate public failures. The raising of revenues by the State 
imposes constraints on the treatment of different individuals (i.e. employment and 
expenditures), and issues such as property rights (Stiglitz, 1989 and 1998b).   
 
Since the State as a social process cannot be reduced or conflated with the 
government, the economic features of the State comprise its universal organization 
membership and its powers of compulsion. The latter is evidently exercised to tax 
citizens, to prescribe certain activities to individuals such as currency emission, to 
grant monopolies i.e. patents, to punish those who break the law and to implement 
redistributive policies for the population. Furthermore, the State’s attendant fiduciary 
responsibilities have consequences for employment and expenditure policy, whereas 
they are limited, for instance, on property rights (Stiglitz, 1989).  
 
These economic features, along with comparatively lower transaction costs due to its 
central and strategic social, economic and political location, place the State in a very 
special position second to no other social structure. Although there is a perception 
that the direct role of the government in the production of goods and services should 
                                                 
15 The mismatch between theory and practice has philosophical roots, as will be mainly discussed in 
Chapter Three, but also throughout this thesis. The neglect of a realist, social ontology must not be 
overlooked. For the inconsistency in methods, social theory and methodology has much to do with the 
unrealistic assumptions and axioms of rational individuality committed to a state of equilibrium 
(Lawson, 1997, and 2003). Thus, owed to a positivist stance, the neoclassical orthodoxy concern for 
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be limited, is not to say that any form of intervention should be discarded. The 
government could be, and indeed is, directly and indirectly involved in the allocation 
and redistribution of goods and services (Stiglitz, 1989). Furthermore, as will be 
discussed in Chapter Five, networking cannot only complement production, 
distribution and the exchange of goods and services, but can also help in reaching 
more equitable scenarios.        
 
One of the suggested ways in which markets and governments could act in a 
complementary fashion proposes the latter should provide incentive mechanisms to 
the former.16 It is important to bear in mind that the governmental reallocation of 
investment and expenditure, if properly done, does not affect aggregate efficiency. 
Yet, the decline in direct involvement from the government in productive activities 
does not mean the government does not have a role to play. On the contrary, the 
government participates as a central actor by different means. Examples are the 
provision of regulations, subsidies and public services, as they all are present, albeit 
to a different extent, throughout the world. This facilitator role should pay special 
attention to restricting influence in areas of special interest, enhancing openness and 
competition, and encouraging the private provision of public goods in a representative 
and accountable way. In short, regarding governance, the need for the public good of 
better information and less secrecy is crucial for securing a more inclusive consensual 
participation in decision-making procedures (Stiglitz, 1998b). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
asocial, ahistorical, mathematic modelling constrains in a deterministic fashion the open ended and 
contingent input of the situated actors in context.   
16 This is a key theme of rational choice institutionalism as well, the argument of which refers to the 
public sector and the private sector. 
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Interestingly, contradicting the perception that financial markets should be the more 
liberalized ones, there are pervasive government interventions quite often in 
developed and developing markets alike, such as central bank interventions to avoid 
national currency devaluations. Amongst the most important market failures, the role 
which imperfect information and incomplete markets play decisively alters the 
context in which agencies act. Since in the absence of government intervention 
markets are not Pareto efficient, the financial markets’ allocation of resources is likely 
to have a series of adverse socio-economic consequences. The role which information 
plays, due to its public good features and benefits, in monitoring the solvency and 
management of institutions, proves crucial for the efficient allocation of goods and 
services. Additional market failures are externalities (of monitoring, selection and 
lending), imperfect competition, missing and incomplete markets and market 
inefficiencies and disruptions (Stiglitz, 1994). Although the government resolves 
market failures imperfectly, its actions both through institutions and directly in the 
capital market help the provision of social objectives. In this sense, government 
interventions aim at improving the financial markets, on the one hand, and 
strengthening itself to play the role of facilitator, on the other.17 Thus, the creation and 
regulation of financial institutions and the directing of credit are available strategies 
for fulfilling the goals of attaining macroeconomic stability, strengthening the 
solvency of institutions and enhancing growth prospects (Stiglitz, 1994). 
 
                                                 
17 Public regulatory policy takes place in a controversial locus and makes use of a broad spectrum of 
different methods. They range from indirect control mechanisms such as incentives and restraints, to 
the setting of regulatory and prudential standards, to designing and enforcing regulations, to improving 
the efficiency with which capital is allocated, to directing credit, and to putting into practice 
competition policies (Stiglitz, 1994).     
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It is also important to note the fact that even though neoclassical economic theories, 
models and approaches tend to be ahistorical, there seems to be a broad cyclical 
pattern of periodic shifts in the relative importance assigned to the government’s 
economic role in such models. With the benefit of historical hindsight it has been 
observed that trends of disillusionment with the failure of the public sector to deliver 
turn into countertrends of disenchantment with the failure of the private sector to 
produce, allocate and redistribute goods and services (Stiglitz, 1989).18 This 
dissatisfaction might turn into a countertendency which would gain momentum and 
strength, and in some cases could become a strong tendency. Therefore, the political 
and economic cycles are closely interlinked with the social processes of punctuated 
evolution and do not operate independently from each other. In this respect, a non-
hierarchical form of governance, as typified by a network, enhances the socially 
embedded character of economic activities. Hence, network governance could help as 
an alternative and complementary resource to address the failures of States and 
markets (Jessop, 2002).    
 
The profit rationale from the private sector contrasts with the public sector’s 
multiplicity of objectives. The latter can be economic (for instance, employment 
concerns), and also non-economic (for instance, national security provision). These 
objectives also change, for political will and support for them does not remain the 
same. However, the recognition that efficient market allocation cannot take place 
without government intervention stresses that the State has a role to play on the 
economic affairs. It does not need necessarily to be directly involved in the 
                                                 
18 Stiglitz recalls Hirschman’s argument about how pro-private sentiments turn into pro-government 
ones due to unsatisfied demands and unfulfilled expectations, in a rough pro-cyclical pattern. He also 
 100
production of all goods and services, but it does need to be alert whenever markets 
fail to meet social needs (Stiglitz, 1989, 1998b).        
 
In this sense, there is an identification of market and public failures, on one side, and 
the recognition that social needs have to be properly met, on the other. Hence, there is 
room for manoeuvre and the viability of networking practices, as will be analysed in 
Chapter Five. The implicit recognition follows that the expansion of markets is 
accompanied, though not perfectly paralleled by, an expansion of social protection. 
What Polanyi termed a ‘double movement’ is a (more or less widespread) common 
denominator.19 He stressed the fact that it is the society, not the economy, which 
guarantees international order, because neither a national, nor an international system 
can depend on utopic ‘self-adjusting’ markets. Unfortunately, this social dimension is 
critically missing in many contemporary political and economic trends, as the 
contemporary orientation of market society is based on self-interest and profit 
seeking. Since markets are neither ‘self-regulating’, nor ‘self-adjusting’, buffer 
mechanisms capable of providing some protection to society are evidently required. 
In the 19th century, the market expansion propelled by the industrial revolution was 
met by counter-movements checking this expansion. These aimed to address social 
dislocations and are exemplified by the development of the Welfare State in Europe 
and some corporatist practices in developing countries in Latin America and also in 
other parts of the world. Since the protection of society is not compatible with the 
                                                                                                                                            
considers good public management as a public good, because everybody can benefit whenever it is 
properly done (1989). 
19 The 19th century institutions which played a crucial role in the one hundred years’ peace period of 
1815 to 1914 are first, the balance of power system; second, the international gold standard; third, the 
neither ‘self-adjusting’, nor ‘self-regulating’ market; and fourth, the liberal state. In Polanyi’s 
perspective the core elements of the period are the laws governing the market economy. For not only is 
the economic organization held responsible for the peace dividends of that period, but also the 
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assumption of a ‘self-regulating’ market, use has been made of different mechanisms, 
such as protective legislation, restrictive associations and other instruments of 
intervention aimed at the conservation of man, nature and the productive 
organization. This principle of social protection was confronted as a response to the 
principle of economic liberalism, in which the use of laissez-faire ideas and free trade 
practices was the product of deliberate State action (Polanyi, 1957). If the State 
facilitates the construction of markets there is neither a theoretical contradiction, nor a 
zero-sum game between market structures and the role of the State.20  
 
Disruptive market strains, such as decreased levels of employment, production and 
earnings, along with social tensions, pressure on economic and trade exchanges and 
the international context, need to be rectified by political means. Here the State is best 
placed to take a decisive role (Polanyi, 1957).21 The facilitative role which the State is 
perceived to play in the provision of goods and services on the one hand, and the 
satisfaction of social needs, on the other, have been over-simplified, dramatically 
reduced and distorted by international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and the World Bank (WB). 
The Washington Consensus of United States’ economic officials and international 
organizations, to be examined in Chapter Seven, emphasizes the agenda of 
liberalization, deregulation and privatization. By focusing on few macro-economic 
                                                                                                                                            
international finance and banking system, ‘haute finance’ in his own terms, is perceived as the main 
link in the European economic and political organization before the First World War (1957).  
20 A growing body of literature has pointed out the way in which the State is often a driver of 
globalization processes (Hay, 2002c; Hay and Marsh, 2000, Gilpin 2001).  
21 The failure of the market utopia, which is at the heart of the economic transformation of the present 
era, initiated from the zone of the market, reached the political sphere and spread to the whole of 
society. The dissolution of the gold standard, the last of the four economic institutions to survive, 
released the stress within the nations. The United States with its independent and strong domestic 
market and currency was more independent from world trade than all other countries, and this allowed 
it to treat the gold standard mostly as a matter of domestic politics (Polanyi, 1957).  
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stability indicators for the formulation of a set of policy recommendations, it leaves 
aside vital elements such as competition and education (Stiglitz, 1998a). Furthermore, 
it also fails to acknowledge that unorthodox, successful domestic initiatives prove 
agencies’ capability to actively influence and modify the context in which they stand. 
Although the post Washington Consensus emphasizes an institutional turn, it does not 
acknowledge the significance of agents as not only followers but also designers and 
practitioners of institutions, as is also discussed in Chapter Seven. Suffice it here to 
say that institutions are tools which actors make use of, not the other way around.      
 
It has become commonplace to assert that States are no longer the main actors taking 
part in economic transactions and the provision of goods and services (Ohmae, 1990 
and 1996). Private actors, such as some interest groups, are now powerful enough to 
set the agenda in multilateral rounds of trade negotiations. The General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has historically prioritised special interests from developed 
economies in its rounds of multilateral negotiations; rather than implementing a more 
comprehensive approach towards the most competitive sectors or interests of 
developing nations. Even though there has been a significant lowering of tariff 
barriers to trade, the rise of non-tariff barriers, such as anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties or voluntary export restraints, is still highly significant. For 
arguably trade is more sensitive to small variations in tariff and non-tariff barriers. 
Even beyond the rise of non-tariff barriers, new trade barriers such as technological 
advances in genetic engineering in countries where there are strong subsidies for 
agricultural sectors are pervasive and remain largely untouched by international 
regulations. For a very significant group of the developing nations, market access to 
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the most developed economies has been on the negotiation table for quite a long time 
with little or no result at all.22   
 
From a different standpoint, it is undeniable that private organizations such as credit 
rating agencies play a crucial role in current financial transactions (IMF, 1999). 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s are amongst the most important and influential rating 
agencies. Because those agencies supply investment grades for the public debt of 
emerging markets, they decisively influence the patterns and directions of capital 
flows, signalling how markets perform and how risky investing is in different places 
according to their criteria (IMF, 1999). The greater the degrees of risk in an emerging 
market, the more it is forced to offer greater rates of return to attract capital inflows.      
 
Still, the disclosure of reliable and timely public information by some emerging 
markets has not prevented them being affected by both capital inflows and capital 
outflows. Nowadays, information about a government’s accounts is not enough. In 
addition to the public figures, there has been an increase in the amount of private 
capital flows to both public and private borrowers. The disclosure of information 
about private flows is treated confidentially and presented incompletely and in a 
technical way which makes open and public scrutiny more difficult. Still, it is 
important to stress that private accountability is also important as some financial 
                                                 
22 The liberalization of trade has been a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for most of the 
developing countries to reap the benefits of development. Quantitative accounts of growth cannot be 
evaluated on the same grounds as improvements in the quality of life. Nowadays, at the turn of the 21st 
century, the international trade agenda goes beyond the borders of the WTO member States and into 
the domestic regulation arena. However, an important point should not be missed. No matter how long 
the development agenda is delayed, it entails much more than macroeconomic variables. Clearly it is 
not only about the provision of basic needs, it is also about providing opportunities and means for 
improving the quality of life. Therefore, development goals go well beyond the narrow neoclassical 
economic orthodoxy criteria of getting the ‘fundamentals’ of inflation, money supply growth, interest 
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collapses have had important social repercussions. Moral hazard, or the perception of 
investors that either the government or international organizations will not allow a run 
on the economy, is conducive to speculation, as recurrent financial crises in emerging 
markets such as Russia and South East Asia clearly show. Within a framework of 
inadequate regulation and surveillance this can prove catastrophic. In most cases, as it 
is discussed in Chapter Eight, the rescue of the economy is paid for, directly or 
indirectly by the society, as evidenced by the crises in the different emerging markets 
since the 1990s, i.e. in Mexico and Argentina; benefiting private profits and 
speculation on one side and socializing the costs on the other. Thus, this makes 
evident the need for private accountability to ensure timely, accurate and reliable 
information disclosure.          
  
Having emphasized some important economic and political issues of social change, it 
is now important to move to another crucial analytical dimension. The focus of the 
following section is on the tangible and intangible dimensions of social change. 
Without claiming that it is an exclusive power to highlight unobservables, with the 
structure and agency analytical referent, the Strategic Relational Approach also 
stresses the way in which material conditions and circumstances are intertwined and 
interwoven with ideational factors. This concern regarding the processes of social 
change is the theme of the following section. 
 
 
MATERIAL – IDEATIONAL DYNAMICS  
 
                                                                                                                                            
rates, and budget and trade deficits right. Indeed, more instruments are needed to achieve more 
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It is important to make clear that the theoretical structure and agency distinction, on 
one side, and the material and the ideational distinction on the other, though 
intertwined and interwoven in practice, can be separated for analytical purposes. To a 
different degree all schools of thought in social science have either an explicit or an 
implicit position on the role of ideas and material factors in their explanations. Either 
they prioritise one over the other, or, adopting a more dialectical perspective, they 
give equal weight to the role of ideas and material factors (cf. Hay, 2002c).    
 
However, the recognition of the interplay between these factors is by no means new. 
For instance, Gramsci’s seminal conception of hegemony highlighted the role of ideas 
and cultural processes; it provided an explanation of the indirect, albeit consensual 
exercise of power and opened up avenues of research (cf. Gill, 1993). Even though 
there has been a preliminary discussion above about ideational elements and 
institutions, I need now to turn to an assessment of these fundamental analytical 
dimensions. In so doing, less explicit mention of the rules of the game is undertaken, 
while the stress is now on ideas as intangible preconditions and their causal and 
constitutive role in the production of outcomes (Watson, 2000).23 In this sense, flows 
of knowledge and ideas could have various consequences; however, the explicit use 
and implicit aims of knowledge and ideas vary in important ways.24     
 
                                                                                                                                            
comprehensive and fairer goals in WTO multilateral trade negotiations (Stiglitz, 2000). 
23 In Keynes’ famous words: “…the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is 
ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist…” (1964, 383). 
24 For instance, critical knowledge is useful for demonstrating how core elements of the ideational 
sphere arise out of and serve to sustain dominant power; while mainstream structural knowledge is 
concerned with stability (Gill, 1993 and 1997).  
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The literature of international relations and institutionalism with their different 
concerns and perspectives, have varied in how valuable they consider the ideational 
dimension to be. The inclusion of ideas has broadened the analytical horizon of the 
disciplines. Consider ‘paradigm shifts’ in economic policy already identified with 
different degrees of impact on the bureaucracy, the political agenda and society. 
When referring to ‘paradigm shifts’, Hall makes a classification of their importance. 
Whilst third order change implies radical modifications not only in the setting of 
policy, but also in the aims and instruments employed to guide policy which is 
associated with a shift in governing paradigms, first and second order changes are 
viewed as social learning adjustment policies which do not challenge the terms of a 
given policy paradigm at all (Hall, 1993).25 Nevertheless, the feasibility of those shifts 
depends on the combination of various economic, political and administrative factors 
(Hall, 1989); for which international relations and institutionalism offer different 
emphases.  
 
The dialectical interactions between the intangible dimensions of ideas and the 
tangible dimensions of the material sphere have recently gained increased prominence 
in international relations literature since the rise of constructivism. The claim that 
structures and political realities can be socially constructed and the exploration of the 
issues of identity, rank among the priorities of this theoretical perspective (Checkel, 
1998).  
 
                                                 
25 In this sense, the example provided by the rise of monetarism as a challenger to the Keynesian 
policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, could also be considered valid not only for developed 
countries, but also for the experiences of developing ones (Hall, 1993).  
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Within the political science literature in general, and international relations authors in 
particular, Wendt’s work is considered to be an example of ‘thin constructivism’ 
because even though it recognises the dialectical relationship between the ideational 
sphere and the material one; it gives greater priority to the latter factors than to the 
former. A ‘thicker’ constructivist position emphasizes more the role of ideas over the 
material world, or to put it more simply, is more ‘ideas all the way down’ (Wendt, 
1999). Interestingly, constructivists have contributed to stretch the debate on the role 
of ideas within international relations, an academic discipline which in the last few 
decades has systematically either omitted or given a low priority to the contributions 
which ideas can make in analysing the international arena.  
 
Wendt engages in a debate over the material or social nature of structures, criticizing 
realism, the mainstream theory of International Relations, for its incapacity to address 
structural change. He claims that, in addition to material phenomena, ideas, beliefs 
and expectations shape the international structure. In addition, he suggests that the 
identities and interests of the States are constructed by the international system itself. 
According to this point of view, anarchy cannot be a structure since ‘it is nothing’, 
and has no logic apart from the process, because it is merely conceived as a 
constitutive element. In Wendt’s famous words it is just ‘what States make of it’ 
(1992 and 1999).         
 
Moreover, in his view the interaction of States is responsible for the reproduction and 
transformation of the international system. Wendt argues that it is ideas and their 
distribution within the social structure which determine not only the meaning and 
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content of power, but the strategies to pursue interests and the interests themselves.26 
Following his argument, culture tends to reproduce itself, becoming a non-
deterministic self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus, the material-ideational distribution of the 
content and meaning of power and interests presupposes the discursive formation of 
ideas, knowledge, culture and beliefs (Wendt, 1999, 92-138).   
 
Even though Wendt considers the State to be socially constructed, he also 
acknowledges the corporate agency constituted by social and internal structures. In 
his perspective, the properties of the State which he refers to include its institutional 
and legal order, its society, its territory, its organization with sovereignty claiming a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force; however he does not go any further than this 
(Wendt, 1999). The significance of the State is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Five of the present thesis.   
 
The role of ideas and discourse should not be overlooked. The importance of this 
intangible dimension proves crucial because ideas can have an independent causal 
and constitutive role in the production of political, economic and social outcomes. For 
instance, they are evidenced by the economic and political agendas i.e., liberalization, 
deregulation, privatization and democratization. Any agent, acting on his or her 
perceptions of the real world, contributes to trigger the creation of realities which they 
are meant to reflect. For instance, Watson’s analysis focuses on the discourse of 
globalization. He devotes special attention to the deconstruction of outcomes on the 
one hand, and accounts, on the other; and makes clear that the tendencies associated 
with the phenomena of globalization allegedly work ‘as self-induced external 
                                                 
26 Actors’ interests imply not only what the actors want and their motivations. Interests are also crucial 
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enforcement mechanisms’ (2000). Simply stated, although the use of rethoric does not 
match reality, government perceptions influence subsequent political outcomes.   
 
This is of crucial importance, since the current trend of governance moves towards 
the depoliticization of not only the most evident decision-making procedures, such as 
the counting of votes and representation of the population, but the implementation of 
otherwise unpopular and clearly unpalatable political and economic tasks, such as the 
reduction of welfare provisions or tax cuts. This takes for granted that a logic of 
inevitability is clearly equivalent to an exercise of power. Shaping not only public 
preferences but the context in which public and private courses of action are selected 
is complemented by a conscious political strategy of restricting the spectrum of 
feasible choices. Furthermore, the lack of accountability enjoyed by external 
constraints favours the reproduction of the status quo and provides a structural 
deterministic aura which neglects the role of the agency in shaping and influencing 
the course of events, as will be shown in Chapter Three. Clearly this is not the case, 
because socially constructed processes depend on ideational and material inputs, 
whose interaction results in contingent and never identical material and ideational 
outcomes.       
 
The way in which ideas function as self-fulfilling prophecies is nothing new, though it 
is only recently that it has attracted attention from political analysts. Consider for 
instance the way laissez-faire and free trade were promoted and allowed by the State 
to take their course. The political promotion of the market economy could only take 
place within a socially constructed market society in more or less a similar fashion in 
                                                                                                                                            
elements of identity and complement who and what actors are (Wendt 1999). 
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the 19th century as it does nowadays. The daily reinforcement of these assumptions 
takes a strong path-dependent channel, which increases the transaction costs of 
changing or reversing a given course of action. This is not to say, however, that 
change is impossible and that the modification or abandonment of any assumption 
cannot take place. On the contrary, alternative ideas can also become self-fulfilling 
prophecies and can therefore trigger change; but this could not happen to them all. 
The vital aspect to bear in mind is that ideas are a necessary, but never a sufficient 
condition for triggering or obtaining social change. The material conditions and 
factors complement any initiative. Just as the laissez-faire ideational push was helped 
by deliberate State action, the social construction of regimes and institutions requires 
consistency and coordination between the goal to be reached and the strategies for 
reaching it. Consider, for instance, the implementation of economic restructuring and 
trade liberalization in Mexico since the 1980s, which will be analyzed in Chapter 
Four.    
 
Two important intangible elements are then the ideas which actors hold and agencies’ 
perceptions of the material contexts. Both of them are crucial for the selection of 
feasible courses of action, and they are also appropriated through discourses; which, 
in turn, influence and are influenced by subsequent ideas and perceptions. 
Unsurprisingly, both structures and agents play a decisive role in the reproduction of 
ideas and perceptions.     
 
On the one hand, structures tend to favour specific courses of action, by providing 
either incentives or signals, or else by omitting alternative routes. To say that the 
context in which the actors situate themselves privileges some specific courses of 
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action is not to argue for structural determinism. Since the decisions which 
individuals make cannot be isolated from their context and from the perceptions of 
what surrounds them, the shaping of preferences and contexts within which courses of 
action are selected is a clear and evident act of power (Lukes, 1974).  
 
However, contrary to the prevalent assumptions in mainstream international relations 
and orthodox neoclassical economics; neither a self-interested rational unitary actor, 
nor a symmetrically informed individual, matches theory with practice.27 Information 
asymmetries have been recognised as quite a common problem and to have negative 
effects on the selection which a collective or individual agency makes (cf. Akerlof, 
1970; Rotschild and Stiglitz, 1976; and Spence 1973).28        
 
The interaction between strategically selective contexts and situated agents with ideas 
and perceptions produces clear ideational and material outputs. Due to some intended 
and unintended consequences, both outputs are in turn partially transformed inputs of 
a subsequent output. The ideas which agents hold and their perceptions of the 
strategically selective contexts help them read where they stand. It does not come as a 
surprise that due to the lack of complete information, actors need to interpret the 
contexts in which they find themselves. In this sense, agencies make assumptions 
about the world which surrounds them to decide which courses of action to take, if 
any, or whether to do nothing at all. Therefore, ideas and beliefs, though immaterial, 
                                                 
27 Some game theory analysis of cooperation makes use of static models. Iterated games imply the 
notion of repetition of the same material and ideational elements. Such an unrealistic simplification of 
the dynamics of social change does not take into account the interactions between the situated agents, 
either collective or individual, the structures, and the way in which they influence each other. Even 
worse, neither leaves room for, nor incorporates contingency in the social processes. In sum, the result 
is a short-sighted, static and deterministic analysis.      
28 For instance, models of analysis on the emergence of social institutions to counteract the effects of 
non-reliable and incomplete information have proved quite influential in economics. 
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are both real and have real effects with a mix of ideational and material consequences 
(Hay, 2002c and 2000b). Thus, ideas, beliefs and perceptions do have an independent, 
causal and constitutive role in the production of outcomes. Consequently, they trigger 
without determining the behaviours and practices of actors. These, in turn, take part in 
the cumulative and incremental processes of social change, through the exercise of 
power embedded in all social relations by agencies. 
 
The perception and interpretation of the way in which actors see themselves in 
context is crucial for selecting strategies or courses of action. Evidence clearly shows 
that the implementation of policy changes and governmental priorities is often 
preceded by ideological shifts on the part of people who hold key decision-making 
posts (Hall, 1989 and 1993). Furthermore, not only are structures selective but they 
are never determinate in directing certain strategies over others. Yet, they operate in a 
similar way to discourses. The selection of certain preferences does not imply the 
unquestioned adoption of certain discourses through which it might be appropriated. 
Thus, ideas and discourses are key components and promoters of the processes of 
social change with a significant material impact (Hay, 2002c, 2000b, and 1996). 
 
 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ORIGINS 
 
Even though the incentives for change may come from different sources, it is the 
actors themselves who make them relevant to change, whenever they reproduce 
specific passive or active behaviour contributing to forge path-dependent courses of 
action or inaction. As has already been indicated, the dialectical interaction between 
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structure and agency is mediated through ideas and perceptions. The ideas and 
perceptions which agents use help them to construct socially their context, altering the 
structures and influencing other agencies in this relationship. It is important to recall 
that power exercised by the agency is a crucial factor of change. Following Foucault, 
I argue that power is present in every social interaction.  
 
There are many different mechanisms of social change which can be induced or 
promoted. The sources of these initiatives might be either external to the social group 
or structure, or they might be internal, or in some cases even a combination of both. 
Some agencies may be more proactive or simply are in a better position, or have more 
resources to shape the agenda and get their preferences prioritised over others. Yet, 
this is not to say that the rest are powerless, because power is never a zero-sum game, 
in which the gain of one player represents the loss to his/her counterpart.  
 
International organizations such as the IMF, the WB, the WTO, and the United 
Nations (UN) itself, have expanded their original limits. Since the post World War II 
years these organizations have exercised considerable leverage not only over 
international regimes, but also in inducing domestic changes for political procedures 
and economic restructuring; such as the ones which the ‘economies in transition’ are 
facing since the fall of the Iron Curtain which signalled the end of the Cold War, or 
the conditionality attached to economic restructuring in Latin American countries 
since the 1980s. Additionally, domestic pressure groups and bureaucrats networking 
can also be identified within the boundaries of the State and many of them could 
extend their contacts beyond the borders; as is the case for non-governmental 
organizations and a wide variety of different networks. Hence, networking makes 
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evident alternative routes for the promotion of change, as sometimes they have 
brought specific concerns into the governmental agenda at different levels. Since 
networking can re-orientate, enhance, strengthen, and deepen the process of change, it 
is to be discussed below (Chapter Five).  
  
Social change needs to be processed endogenously both at the structural and at the 
agent level as well. War might dramatically modify the conditions for both the 
winners and the losers of the armed conflict, but it is not until the outcome of the 
confrontation has been internally digested and endogenously appropriated by the civil 
society that it can be accounted as an element of incremental, or sometimes abrupt, 
cumulative change. War is clearly a vital transformation factor in the processes of 
social change (Hay, 1996). It is also the crudest exercise of power. Whatever the aims 
of deploying warfare and exercising military muscle might be, a power factor 
supporting and promoting the use of violence can always be found. Since the 
destruction and reconstruction which military confrontation brings cannot be 
overlooked, war significantly shapes and transforms social processes, leaving its mark 
upon them. Not only is the use of violence one of the most dramatic ways in which 
change can be brutally imposed, but it also represents one of the most profitable 
businesses in the world, as the United States economy with its military-industrial 
complex makes evident. Still, it is necessary at this point to make explicit that this 
thesis does not explore processes of social change as a result of war or military 
confrontation. Rather, the emphasis of this thesis is on non-violent punctuated 
evolutionary change. The mix of different mechanisms of coercion and consent 
clearly benefits some agents because neither governmental policies nor strategies are 
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completely neutral. There is always some interest or preference privileged over 
others. 
 
Social change necessarily must have an internal momentum and initiative, and also 
needs to be processed internally. It needs to become part of most, if not all the actors 
involved in the processes, otherwise it is only an alien element in the social pattern. 
Social change is also quite permeable and open to innumerable influences 
nevertheless, there are just a few which prove decisively important. Transformations 
can be induced or promoted from the structural context or from within the agency. 
The initiators or promoters of radical change could be located either at the top of the 
governmental or social structure or down among the grass roots. Crucial in the 
implementation of changes are ideas, beliefs and perceptions, on which the actors 
stand and which make them act, selecting their preferences within a range of options.   
 
In most cases, unidirectional trends or the convergence of policies, courses of action 
and decisions is not the only identifiable tendency. There are always 
countertendencies in play which, depending on the context, provide contingency and 
uncertainty for social processes, albeit to a different degree and depending on each 
one’s specific circumstances.29 A dialectical understanding of interactions is helpful 
                                                 
29 Consider for instance the indigenous peasant uprising in Chiapas, a Southern state of Mexico, in 
1994. The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) symbolically erupted into the political 
and military arena the very first day that the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), came 
into force. Since then, undoubtedly the most important and dramatic influence it has exercised has been 
the exemplary evidence that the promotion of social change lies in the actions and omissions of the 
actors themselves. Controversial as their demands and methods are, they also remind us that no matter 
how tight exclusionary  governmental policies, in this case, or structural constraints more generally are, 
the agency can either contribute to determinism by inaction, or alternatively,  forge and promote a 
more appealing context to live in. Demands in the negotiation table have not been satisfied by the 
government, but still cannot be ignored altogether. Subcomandante Marcos, the most visible Zapatista 
leader, has also promoted its cause beyond the Mexican borders quite successfully. This has been done 
by incorporating additional dimensions to the conflict, attracting international attention, and altering 
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for portraying a broader, more comprehensive and detailed picture of the succession 
of events, and for process-tracing analysis.   
 
Not only is the Strategic Relational Approach adopted here capable of tracing the 
features of processes; it is also well equipped to follow the strategic and discursive 
selectivity which mediates and influences social groups.30 Furthermore, and even 
more importantly, this theoretical approach analyses how the various elements leave 
distinctive imprints in such processes. What it is important to underline is the fact 
that, regardless of the original push or move to promote change, it always needs to be 
endogenously digested. Since the internally appropriated change modifies the agents’ 
conditions and circumstances, it comes as no surprise that uncertainty, 
unpredictability and uneasiness are incorporated into the tendencies and 
countertendencies in play in the processes. The likelihood of unintended 
consequences arises due to tangible and intangible influences both for the 
strategically selective context and for the strategic actor. The intangible influences 
include institutions, interests, ideas and perceptions; which in turn modify the original 
input at different levels. The outcome might, or might not, retain all of the original 
characteristics. What is certain is that the outcome of the processes is seldom the 
intended one, due to the power present in all social interactions. Since no agent is 
powerless, each interaction made has an impact on some counterpart, albeit to a 
different extent. Accepting each interaction is case specific; the degree to which 
                                                                                                                                            
the government’s original intention to simply crush the EZLN. Nowadays it is recognized as a political 
and social collective actor in its own right, able to exercise social power in its interactions.   
30 Strategic selectivity refers to the contextual selection of some preferred means towards the 
achievement of a specific set of goals. Furthermore, outcomes are structurally underdetermined for the 
strategic actor, since it is he/she who brings indeterminacy to the fulfilment of those goals (Hay, 1996 
and 2002c).  
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relationships are modified might alter the original aim. For example, opposition 
movements to some governmental policies or plans may spread and grow through 
social interactions, making use of diverse methods, channels and forums. In this 
sense, the tendencies and countertendencies of the social interactions in play bring an 
uneasy, uncertain and unpredictable mix which makes social phenomena extremely 
difficult to reproduce. Since attention needs to be paid in the distinctive evolutionary 
features of social changes in process, I focus my argument on it in the following 
section.  
 
 
THE EXTENT OF INCREMENTAL PUNCTUATED EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE  
  
One of the best ways to identify the transformative, adaptive and incremental 
character of changes in social processes is with the help of hindsight. Historical 
processes reveal trajectories otherwise impossible to perceive by means of static 
analyses. Crucial to the analysis of the tendencies and countertendencies of the 
processes are both the ideational and the material preconditions in which some of the 
causes and original motives could be identified; for history matters as much as the rest 
of the factors which the analyst identifies or selects. The Strategic Relational 
Approach is characterized by a strong historical perspective, in which an adequate 
balance between theoretically informed and empirically grounded analysis must be 
pursued.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
In a similar way, the context within which situated agents interact tends to favour a selection of ideas, 
perceptions, understanding, narratives and discourses. This discursive selectivity, in turn, informs the 
actor to best formulate his/her strategies (Hay, 2002c).      
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However, as has previously been emphasized, processes of social change do not move 
in a linear way. Unlike neoclassical economically oriented influences, equilibrium is 
very seldom if ever achieved in social processes. Moreover, iterative yet cumulative 
change is characteristic of interrupted evolution at different intervals by various 
phenomena and factors. Due to the fact that different agencies pursue contrasting 
agendas, it should not come as a surprise that forces seem to pull in contradictory 
directions all the time, and these reflect the immanent power exercised in social 
interactions. Nonetheless, these countertending patterns act dialectically and 
relationally as constituent elements of a more aggregated trend. Such scenarios are 
incompatible with the concerns for stability and equilibrium; although these in turn 
are perceived to be vital for economic and institutional restructuring efforts all over 
the world. Consider for instance, the rise of public officials highly trained in 
economics to decision-making positions in official circles, who have implemented 
economic restructuring in Mexico since the 1980s, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Four.  
    
One point, however, should not be overlooked. The depth of social changes leaves 
traces at different levels. The fact that the analysis hitherto has concentrated on the 
macro level does not mean that the meso and the micro dimensions are ignored. This 
is simply an analytical distinction similar to others already mentioned, because all 
these levels are not segmented and clearly delimited in the daily interactions in the 
world out there. For the purposes of the current analysis the macro level of analysis is 
more appropriate; however, it is important to say that the other two dimensions are 
also incorporated in this work. For instance, political reforms, which are a small part 
of a broader democratization process, account for the recognition of every citizen’s 
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right to vote, elect, or abstain in choosing whomever he considers to best match his 
ideas and interests. Or it could be the case that no specific governmental programme 
is put into practice straight away. Rather it is mediated, influenced and modified by 
the different agencies involved, which sometimes dramatically alter the intended 
outcome. This brings indeterminacy and unintended consequences into play. The 
continuous interactions of situated actors in context present patterns of incremental 
evolution which characterize social processes, as represented symbolically in Figure 
2.3 below.    
 
 
 
The social processes of punctuated evolution are never uniform or identical. On the 
contrary, their features and patterns are always evolving and could hardly be 
exhaustively listed. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a crude distinction between 
soft reformist and adaptive changes. This is similar to the distinction made by Hall 
between first and second order changes, on the one hand; and more transformative 
interactions, known as third order changes, on the other (1993). Since these 
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theoretical distinctions have already been spelled out above, suffice it to say that 
throughout this work more emphasis is put on the transformative patterns of change 
which are more evident at the macro level. Reformist and adaptive changes, minor as 
compared to third order changes, can be better studied at the meso and micro levels of 
analysis.  
 
Moreover, the present study does not deal with those latter dimensions in detail. An 
important caveat is needed at this point. Acknowledging that social interactions 
incrementally account for change, it is not the aim of the present study to X-ray 
microscopic interactions. Rather, it lays emphasis on more general patterns in a more 
balanced account of both the strategic and discursive selectivity which actors face in 
their interactions. As should be clear from the above, changes in ideas and emphasis 
on their implementation prove vital for the establishment or orientation of a 
subsequent institutional evolution trajectory. In this sense, it is not rare that some 
discourses emphasize external constraints for displacing responsibility whenever 
unpopular reforms are faced. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the case 
particularities at all levels increase the difficulty of making policies converge and the 
practices, standards and institutions harmonize.      
 
Although it has been argued that the extent of social change remains open-ended, it is 
vital to stress that not every single input translates into an outcome. Since not all 
inputs automatically produce outputs, there might be some which might have no 
immediate direct effect at all. The explanation lies in the fact that there is no such 
thing as an automatic unidirectional linear mechanism in social interactions. Rather, it 
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is more the iterated and cumulative cascade of first order and second order changes, 
which makes important adaptations or third order changes more likely and evident.  
 
Three broad processes are to be discussed in more detail in this thesis. They are the 
processes of commodification, democratization and integration. Furthermore, the fluid 
nature of the dialectical interactions between structural, agential, ideational, and 
material elements, although they are never free of contradictions, serve to maintain a 
momentum that seems sometimes either to accelerate or to slow down. Even though 
the eruption of crises or the perception of stability and equilibrium might seem 
consensual sometimes, it does not necessarily mean that the punctuated evolution of 
the social processes is exempt from countertendencies, as the next chapter argues.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The work presented in this chapter has been a theoretical enterprise aiming to provide 
an answer for the questions formulated at its outset. They are: What triggers social 
change? How does it happen? and, What are the factors which make changes evident? 
I have attempted to make explicit the immanent nature of power in all social relations. 
This is the core factor triggering change. Since it could be exercised by structural and 
agential sides, there is room for contingency and indeterminacy in the punctuated 
evolution of every social process of change. Furthermore, it has also been clearly 
stated that in order to keep these processes going it is necessary that change should be 
internally appropriated and incorporated into the social dynamics. The dialectical 
transformation of the original inputs into incremental outputs with intended and 
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unintended consequences are, in turn, the raw materials for some other subsequent 
interactions, i.e., social, political, and economic change neither starts, nor stops; it is 
ongoing.    
 
Not only is the methodological emphasis on individualism on which neoclassical 
economic orthodoxy and rational choice models are founded not applicable to all 
human behaviour; it also neglects the existence of any collective agency such as the 
government, or even a State. This limitation, along with the problematic assumption 
that individuals always act rationally, making use of complete information in 
perfectly competitive markets free of uncertainty, is clearly inaccurate; however, there 
have been important attempts to escape these assumptions. Clearly, the understanding 
of social processes must not be reduced to narrow economic determinism. On the 
contrary, a comprehensive multidisciplinary approach to politics, such as the Strategic 
Relational Approach defended here, allows us to trace the social processes of change 
and to identify power as a core factor which would otherwise be invisible. But this is 
not the same as claiming that its theoretical lenses are the only ones capable of 
identifying intangible factors.              
 
It has also been argued that one merit of institutionalism is its incorporation of 
intangible elements such as rules into the analyses of political, economic and social 
sciences in general. Moreover, to acknowledge the difficulty of reforming or 
replacing embedded institutions clearly shows that such a task is beyond and cannot 
be reduced to merely instrumental self-interest (Hay, 2002c). Despite this, the 
acknowledgement that institutions as the rules of the game, and that history matters is 
significant, since courses of action pursued in the past describe path-dependent 
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patterns which have influence, even if not decisively, determining the outcome for a 
contextualised agency.    
 
It should be clear now that rational choice institutionalism is unable to provide 
adequate insight into the incremental and punctuated evolutionary patterns of social 
change which are the main concern of this thesis.31 Since rules, legislation and 
regulations, as institutional rules of the game, are intangible elements, they play a 
major role, if not in directly shaping, at least in orientating or inducing the preferences 
and the contexts of the mental constructs of agencies to which they are targeted. 
These intangible elements work as the strategic and discursive mechanisms, which the 
actor in context takes into account for the formulation of strategy according to the 
strategically selective context he is situated in. Still, the perceptions, interpretations 
and social constructions of the world which the individual and collective actors are 
part of, proves vital, though it does not necessarily determine the choices which they 
make.  
 
Nevertheless, the extent to which ideas contribute to alter or modify the material 
factors are just one part of the two way interaction process between ideas and tangible 
elements. It is complemented by the impact which structures and agents make in the 
ideational sphere.         
 
                                                 
31 Institutionalism is not appropriate for the understanding of long-term social change, due to two 
important circumstances. The first one is the predatory rule from governors who try to extract as much 
revenue as they can from the population. Linked to this, the second one relates to the path-dependency 
of institutions. Though their persistence is not permanent at all, institutions tend to favour stability and 
the status quo (Cammack, 1992).  
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Consider the role of the State in the production of goods and services. Within a 
context of imperfect information and incomplete markets, the contemporary 
retrenchment of productive activities by government bodies follows a wave of 
increased commodification of economic activities. The privatization of industries is 
based on an economic efficiency argument, on one side, and on a rent extraction 
justification on the other. The temptation to extract as much rent from producers as 
possible is matched with the arguments of the comparative advantage holders to 
undertake the tasks of production (Stiglitz, 1989, 1998b).  
 
Since multiple factors and elements interact in all dimensions of the economic, 
political and social process, unpredictable and variable outcomes should not surprise 
anybody. Intended and unintended consequences are the results of ever-changing and 
fluid structural, agential, material and ideational factors, as the Strategic Relational 
Approach reveals.     
 
Even though structures are selective, they never determine social outcomes, for it is 
the actors who tend to select their preferred strategies within their own context. 
Outcomes are structurally undetermined and dependent on the selected strategies of 
either action or inaction by the agencies. In this sense, any chosen strategy is rooted in 
ideas, beliefs, information, interests and perceptions. Immaterial as all of them are, 
they have a real impact on the material dimensions of the social processes. They also 
act as triggers for the strategies and selected courses of action, both passive and 
active.     
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In using the Strategic Relational Approach, different degrees of transformation, 
reform and adaptation could be identified as evidence of social change. Due to the 
overarching richness of the social processes and the exercise of power inherent in all 
social interactions, the elements which account for continuity and discontinuity can be 
identified. However, the sum of the parts might not equal the whole of the social 
processes of change. Moreover, the exercise of power inherent in all social 
interactions is the vital factor in the processes of social change. Nevertheless, it is 
important to mention that there are some qualitative differences between the actors. 
Even though all agencies are capable of displaying features of power immanent in 
their social relations, there are some actors who are in a better position to assert their 
priorities or preferences over others. Nevertheless, this asymmetry does not neglect or 
cancel in any way the capacity and potential for other agents to challenge, modify, 
alter, or even radically transform the contexts and conditions in which they find 
themselves.         
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Politics of Economic Determinism:  
Identifying the Causal Relations of Commodification 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
It has become commonplace amongst some government officials, business circles, 
and even academics, to say that social processes are driven by market forces, and that 
no serious challenge can be posed to those anonymous, yet extremely powerful 
tendencies. Resistance becomes futile, since we are told that no alternatives exist, and 
bandwagoning becomes inevitable.1 However, those economic imperatives, important 
as they are, do not work independently of, or isolated from, the context in which they 
become operative. They are embedded in broader social relations and interact with 
other economic and social agencies and structures. This, in turn, dynamically reshapes 
the features of the social processes.  
    
The problematic emphasis of policy-makers on commodification lies in the denial of 
its political character and on the neglect of its socially embedded features. 
Exclusively economic imperatives are unable to provide an integrated account of the 
processes of social change and of the complementary role which States and markets 
                                                          
1 The phenomena and discourses associated with the first wave of globalization are classic examples of 
this position. The portrait is one of a homogenising economic force for convergence which brings 
about irreversible changes. Hay, and Marsh 2000; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, 1999. See 
also, Dicken, 1998; Held and McGrew, 2000; Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Ohmae, 1996 and 1990; 
Rodrik, 1997; Scholte, 2000; Strange, 1996; and Weiss, 1998.  
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play in the economic arena. It is important to recall that, in order to bring analytical 
clarity to this research, commodification has been associated with the vertical axis of 
the theoretical map presented in the first chapter. In addition, core issues of the 
processes of social change have been discussed. These have paid particular attention 
on one side to the crucial part which power plays, and to the capability of an agency, 
on the other, to actively influence, and be influenced by the dynamics of the 
processes. All these notions are undoubtedly a fundamental departure point for 
challenging deterministic explanations and economic reductionism in social, political 
and economic analysis.  
 
The crucial historical moments of the Mexican revolution and of the early 1980s 
crisis made use of mechanisms of change, and also opened up windows of opportunity 
that did not merely constrain acts of purposeful human agency.2 It becomes necessary 
at this point to recall the main theoretical findings of the Strategic Relational 
Approach in relation to the structural change and punctuated evolution of the State. A 
detailed representation of those changes was presented in the first chapter. They are 
                                                          
2 It is necessary to recall that Chapter One of this thesis, by making use of the Strategic Relational 
Approach, drew a theoretical map for tracing the punctuated evolutionary trends of the State’s 
development in Mexico along two different axes. The horizontal or political axis, as I called it, 
provided a spectrum for differentiating a range of positions from hard political constraints to flexible 
political autonomy. The ‘y’ or market axis, as it was labelled in that chapter, was used for tracing the 
various degrees between pure economic openness at one end, to total market protection at the other. No 
mutual interdependence between the market and the political axes is claimed. They are analytical tools 
useful for tracing the trajectory of the social processes, as already explained in the opening chapter. 
The map presented in Figure 1.2 of Chapter One, when applied to the Mexican experience from before 
the 1910 revolution to the present day, showed a broad trajectory of the processes of structural change 
of the Mexican State which touched the four different quadrants and crossed the two axes. Figure 1.3 
shows how different political and economic concerns have impacted upon the agenda of the Mexican 
State since the turn of the 20th century. Moreover, it also showed that, regarding the processes of social 
change, the economic priorities of the State have varied and they have tended to be more associated 
with patterns of continuation and reformism. By contrast, the identification of moments of crisis and 
the imposition of more significant changes in the trajectory of the State was traced along the political 
axis. According to this perspective, not only did the Mexican revolution of the early 20th century 
represent a crisis, but so also did the macroeconomic mismanagement of the 1980s due to the 
imposition of a new set of economic, social and political priorities. The latter is to be analyzed in 
greater depth in Chapter Six. 
 128
also summarized in Table 1.1 of the opening chapter. The economic dimension axis of 
analysis referred to the degree of openness or market protection. Based on Polanyi’s 
idea that the protection of the factors of production, labour and land were the main 
functions of State interventionism in economic activities, decommodification means 
increased protection from the market, while commodification is just the opposite, 
decreased economic protection.3 The concept of ‘double movement’ is useful for 
representing the expansion of markets as accompanied by the protection of society 
and nature. However it should not be assumed that this is an automatic process 
(Polanyi, 1957). 
   
Adopting the Strategic Relational Approach suggests that the evolution of the State 
tends to favour the ratification of former trajectories. Insofar as there is a tendency, it 
is not towards radical change. Rather, policy adaptation and reformism characterize 
social and political changes, which are in turn reflected in a concern for stability 
either for economic fundamentals or for political consensus. On the one hand, 
decommodification practices tend to be associated with patterns of increased 
protection from markets. Here, for instance, corporatist agencies play a leading role 
when the implementation of welfare policies is put into practice. On the other hand, 
the emphasis on commodification gives more room for private actors, and tends to be 
associated with dismantling labour’s protection from the market. This latter 
                                                          
3 The concept of commodification used here borrows from Polanyi’s commodity fiction (1957). 
According to him, the commodity description of labour, land and money is entirely fictitious. Since his 
influential analysis has already been discussed in Chapter One, suffice it to say that such a perspective 
has opened up important research avenues. For instance, Esping-Andersen (1990) and Cerny (1990) 
also use this landmark study of the social implications of the market economy to inform their studies. 
Furthermore, the process of commodification is not limited to the three commodities originally 
suggested by Polany. It has also been suggested that information faces a similar process of 
commodification. Therefore, knowledge can be added to the list of fictitious commodities too.  
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orientation of governmental affairs is justified in terms of neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy and the efficiency of market rules.    
 
Nonetheless, processes of social change are highly political, because actors play a 
crucial role in shaping and influencing the course of events. However, this is not 
widely acknowledged. For instance, according to the neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy, government failures not only affect optimal economic performance but 
also increase transaction costs. Therefore, economists trained in this school of thought 
advocate structural reforms and a minimal State. However, the abandonment of 
productive and distributive activities to the market is by no means unproblematic. 
Markets are not failure-free, and this is precisely the reason for government to play an 
active role, especially when problems of incomplete markets, inefficiencies, imperfect 
information and market disruptions arise. The aim of an efficient market allocation of 
resources requires the government to play an active role in the provision of welfare 
and redistributive policies. By contrast, increased market competition raises 
incentives and mitigates public failures, as already discussed in Chapter Two (Stiglitz, 
1989, 1998a, 1999b, 2002).  
 
In addition to material and structural elements, such as those mentioned above, the 
Strategic Relational Approach also pays attention to the ideational and agency factors 
implicated in the evolution of social processes. In this chapter, I look at some of the 
neoclassical economic ideas and concepts and their influence upon actors’ conduct, 
prior to the discussion of the problematic emphasis on commodification by policy-
makers. Next I discuss the so called ‘market friendly’ position of the State defended 
by the World Bank, which is found to be structurally and economically deterministic. 
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This is important, because the World Bank has been one of the main architects of the 
economic restructuring in Mexico that has been enforced since the early 1980s. 
Additionally, in exploring some of the causal mechanisms in the process of social and 
political change, I analyze the relations between the institutional framework and 
economic agents such as firms. I then move on to discuss how the Schumpeterian 
notion of ‘creative destruction’ highlights crises and innovations as fundamental 
elements which help us in tracing the processes of social change. The final part of this 
chapter stresses that the relational character of the exercise of power makes use of 
causal relations, such as the ones suggested here, to continuously build the ever-
changing social dynamics and processes. 
 
At this point, a caveat needs to be introduced. It is important to make clear from the 
outset of this chapter that the theoretical exploration and emphasis on the political 
economy of determinism and the identification of some of the causal relations of the 
processes of social change aims to link several of the arguments of this thesis. The 
next chapter pays more attention to detailing and illustrating the Mexican 
commodification experience. Therefore, the argument in Chapter Four should not be 
regarded as disconnected from the claims made here. On the contrary, the 
theoretically informed narrative of the Strategic Relational Approach depends on this 
chapter’s analysis in order to further explore the polarizing results of the ostensible 
economic imperatives imposed upon Mexico in the last quarter of the 20th century. As 
such, this chapter sets the scene for the discussion in the following chapter. The 
following section is devoted to the ideational counterpart of the material dimension. 
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INFLUENCE OF THE NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMIC ORTHODOXY  
 
It has been argued that the causal and constitutive role of ideas in the production of 
specific material and ideational outcomes is crucial for triggering, without 
determining, the behaviour and practices of actors. This was discussed in the previous 
chapter regarding the material and ideational dimension of social processes of change. 
However, I take this opportunity to recall the interaction between ideas and material 
factors, where the former play a casual and constitutive role in the production of 
material and ideational outcomes (Watson 2000, and 2001b). Moreover, there is a 
growing recognition among scholars of International Political Economy that the 
elements of ideas are crucial in the social construction of the tangible and intangible 
contexts and realities in which agencies are situated. In addition, the role of ideas in 
reducing uncertainty also significantly contributes towards making institutional 
change possible (Blyth, 2002). 
 
For instance, Blyth presents a sequential set of hypotheses for understanding 
institutional change under conditions of uncertainty. He presents them in the 
following order: first, ideas reduce uncertainty during periods of economic crisis; 
second, once uncertainty is reduced, ideas make collective action and coalition 
building possible; third, ideas can be used as weapons in the struggle over existing 
institutions; fourth, after legitimising institutions, ideas function as institutional prints; 
and fifth, following the institutional construction, ideas make institutional stability 
possible (2002).  
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According to him, ideas and interests are not mutually exclusive analytic categories. 
This is important, since he regards institutional change as an endogenous process 
which faces a unique situation of uncertainty reducible neither to risk nor to 
complexity. It is under this unique situation of uncertainty associated with economic 
crises that agents are unable to anticipate possible outcomes and also to identify their 
interests in such a situation (Blyth, 2002). 
 
However, important as Blyth’s view of endogenous process is, two main problems 
with his account of institutional change are worth mentioning. The first regards the 
conditions which trigger changes in institutions. The uniqueness of uncertainty 
associated with economic crises, he argues, works as an external shock which sets 
incentives for agents to reconsider the utility of their institutions. But this sort of 
external incentive, according to my perspective, cannot be held as the only causal 
explanation for institutional change. Changes can also be small, incremental, and 
evolutionary, yet deliver the conditions for the endogenous process which allow for 
change in the institutions. By emphasizing unique situations which resemble chaos, 
Blyth stresses the punctuation of the process, albeit at the price of paying less 
attention to the equally important incremental and evolutionary character of change. 
The second problem with his perspective lies in his sequentially arranged hypothesis. 
Since these ordered regularities are among the major topics discussed below in this 
chapter, there is no need for further elaboration here. Suffice it to say that the 
Strategic Relational Approach places more emphasis on causal relations than on 
sequential patterns. The fluid social dynamics alert us to the existence of often over-
lapping tendencies and counter-tendencies which would be unaccounted for if we 
followed a rigid schematized account.           
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Economic imperatives are socially and discursively constructed by making use of 
external imposition of limits on what is perceived within the parameters of feasibility. 
This suggests that it should come as no surprise that such imperatives favour the 
orientation of certain preferred courses of action and outcomes over others, 
transforming and mediating external inputs into domestic political priorities (Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002).4  
 
It is important to make clear at the beginning that ideas are not the only driving force 
behind political and economic outcomes. Nevertheless, it is equally important to 
stress that their impact and leverage needs to be analyzed within contextual 
circumstances specific to certain points of time and space. At the beginning of the 21st 
century there seems to be an inert and uncritical acceptance by neoclassical 
economists of ideas and assumptions which have substantial material impacts and 
social consequences.5 Some of them are undoubtedly clear exercises of power 
relations in a way which not only influences governmental and private agendas, but 
also leads to the shaping of preferences, which in turn influence the context in which 
agencies are situated. For instance, the rationality of economic actors, perfect 
competition and symmetric information are recalled in government and private sector 
circles despite overwhelming evidence of the inaccuracy and inconsistency of such 
                                                          
4 It is in this sense that the use of discourse and ideas serves to legitimate a range of policies and 
initiatives which might otherwise be unpalatable and would therefore have faced stronger opposition 
had there been different circumstances. The recourse of appealing to external constraints has been 
effectively used for displacing responsibility from accountable and responsible bodies to diffuse 
structures or unaccountable agencies, such as international priorities and global trends (Hay and 
Rosamond, 2002). 
5 Associated with Gramsci’s explanation and concept of hegemony, the acceptance of a dominant 
ideology might suffer a twist and turn into beliefs that are appropriated, made their own, taken for 
granted and rendered simple common sense. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of this conflation 
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assumptions (Stiglitz, 1991). Nevertheless, they are sometimes justified in terms of 
parsimony which, in turn, implies that the theorist does not regard the assumptions as 
specific so much as useful. Something similar happens with the omission of social 
determinants and institutional differences in the abstract neoclassical economic 
models which have replicated the market homogeneity and policy convergence that 
the globalization hypothesis takes for granted (Watson, 2003b). In order to be 
insulated from contradictory evidence, some contemporary policies of welfare 
retrenchment appeal to ideological justifications, and in so doing they acquire a 
discursive power of their own.6      
 
The importance of ideas, and specifically of the assumptions with which economists 
work has been discussed by the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman in his essay on The 
Methodology of Positive Economics. There, he argues that positive science as “…a 
body of systematized knowledge concerning what is…” is different from normative 
science which focuses on the discussion of criteria of what ought to be.7 The former is 
presented as independent of any ethical position, capable of developing predictions 
about phenomena not yet observed by means of using a set of hypotheses, whereas 
normative science is said to be always dependent on a positive science (Friedman, 
1953).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
and to clearly draw the conclusion that ideologies do not in and of themselves constitute a form of 
common sense (Van Dijk, 1998). 
6 Within economists’ circles the General Equilibrium approach has been appropriated and faced a 
metamorphosis in which the analytical construct has been used as a framework with an ideological 
emphasis for the prescription of preferred political actions. For this mathematical neoclassical 
economics approach is a methodological contribution which takes perfect competition as a 
precondition for its reconstruction of a pure exchange economy. Despite the caveat that equilibrium is 
only achieved within the model and cannot be taken out of it, owing to the fact that it is only a 
constitutive property of the model itself, the prescribed advice has been systematically ignored beyond 
the academic community and has already spread in less technical and more discursive forms. 
Therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind that since the General Equilibrium approach is founded on 
inapplicable assertions, its assumptions should not be treated as realistic ones (Watson, 2003b).  
7 Friedman’s argument is based on John Neville Keynes’ The Scope and Method of Political Economy.  
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In this essay, Friedman considers assumptions as short-hand descriptions or 
presentations of a body of theory which are helpful for testing, the hypothesis by their 
implications, yet not directly. Although he makes it clear that assumptions offer some 
convenient means for specifying the conditions under which a theory is expected to 
be valid, this position is stretched to the limit of arguing how irrelevant it is whether 
assumptions are descriptively realistic or not. For him, theoretical assumptions are 
valid if they are used and accepted in a continuous way, and as long as the hypotheses 
hold for the phenomena they aim to explain (Friedman, 1953). This standpoint on a 
positive philosophical position needs to be examined in further detail. 
 
The problem of mismatch between theory and practice arises whenever the 
assumptions of positive economics, which are theoretically presented in a closed 
system, are then taken out of the context in which they are operative. In the real world 
it often happens that descriptively unrealistic assumptions are put into practice in 
open systems. Needless to say, those operations do not at all match the useful 
approximations in a closed system which Friedman claims. Furthermore, the impact 
which makes carries intended and unintended consequences. The insulation of the 
positivist ontological position collides with the practical prescriptions for real and 
concrete situations which derive from their initial philosophical and analytical 
standpoint. The implementation of neoclassical policy advice confronts open systems 
in reality, which poses a formidable challenge for them to succeed. This explains the 
important efforts undertaken by some economists such as Stiglitz, either relaxing 
unrealistic assumptions such as complete markets and perfect information, or the new 
group of theories which aim, amongst other things, to compensate for the inadequacy 
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of neoclassical economics in the analysis of economic change, the lack of attention 
paid to institutions and the disregard of the role played by governments in 
coordinating economic activities (Gilpin, 2001).8 Moreover, the positivist ontological 
position defended by Friedman and some other economists has been embraced by 
international financial organizations whose leverage has been very strong and has had 
specific consequences in different countries, as the next chapter shows. But before 
turning to those issues it is important to clarify the differences between the 
ontological position adopted by neoclassical economics and the critical realist 
ontological stance of the Strategic Relational Approach adopted here. 
 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY: DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN POSITIVISM AND REALISM 
 
Hay has claimed that there is a directional dependence between ontology, 
epistemology and methodology (2002c). The former two are philosophical positions, 
relating the world and knowledge respectively, which cannot be reduced to empirical 
examples. The latter follows the former two and functions as an analytical strategy 
and research guide. All theoretical approaches make specific claims and assumptions, 
either in an implicit or an explicit way, about what is out there to know about the 
world. I want to show that positivism and realism have contrasting perceptions of the 
nature of the social and political world.9   
                                                          
8 The group of theories considered include the theory of endogenous growth, the new economic 
geography and the strategic trade theory (Gilpin, 2001). 
9 Although there are other ontological positions, the purpose of my analysis and nature of this research 
requires us to concentrate only on positivism and realism. Informed explanations of the different 
positions in social science can be found in Blaikie’s Approaches to Social Enquiry (1993). Regarding 
the scope and methods of economics, see Lawson’s Economics and Reality (1997).  
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Ontology, as the science or study of being, refers to the claims and assumptions that 
are made about the world and, more specifically for our purposes, about the nature of 
social reality. Epistemology is a study of theories of knowledge, which departs from 
the original (ontological) claims and assumptions, focusing on the ways to gain 
knowledge. By contrast methodology can be described as the research design, 
because it tells us how the research proceeds (Blaikie, 1993, 6-7).  
 
Bearing these philosophical distinctions in mind, the ontology of positivism assumes 
the world to be made of ordered observable events which resemble atoms. It takes 
into account only observable phenomena, claiming perfect correspondence with 
reality. According to this position, universal propositions or constant conjunctions can 
be claimed in its search for the external causes of human behaviour. Positivism does 
not recognize the existence of unobservable structures at all, because it perceives 
there to be no dichotomy between appearance and reality. Therefore, it takes the 
world as real, and considers that there cannot be any mediation by any senses, 
perceptions, or socially constructed phenomena. The directional dependence of 
positivism’s ontological stance leaves an imprint in its theory of knowledge, allowing 
its epistemology to affirm that empirical regularities can be given equal status to 
scientific laws.10 By making use of induction, the observations of specific events are 
taken as starting points for building generalizations which end up as general 
propositions. These, in turn, are then claimed to provide neutral explanations of the 
                                                          
10 For instance, rational choice theory makes strong assumptions about the rationality of individuals, 
aiming to generate testable and predictive hypotheses. Far from being a universal theory of social 
behaviour, excessive claims place it dangerously close to the edge of becoming a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Reassessing those totalising claims might help and be a useful service to social science 
analysts (Hay, 2003a).  
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observed phenomena (Blaikie, 1993; Lawson, 1997, and 2003). In other words, the 
use of direct observations to generate, test and falsify hypotheses about the 
interactions between the social phenomena is vital for this position, because it is a 
condition of statements being made about social, political and economic phenomena 
(Marsh et al., 1999).  
 
In contrast, realist ontology makes distinctions between observations of experiences, 
events either observed or unobserved, and the processes which generate them. It takes 
the world as independent of observers, and assumes that as a result of the separation 
between reality and appearance, social relations are products of material, albeit 
unobservable, structures of relations. The directional dependence of the realist 
ontological position makes its epistemology focus merely on the tendencies of events, 
which makes a sharp contrast with the regularities of positivism. Starting with the 
observation of often different and contrasting tendencies, realism proposes models 
and mechanisms to explain the observed phenomena (Blaikie, 1993; Lawson, 1997, 
and 2003).  
 
Regarding the position on which the Strategic Relational Approach stands, the realist 
ontology makes four primary statements about the nature of the world. Firstly, it 
contends that there is a clear and neat distinction between the world and all of its parts 
and components on the one side, and our knowledge about it on the other. In this case, 
the economic relations of production, distribution and exchange are independent of 
our knowledge about them and the rest of the world. Secondly, the observation of 
some structures might not be possible to achieve in a direct way, because their 
existence has to be inferred. Power interactions are immanent in all social relations, 
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especially at the structural levels of preference and context shaping (Sayer, 1992, and 
2000; Lawson, 1997, and 2003). Thirdly, the relationship among different elements 
can be analysed to provide insight into specific cause-effect mechanisms, albeit not 
necessarily law-like regularities. Objects and social relations are acknowledged to 
have causal powers and liabilities capable of generating events, where powers might 
be explained independently of them. Finally, the realist ontological directional 
dependence leaves a mark on its theory of knowledge, as it argues that structures 
neither generate nor determine outcomes. Rather, structures offer windows of 
opportunity and constraints which provide some room for the agencies to manoeuvre. 
The fact that some of the alternatives appear more feasible to realise does not 
necessarily mean that there is only one possible course of action, previously given or 
externally decided and unavoidable (Lawson, 1997, and 2003; Marsh et al., 1999; 
Sayer, 1992, and 2000). 
 
Following a directional dependence from the ontology of realism, the Strategic 
Relational Approach features a realist epistemological stance. From the latter, it views 
knowledge of any kind as a social practice gained mainly through activity and 
interaction, which is situated in specific contexts and never develops in a vacuum. 
Since its fallibility and its theory-laden character of observation must be admitted, the 
plea to adopt a critical approach should come as no surprise. Furthermore, since the 
production of knowledge is a social practice, the explanation and understanding of 
social phenomena engages the analysts in critical evaluations of society and of our 
understanding of our own place within society. Therefore, the formulation of 
informed critiques cannot be avoided (Marsh et al., 1999; Sayer, 1992 and 2000). 
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Realism is a philosophy of and for the social sciences which draws a distinction 
between transitive and intransitive dimensions of knowledge (Sayer, 2000).11 On the 
one hand, the intransitive dimension comprises objects of science, such as social 
phenomena or political events. On the other hand, the transitive domain pays attention 
to theory and discourses, which in turn could also be treated as objects of study 
themselves. Furthermore, acknowledging that social sciences resemble open systems 
where social, political and economic phenomena exhibit different degrees of 
complexity, it is the identification and assessment of connections, rather than of 
formal associations or regularities, which proves crucial. In so doing, making use of a 
critical method not merely describes observable, but also unobservable, phenomena, 
examining necessary and contingent relations, as well as warranted and unwarranted 
associations (Sayer, 1992; Lawson, 1997 and 2003). Therefore, the examination of 
relationships between structures, mechanisms and events is vital for analysing the 
processes of change; this adds to the importance of paying special attention to the 
problems of conceptualization and abstraction, as is attempted in this thesis. For 
realism, the recognition that social processes are situated within specific spatio-
temporal contexts should not be overlooked, as the need for geographical and 
historical specificity might help to overcome interpretive understandings, and move 
towards causal explanations, rather than formal regularities of social phenomena 
(Sayer, 2000; Lawson, 1997 and 2003). 
 
Crucial ontological distinctions between positive economics on the one hand and the 
realism of the Strategic Relational Approach on the other, are the distinctions between 
structure and agency, and the material and ideational factors (Hay 2002c). The latter 
                                                          
11 The work of Roy Bhaskar presents and supports the Critical Realist arguments, especially A Realist 
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theoretical perspective, adopted in this study, has, as should now be clear, realist 
epistemological and ontological positions as it pays attention to powers, relations and 
institutional logics (Jessop, 1990b). The dialectical relationship between structure and 
agency has already been discussed in the previous chapters. Suffice it to say that 
situated agents interpret their structural situations and specific contexts regardless of 
where they are standing. The decisions and courses of action could affect and modify 
the context within which the agency is situated, making it impossible to remain 
unaltered. Additionally, it is argued here that, consistent with the realist ontological 
position, material and ideational features, observable and unobservable elements, all 
play a role in the dialectical relations of the social processes, although this happens to 
different degrees because it has various consequences and impacts within specific 
spatio-temporal locations. Therefore, intangible factors such as perceptions, 
discourse, ideology and assumptions are elements which influence the course of 
actions and the decisions which agencies make when situated in specific 
circumstances. They are extremely difficult to quantify and measure accurately. 
However, this is not to say that their existence should be neglected and nor should 
their causal and constitutive role in social processes. Following Adam Smith’s 
assumption that man has a propensity ‘to barter, trade, and exchange one thing for 
another’, the science of economics in its neoclassical form evolved into the study of 
‘self-adjusting’ and ‘self-regulating’ mechanisms supposedly disembedded from all 
social relations. By so doing it is ignored the fact that the economic system does not 
run like all social phenomena, on exclusively economic motives.12  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Theory of Science (1975), and The Possibility of Naturalism (1979). 
 142
It is therefore misleading to follow the reductionist and deterministic neoclassical 
argument that agencies, either individual or collective, such as States and 
corporations, are unable to resist, or even to influence, the dictates of impersonal 
economic forces. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the use of power is immanent 
in all social relations and is able to influence the context and the desirability of certain 
preferences over others. It provides agents with a transformation capacity to favour 
their aims and objectives, which might either be tangible or intangible.13 The way in 
which each capability is used is case-specific and varies in each time and space 
situation.  It is contended here that markets are embedded in larger social and political 
systems, where different actors and institutions interact with each other and promote 
their own agendas. No wonder national governments are among the most important 
and influential actors not only in the economic realm, but also in broader social and 
political systems, because markets are inherently political. Thus, as the locus of 
human interaction, markets are a constitutive part of a broader and more complex, 
dynamic and ever changing whole, where the social reality cannot and must not be 
reduced purely to arenas of supply and demand. 
 
Nonetheless, the neoclassical approach to markets often presents the recurrent ‘ceteris 
paribus’ caveats, which refer to the consideration that all things being equal in the 
models makes them work in a static equilibrium scenario. In such scenarios there are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 Although Adam Smith had a theory of innate rationality which contained ideas about mutual 
sympathy, rather than personifying the characteristics of ‘homo oeconomicus’, it was Mill and 
Bentham who developed the latter concept. Thanks to Matt Watson for clarification of this point.   
13 The pursuit of preferences or self-interest is characteristic of the economic rationality associated with 
neoclassical economics, and more generally of positivism. Since the Strategic Relational Approach is 
based on a realist ontology and critical realist epistemology, it offers a different account, adopting a 
method of articulation in its identification of powers immanent in social relations and the causal 
relations of agencies. Therefore, actors are not perceived as merely rational unitary utility maximizers, 
but as informed agents situated in contexts. Moreover, this theoretical perspective searches for 
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no incentives to change any existing situations. Moreover, it places the analysis in a 
closed system insulated from any contact with a real world situation. Such unrealistic 
assumptions have considerable impact on the implementation of economic 
recommendations which many different countries have adopted following the 
prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions. However, before analyzing the World 
Bank’s position on the role of the State, it is necessary to analyse contemporary 
economic imperatives in the next section.    
 
 
THE PROBLEMATIC EMPHASIS ON COMMODIFICATION 
 
Political interests and economic activities have always been crucial for the processes 
of social change. The degree of influence of power relations and the way in which the 
market is approached also shapes the social processes themselves. Even though 
economics and political science have been targeting their constituencies from 
different angles and perspectives, they are not incompatible at all. On the contrary, 
multidisciplinary approaches can provide insight and substantially enrich the analysis 
of social phenomena.  
 
Economic activities are social activities per se as Polanyi and Schumpeter, among 
many other scholars, have shown.14 For instance, Robert Gilpin has acknowledged 
                                                                                                                                                                      
contingent necessities, presenting the analysis from abstract to concrete and from simple to complex 
(Jessop, 1990b).   
14 For economics, political science, international relations, sociology, and the social sciences in 
general, it has been argued, have all the common denominator of Social Theory.  This is not the same 
as saying that there are no clear differences among all of the social sciences, as has already been 
discussed. Disciplinary distinctions tend to emphasize theoretical orientations, analytical focus, 
specific approaches and methods, while the general agenda of the social sciences clearly shows much 
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that “…despite the growing importance of the market, historical experience indicates 
that the purpose of economic activities is ultimately determined not only by the 
markets and the prescriptions of technical economics, but also (either explicity or 
implicitly) by the norms, values and interests of the social and political systems in 
which economic activities are embedded…” (2001, 12).   
 
Therefore, neither markets nor economic activities should be stripped of their social, 
historical and contextual customs. Restricting attention to a few ‘fundamental’ 
macroeconomic variables omits the social, political and historical aspects which every 
actors’ action or transaction carries within itself.15 Thus, it is not surprising to find a 
growing recognition that the goal of sustainable development cannot be achieved 
without changing current economic policy means and instruments (Stiglitz, 1998a).  
 
The problematic emphasis of policy-makers on commodification starts from the 
assumption that economics in general and neoclassical orthodoxy in particular, 
provides the leading perspectives for the study of social and political phenomena. As 
has already been shown in previous chapters, there are severe problems and 
inconsistencies with the imposition of economic determinism and structuralist 
explanations.16 There is no such thing as a market governed exclusively by objective 
laws and universal principles. Not only is there no incompatibility between market 
                                                                                                                                                                      
common ground for all of the disciplines. This should not surprise any specialist, as all social sciences 
refer to and develop from common sources of Social Theory (cf. Cuadra, 2001; and Lemert, 1999).  
15 The emphasis on the parsimony of the theoretical models stresses their predictive capacity and level 
of abstraction, although it faces a trade-off between their predictive capacity, concreteness and 
plausibility (Hay, 2002c). 
16 It is not being claimed in this thesis that economic analysis automatically leads to determinism; 
rather, that economic analysis alone is no substitute for historical, political and sociological analysis, 
which situates the phenomena and the actors in specific contexts, crucial for informing their 
interactions (Lawson, 1997 and 2003). 
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activities and the role of the State, indeed the creation of the former was in itself a 
political act embedded in the social relation.   
 
Neoclassical economic theory, in so far as it conduces to a false distinction between 
States and markets, shows clear signs of inconsistency and fallibility. Consider, for 
instance, one of the main arguments for orientating domestic markets to external 
competition. It has been argued that greater rates of growth should follow the opening 
of an economy, due to increases in efficiency in economic activities. However, Rodrik 
provides compelling evidence that openness does not guarantee economic growth, 
since there is no straightforward association between trade barrier levels and the long-
term growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).17 It is the investment and 
macroeconomic policies that remain key in the promotion of economic growth, 
because the maintenance of macro-economic stability, on the one side, and the 
investment of an important share of GDP in the provision of welfare and adequate 
public services on the other, provide adequate conditions for performing economic 
activities (Rodrik, 1999).            
 
More plausibly, regardless of the degree of openness of the economy, it is economic 
growth which works as a magnet for the attraction of trade and investment flows. The 
Bretton Woods institutions’ prescriptions for the divestiture of public enterprises in 
developing countries seized the opportunity to impose detailed neoclassical economic 
prescriptions, as will be shown in Chapter Four. Unfortunately, some of the 
                                                          
17 No indicator of policy towards trade and capital inflows correlates significantly with per capita GDP. 
Average tariff levels, non-tariff coverage ratios and indexes of capital account liberalization all show a 
weak correlation between openness and economic growth. Most importantly, the link is contingent on 
the presence of complementary policies and institutions (Rodrik, 1999). 
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prescriptions have gone far beyond prudential limits, either on the basis of theoretical 
support or empirical demonstrations (Rodrik, 1999; and Stiglitz, 1998a). 
 
It is no secret that the orientation of economic policies represents a highly political 
decision. Since there is overwhelming evidence that market discipline empowers 
financial markets over other constituencies (Ohmae, 1990 and 1996; Strange, 1996), 
the degree of commodification of economic activities is not exempt from difficulties. 
It is under these circumstances that democratic governance proves increasingly 
difficult. Unsatisfied social conditions and demands, especially if they are not 
attended by externally induced disciplines and strategies, may produce unexpected 
and undesirable social results. Since it is domestic voters who elect their own national 
governments, the latter must be held accountable to the former. However, the 
neoclassical economic orthodoxy and discourse point to the increasing importance of 
foreign investors, fund managers and members of the economic oligarchy for 
domestic policy makers, taking the responsibility and accountability away from the 
immediate representatives of the electorate. An important historical lesson which 
should not be overlooked is that successful economic management must not be 
induced to converge. There must be enough room for the implementation of economic 
policies. The domestic focus, design, debate and degree of various issues such as the 
structure of institutions, the tolerated and permissible extent of inequality and the 
types of public goods to be provided by the government, are not only a government 
agenda but a civil society priority. Thus, the government is held responsible for 
producing outcomes which satisfy the demands and aspirations of the citizens which 
it represents (Rodrik, 1999).    
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The succession of economic and financial crises in emerging markets during recent 
decades has shown strong evidence for not holding the assumption that international 
markets get things right in all circumstances. The neoclassical economic orthodoxy 
has modestly made some concessions on its silence on the socially embedded 
character of the market.18 The myths of ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-adjusting’ markets 
proved incapable of delivering either economic efficiency or socially equitable 
growth. Therefore, there is growing recognition that public and private spheres are by 
no means opposite to each other. The pendulum of the public debate has oscillated 
between various emphases on markets and government interaction throughout history. 
Economics, especially in its neoclassical guise, has been an influential social 
discipline since the last century. Nowadays their economic imperatives are widely 
portrayed and perceived as the self-induced external mechanisms of recent decades, 
discursively associated with different phenomena labelled in many different ways, 
including neoliberalism, Washington Consensus and globalization.19 
                                                          
18 For instance, the Washington Consensus of economic reform focused mainly on the role of ten 
policies aiming to foster growth in the Latin American region after the early 1980s debt crisis. Since it 
is to be discussed in Chapter Seven, suffice it to say that the label of this set of policies was intended to 
reflect what the members of the Washington Congress at that time, the technocrats of the international 
financial organizations, think tanks, economic agencies of the US government and the Federal Reserve 
Board regarded as a desirable set of economic policy reforms for the Latin American economies. The 
reforms emphasized the role of policy instruments, rather than objectives or outcomes. Additionally, 
there was also recognition that these actors do not always follow their own precepts. The Washington 
Consensus set of policy instruments featured small budget deficits, redirection of public expenditure, 
tax reforms, financial liberalization, competitive exchange rates, progressive reduction of trade barriers 
and tariffs, facilitation of foreign direct investment entry, privatization of public enterprises, 
deregulation, and the provision of secure property rights (Williamson, 1990).  
The Washington Consensus became associated not only with the process of economic restructuring, 
but also with the ideological agenda of neoliberalism, precluding any concern for distributive policies. 
Two decades later, characterized by disappointing rates of growth in Latin America, and severe 
economic crises in many countries, another agenda has been launched for the region. Its broadened 
scope incorporates equity and institutions as core issues. The post Washington Consensus takes the 
completion of first generation reforms, and implementation of crisis-proof mechanisms as necessary 
conditions for embarking on institutional reforms, and also for improving income distribution and the 
social agenda. Furthermore, these expanded medium-term objectives are supposed to be complemented 
at the social and political levels as well (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003; Birdsall and de la Torre, 
2001). Chapter Seven, below, also examines the emphasis of institutions of the post Washington 
Consensus in more detail.  
19 The assumptions on which neoclassical economics is based portray a homo oeconomicus who seems 
to have nothing in common with Aristotle’s political animal. However, it is important to stress that it is 
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The common denominator of these labels is oriented towards the discourse of 
powerless agencies incapable not only of opposing the structural determinism of 
economic imperatives, but the unavailability of options to do anything else than 
blindly obey whatever the market dictates. It is under these circumstances that the 
unrealistic assumptions which Friedman associates with his ‘positive’ epistemological 
position can impact upon the open systems in the world from which they were 
initially isolated as a form of self-induced external enforcement mechanism. 
Similarly, political science has not been immune from the influence of neoclassical 
economics. Aiming to emulate the parsimony of this discipline, one of the most 
significant efforts to import the explanatory power and predictive capacity of the 
assumptions which distinctively made neoclassical economics important has been 
rational choice theory. By making use of broad generalizations and simplifications in 
a similar way to positivist epistemology, rational choice positions itself far away from 
the complexity of the phenomena which it seeks deductively to analyse.  
 
The imposition of a methodological rigour that leaves out the complexity of the 
phenomena has already been discussed. Suffice it to say that the neoclassical model is 
easily recognised in the rational choice institutionalism already discussed in Chapter 
Two. Unsurprisingly, the assumptions of bounded rationality and utility maximizing 
actors, on which this theoretical perspective draws, represent one of the main 
examples of the real impact which ideas can have, as we shall see. Before proceeding, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
precisely this lack of contact that is one of the factors which has accentuated an impasse in the 
dialogue between disciplines. What is needed is a decisive will to open the debate, rather than 
constraining them with specialists’ jargon, since there is no such thing as a uniform model of economic 
policies and governance, as I contend in this thesis.    
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it is important to bear in mind one caveat. I am not providing a quantitative test of any 
of the economic fundamentals that the neoclassical economic orthodoxy prescribes. 
On the contrary, what follows is a qualitative analysis of an idea which an 
international organization has promoted. According to the World Bank, the role 
which the State should play in economic activities acknowledges rational choice 
institutionalism as one of the theoretical influences on the basis of which economic 
policies are prescribed. Those policies in turn, impact upon the material dimension of 
millions of people throughout the world. It is not my goal to attempt a global 
evaluation of the economic advice of the monetary and financial organizations, on the 
basis of positivist assumptions.  Rather, what will be attempted in the next chapter is 
to approach the highly political sets of decisions which have been taken in the specific 
case of the Mexican economic restructuring since the early 1980s, all of which have 
had a material and differentiated impact on the population’s living conditions.      
 
It is important to recall the notion of institutions which provide the rules of the game 
and in turn shape human interaction. By opening up and closing down windows of 
opportunity, each actor is supposed to take optimal decisions to make him or herself 
better off. As has already been discussed, the structural and deterministic perspective 
taken by rational choice institutionalism unsurprisingly portrays agencies as 
powerless to make their own decisions: they can only choose from the given options. 
According to this perspective, the institutional framework is an important 
precondition for the performance of an economy, as the analysis of institutional 
change is pursued from the top structures down to the bottom ones. Furthermore, 
social change can only be vertically induced, where organizations are able to modify 
the institutional framework and to alter the structural setting (North, 1990a). It is 
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therefore important to focus my analysis on the promotion of an idea by one of the 
most influential organizations during the post Second World War period. The World 
Bank has undeniably played a very important role in the dissemination, prescription 
and introduction of neoclassical economic orthodoxy prescriptions and advice. They 
are given to member countries which borrow conditioned resources, and these in turn, 
either in a direct or in an indirect way, have an impact on the living standards and 
conditions of the people from the borrowing countries. In many cases, economic 
resources have been given to developing nations in Latin America, Asia, Africa and 
Europe. It is, then, to the World Bank’s perspective of the State that I now turn.  
        
 
A STRUCTURAL ‘MARKET FRIENDLY’ VIEW OF THE STATE 
 
It is not the aim of this chapter to argue that the World Bank promotion of its 
particular State agenda comes before its economic recommendations. Rather, it is 
argued here that the influence of neoclassical economics and rational choice 
institutionalism has been decisive in the formulation of the perspective of such 
international institutions. Economists and staff trained in these schools clearly not 
only defend but aggressively take for granted, spread and promote the postulates and 
assumptions on which their economic advice and prescriptions are given. It would not 
surprise anybody that, based on orthodox approaches such as neoclassical economics 
and rational choice institutionalism, the ‘market friendly’ view of the State adopted in 
the World Bank’s latest publications and reports makes explicit its preferences for 
outwardly oriented market criteria, economic policy convergence and harmonization 
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of best practices.20 Whenever room is given for heterodox options, the relaxation is 
never loose enough to pose a real challenge to the ‘economics comes first’ position.  
However, as is stressed throughout this thesis, markets do not necessarily set the 
priorities, nor do they determine some outcomes over others, since they are embedded 
in broader social contexts, as Schumpeter, Granovetter and Polanyi have argued.    
 
The World Bank’s recommendations and structural adjustment programmes have 
evolved through different phases. Since the Washington Consensus and the post 
Washington Consensus are further discussed in Chapter Seven, limited space prevents 
a detailed exploration here.21 The World Bank, as one of the main economic and 
financial organizations of the post Second World War era, has not been untouched by 
the specific circumstances in which it and its members are situated.22 For example, 
after the oil crises of the 1970s, one of the main concerns of the World Bank for the 
promotion of sustainable growth in the world economy was the adjustment 
mechanisms for energy, trade and capital flows. Moreover, general recommendations 
were based on the distinction between oil importing developing countries, capital-
surplus oil exporters and industrial countries. In any case, the emphasis of 
international policies was orientated towards the improvement of poor countries’ 
gains from trade, assistance for developing countries’ energy production and the 
allocation of aid to the poorest countries (World Bank, 1981). After the debt crisis of 
                                                          
20 There are, nevertheless, some analyses which move away from the orthodoxy. Regarding rational 
choice institutionalism, see Hall and Taylor, 1996; Hay and Wincott, 1998; Peters, 1999; and also 
Chapter Two of this thesis. 
21 See the various issues of the World Development Report and Williams, 1999. 
22 An important aspect which needs to be taken into account is that both the role and importance of 
ideas are contextually specific in time and space. Important developments in economic theory have 
attempted to tackle some specific problems and theoretical puzzles regarding growth, development, 
economic cycles, inflation, trade, employment, so on and so forth. Not only are they not automatically 
triggered, but in some cases it takes several years, even centuries, to bring to maturity the ideas which 
in turn provide the bases for further theoretical and ideational evolution (Backhouse, 1994 and 2002). 
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the early 1980s and two decades of lost growth and development for a big share of the 
developing world, the emphasis on macro-economic and micro-economic variables 
has been ‘fine-tuned’ between different generations of economic reforms, and a more 
explicit and intrusive position as regards the economic role of the State has been 
adopted.     
 
Nowadays international organizations such as the World Bank draw up a list of 
recommendations and preferences about what the role of the State should and should 
not be, what its capabilities could allow it to do and what it could not be allowed to 
do. Interestingly, the recognition of the central role of the State is said to be more that 
of a “partner, catalyst or facilitator”, rather than a major player in its own right 
(World Bank, 1997b). The State, it is argued, has to specifically serve the market, but 
in a social way. The World Bank proposes a strategy in order to achieve this goal. 
First, the State needs to match its role to its capability, and second the State needs to 
have its capabilities raised through reinvigorating public institutions. According to 
this view, the more capable a State is, the more effective it becomes. The undertaking 
and promotion of effective collective actions (i.e. infrastructure, the rule of law and 
public health, among others) represents the State’s capability. In addition, it is said to 
be effective when it satisfies society’s demands for these goods and services (World 
Bank, 1997b). 
 
To achieve the first part of the strategy, namely matching the State’s role to its 
capabilities, requires certain mechanisms for choosing what to do and how to do it. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the socio-political fundamentals include a 
range of different issues which are case specific, the strategies need to be adjusted 
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accordingly.23 The fundamentals include the protection of the environment and 
vulnerable social groups, investment in social services and infrastructure, the 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability and the overall policy environment, and the 
establishment of a foundation of law. For the World Bank, getting the State’s social 
and economic fundamentals right, mean providing adequate institutional foundations 
for markets.24 These general considerations need to be evaluated and tailored 
according to the specific circumstances of each individual State. Moreover, attention 
is paid to the credibility of governments and their way of ensuring the spreading and 
sharing of the benefits of growth for their populations; for instance, via adequate 
investment and the provision of education and health (World Bank, 1997b). 
 
Furthermore, this first part of the strategy goes some steps further. Once they have 
provided institutional foundations for markets, governments are supposed to ensure 
that the State does not monopolize the provision of goods and services. According to 
the World Bank’s recommendations, regulatory systems, the privatization of State 
enterprises and the focus on specific policies are means to avoid a situation in which 
the State is cast in the role of sole provider. Additionally, the World Bank 
acknowledges as a crucial element for a capable State the government’s political 
commitment to economic and institutional reforms. The more committed a 
government is to reforming its macroeconomic policies and institutional structures, 
                                                          
23 Williams argues that, based on the view that economic rationality is somehow natural, the World 
Bank pursues an agenda for implementing reforms at different, albeit complementary, levels. The 
macro-institutional reforms, such as the structural and sector-specific adjustment programmes, are 
complemented by other strategies. In addition to the agenda for modifying the social, political and 
economic role of the State, there are some other specific projects. These include the implementation of 
micro-level programmes, aiming to teach individuals to think in terms of economic rationality so that 
they can be then subjected to the discipline of the markets. In short, the construction of economic space 
and the making of the homo economicus programme target not only governments and institutions, but 
also the habits and social mores of people (1999).  
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the faster and more equitable will be the economic development which it can deliver 
to its citizenry. The reforms of the State which aim to make it a more effective and 
capable entity take place not only at the macroeconomic level, where the emphasis 
has been on the exchange rate, industrial and trade policies, but also at the 
institutional level, at which they need to deal with regulation, social services, finance 
and infrastructure (World Bank, 1997b).  
 
The second part of the strategy which calls for reinvigorating the institutions of the 
State matches the institutional emphasis of the post Washington Consensus to be 
analyzed in Chapter Seven. The reinvigoration of the institutions of the State aims to 
stimulate better performance by raising the returns for a more efficient bureaucracy, 
making sure that the disincentives are always lower and less attractive than the 
incentives for reinvigorating the institutions of the State. The World Bank’s 
perspective stresses openness, transparency and accountability by offering citizens a 
voice and partnership; the practice of effective rules and controls, preferably making 
laws enforceable and backed by an independent judiciary; and the promotion of a 
competitive environment not only for policy making, but for delivering public goods 
and services, and within public officials and the bureaucracy (World Bank, 1997b). 
 
The fact should be stressed that the World Bank’s institutional assessment of the State 
does not consider it as an agency. Rather, the State is viewed as part of the economic 
structure, which serves and provides the foundations for markets.25 And in so doing it 
                                                                                                                                                                      
24 Such institutional emphasis is characteristic of the post Washington Consensus further discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
25 The phenomena associated with the processes of globalization provide non-deterministic windows of 
opportunity and constraints for governments to modify their practices together with effective 
international cooperation, versus rising transnational concerns, such as the promotion of economic 
stability, the protection of the environment and the aim of making international development assistance 
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reproduces the structural and deterministic approach portrayed by neoclassical 
economics and rational choice institutionalism, as analyzed in the previous chapter of 
this thesis. As indicated, the World Bank’s market friendly formula aims to achieve 
faster economic development through two core elements: good policies, on the one 
hand, and State institutions more capable of putting them into practice, on the other. 
Depending on the region of the world on which we are concentrating and, 
specifically, on the characteristics of the specific case study, different agendas are set. 
For instance, the recommendations for Latin America call for the implementation of 
democratic practices, and decentralization of power and spending, in addition to 
reforms of the legal system, civil service and social policies.   
 
In the World Bank’s view, the role of the State is crucial for reaching better levels of 
economic and social development. In advancing this goal, it recommends that the 
State must never engage itself in this task as a direct provider, but simply as a 
‘partner, catalyst and facilitator’ (World Bank, 1997b, 1). The impact of all these sets 
of ideas is clearly having strong repercussions on the daily lives of millions of people 
throughout the world. The World Bank’s view of the State is a structural perception 
which reduces the State’s raison d’être to a set of mere strategies for effectiveness. It 
sees effectiveness as the crucial match and interaction between rules and institutions, 
where the provision of goods and services is the State’s most important role. The 
World Bank argues that the effectiveness of a State’s performance is determined by 
the extent to which markets are able to flourish, and thus the extent to which better 
living standards can be derived.      
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
more effective, the management of regional crises and the spread and promotion of knowledge (World 
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What it does not say is that the capacity for change lies in the way in which policies 
are implemented, and also in the courses of action selected by actors themselves, 
notably governments. The World Bank does not make any explicit mention that there 
is a broad range of feasible alternatives, although it accepts that there is no unique 
model for change. However, for this international organization, the nature and extent 
of change is reduced to a matter of incentives. According to this argument, the 
stronger the incentives for throwing out old policies and institutional arrangements, 
the more likely changes become (World Bank, 1997b). 
 
Adopting this perspective, the World Bank views change merely as a structural 
outcome.  There is neither any recognition of the role which agencies play, nor of how 
vital they are for the provision of contingency in the State’s tasks and effectiveness. 
This should not surprise anybody, since the economic concerns of macroeconomic 
stability and attraction of investment are perceived to be built upon, and to operate on, 
a static and stable social context within a framework. It is argued that contingency 
brings uncertainty, which in the eyes of the investors is perceived as an economic 
disincentive. Nevertheless, the unrealistic assumption that economic transactions and 
activities take place in static conditions ensures that it is impossible either to 
reproduce them or even to find them in the real world. The fluid and non-static nature 
of social processes clearly needs to be taken into account.  
 
The structural deterministic view, not only of the World Bank in particular, but of 
international organizations in general, promotes inaction, passive behaviour, 
submission and acceptance of the status quo. The huge potential which actors have for 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Bank, 1997b). 
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modifying the context in which they live is a cause of concern; therefore, it is 
deliberately excluded from conservative social, political and economic agendas. 
Although, in the short-term, policies may induce or select certain strategies over 
others, in the long-term, change with all its desired and undesired consequences will 
come. Unsatisfied demands and exclusionary policies can be partially attenuated. 
However, in circumstances in which they are not corrected, the desire for a radical 
transformation will build up pressures which are each time more difficult to contain. 
Regardless of concerns for stability and equilibrium, history teaches us that change 
always comes in the end.          
 
Consistent with the argument presented in this thesis, it is imperative to explore the 
links and causal relations between ideas, firms and institutional stability, as all have 
been instrumental in the orientation of government policies and the social impact of 
the efforts towards increased commodification. In so doing, attention is also paid to 
the importance of both innovation and crisis which Schumpeter terms ‘creative 
destruction’.  
 
 
IDEAS, STABILITY AND FIRMS: AN INSTITUTIONAL LINK  
 
The previous chapter discussed the importance of institutions and the inadequacy of 
rational choice institutionalism for explaining and understanding the processes of 
social change. Nevertheless, the role played by institutions clearly has an impact on 
the contexts and structures in which agents find themselves. The spatial and temporal 
dimensions are especially important in the identification of constituent elements 
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which play a role in the processes of social change. For, it has been argued, 
geographical and historical specificity are among the most important features to be 
taken into account in social, political and economic theory (Sayer, 2000).26 Although 
the social and political contexts are undoubtedly important, some neoclassical 
economic analysis and recommendations based on this theoretical perspective tend to 
de-contextualise the economic phenomena from their specificities of time and space. 
Consistent with my position, it is important to mention that, in order to bring those 
details back into the analysis, some efforts have been made to relax some neoclassical 
assumptions and present a more rigorous analysis, as are exemplified by the 
arguments of Stiglitz, some theories of endogenous growth, strategic trade theory and 
the new economic geography. None of those theories are adopted here. However, 
there are some common issues showed by their research agenda and the one presented 
in this thesis.   
 
What is important to stress in this chapter is how actors, contexts and actions 
articulate by putting particular emphasis on conceptualization and abstraction. Since 
the Strategic Relational Approach is not blind to the geographic and historical 
contexts in which processes are situated, it takes into account the spatio-temporal 
dimensions of the social phenomena, as it does with the analytical distinction between 
the material and the ideational, as well as that between structure and agency. 
Regarding the time and space particularities of the social changes presented in chapter 
one, the two moments of decisive intervention identified in the trajectory of the 
Mexican State were the revolutionary period and the early 1980s. Since the emphasis 
                                                          
26 For instance, early 20th century institutionalists argued that taking into account history and the 
changes which societies display over time is necessary to provide an evolutionary account of the 
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of this research is placed on the theoretical identification of causes, rather than finding 
law-like regularities of the processes of social change, the argument presented in this 
thesis pays attention to some of the tendencies which are typically overlooked in the 
emphasis and efforts at commodification.27 The main purpose of this section is briefly 
to recall the notion of institutions presented in Chapter Two and to discuss how they 
affect the windows of opportunity and constraint for situated economic agents. This is 
important, as it provides a broader perspective than if the analysis had merely focused 
on quantitative variables. Since my concern goes beyond the rate of growth of the 
economy, attention needs to be paid to causal elements and interactions, not merely 
on statistical regularities.28  
 
Consistent with the emphasis placed on the causal and constitutive role of ideas in 
processes of social change, as discussed above, a certain pattern of interaction 
between economic ideas and institutions needs to be taken into account. Either in the 
face of a crisis, or in the narration of one, we are told, institutional stability cannot be 
promoted without first allowing economic ideas to reduce uncertainty (Blyth, 2002). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
economy. Moreover, it was also argued that the evolution of social structures is a process of natural 
selection of changing and cumulatively self-reinforcing institutions (Veblen, 1919).   
27 A caveat needs to be introduced at this point. The use of reference milestones is preferable due to the 
fluidity, incremental and punctuated evolution of the processes. For the purposes of this study, the 
early 1980s represents the period in which economic, social and political priorities were modified in 
the Mexican agenda. However, some of the elements and causes to be analyzed can be traced back to 
an earlier time. 
28 Behaviouralism, for instance, reduces the significance of theory to a descriptive record of material 
regularities. It makes use of inductive logic by applying empirical and statistical methods in its search 
to discover regular patterns of behaviour which would help it generate probabilistic predictions. Since 
behaviouralism treats agencies as simple aggregations of individuals and does not rely on theory to 
inform its observations, it suffers from narrow definitions, albeit compensated by employing rigorous 
statistical techniques. However, correlations among variables are sometimes confused with causes of 
the phenomena under scrutiny. This conflation, rare in closed systems, becomes problematic in open 
social, political and economic systems, where the objects and subjects of study can affect their own 
contexts. Therefore, the character of the open systems makes it impossible to get a clean observation, 
where the isolation of variables is vital. For it is one thing to quantify statistical significance between 
observable variables, and another either to reduce or to leave aside unquantifiable factors such as 
power and ideas in the analysis (Hay, 2002c). The Strategic Relational Approach is better equipped to 
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The proposition that ideas contribute towards the reduction of uncertainty during 
moments of crisis functions as a preliminary step in the construction of institutions, as 
they make political coalition and network building possible, which in turn facilitates 
collective action. Building on these steps and at the same time parallel to these tasks, 
the dismantling of existing institutions is of use because it justifies a new institutional 
design. Furthermore, ideas do play a role, not only in building a new set of rules, but 
also in paving the way for reaching or regaining institutional stability. Once the 
construction or adaptation and legitimation tasks for a new set of institutions are 
accomplished facts, stability is made possible to let them provide a framework 
conducive to the prospering of economic activities (Blyth, 2002). Thus, ideas play a 
causal and constitutive role in the construction of a stable institutional framework in 
which situated economic agents such as firms realise their productive endeavours.29              
   
The informal and formal set of rules which actors generally follow, as defended by 
North and discussed in Chapter Two, affects the room for agents to manoeuvre, 
conditioning the latter’s interactions. Bearing this in mind, the role institutions play in 
producing economic and political outcomes is of crucial importance. In particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
analyse the dynamic flows of interaction of situated actors and their context, which continuously 
reshape the social, political and economic arenas.   
29 There are important common reference points and differences between Blyth’s position and the one 
presented here. He places more emphasis on institutional change, whereas this chapter stresses some of 
the causal relations of the processes of social change. I do agree on the analysis of the way in which 
the broad pattern of ideas and institutional change follows attempts to regain stable institutions when 
threatened, discursively or by crisis and instability. Nonetheless, problematizing structural notions of 
institutional change and focusing on the causal role of ideas is not the same thing as labelling the 
economic changes in the last quarter of the 20th century ‘the second great transformation’ as Blyth 
does. In my humble opinion, a qualitative historical transformation such as that of the 19th century 
analyzed by Polanyi in his classic work has not taken place in the contemporary period. It is important 
to recall that the great transformation rested on a few, but crucial, elements: the balance of power 
system, the international gold standard, the ‘self-adjusting’ market utopia and the liberal State, where 
the laws governing the market economy were of the utmost importance (Polanyi, 1957). Even though 
important economic changes have occurred since then, according to my perception the qualitative 
historical transformations of that time dwarf our times.  
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regarding the economic sphere, the importance of firms and the ability of institutions 
to open up or cancel out certain courses of action have been stressed, among other 
authors, by Hall and Soskice. In their book Varieties of Capitalism, these authors take 
firms as core economic actors, and portray them as self-interested entities who 
strategically interact with others. According to this perspective, firms make use of 
their capacities in a relational way. They orientate their efforts in order to produce, 
develop and distribute goods and services profitably. In so doing, they also make use 
of strategic interactions, not only with their peers and counterparts, but also with the 
institutional set of formal and informal rules.30 From this point of view, structures 
such as institutions, condition without determining the range of available and feasible 
strategies for the actors (in this case, corporations). It is the institutional frameworks 
which provide national economies with comparative advantages in particular 
activities and products, from where cross-national patterns of specialization emerge, 
due to the availability of modes of coordination which condition firms’ efficiency 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Bringing a loosely Ricardian notion of ‘comparative 
advantage’ to their framework, Hall and Soskice argue that nations prosper not by 
becoming similar, but by building on their institutional differences.31 Because firms 
are able to retain the core characteristics of their long-standing strategies, the 
modification of practices to overcome external shocks allows firms to sustain and 
recreate their advantage, on the basis of common beliefs and understanding. In other 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Rather than claiming a second great transformation, what I attempt to do in this thesis is to take 
theoretical tools and methodological criteria for my study, and analyse the processes of social change. I 
hope this is clear from the preceding chapters.  
30 The core competencies or dynamic capabilities which Hall and Soskice consider include a firm’s 
industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and 
coordination problems in relation with its employees (2001). 
31 Taking labour and capital as immobile between two countries David Ricardo argued that trade was 
determined not by the most efficient producer of goods, as Adam Smith had proposed, but by 
‘comparative advantage’ in which the relative efficiency of producers would help expand the market 
and stimulate growth (Backhouse, 1994). Technicalities aside, Hall and Soskice take principally the 
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words, there is room for policy diversity, which does not enforce uniformity in 
policies, practices or strategies. Moreover, Hall and Soskice acknowledge the path-
dependent character of institutions when they mention that the institutions of any 
given economy are inextricably bound up with its particular history (2001).  
 
Appealing at first glance as this ‘actor-centred approach’ may appear to be, it is, 
however, by no means unproblematic (Hall and Soskice, 2001, 6).  As this analysis is 
heavily influenced by rational choice institutionalism, it should come as no surprise 
that some of the latter’s deficiencies are also present in the former. Since a more 
detailed discussion of this topic is presented in Chapter Two, suffice it to say that the 
bounded rationality and utility maximizing behaviour of the actors is perceived to be 
affected by the institutions of the economy. In addition, it is quite evident that Hall 
and Soskice consider the institutional framework as a precondition for the 
performance of the economy, similar to rational choice institutionalism. Therefore, 
this sort of top-down analysis suggests that change can be induced vertically. Even 
though these writers acknowledge that actors interact with others, this point does not 
influence any concession as to the potential for actors to influence, promote and 
achieve changes.  
 
Furthermore, Watson criticises the use made by Hall and Soskice of the conceptual 
abstraction of ‘comparative advantage’ in the face of empirical indicators which do 
not match the specialization of contemporary trade flows. He argues that the socio- 
institutional differences of their approach do not correspond to the distinctive patterns 
of specialization observed in the real world. His main critique points out that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
pattern of product specialization found across nations and expand the notion to allow them to insert, 
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fundamental features of the social structure of accumulation are obscured by 
emphasizing the existence of national models such as the ones which Hall and 
Soskice employ. Thus, the variety of models is poorly explained, weakening David 
Ricardo’s notions of specialization, trade and comparative advantage (2003c). 
 
There is an additional controversy in Hall and Soskice’s work besides the strong 
traces of deterministic structural logic and the loose adaptation of the Ricardian 
notion of comparative advantage. This is the paradoxical reductionism of two broad 
types of market economies. The liberal model, which they associate with Anglo-
Saxon countries, is juxtaposed with the coordinated model, associated with European 
countries and Japan. According to Hall and Soskice’s analysis, the main feature of the 
Anglo-Saxon liberal economies is the competitive market arrangements set for firms. 
By contrast, in the European and Japanese coordinated economies, as well as the 
market mechanism, firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to 
coordinate the orientation of their activities. Even though those authors hint that their 
typology could not fit many national cases, no efforts are undertaken to provide a 
more balanced and less schematized account of national systems of political 
economy. Clearly, there are certainly more varieties of capitalism, to use Hall and 
Soskice’s term, than the ones which they identify. If institutions matter to the 
efficiency with which not only goods but also services can be produced, it follows 
then that we need to consider the conditions for domestic policies which aim 
especially at promoting endogenous growth. This makes innovation one of the crucial 
dimensions of economic success. It is to a discussion of innovation that I move in the 
following section, as it is needed for a further analysis of institutions, firms and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
rather than fitting, the institutional framework into their account of institutional varieties of capitalism. 
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innovation to provide a different pattern of economic relations from those presented 
by Hall and Soskice.    
 
 
THE ‘CREATIVE DESTRUCTION’ OF CRISES AND INNOVATION       
 
Innovation has been identified as one of the most important dimensions of economic 
success. Hall and Soskice point to one of the important elements of the distinctiveness 
of Anglo-Saxon economies, its tendency towards radical innovation, whereby not 
only production processes, but also goods, services and technology sectors are 
equipped with better capacities. By contrast, the coordinated market economies tend 
to have a more incremental model of innovation, providing continuous but small scale 
improvements (2001). From their analysis emerge patterns of specialization in 
economic activities and products which could be interpreted as responses to 
institutional frameworks. Therefore, the importance of innovation creates market 
niches and incentives for increased levels of efficiency, both of which are praised in 
the commodification dynamics which characterize contemporary economic activities. 
Following this research, firms are revealed as important units of analysis, because 
they are economic agents situated within an institutional framework. Thus, the 
analysis of economic agencies such as firms might help the Strategic Relational 
Approach to provide insight into causal and endogenous mechanisms, as will be 
shown in the next chapter.   
 
The academic literature on economic development takes technological issues such as 
innovation and transfer as crucial elements which may help national economies to 
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develop.32 Limited space and analytical scope does not allow us to discuss the 
different contributions in this field since the post World War II era onwards.33 Suffice 
it to say, however, that there seems to be some common ground based on two 
important authors. The first one is John Maynard Keynes, whose recommendations 
that the State should play a role in economic development, along with the caveat 
against market failures, gained considerable political influence in the post World War 
II period. Since this time, analysis of the economic role of the State, imperfect 
markets and asymmetric information has been expanded by Stiglitz.34 The other 
influential author whose ideas about innovation and economic development have had 
considerable impact is Joseph A. Schumpeter, whose publications have also 
influenced economics, political economy, economic sociology and political science.    
 
Innovation in economic activities was regarded by Schumpeter as a core part of the 
economic process. These, in turn, were never isolated from, or independent of all the 
social processes (1934). As open systems work, he held that social facts are never 
purely or exclusively economic.35 Situated within a broader social realm, the 
                                                          
32 Besides technological developments, innovation can also be identified in social, political and 
economic affairs, although here it is not as widely acknowledged and praised as in its impact of 
technology.   
33 Development economics has been associated among others, with the work of Raúl Prebisch, Gunnar 
Myrdal, Alexander Gerschenkron, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, as well as analysis and reports from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Economic Commission on Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Albert O. Hirschman, Moses Abramovitz, Paul M. Romer, Amartya Sen 
and Paul R. Krugman have also made important contributions. Placing more emphasis on structural 
adjustment, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank programmes and recommendations have 
been put into practice, leaving no continent untouched. 
34 I have discussed Stiglitz in Chapter Two; due to space constraints there is no need here for further 
detailed examination. 
35 Like Polanyi, Schumpeter does not consider land and labour as products. There are, however, 
important differences in their accounts. In the latter’s perspective, the economic exchanges between 
labour and land continually renew the stream of economic life, as do consumption goods as well. 
Money is regarded as a technical instrument which functions as an intermediate link, facilitating the 
circulation of commodities (Schumpeter, 1934). As reviewed in Chapter One, it is the commodification 
of land and labour in the first leg of the expansion of the markets, operating alongside the protection to 
society and nature associated with the ‘double movement’, which distinguishes Polanyi’s contributions 
(1957). 
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economic dynamics feature circular flow processes, development processes and 
crises, which prevent development from following an undisturbed course.36 
Schumpeter argued that cyclical fluctuations are as important as economic stability, 
because they foster the continual emergence of new economic and social forms. 
Overall, this has the effect of improving economic well-being (1934). In order to 
achieve economic development, he maintained that changes in economic life alter and 
displace states of equilibrium. In his perspective, changes in economic life would be 
more likely to appear in the supply-side of activities of industrial production and 
commercial life, rather than as demand-driven phenomena of consumer wants. He 
went on to say that changes in economic life require new combinations in materials 
and forces which make productive economic activities. The innovative combinations 
draw necessary means of production from former combinations. Innovation, therefore, 
becomes a core component for the introduction of new goods, new methods of 
production, the opening of new markets, or carrying out the new organization of any 
industry (Schumpeter, 1934).  
 
Innovations and crises combine in a process of ‘creative destruction’. If crises do not 
permanently obstruct economic and social processes, it is in the emergence of new 
economic and social forms where social and economic sectors rise and fall, that 
innovation plays a pivotal role. For Schumpeter, the process of ‘creative destruction’ 
is regarded as an evolutionary form of economic change. As the label suggests, it 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, destroying the old and 
                                                          
36 The business cycle was described as having different stages. Those are i) a situation of boom which 
creates out of itself dynamics and which, when they end, gives way to a crisis; ii) the crisis may turn 
into depression which might be followed by a temporary absence of development, leading to a new 
equilibrium; iii) the fact that this is an underemployment equilibrium may trigger the reorganization of 
production which precedes another boom stage (Schumpeter, 1934).    
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creating the new. The ‘creative destruction’ brought by innovation and crises might 
translate in the economic sphere into increased levels of competitiveness as one 
participant finds that the latter factor command a decisive cost or quality advantage. 
This, in turn, strikes at the foundation of other firms (Schumpeter, 1954).  
 
The fundamental impulse towards novelty in consumer goods and services, methods 
of production, forms of transportation, market shares and niches, industrial 
organization and management reduces the long-term scope and importance of 
established economic entities. To introduce new goods, services, processes and 
technologies, a revised and updated economic and industrial reorganization is 
required. This may bear little relation to the neoclassical economic orthodoxy of 
perfect competition. Even though new methods of production, technology or 
commodities do not per se confer monopolistic tendencies, those positions are often 
approximated. Furthermore, imperfect competition affecting market prices and 
economic output is situated within an institutional pattern, which in turn also creates 
conditions for another institutional framework (Schumpeter, 1954). Therefore, the 
crises and innovations which characterize the processes of ‘creative destruction’ 
decisively impact upon and make the institutional frameworks follow a similar or 
equivalent dynamic pattern of renovation, as they also need to adapt themselves to the 
ongoing changes and processes in a dialectical fashion.     
 
By making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, I hope I have shown so far that, 
while crises, as mechanisms of change, provide windows of opportunity which are 
appropriate for a macro and meso level of analysis, innovation is better dissected at 
the micro and meso levels of analysis. The innovation of economic activities 
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undertaken by firms situated within an institutional framework will follow after an 
overview from the early 1980s in Mexico on the orientation of the reforms. This will 
be the main purpose of the next chapter.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
What I have attempted in this chapter is to enquire into some of the causal relations of 
the processes of social and economic change which are the focus of this thesis. The 
open character of the system being analysed means that this should not be considered 
an exhaustive list. On the contrary, an enquiry such as the one undertaken in this 
chapter must be assessed as exploratory and illustrative. Since it is virtually 
impossible to control for all of the interactions among variables which affect complex 
social and economic systems, efforts have been orientated towards revealing the 
contribution of causal processes of commodification-linked phenomena. The dynamic 
nature and fluid interactions which characterize this orientation is undoubtedly fertile 
ground for contingency and indeterminate tendencies and countertendencies.  
 
In order to help us make clear the distinction between closed and open systems, I 
touched upon the differences between a positivist and a realist ontological and 
epistemological position. I made explicit a preference for realism and evidenced the 
weaknesses of positivism. The purpose of the discussion was to highlight that, by 
making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, attention can be paid to social 
interactions and relations. This provides a different picture than would have been the 
case had I used any theory or model based on positivist assumptions. Those 
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distinctive pictures of the objects and subjects ‘in motion’ are, in my understanding, 
adequate for embarking on the study and analysis of social, political and economic 
processes. 
 
Having stressed the character of power immanent in all social relations as the core 
factor of change in the preceding chapter, attention in this chapter was devoted to an 
exploration of some of the causal relations which might be found in the contemporary 
orientation of economic activities. Those activities are not performed in a vacuum, 
isolated from the world outside. They are embedded in a broader social spectrum. 
They are part of an inclusive social universe and, therefore, need to be analysed and 
dissected with these conditions and characteristics in mind. Neither the analytical 
distinctions which we make in order to approach objects and subjects of study, nor the 
evaluations we make of the relations and interactions, are by any means conclusive. 
The ever-changing social dynamics do not allow us to make such universal claims.    
  
So far, the Strategic Relational Approach has proved helpful in the task of identifying 
immanent power within social relations as the core factor of change. Rather than 
following a uniform pattern, the exercise of power makes use of a broad range and 
variety of causal relations which move in different directions and affect, to different 
degrees, actors and structures alike. The suggested causal relations I have focused on 
in this chapter were selected in order to highlight the interactions between structures 
and agencies, as well as the interactions between material and ideational factors. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, Foucault stressed that power is attributed to strategic 
situations in all social relations (1976, 1977 and 1979). As such, its immanency in all 
social interactions makes use of a range of mechanisms, such as the ones suggested 
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here, in a non law-like regular form, to continuously build perpetually moving social 
dynamics and processes. The relational character of the exercise of power provides 
actors with the endogenous capacity to trigger, produce, and bring about changes 
which affect them, as well as the contexts in which they are situated. Moreover, the 
omnipresence of power interactions is not alien to economic activities as the ‘invisible 
hand’ of market forces might suggest. On the contrary, it is articulated and integrated 
in all and every phase of the commodification process. Markets are highly political, 
so are their transactions and activities, and especially so are the frameworks and 
actors which operate and interact there.  
 
If power is the core factor triggering social change, it operates through a variety of 
otherwise intangible causal relations, such as the ideational and institutional, which 
the situated actors in context systematically transform. Power has neither an a priori 
essence, nor a privileged origin.  The strategies through which it is relationally 
exercised from innumerable points never move uniformly in the same direction, or 
aim for the same goals. Furthermore, power relations are uneasy and unpredictable 
phenomena. These open-ended and indeterminate features are, however, the ones 
which the Strategic Relational Approach is well equipped to analyze. Exercises of 
power can be deciphered by tracing agencies’ strategies and causal relations. Yet, the 
account is never conclusive. Nonetheless, no theoretical models or analytical 
strategies should be blamed for this, because contingency and open-endedness are the 
wealth, never the misery, of all social sciences.     
 
Praising this wealth, after the section devoted to the influence of neoclassical 
economic ideas, and the philosophy of science positions, I took the case of the 
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contemporary outward orientation of domestic markets to external competition. Here, 
rates of growth, contrary to conventional wisdom, are reported to show weak law-like 
regularities or correlations with the degree of openness of an economy. Markets are 
socially and politically embedded. They are by no means neutral or independent of 
the context in which actors interact. The consideration of social factors other than 
merely economic variables reflects the highly political character of the markets and 
the implementation of economic policies. The socio-political context could not be left 
aside, nor could stability be taken for granted, since the social character of the market 
provides enough room for different orientations of policies, actors’ roles to be played 
and diversity in the implementation of strategies.  
 
According to the analysis undertaken in this thesis, I found the World Bank 
perspective on the economic and political role of the State to be deterministic and 
structuralist. Since, I contend, social change is mainly an endogenous process, 
agencies themselves have the capacity to internally decide which course of action to 
take. They are, however, situated in circumstances not necessarily of their own 
choosing, leaving the door ajar for contingency and indeterminacy. The Strategic 
Relational Approach focuses on the role played by agencies and on their interactions 
and capabilities as well. This perspective, as shown above, is not shared by the World 
Bank, as it emphasises a top-down view, with the perception of change as a structural 
outcome.   
 
It was in the last parts of this chapter that I considered the interaction between firms 
as economic agents and institutional structures as a useful approach for the analysis of 
innovation. The relevance of this task lies in the fact that innovation has been 
 172
identified as a core component in the economic performances and development of the 
State. A vital element of the expansion and strengthening of productive economic 
activities is novelty in the production of goods and services, channels of distribution, 
management and market shares and niches. As such, I have highlighted its association 
with the ‘creative destruction’ which, together with crises, helps to propel the onward 
march of economic cycles.   
 
Chapter Four further explores the interactions between the power immanent in social 
relations and the causal factors contributing towards the continuous (re)shaping of 
social, political and economic dynamics in a specific context. The Strategic Relational 
Approach has a strong explanatory power which enables it to make a significant 
contribution to the study of International Political Economy. As such, the theoretical 
exploration ahead focuses on applying the Strategic Relational Approach to the 
contemporary trajectory of Mexican economic restructuring during the last quarter of 
the 20th century. The aim is to provide a theoretically informed and empirically 
grounded analysis of the overlapping, irregular and contingent convergence of the 
tendencies and countertendencies in play, where agents undeniably take a decisive 
role.       
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Social Change in Mexico: Economic Imperatives and Polarizing Results 
 
 
PROLOGUE 
 
It is the argument of this chapter that the governmental emphasis on the 
commodification experience of economic restructuring has left an imprint on the 
processes of social change in contemporary Mexico. The narrow concern for 
economic imperatives and ‘fundamentals’ has contributed towards rising levels of 
inequality and has also worsened income distribution. According to a study of the 
World Bank on well-being and poverty in the country, despite some progress in 
dimensions such as access to basic services, other dimensions such as the income of 
the poorest remains widespread and has not improved (2004).1 
 
It is not the aim of this chapter to claim that the causes of wealth polarization are 
simply a few variables which could be easily identified. Far from it, and consistent 
with the argument of the previous chapter, I contend that due to the social and 
political embeddedness of market activities, the causal relations of commodification 
can be identified, although they do not claim a perfect correspondence with the 
phenomena under scrutiny. Important changes need to be undertaken if the aim is a 
                                                          
1 There is growing recognition that poverty is also associated with inequality. Furthermore, 
acknowledgement that poverty does not only refer to low incomes, but that it has some other 
dimensions including human capacities, where education and health are particularly relevant. In 
addition, access to infrastructure, vulnerability and social status are also important. Following Amartya 
Sen’s Inequality Reexamined and Development as Freedom, the World Bank argues that if these 
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more equitable scenario. The Strategic Relational Approach helps us to illuminate the 
interactions between factors such as power, agents situated within specific contexts, 
the importance of ideas and unexamined assumptions as well.2    
 
As already identified in Chapter One, since the milestone of the late 1970s and early 
1980s the economic model of Mexico faced a moment of decisive intervention. The 
Mexican government made use of a broad range of strategies to emphasize an 
outward orientation of the economy. The process of economic restructuring, which 
was put into practice considered the provision of a new legal and institutional 
framework including new investment laws, the constitutional reform of land tenure 
and the membership of the North America Free Trade Agreement. Moreover, by 
eliminating trade restrictions, it also facilitated increasing levels of competition 
including foreign goods and investors, as new investment and business opportunities 
were opened. The privatization, deregulation and liberalization processes acted as 
core and fundamental guidelines in the forging of stronger economic links with the 
United States. For instance, the attractive returns in the stock exchange were 
augmented as NAFTA started taking proper form.     
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
factors give a person the freedom and capability to choose a life of his/her choosing, this person can 
enjoy and develop his/her well being (World Bank, 2004).      
2 I have shown that the theoretical lenses we use are neither neutral, nor immune from philosophical 
considerations about the nature and constituent elements of the social, political and economic world 
and the way we approach it. The directional dependence of any philosophical position is irreducible, as 
the ontological views about the world precede the epistemological views about knowledge, which in 
turn precede the methodological views about the ways to acquire it (Hay, 2002c). The previous chapter 
has highlighted substantial differences between positivism and realism. The former, associated with 
neoclassical economics and rational choice models claims universal propositions by generating, testing 
and falsifying hypotheses. Moreover, positivism asserts that its suggested explanations even have 
predictive capacity. Realism, in contrast, by acknowledging the open nature of social systems and 
conceding that intangible factors could influence courses of action and the decisions which actors take, 
rather than claiming law-like regularities, is able to identify causal relations otherwise invisible or 
difficult to detect (i.e. power and ideas).   
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It is important to make clear that the focus of this chapter is mainly the application of 
the Strategic Relational Approach as a theoretical framework. Nonetheless, it should 
not be considered by any means as an exhaustive case study of contemporary Mexico, 
but rather a theoretically informed critique of current trends there. I make use of the 
Strategic Relational Approach to stress causal relations, and to identify tendencies 
and countertendencies. However, it is not the same thing as saying that this is the only 
way of analyzing observable and unobservable phenomena alike. The chapter opens 
with a discussion of the influence of neoclassical economic orthodoxy in the process 
of economic restructuring. Next, I highlight important characteristics of the re-
designed Mexican economic agenda, such as the lowering regulatory frameworks for 
land tenure and foreign investment, fiscal reform, the privatization of public firms and 
trade liberalization. Even though the outward oriented model is relatively consistent 
in its own terms, it falls far short of taking into account the socially embedded 
character of economic activities, as it has an uneven social impact. Growing patterns 
of inequality have been a very high price to pay for the economic transformation of 
Mexico. For the study of this phenomenon, special attention is devoted to the weak 
institutional links which characterize the leading manufacturing activities and sectors 
in the Mexican economy. The neglect of the domestic market has not helped 
endogenous growth conditions, at a time when economic linkages between outwardly 
oriented firms and domestic enterprises are further weakening. Creative and 
innovative pushes have lacked strength and consistency to deliver equitable growth. 
On top of this, the destructive momentum seems to be much stronger than the creative 
one, delivering a social legacy of uneven income distribution and polarization.  
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Estimates of income distribution in Mexico during the last three decades vary due to 
different methodologies, but nevertheless, they show evident patterns of inequality. 
For instance, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean reports 
that the poorest two quintiles of Mexicans in 1984 shared 7.9 % of income in urban 
households, while the richest two quintiles owned 41.2 %. By the year 2000 the 
situation had worsened as the poorest two quintiles reduced their share to 6.7 %, 
while the richest two quintiles increased theirs to 49 % (Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and 
the Caribbean). Some authors make use of adjustment factors for their own estimates 
in order to correct underreporting of data. One researcher argues that in 1984 42.5 % 
of the population were considered to live in poverty. Twelve years later the poverty 
had reached 52.8 % of Mexicans (Calva, 2000). Another author found that the lowest 
two deciles of the population in 1984 shared 4.8 % of total income in Mexico, but 4.7 
% in 1996, whereas the highest two deciles increased their share from 49.5 % to 53.7 
% during the same years (Dussel Peters, 2000). The Gini coefficient is an inequality 
index which increases if the income distribution becomes more skewed. A third one 
reports a Gini coefficient of 58.2 in 1984, and 58.9 in 1992 (Lustig, 1998). According 
to the World Bank’s report Poverty in Mexico, the Gini coefficient was 53 in 1992, 52 
in 1996, 54 in 2000 and 51 in 2002. This financial organization also reports that 
during 2000 the share of the top decile in total income was 43.1%, whereas the share 
of the bottom two deciles in total income was only 3.1% (World Bank, 2004). 
 
The praised process of economic transformation undertaken by the Mexican 
government, even though it was consistently presented in its own terms, failed to 
address its own social impact, as insufficient attention was given to redistributive 
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policies. The agenda, however, was not purely economically driven and aimed for 
increased efficiency. Political concerns and the targeting of specific constituencies 
were presented in a technocratic discourse of inevitability, de-politicizing the 
processes, and insulating them from public participation and scrutiny. Moreover, it 
was implemented vertically from the top of the government’s hierarchies, down to the 
different sectors of society.  
 
Consider for instance that one of the main mechanisms in which, taking advantage of 
asymmetric information, a series of economic reforms, such as a reduction of public 
expenditures that forced reductions in public sector jobs, pushed by technocratic 
governments in Mexico during the 1980s, was simply agreeing the terms and 
conditions of letters of intent with the International Monetary Fund. This strategy was 
perceived abroad as a trust-worthy sign of the political will to engage in economic 
reforms, and also as consistent with neoliberal trends and the Washington Consensus. 
However, the decision-making process was never an open and democratic exercise, 
because the IMF’s letters of intent are negotiated and the agenda are specified by the 
Executive and need not be ratified by the Congress. Therefore, they very easily avoid 
formal rejection from opposition parties and the divided Congress, because 
responsibility for the economic packages is portrayed to the domestic constituency as 
displaced upwards (Vreeland, 2003). Furthermore, during that period in Mexico, the 
PRI was not only the ruling party at that time, but also generally commanded a 
majority in both the Senators’ and the Deputies’ chambers.     
 
The strong character of the Mexican presidential regime, and the blurred links 
between bureaucracy and the hegemonic position of the PRI (Institutional 
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Revolutionary Party in its Spanish acronym) the then ruling party which dominated 
the Congress, facilitated the approval and implementation of those tasks in a crucial 
way, especially for the de la Madrid and Salinas administrations.3 As the government 
could not be seriously challenged via the official and institutional channels, these 
years also saw significant mobilization which gained strength and increased political 
representation in the following years. For instance, the two following presidential 
administrations, both faced divided congresses where no political party had an 
absolute majority and therefore negotiations among the different political forces were 
required to reach political agreements, were not needed by their predecessors.4 
   
The redesign of the Mexican economic agenda brought to the social and political 
stage the goal of improved economic efficiency. Encouraging enhanced competition 
and decentralization, the authorities took for granted that these initiatives and efforts 
would outweigh the costs of any decrease in equality. Such an assumption could be 
explained in relation to positivist philosophical postulates and stances which were 
followed either consciously or unconsciously, and internalised by the small number of 
technocrats trained in neoclassical economic orthodoxy while in charge of the 
economic restructuring process. The law-like regularities claimed by positivism, as 
ideational elements, clearly have material and real impacts and consequences which 
must not be ignored.     
 
                                                          
3 Presidential terms in Mexico last six years without any chance of re-election. Since this mode was 
implemented during the mid 1930s all presidents have finished their terms. The De la Madrid 
presidential term started in 1982, and was followed by that of Salinas in 1988. 
4 Zedillo took office in 1994 and was the last president from the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI) to rule Mexico uninterruptedly for more than seventy years. Fox from the Partido Acción 
Nacional (PAN) ended this supremacy in 2000.  
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Contrary to the conventional wisdom, which argues that financial liberalization in 
emerging economies was a consequence of international trends, Mexico’s experience 
does not match that pattern. Nevertheless, this is not the same thing as saying that 
agents such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the US 
government dictated the whole economic script to the Mexican government. Even 
during the late 1980s, after following orthodox adjustment programmes which proved 
insufficient for the recovery of the Mexican economy, the government opted for a 
heterodox plan in which orthodox recommendations and schedules were not followed 
(Minushkin, 2001a, and 2002). Moreover, since the goals were not altered, and were 
even enhanced, the use of alternative means did not oppose the consensual view of 
what the economic restructuring programme for this particular case should be.  
 
The improvement in aggregate macroeconomic indicators was presented as evidence 
of stabilization and a proper investment environment. Yet, the 1994 crisis made 
evident the weaknesses of the instrumentation and political management of the 
economic strategy. The heavy reliance on short term financial instruments proved 
catastrophic because it increased the vulnerability of the economy to the attraction of 
financial capital inflows; which, combined with financial mismanagement, ended in 
the worst economic crisis in Mexican history (Lustig, 1998; Edwards, 1998; 
Weintraub, 2000a). Further details and a discussion of the mid 1990s financial crisis 
and banking problems are to be presented in Chapter Eight. What follows is an 
informed critique, making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, of the process of 
economic restructuring in this country since the late 1970s and early 1980s.   
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THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONAL APPROACH 
 
As thus far demonstrated throughout this thesis, the distinctiveness of the Strategic 
Relational Approach makes it a very powerful tool, albeit one with no monopoly on 
explanatory power, for identifying structural elements which influence without 
determining agents’ courses of action (Hay, 2002c, and 2000a; Hay and Marsh, 
2000). Even though the theoretical emphasis in this chapter is placed on economic 
actors such as firms, this does not exclude other agents, because economic activities 
are socially embedded, as acknowledged in the SRA. The strategically selective 
context is, therefore, fundamental to analyze processes of change such as that 
undertaken here. I do not offer, however, a deterministic account, since I also 
acknowledge the agencies’ capacity to influence the conditions which surround them. 
 
Therefore, the study of political networks becomes one of the classical examples of 
the relational character of agents (see Chapter Five). However, in this chapter I want 
to focus on manufacturing chains and clusters of innovation. As it will be shown 
below, they constitute socially embedded economic networks which complement the 
markets and economic activities of the State. This is important for the Strategic 
Relational Approach as I stress, following Polanyi and Schumpeter, the fluid and 
dynamic motion of the relations and interactions which continuously reshape not only 
the material elements, but also the ideational ones.  
 
The role which ideas play is also of immense importance here (Hay, 2002b, 2002c, 
and 2000b; Watson, 2003b, and 2000). Ideas such as the liberalization of trade and 
investment flows, privatization of public enterprises, lowering regulatory frameworks 
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and fiscal reforms have had real material impact in several different latitudes. I 
consider that neoclassical economic ideas were crucial in the re-designing of the 
Mexican economic agenda, as they provided the guidelines on which the restructuring 
of the economy was based. Nevertheless, the agenda of economic reforms and their 
modest consistency, has also brought into the spotlight some, arguably, unintended 
consequences. The widening gap in income distribution and rising levels of 
polarization must neither be overlooked, nor considered only as ‘costs’ of the new 
orientation of economic policies.     
 
Since windows of opportunity and constraint are used by agencies to inject 
indeterminacy into the social, political and economic processes, I turn here to the task 
of tracing features of contemporary processes in Mexico. This will, I hope prove a 
very useful exercise because I deliver an assessment of those features in the form of a 
broad theoretical perspective in the next chapter. Thus, stressing the importance of 
social interactions, I document the experience of commodification tendencies and 
countertendencies in Mexico.  
 
The Strategic Relational Approach provides a balanced account of the current 
processes of social change in Mexico. In using it in this thesis, I aim to identify causal 
relations and features of what have been perceived as economic imperatives and their 
polarized results. The analysis is qualitative. It gives a theoretically informed account 
of the Mexican commodification experience and the ongoing processes of social 
change.   
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THE RE-DESIGN OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC AGENDA  
 
The concern for growth was quite clear in the economic restructuring agenda which 
has been put into practice from the early 1980s. During these years, the core concerns 
were stabilization and the pursuit of structural change in the Mexican economy. This 
process of reforming the public finances and reaching macro-economic stability was 
considered the key. Heading the agenda were financial and trade liberalization, the re-
design of fiscal institutions and instruments, the renegotiation of the external debt, 
and the privatization of public sector enterprises (Aspe Armella, 1993).  I analyse 
these in the following sections. The efforts to reform the role of the State were 
oriented towards this agenda in a manner which was intended not to disrupt 
macroeconomic stability. However, the strategy fell short of expectations in other 
respects, such as employment expansion, the eradication of poverty and provision of 
justice and public safety, because they were not considered priorities. Aiming for 
growth without considering equity has been one of the main deficiencies of the 
outward oriented economic strategy in Mexico, as it will be discussed after an account 
of the features of its economic restructuring.  
 
An important concern for officials in charge of the external debt renegotiations was to 
secure packages as extensive and flexible as possible. Pursuing the objective of 
reaching a solution to the external debt problem was a pragmatic criterion which 
considered it a better option to reach a timely satisfactory agreement, rather than a 
good, but extemporaneous deal (Aspe Armella, 1993).  During the 1980s, -- an epoch 
dubbed the ‘lost decade’ of growth and development for most Latin American 
countries -- neither the Baker, nor the Brady plans provided Mexico with the 
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conditions to reactivate its economy and stimulate growth as was needed. The plans 
were relatively timely agreements, albeit insufficient and far from optimal from the 
debtor’s perspective, since there was a negative transfer of private and public capital 
flows during most of the 1980s (Villarreal, 1990; Ramos de Villarreal and Villarreal, 
2000). The strategy of using revenues from the sales of government-owned 
enterprises was a key complementary strategy for the reduction of the problem of 
public debt. On the one hand, the divestiture of public and semi-public firms was seen 
as a step towards a more effective and efficient government which would provide the 
conditions for long-term macroeconomic stability. At the same time, criteria such as 
the sale of government-owned enterprises on a cash basis, and the use of creative 
financing, were operated as complementary guidelines towards the use of 
privatization proceeds to repay public debt (Aspe Armella, 1993). In order to make 
the outward orientation of the economic model compatible with domestic legislation, 
and to provide a legal framework for such changes, important legislative 
modifications and adjustments were undertaken. This is the focus of the next section.  
 
 
LOWERING REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR LAND TENURE AND 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
Even though the use of the term ‘deregulation’ has become widespread, attention 
should be paid to the fact that it is used generically as a label for lower level re-
regulation measures. Every step either to lower or upgrade the regulatory framework 
needs to be clearly specified. Therefore, either as used for setting a ceiling or a lower 
common denominator, deregulation must not be confused with the absence of any 
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framework, rule, regime or institution at all. There is no such thing. The term has been 
associated with government efforts to provide a market oriented regulatory 
framework, in most cases tend to be sector specific, compatible with certain general 
guidelines. For instance, efforts to relax regulations by the Mexican government have 
focused on the financial sector, the elimination of licensing schemes and other 
restrictions for such sectors as road transport, petrochemicals, fishing, mining, 
commodities and telecommunications. Price liberalization has also been among the 
options (Lustig, 1998).  
 
One of the modifications often overlooked of the Mexican economic restructuring 
regards the land tenure constitutional reform of 1992. As already mentioned in 
Chapter One, article 27 of the 1917 Constitution granted special treatment for land 
property rights. Originally, the ‘ejido’ (or communal land unit in which the right to 
exploit the land was given, and which allowed its exploitation), denied the right to 
sell, rent or borrow against it. This constituted one of the social conquests of the early 
20th century revolution -- when Mexico used to be an agrarian economy and a rural 
country. At this time, the agrarian economy favoured by government intervention had 
a political engagement rationale. Chapter One already mentioned that the peasant 
sector was one of the pillars of Mexican corporatism. As the demography of the 
country changed from rural villages to urban cities, while the economic focus moved 
from the agricultural sectors to industries and services, the peasantry lost political 
ranking and the transfer of economic resources was prioritized towards the industry 
and service sectors. The 1992 reform of article 27 of the Constitution legalized the 
rental and private ownership of the ‘ejido’ land, even allowing commercial companies 
to own rural land within certain limits. Furthermore, the reform made possible the 
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division of the productive portion of the land unit, even allowing beneficiaries to 
associate with each other or outsiders to exploit, sell or rent their holdings, which had 
not been permitted under the former regulatory framework (Lustig, 1998). In short, 
this was clearly a commodification initiative, aiming to withdraw provisions and 
protection from the land and from social groups for whom represented the main 
source of income. These were the demands for which the zapatista indigenous 
uprising in one of the poorest states of Mexico, made a symbolic outcry the day when 
NAFTA entered into force.  
 
Prior to the late 1970s/early 1980s economic milestone, it is important to recall a 
crucial issue that was discussed in Chapter One. The import substitution 
industrialization which characterized the dominant economic strategy during the post 
World War II era made use of both tariff and non-tariff barriers to guarantee 
protection from foreign competition. The included industrial sectors changed over 
time. With the benefit of hindsight, however, agriculture turned out to be the main 
loser in this scheme because priority for government expenditure was given to 
industry and services.  
 
Regarding foreign investment regulations, the modifications in the legal framework 
aimed to allow unrestricted foreign ownership, in all but the strategic areas reserved 
for the State. This meant a crucial step towards institutionalization not only for 
foreign direct investment flows but also for banking and finance, though there had 
been some prior minor modifications in the late 1980s. They paved the way for the 
financial services and investment reductions of barriers addressed in the North 
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America Free Trade Agreement and also for the creation of the National Banking and 
Securities Commission in 1995.5  
 
Originally, the 1973 Foreign Investment Law restricted foreign ownership in the 
following way. Four sorts of economic activities were distinguished. First, the priority 
sectors were reserved exclusively for the Mexican State. Second, there were activities 
reserved exclusively for Mexican citizens. Third came economic activities in which 
foreign investment could not exceed a certain percentage. Finally, there were 
activities in which foreign investment was not allowed to be greater than 49 %.6 In 
practice the restrictions were often circumvented, except for the strategic activities 
(Lustig, 1998; Adams, 1997).  Twenty years later a new set of rules repealed all prior 
regulations governing foreign investment.   
 
The 1993 Foreign Investment Law modifications allowed 100 % foreign ownership in 
most industrial sectors, granting foreign investors the same status as national 
                                                          
5 The latter’s main aim was to streamline and resolve differences in accounting and regulatory 
standards when it merged the National Securities and National Banking Commissions (Adams, 1997).  
6 Article 2 of the 1973 Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment defined 
foreign investment in the following terms: “…investments made by (1) foreign corporations; (2) 
foreign individuals who are not bona fide permanent residents of Mexico, or those who, because of 
their other activities, are tied in with or bound to entities or groups making their economic decisions 
abroad; (3) foreign legal entities without legal personality; and (4) Mexican enterprises in which a 
majority of their capital is owned by foreigners, or in which foreigners control management…” 
(Lustig, 1998).  
The strategic activities reserved to the Mexican State included the extraction of petroleum and natural 
gas; production of basic petrochemicals; exploitation of radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear 
energy; certain mining activities; generation of electricity; railroads; telegraphic and radio 
communications; and all other activities determined by specific laws or regulations.  
The activities reserved exclusively for Mexicans or for corporations with an ‘exclusion of foreigners’ 
clause in their articles of incorporation listed radio and television; urban and interurban automotive 
transportation and federal highways transport; domestic air and maritime transportation; exploitation of 
forestry resources; gas distribution; and other activities determined by specific laws or regulations. 
The activities in which foreign investment was subject to specific percentage limitations were mining 
under ordinary concessions (49 %); mining under special concessions for the exploitation of natural 
mining reserves (34 %); production of secondary petrochemicals (40 %); manufacture of automotive 
parts (40 %); and any other activities for which percentages were indicated in specific laws. 
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investors. It was subsequently modified in 2001. The 1993 Foreign Investment Law’s 
opening title lists the exclusively reserved activities for the State on the one hand, and 
the ones reserved for Mexicans with a foreigners’ exclusion clause on the other.7 
They are followed by a list of those economic activities and acquisitions which are 
specifically regulated.  
 
Moreover, the National Commission on Foreign Investment (Spanish acronym CNIE) 
had its role, composition and powers for developing policy guidelines and reviewing 
all new foreign investment applications revised in 1993 (Adams, 1997). The Foreign 
Investment Time Schedule went through up to January 2004 and considered three 
different stages to reach up to 100 % capital stock without the need to obtain a 
favourable decision from the commission.8 After the 1993 Foreign Investment Law 
modifications there have been some subsequent amendments in order to make 
Mexican law compatible with the North America Free Trade Agreement framework, 
as for instance seen in the 2001 modifications. These amendments allow foreign 
direct investment in most of Mexico’s economic activities, though Canada and the 
United States are given preferential treatment (Dussel Peters, 2000).9      
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
All the remaining activities restricted foreign investment to a limit of 49 % (Lustig, 1998; Adams, 
1997).   
7 Articles 5 and 6 of the 1993 Foreign Investment Law, respectively.  
8 The first two stages were up to 49 % in capital stock ownership in a Mexican corporation by 
December 1995; and up to 51 % of capital stock of a domestic company by January 2001 (Adams, 
1997).  
9 Regarding the energy sector, there are two public enterprises considered strategic for the Mexican 
government: the exploration, extraction and refinement of crude oil and basic petrochemicals under 
Petróleos Mexicanos, better known as PEMEX, on the one hand; and the electricity sector under the 
CFE (Federal Electricity Commission Spanish acronym) on the other. These have been core actors in 
their respective subsectors. Since the sectors those enterprises are in have been classified as priority 
ones, constitutional reforms would be explicitly required if they are to change ownership status.  
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FISCAL REFORM: ‘DECONCENTRATION’ AND ‘DECENTRALIZATION’ 
EFFORTS 
 
In addition to a more relaxed regulatory framework for foreign investment and land 
tenure as analyzed above, fiscal reform has been a core issue on the agenda. The 
Mexican tax reform has been viewed not only as a problem of economic efficiency, 
but it has also been presented as a commitment to social justice. The universal 
organizational membership of the State and its powers of compulsion can be used for 
redistributive purposes. Still, they do not necessarily point to a minimal role, but only 
to a more efficient one. Consequently, the pending task in Mexico represents an 
important challenge. Even though it may seem paradoxical at first glance, based on 
the fallacy of governments’ inefficiency everywhere and at all time that liberalization, 
deregulation and privatization projects might all point to a diminished role for the 
State in economic activities, the picture in reality is a much more complex one.10 
Indeed, reaching those objectives might be better achieved by implementing industrial 
policies, retaining control over some strategic sectors and broadening the tax income 
base, to mention only a few economic policy instruments. Given that neither the 
public nor the private sectors are failure-free, the features of universal membership 
with powers of compulsion characteristic of the State cannot be assumed by any other 
agency. No other collective agent, either public or private, has the capacity, 
representation and authority to become responsible for the collection of taxes and the 
implementation of redistributive policies, among other things. Monitoring production 
                                                          
10 Stiglitz identified four different public and private sector fallacies. The first one supposes that 
nationalized industries act in the public interest. The second one is that government is inefficient 
everywhere and at all times. The third one pays attention to control and planning, where limitations of 
information pose a constraint for controlling, monitoring and planning. The fourth one is the Coase 
fallacy which asserts that the government can do no better than the market; this is simply false. Hence, 
efficient market allocation cannot be obtained without government intervention (Stiglitz, 1989).  
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and consumption of economic activities, along with the fiduciary responsibility for 
raising revenues compulsorily, are tasks which weak or insufficiently funded 
governments cannot perform satisfactorily (Stiglitz, 1989, 1994 and 1998b). The 
latter option is not an alternative for the State to perform its economic, especially its 
redistributive role, either in a developed market, or in an emerging economy.  
 
Regarding redistribution, the State is situated at a strategic crossroads where social, 
political and economic factors and agencies meet. The State powers of compulsion 
provide the capability to decide the amount and origin of resources, and also the 
beneficiaries of its redistributive policies. As the State is the main organization 
permitted to take away resources from individuals, it has the responsibility of making 
an adequate and transparent use of those resources. Governments’ fiduciary 
responsibilities are, therefore, second to none, due to consequences for employment 
and expenditure which cannot be separated from taxation and redistribution policies 
(Stiglitz, 1989). The distributive consequences of public decisions would optimally be 
economically efficient and politically accountable. This criterion is also valid for the 
private sector as well, as it might help towards the provision of more accurate and 
reliable information, a public good and key input, which organizations and 
individuals alike need for efficient and effective decision-making.  
 
On the one hand, the reforms of the tax system in Mexico aiming to increase 
efficiency and to modernise tax collection are oriented towards ‘decentralization’ and 
‘de-concentration’. A federal system in principle, however, is quite different in 
reality, where heavy centralization and the management of direct and indirect taxation 
are to be tackled on two fronts. According to the government, the first one aims at 
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establishing a real fiscal federalism with homogenised taxes across the country. A de 
facto heavily centralized system in a big country such as Mexico meant that an 
important number of local and State taxes were cancelled, increasing the dependence 
on central government tax shares. Associated problems of the reduction of tax rates 
and the reduction of the tax base, translated into a weakening of the capacity to collect 
tax, aggravated by a lack of incentives for local and State authorities to collect their 
own revenues. Modernization of the agency in charge of tax collection has been 
justified, for these reasons. Therefore, the Mexican challenges ahead on the revenue 
side are to match and foster the public capacity to satisfy the needs and demands of 
their constituencies (Moreno, 2001).11 Furthermore, the ‘de-concentration’ and 
‘decentralization’ of public expenditure are considered also as key components of the 
economic policies.  
 
The achievement of goals such as a larger local financial autonomy, a larger 
institutional development, broader economic efficiency and the improvement of 
democratic governance represent the challenges ahead for public expenditure. The 
achievement of those goals faces grave risks that Mexican government officials need 
to avoid. The disruption or alteration of a relative State of macro-economic 
equilibrium is a major concern, as it would exacerbate regional differences. 
According to the government, avoidance of such scenarios and the reinforcement of 
institutional frameworks would help to deliver better and more efficient public goods 
and services (Moreno, 2001). Although a similar efficiency concern is supposed to 
                                                          
11 In this sense, the devolution of tax faculties which would enhance fiscal responsibilities and 
institutional development, and the empowerment of local constituencies to demand the use of revenue 
according to local and State needs have been identified as important priorities (Moreno, 2001).  
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guide the provision of services; the emphasis has been mainly to rely on the private 
sector, as shown below. 
 
 
DIVESTMENT OF GOVERNMENT OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
Most of the privatization initiatives undertaken since the 1980s rest on the intellectual 
positivist foundation of Friedman, and the US and the British antecedents of the 
1980s, whose ideational traces continue to influence some other experiences 
nowadays.12 It is important to recall that the generalizations of positivist closed 
systems and their predictive capacity allows them to claim universality.13 It comes as 
no surprise that, based on the US experience, judgments about privatization are 
presented as applicable to all cultures and socio-economic systems, regardless of the 
institutional means by which goods and services are supplied. The objective of each 
time relying gradually more on private delivery and less on government delivery for 
the satisfaction of the population’s needs goes beyond justification in terms of purely 
economic efficiency. There is no doubt that the different methods of delegation, 
divestment and displacement for public and private partnership are emphatic political 
acts themselves.14 The role of government agencies throughout the privatization 
                                                          
12 For an important analysis of that period in Great Britain see Hay, 1996, among others.  
13 The ontology and epistemology of positivism are analysed in Chapter Three. 
14 There are several different arrangements for providing public services in which government 
agencies, private actors, consumers and voluntary associations could participate as arrangers, 
producers and cost bearers (Savas, 2000). For instance, delegation from the government acts as the 
main arranger, while the private sector produces. Forms of delegation mainly include contracts, 
franchises, grants, vouchers and mandates. Regarding the divestment of public assets and enterprises, it 
could be done through sale, free transfer and liquidation. Sale is one of the main ways in which 
government transfers assets to the private sector and gets some revenue at the same time. It is 
therefore, a preferred method when the activity is economically profitable and the sector is a non-
strategic one. The sale of public enterprises could be targeted to joint ventures, private buyers, the 
public, managers and employees, and even to a users’ or customers’ cooperative. The scope of the sale 
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process is fundamental for establishing the objectives, selecting the appropriate forms, 
enacting legal reforms, developing clear and transparent procedures and providing a 
suitable policy environment. Not only do they aim to strive for efficiency in the face 
of unresponsive bureaucracies, but also to apply market models for political and 
administrative relationships and for governing and managing public services as well 
(Savas, 2000).  
 
It is important to make clear that the public sector in Mexico grew disproportionately 
during the 1970s and early 1980s. During the late 1970s alone, more than six hundred 
firms engrossed the public sector (Rogozinski, 1998). It is not the aim of this chapter, 
nor possible in the limited space to engage in a detailed account of the public sector 
history in Mexico.15 However, it must be highlighted that it was during the 1970s and 
up until the early 1980s that the number of government owned enterprises showed a 
fivefold increase to more than 1100 (Rogozinski, 1998). However, not all of them 
contributed in a decisive way towards the economic performance of the public sector. 
According to Rogozinski, the biggest share, especially of those which were 
incorporated into the Mexican public sector from the 1970s on, were unnecessary 
                                                                                                                                                                      
may be partial or full, and the buyer could be domestic, foreign or even mixed. Finally, the main forms 
of displacement of public enterprises comprise default, withdrawal and deregulation (Savas, 2000).   
15 Suffice it to say that since the first half of the 20th century five broad stages in the Mexican public 
sector can be identified. First, the setting and institutionalization of the legal and regulatory framework 
for economic activity after the revolutionary period saw a minimal number of government owned 
enterprises during the 1920s and 1930s. It is during those years that, consistent with the 1917 
Constitutional mandate articles 27 and 28 acknowledge regulator and promoter roles for the State. It 
was also in this period that the Mexican central bank supplied its initial capital and a few national 
development banks were created. The next period, known as the import substitution Industrialization 
of the 1940s and mid 1950s, featured stable rates of growth. A similar situation characterized the 
stabilizing development epoch which followed. Even though during those two periods there was an 
increase in the number of public enterprises, the performance of the economy and the socio-political 
context were not hostile to it. (Rogozinski, 1998).  
According to the structural change and punctuated evolution map of the Mexican State presented in 
Chapter One, all these stages except the contemporary one could be associated with an imperfect 
degree of protection from the market. Therefore, they can be located in the two bottom quadrants due 
to their decommodification patterns.   
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because some represented fiscal losses, and were therefore, eligible for being re-
privatized after the 1980s.16 A point to note, however, is the fact that up to 1982 the 
criterion for an increasingly direct engagement of the government in the economic 
activity of rescuing firms with financial problems was a decommodification concern 
for preserving employment and thus preventing deterioration in income distribution.  
 
Up to this point, the high priority of strategic sectors, such as oil, had not been 
seriously considered for sale or transfer to the private sector. Significantly, the 
resources obtained from privatization proceeds were to be deposited in a special fund 
for paying off public debt. The whole process was supervised by the Mexican 
Ministry of Finance.17 Since privatization revenues are a one-off, the main objective 
was public debt repayment, which would contribute towards the elimination of a 
major source of public deficit by liberating the public sector from excessive burden. 
                                                          
16 Sometimes although theoretical and analytical distinctions can be drawn on paper, when something 
is put into practice differences blur and the task becomes more complex than originally expected. The 
privatization of government-owned enterprises is a good example of this. While the fundamental goals 
of a programme of divestiture of public firms pursues are economic efficiency, equity and rent 
extraction, as viewed from a purely economic perspective, the socially embedded character of 
economic activities evidence that their social and political time and space context need also to be taken 
into account. 
17 The sale and transfer of firms to the private sector observed compliance with the legal and regulatory 
framework, dominated by the 1917 Constitution and federal public administration and semi-official 
entities federal laws. Limits to the private sector participation are detailed in the Constitution’s article 
25. Additionally, article 28 lists the public sector strategic areas exclusive to the State, whereas article 
134 points out the satisfaction of the minimum criteria which the divestiture process must follow, 
whereas, the Federal Law of the Federal Public Administration refers to the bankruptcy and liquidation 
of semi-official entities; while the legal conditions for mergers and transfers are in the Federal Law of 
Paraestatal Entities (Aspe Armella, 1993).   
The privatization initiatives took macro-economic stability as a pre-requisite. Once a divestiture 
proposal was evaluated and the sales process were agreed to start, a sales agent needed to be appointed. 
Having selected a commercial bank for the financial valuation, the announcement and sale of the 
public enterprise in question proceeded; the sale mechanism could adopt different strategies depending 
on the characteristics and importance of the government owned firm. Smaller enterprises were first 
considered, following a legally coherent and consistent procedure, which was standardised afterwards. 
A profile and prospectus of the firms were first required. Once presented, the technical and financial 
valuation of the enterprises which had an objective of maximizing social welfare was followed by a 
pre-selection of buyers who considered their financial solvency and offered a price, experience in the 
sector and investment commitments. The coordination with complementary processes and the costs of 
implementation which included the bank’s commercial commission and expenses were considered as 
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At this stage a resolution and legal authorization were needed for the closing of the 
sale. If positive, the signing of the sales, contract, divestiture and preparation of the 
‘white book’ followed. The savings from decreased interest rates were used to 
increase non-inflationary social spending. Along with parallel strategies of trade and 
financial liberalization and deregulation, they were meant to make a positive impact 
on public finances, the balance of payments, financial system and public welfare 
overall, while enhancing a competitive economic environment boosting employment 
and productivity (Aspe Armella, 1993; Rogozinski,1998).    
 
Since the late 1980s the Mexican privatization programme has been aggressive in 
almost all economic sectors except the ones regarded as strategic in the 1917 
Constitution, attracting local and foreign investors either for total or partial shares.18 
For instance, the privatization of the main telephone carrier attracted particular 
interest at home and abroad, similar to that of the banking sector.19 Nevertheless, 
there have also been some significant difficulties with some of the privatization 
initiatives. Highways and the banks are among those which have aroused controversy. 
For the former, errors in the concession programme aggravated by the mid 1990s 
financial crisis led the government to rescue the investors. Much more seriously, the 
cost of the bailout of the banking sector, a moral hazard seriously exceeded the 
revenues of its sale a few years before, converting into public debt non-performing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
well. Finally, the sale proceeds were to be deposited in a special fund -- Fondo de Contingencia 
Económica --, to repay public debt (Rogozinski, 1998).   
18 Privatization of former Mexican government owned enterprises has been transacted in various 
sectors such as airlines, hotel, mining, chemicals, commerce, financial services, insurance, 
manufacturing, ship building, steel, sugar, textiles, agribusiness, fishing, forestry; shipping, 
telecommunications, transportation, banking, beverage production, bottling, energy, fertilizers, media, 
television, construction, building material, food processing, gas stations, tourism, services, warehouses, 
cargo and containers, ports, storage, railway, gas distribution, satellite systems, airports, etc 
(Investment Promotion Network, 2001).   
19 Teléfonos de México is also well known by its Spanish acronym TELMEX. 
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loans, but also controversially rescuing solvent firms and individuals (Huerta 
González, 1998a; Székely, 1999).   
 
 
TRADE LIBERALIZATION: THE BANNER OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING 
 
Having discussed the characteristics and context within which the divestiture of 
government owned enterprises in Mexico has taken place, I should now move to 
another significant aspect of the country’s process of commodification. Trade 
liberalization has been a core component of Mexico’s economic restructuring and 
stabilization strategy since the very beginning. The originally inward-looking 
economy was pushed towards a qualitative transformation aiming at more open 
conditions. A comprehensive elimination of non-tariff barriers preceded further 
reductions in the level and dispersion of tariffs. Becoming a member of the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), back in the mid 1980s, signalled the new 
outward orientation of the economy. It was also a step towards institutionalizing the 
initial unilateral moves favouring a shift from oil exports and agricultural 
commodities to the promotion of exportable manufactured goods. In order to 
reinforce the institutional character of the trade liberalization process, one strategy 
favoured by the Mexican government since the 1990s has been to seek membership 
and active participation in multilateral forums. They include the Free Trade Latin 
American Association (Spanish acronym ALADI), the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), among others. Additionally, another 
strategy running parallel to the multilateral membership has been to sign free trade 
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agreements with the United States and Canada, various Latin American countries, the 
European Union, and the European Free Trade Association, among others.20   
 
The increasing volume and value of trade and investment flows, especially those from 
the United States, have permitted an expansion in the volume and value of exchanged 
goods and services among the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
members. Tendencies and economic patterns have strengthened economic practices in 
which manufacturing sectors of the Mexican economy are presented as beneficiaries 
of trade liberalization, for they have become second to none in production standards 
for some specific sectors. Aggregate figures of trade in goods and services since the 
liberalization strategy started to show a steady rise in the volume of exports, as the 
emphasis on an outward orientation of economic activities would favour. 
Nonetheless, the pursuance of trade liberalization and manufacturing integration has 
not delivered a balanced distribution of economic gains. On the contrary, it is 
discussed below that the export orientation and the strategies privileging inbound 
industries have contributed towards income concentration and rising polarization, 
weakening linkages between the domestic market and the export one, and making 
evident the importance of those features which institutions should have for equitable 
economic activities.    
                                                          
20 Since the late 1990s free trade agreements have been reached with Bolivia starting from 1995, Chile 
since 1999, Costa Rica since 1995, the European Union since 2000, Nicaragua since 1998, the 
Northern Triangle of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala since 2001, the Group of Three 
comprising Colombia and Venezuela as well since 1995, the North America Free Trade Agreement 
with the United States and Canada since 1994, the European Free Trade Association since 2001, Israel 
since 2000, and Uruguay since 2004. Ratification by the Parliaments of Japan and Mexico is pending 
for their bilateral free trade agreement to take effect from 2005. Prospective agreements include among 
others an associate membership for MERCOSUR (Market of the South which comprises Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay); whereas China and South Korea may also be considered in the future. 
The current negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which claims to bring free 
mobility of capital and goods, but limits that of labour was conceived as an initiative from the United 
States back in the 1994 Summit of the Americas. The negotiations have encountered difficulties to be 
surmounted if the FTAA is to be agreed by 2005, as is to be discussed in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
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Traditionally, free trade agreements provide the framework for the free movement of 
capital and goods among members. Free labour mobility is normally excluded. 
Consistent with those theoretical considerations, NAFTA goes slightly beyond the 
traditional scope of a traditional free trade agreement because it also considers 
investment rules.21 Moreover, trade in financial services is granted National 
Treatment and Most Favoured Nation status, which aims for fair, equitable and non-
discriminatory treatment.22 Parallel to those considerations, transfers, standards for 
expropriation and for compensation, and dispute settlement provisions are also taken 
into account. Nevertheless, NAFTA does not go far enough to allow for the free 
mobility of people. Even though there are two parallel accords on environmental and 
labour cooperation within the NAFTA text, there is no authorization for the free 
movement of labour between Canada, the US and Mexico. In practice, migratory 
restrictions aim to prevent a flow of unskilled migration into US territory, where a 
blind eye is, however, turned to the benefits that they deliver to its economy.  
 
Even though the emphasis on institutions is quite evident in the negotiation of several 
trade agreements by the Mexican government, the main weight of Mexico’s trade 
relations with the world is heavily concentrated within the North America Free Trade 
                                                          
21 NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven considers investment provisions and Chapter Fourteen focuses on 
financial services. 
22 Financial integration as a privately driven phenomenon has been considered a step towards the 
financial and monetary integration of the Americas, where the dominance of the US markets acts as a 
magnet for financial flows. However, there is an important differentiation between monetary and 
financial affairs which should not be overlooked. The decentralized nature of the financial sector and 
activities allows a range of different private actors to create and maintain them, albeit with a 
government regulatory and supervisory role. But the government is the principal actor and sole 
decision maker for monetary issues. For monetary integration government support is needed in order to 
move towards an integration stage. Those considerations are important since financial and monetary 
integration are expected to become central part of the economic agenda in the American continent in 
the future. Negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas are currently under way, following the 
NAFTA narrow framework model, as argued in Chapter Eight, below.   
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Agreement, and especially with the United States. Consider for instance that 69 % of 
Mexican exports went to the US in 1990, rose by 85 % in 1994 the year NAFTA 
entered into force, and went up to 89 % in 2000, manifesting a very heavy 
concentration. Similarly, the biggest share of imported goods comes from the US. 
They were 62 % of the total in 1990, reached 72 % in 1994, and increased to 74 % in 
2000. Paralleling those trends during the last decade, imports from Asian countries 
and the European Union have steadily grown (INEGI, 2002).  
 
Since the reach and scope of those institutional moves go beyond national boundaries, 
Chapter Seven of this thesis pays particular attention to the international, multilateral 
and global contexts in which Mexico, as a collective agent, is situated. Suffice it to 
say that the Mexican trade liberalization experience, along with its financial 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation could be considered different facets of 
the commodification process, as its emphasis is placed on economic motives, rather 
than welfare concerns. This is what I show in the remaining sections of this chapter.    
 
 
WEAK ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONAL LINKS: DESTRUCTIVE RATHER 
THAN CREATIVE 
 
At this point it is important to recall that the institutional links are important reference 
frameworks for the situated agents in context. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
economic actors such as firms are no exception because they work within formal and 
informal institutions. The variety of institutions and the different ways in which they 
can be coordinated have been used to suggest that the economic performance of the 
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economies and the prosperity of nations is built based on institutional differences, 
since one of the aspects which affects firms’ efficiency is the institutional 
coordination to which they are subject (Hall and Soskice, 2001).23 Important as those 
considerations are, however, they leave something crucial. The profiles of the firms 
are as important as the character of the institutional framework. For, if we are 
restoring agency to the processes that appear to be irresistible, we cannot afford to 
leave features of the actors unexamined. The role and characteristics of the agents, 
economic firms in this case, do not contradict, or are opposed in any sense, to the 
features of the structures, and the institutional framework. I argue throughout this 
thesis, consistent with the Strategic Relational Approach, that agents have the power 
and capability to influence and contribute towards shaping the processes in which 
they take part. Therefore, the orientation and profile of the firms also influence the 
characteristics of the structures they are in contact with.  
 
It is argued throughout this thesis that the importance of institutions for making 
explicit what ‘the rules of the game’ are, functions as one of the crucial elements 
which contribute towards shaping the context for agents. It has already been discussed 
in the preceding chapter that Hall and Soskice even suggest that the institutional 
framework provides economies with comparative advantages which may become a 
determinant of their prosperity (2001). It is also discussed that emphasis should be on 
the institutional link between the immaterial character of projects, goals and ideas, on 
the one hand, and the stability of the economic, political and social conditions, on the 
                                                          
23 Hall and Soskice made a broad differentiation between liberal (Anglo-Saxon) economies and 
coordinated ones. According to their perspective, the former are more conducive for firms to engage in 
radical innovations because firms are situated and respond to a competitive market arrangement, 
whereas firms in the coordinated economies, referring to European and Japanese models, tend to rely 
more on non-market mechanisms, and their patterns of innovation tend to be more incremental (2001).  
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other, as the formal and informal rules in society which shape human interaction 
(North, 1990a).     
 
However, because the Strategic Relational Approach, based on realist ontological and 
epistemological positions, enables us to explore the articulation between actors, 
contexts and actions, the analysis presented here differs from neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy which tends to de-contextualise economic phenomena. My analysis shows 
that institutions per se do not guarantee any success or automatically trigger any 
particular achievement. Weak institutional links, or a poor orientation of the efforts 
and strategies, may cause harm, which is not necessarily limited to economic losses or 
externalities. The impact of such poor orientation, and of weak links in spheres other 
than economic, is often unacknowledged.  
 
I contend here that it is not enough to stress the institutionalization of economic 
restructuring, but that a careful evaluation is needed. The commodification process 
under way in Mexico does not follow an economic trend alone; it is also, in its own 
right, a strong political process, and as such, open ended, contested and contingent. 
Moreover, it is not by any means a terminal stage, but a phase in the historical 
transition of that country.  
 
Since all economic activities are socially embedded (cf. Schumpeter, 1934, and 1954; 
Polanyi, 1957, 1992, 1996; Granovetter, 1996a, 1996b, and 1994), I go beyond 
regularities to illustrate a different picture which comprises not only economic gains 
and costs, but also some of the causal elements and interactions otherwise invisible. 
This section explores the weak institutional links; the lack of cluster connections 
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among economic activities oriented towards both the domestic market and the 
external market; the polarization and widening income distribution gap in Mexico; the 
poor features of innovation which tend to relegate the Mexican economy’s insertion 
into niches in the world market; the costly social legacy of the economy which is 
intertwined and interwoven with the import-prone export-oriented industrialization; 
and liberalization and deregulation processes. At this point it is important to stress the 
fact that there is no necessary trade-off between economic performance and 
inequality. Though there can be one in some circumstances, the point is that there 
need not be one. Equitable growth is possible if attention is given to a proper balance 
of economic and social policies.  
 
One of the major problems of the Mexican industrialization experience which is also 
found in some other Latin American economies has been the aiming at and 
maintaining positive rates of economic growth at the expense of redistribution and 
equity. It is not the argument that the export oriented industrial model is the only 
factor responsible for unevenness and polarization, but that it certainly has not made 
any contribution towards the improvement of those pressing issues, as palliative 
programmes do not address the causes of inequality. It is true that the origins of the 
poor income distribution in that country in particular, and the region in general, have 
historical antecedents. However, the current implementation of economic strategies 
which accounts for the commodification experience has pushed further the 
accentuation of the patterns of decreased protection from the market. The emphasis 
has been placed on a socially disembedded expansion of markets and exchange 
transactions.  
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The search for economic efficiency, based on a platform of sound economic 
fundamentals, from which growth and economic benefits would trickle down has not 
delivered as expected. It never does. Patterns of unemployment, the precarious 
financial situation, indebtedness, the low rate of non-speculative investment, technical 
obsolescence and weak support for technological research and development have 
contributed towards further weakening of the industrial sectors (Fajnzylber, 1990). 
Given that the industrial sectors are crucial for the outward orientation of economic 
activities, it is striking that so little attention has been paid to the quality of the 
industrial insertion and its linkages. A broad picture of the industrial activities 
portrays poor innovation features in most of the sectors; although there are some that 
perform above average, even using state of the art innovation. However, they tend to 
be more the exception than the rule. Chapter Three suggests that innovation in 
economic activities is vital for keeping the economic processes in being. Along with 
crisis, innovation forms part of a dynamic pattern of renovation which not only 
adapts, but is capable of influencing the depth and pace of ongoing changes, as it 
contributes towards revolutionizing the socially embedded economic structures from 
within, destroying the old and creating new ones (Schumpeter, 1954).   
 
The Mexican experience during the last two decades has put heavy emphasis on 
stability as a precondition for reactivating economic growth. It is undeniable that the 
whole economic restructuring experience of the country has taken as a guideline the 
goal of growth and the promotion of stability. Even though there have been some 
results, they are by no means impressive, especially at the micro and disaggregate 
level. A big share of the population has found its living standards to have deteriorated 
overall during the last two decades, especially if compared to the conditions prevalent 
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up to the late 1970s and early 1980s (Székely, 1998; Kelly, 1999; Damián, 2000). 
Clearly, both domestic and international conditions have changed much since then, as 
compared to what they were at the dawn of the 21st century, and it is not my purpose 
to review them. The reactivation of the business level and the reorientation of the 
productive activity followed an orthodox neoclassical rationale which ignored more 
inclusive social and political considerations. 
 
What I am arguing, however, is that making use of the Strategic Relational Approach 
suggests that the same importance has not been granted to innovative inputs and 
combinations in economic activities and the promotion of cyclical fluctuations. These 
fluctuations, in turn, if properly conducted, could promote a more equitable 
distribution of benefits and welfare. The focus on manufacturing has been on 
relatively mature industries, such as automobiles and electronics; while the insertion 
has not been where most of the added value of the processes is, but on non key stages 
such as assembling (Dussel Peters, 1997 and 2000). Sadly, innovation is not one of 
the main features of the Mexican manufacturing sector, as a big share of it is low in 
added value. Similarly, the articulation between industry with a base in natural 
resources and service industry cannot be characterized as optimal, either. It also 
appears that the designing of strategies and policies, and the strengthening of 
institutions face important challenges ahead. What I find disquieting is that the 
reproduction of institutions and features of the model which have been weak in 
delivering growth, and much worse for the promotion of equity, are inclined to 
engage in a path-dependent pattern which present no alternatives beyond further 
commodification.  
 
 205
Clearly, this is far from an optimal stage, as it would make the cyclical fluctuation 
increasingly critical. Decisive steps towards promotion of equity are necessary, as 
they would bring about decommodification. In so doing, political will and a clear 
identification of the economic sectors and activities which can be targeted as 
beneficiaries of specific government programmes are vital components if a qualitative 
change is to be achieved. A qualitative transformation aiming for greater equity needs 
leadership in the design and implementation of public policies which touch upon and 
affect consumption and investment patterns. Enhancing the international 
competitiveness of the industrial system cannot be left to the invisible, or more 
precisely, the inexistent hand of the economy, as attention needs to be paid to the 
natural resources endowments, agriculture, the demographic trends, the domestic 
entrepreneurial capacity, portfolios and foreign direct investment, to mention only the 
most obvious areas (Fajnzylber, 1990). The restructuring of the economy, if equity is 
to be delivered, gives the State important functions to play in complementing market 
mechanisms. It is not my argument that the State does need to be the main economic 
actor; however, I contend that, due to its centrality, the State is best placed to 
attenuate and correct market failures. Furthermore, markets similarly compensate for 
and address public failures via increased economic efficiency.  
 
The State can promote innovation not only by allocating resources to research and 
development, which are undeniably important, but also by promoting stronger and 
more integrated forward and backward links in the economic chains. The more 
coherently planned and implemented these are, the better. This is of crucial 
importance in a country where the outward orientation of the economic activities has 
been inattentive to the socially embedded features of the model. As part of the process 
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of ‘creative destruction’, innovation in economic activities has been acknowledged as 
key for reaching a more evenly developed condition. Innovation in economic 
activities is associated with the degree of technological knowledge in the productive 
activities. Therefore, the attention paid to technological issues is a core factor for the 
economic performance and progress of an economy (Fajnzylber, 1990).24 
Technological knowledge not only helps productivity to surge, but also could favour 
growth, improve living conditions and infrastructure, and enhance an equitable 
distribution of benefits. Thus, the absorption, development, incorporation and 
innovation of technology is one of the core variables that the industrial policy of a 
State needs to pay attention to. The absorption, incorporation and spread of 
technological innovations in economic activities helps to push economic processes 
and activities a few steps forward from the mining and exploitation of natural 
resources, either perishable or non-perishable, which lead to non-renewable income, 
especially in the medium and long term. The difficulty lies in the fact that to absorb, 
innovate, incorporate and innovate in technology are not easy tasks at all. Although 
the technological frontiers move quite fast, and increase the difficulty of catching up 
with the latest developments, let alone leading the dynamics, the incentives to 
innovate lie in the fact that income from more technologically advanced sectors and 
progress tends to be better rewarded (Cimoli, 2000). The gains however, must not be 
concentrated in a few hands, because that would take us back to a vicious circle of 
polarization and pauperism. Thus, there is a task and a rationale for the State to design 
and put into practice industrial policies which compensate for the heavy reliance on 
                                                          
24 Even though there is an agreement on the importance of technological progress, it is striking how 
little, if any, attention neoclassical economic orthodoxy has paid to it. Economists trained under 
positivism frameworks tend to be more concerned with short-term equilibriums at an aggregate level 
where the specificities of the sectors housing technological progress is ignored, than with the reach and 
spread of their benefits (Fajnzylber, 1990).  
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foreign markets. The challenge of industrial restructuring is to reinvigorate the 
domestic markets at the same time as gaining a better position abroad.  
 
True, this is easier said than done, but sketching a very detailed strategy goes beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, Fajnzylber has pointed to the identification of 
specific subsectors which have more reach, spread and impact in the productive sector 
as a whole. Those which are more integrated into the whole economy and which 
feature more backward and forward linkages for incorporating and disseminating 
technological progress must be considered as candidates (1990). One of the shifts in 
priorities which cannot be postponed in Mexico is to move away from a 
‘maquiladora’ assembly enclave to a more dynamic and better integrated economy. 
The importance of this lies in the facilitation for promoting the insertion of those 
sectors which have enhanced productive and competitive specific features into the 
international economy. Nevertheless, the institutional framework plays a very 
important part in providing an adequate environment conducive to strategic 
cooperation between the public and the private sector, without leaving aside interests 
of labour (Fajnzylber, 1990). In other words, for the Mexican case it would mean 
abandoning the low cost labour strategy and re-orientating efforts towards enhancing 
the quality of educational, medical and welfare resources provided throughout the 
country.    
 
Important as all these considerations are, they would make no sense if the emphasis is 
merely concentrated on a narrow economic agenda. For the historical, social, political 
and cultural processes all interact with each other.  It is crucial to recognise that the 
open nature of social systems and the identification of contingent causal relations, 
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rather than formal associations, permits the Strategic Relational Approach to broaden 
the analytical scope and to formulate informed critiques of the phenomena under 
scrutiny. The commodification emphasis of the current process in Mexico has many 
different facets, but it does not by any means lack a political character. If the concern 
for equity is to be convincingly approached and tackled, granting protection from the 
market to the labour sector is an additional step towards abandoning the 
commodification process. The promotion and delivery of equity needs adequate 
welfare levels, and it is again the State, via public policies and instruments, which is 
the best situated agency to attend to this issue.   
 
However, this capacity of the State to transform the function of industrial and trade 
policies is a resource which can be used in several different ways. For instance, due to 
the heavy concentration of power on the executive, it was used by the Mexican 
government during the 1980s and early 1990s to present vertical economic pacts 
which allowed unilateral and fast liberalization aiming to benefit the private export 
oriented sectors. Since there was no effective counterweight in the Congress legal 
reforms, they posed no obstacle. Furthermore, the implementation of specific 
programmes targeting outwardly oriented enterprises was put into practice without 
paying adequate attention to the economic linkages and broader social context within 
which the economic actors were situated.25 Special manufacturing enclaves on the one 
hand, and the agricultural sector, on the other, have faced such situations as are 
studied below.     
 
                                                          
25 Examples of these include programmes openly tending to favour temporal imports over the 
production of export goods (Programa de importación temporal para producer artículos de exportación, 
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CRUDEST COMMODIFICATION FOR AGRICULTURE AND INBOUND 
INDUSTRIES   
 
In Mexico there is a deep need to reverse the unsustainable use and deterioration of 
natural resources including water, land, forests and air. The challenge of first halting 
and then reverting deforestation, soil erosion, urban air pollution and surface and 
underground water contamination trends are enormous, as they all betray the 
pernicious effects of commodification.26 On top of those environmental concerns, and 
situated within the contemporary socially embedded processes, in historical terms not 
only has the agricultural sector of Mexico been neglected, but also its political 
importance has been downgraded. At the same time that the economy changed from a 
main producer of raw materials and commodities, to manufacturing goods and 
services, the process was accompanied by a demographic transition from a rural to an 
urban country (Reynolds, 1970). Needless to say, the political importance of the 
peasant sector varied as well. As has been discussed in Chapter One, Mexican 
corporatism worked as a strategy of political engagement and control of social 
groups, where the peasantry over the years received less attention while economic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Spanish acronym PITEX); maquila exports; and highly exporting firms (Programa de empresas 
altamente exportadoras, Spanish acronym ALTEX). (Dussel Peters, 2000). 
26 Mexican environmental priorities include, amongst others: a) reversion of deforestation; b) stopping 
practices which erode the soils; c) sustainability in water use, reduction of water contamination and an 
increase in the supply of potable water; d) adequate management of solid waste; e) extension of 
wastewater collection and treatment systems; f) improving the capacity to manage and dispose of 
hazardous waste; and g) to slowing down the loss of biodiversity (Gilbreath, 2003). 
These broad objectives have historically been approached with different strategies and, therefore, the 
results obtained so far vary. Consider for instance that the Mexican government aims to achieve a 
sustainable use of water resources. This goal, in turn, is translated into the design of strategies seeking 
to make a more efficient use of agricultural irrigation and urban supply (Comisión Nacional del Agua, 
2001). For such case, a policy of multiple and successive uses of water implies, amongst other factors, 
the agricultural and industrial reuse of waste water. In doing so, it liberates underground water 
supplied by a complex of pumping stations to the main cities and areas where the population is 
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resources from agriculture contributed to finance the import substitution 
industrialization model (Reynolds, 1970; Hansen, 1971).  
 
As has been argued above, the reforms entailed in article 27 of the 1917 Constitution 
became some of the drastic reforms carried out in the rural economy, eliminating the 
‘ejido’ or communal land. It meant that the special treatment which had been given to 
land was changed to allow for ownership and not mere exploitation as had been the 
case. Additionally, the trade in agricultural commodities was liberalized, and price 
interventions were eliminated. In 1995 a programme of land titling complemented the 
constitutional reforms of three years before (Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen, 2001). 
The organizations and institutions which had previously supported the agricultural 
sector were privatized, reduced or eliminated, leaving agriculture in an institutional 
vacuum without any protection from the market. This is of utmost importance since 
the Mexican government has historically provided support to the agricultural sector; 
the withdrawal of its protecting mechanism, notably particular subsidies and public 
investment, severely affected small farmers and peasants, who relied on them for their 
survival.27 Therefore, it is the rural areas where poverty is not only most acute, but 
also has intensified parallel to the process of economic restructuring, as one fifth of 
the population belongs to the worst-off deciles (Kelly, 1999).  
 
The World Bank reports that during the 1990s a contrasting phenomenon with 
indexes of inequality was observed. The national Gini coefficient for income was 53 
in 1992, 54 in 2000 and 51 in 2002. The indicators for expenditure were 51 in 1992, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
concentrated; while at the same time, it addresses the problem of tapping hydrological underground 
sources to satisfy the demand of a growing population (Cuadra Moreno, 1981).  
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52 in 2000, and 50 in 2002. However, this was not by any means a uniform trend. The 
pattern described by urban areas was similar to the national tendency, whereas in the 
countryside, where an important share of the indigenous population lives, inequality 
has increased. Specifically, in the rural areas, Gini coefficients for income rose from 
47 in 1992 to 53 in 2000, and went down to 49 in 2002. Regarding rural expenditure, 
Gini coefficients rose from 41 to 56 and decreased to 48 during the same years 
(World Bank, 2004).      
 
Nevertheless, following the broad pattern of the government’s dismantling the 
protection from the markets, some agency initiatives have tried to build or restore 
regulatory frameworks, as a response to the abrupt removal of legislation, 
organization and institutions. Even though those subnational efforts are not centrally 
coordinated they provide evidence of the extreme importance which agencies play in 
the pushing and promotion of decommodification initiatives, on the lines originally 
suggested by Polanyi.28 
 
Although for some years during the import substitution industrialization period the 
agricultural sector contributed towards the financing of the model, by the 1980s and 
1990s stagnated rates of growth and lack of competitiveness were to be blamed for 
the increase in rural poverty and for its small contribution to the Mexican Gross 
Domestic Product. According to the North America Free Trade Agreement schedule, 
open competition of this sector with Canada and the United States is due in 2008. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 The World Bank’s view portrays the unsustainable subsidies which led to dependency in the ejido 
sector (Giugale, Lafourade, and Nguyen, 2001). 
28 For a compelling argument paying particular attention to coffee, one of Mexico’s most important 
agricultural exports, see Snyder, 2001.  
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However, the US shows no signs of eliminating its controversial farm subsidies in the 
foreseeable future.29  
  
During the 1980s, in the aftermath of the debt crisis, the reactivation of economic 
activities proved critical, as external financing sources were no longer available. 
Therefore, the original orthodox structural adjustment programme was abandoned and 
replaced with a heterodox package during the second half of the 1980s (Minushkin, 
2001a, and 2002; Ramos de Villarreal and Villarreal, 2000). The manufacturing 
sector was selected as a viable alternative to diversify the economic profile of the 
                                                          
29 Inconsistent with what it preaches to the world, the United States agricultural subsidies and policies 
have systematically protected their farmers from international competition at bilateral and multilateral 
levels. The elimination of agricultural subsidies and tariffs which the US government obliges trading 
partners to pursue is not matched by their own actions. The country’s agriculture subsidies affect not 
only export oriented agribusiness but also inwardly oriented small farmers abroad. Consider for 
instance that the plummeting prices of some agricultural commodities such as corn have helped to 
increase rural misery in Mexico. Without any significant protective net in Mexico, unfair competition 
from their counterparts on the other side of the border puts the small, poor and worst-off out of the 
business; while the subsidies for farmers from the United States, allow them to sell their commodities 
at prices far below what they cost to produce.   
Furthermore, the use of genetically modified crops critically threatens biodiversity. Such is the case of 
maize which has been imported from the United States without any regulation, and without any 
labelling requirements warning of its altered conditions. Not only is maize one of the most important 
crops in the world, but Mexico is the place where it originated and where its enormous diversity comes 
from. Genetically modified grains must not be used as seeds as they contaminate, in this particular 
case, the very center of origin of a crop with huge importance for world supply. The genetic 
contamination of Mexican maize risks environmental and health effects, neither have been seriously 
evaluated. Crucially, maize represents not only a food source, but it is a vital part of the Mexican 
cultural heritage.        
Wealthier nations have been undermining agriculture in the poor and developing countries by their 
discretionary use of tariffs, export subsidies and direct farm subsidies. The European Union is not 
exempt from controversy either, as its Common Agricultural Policy seizes an important share of the 
common budget. Even though both actors, the European Union and the United States, have accused 
each other of unfair trading in multilateral negotiations such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the main losers are neither the EU nor the 
US, but the developing economies whose agricultural commodities are systematically either denied 
access or given restricted access to those markets.  
The United States’ agricultural subsidies only benefit their farmers; whereas the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the European Union guarantees a level of protection to the farmers of all EU members. Ever 
since the very beginning both policies were conceived to guarantee a food supply for the population on 
one hand, and farming income on the other; while allowing the export of surpluses. It is this scheme in 
conjunction with the restricted access to the protected agricultural sectors for developing countries, 
which has remained a problem, as neither the US, nor the EU make any substantial concessions in it.  
Since a free trade area coverage is not as comprehensive as an economic union, and members set their 
own tariffs, in some cases an individual decision may cause economic injury to another. Furthermore, 
dumping or countervailing duty panels might be set in specific cases.     
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country, then heavily dependent on oil exports and some raw materials. Foreign direct 
investment flows privileged inbound industries, also known as ‘maquiladoras’, as the 
government provided incentives such as tax exemptions, which were accompanied 
with the availability of low cost labour along the border with the United States.30 The 
spread of those foreign enclaves in the Mexican territory which import parts and 
supplies duty free into Mexico and export their production, largely to its northern 
neighbour, has been the target of serious criticism (Calva, 2000; Dussel Peters, 2000; 
Villarreal 1990).  
 
Although the inbound industries were allegedly conceived as an option for remedying 
the lack of external links with the foreign markets, associated with the import 
substitution industrialization the result went too far in the opposite direction. It is no 
secret that those assembly plants are not properly integrated into the domestic 
industrial structure of Mexico. They have benefited from low cost labour, fiscal 
special treatment, and a relaxed enforcement of environmental regulations, among 
other things; making use of scarce domestic inputs, representing neither a solution for 
the rising employment demand, nor for technological transfer. Even though the zero 
tariff put into place with the North America Free Trade Agreement would formally 
account for abolishing the inbound industries regime, in reality the model has become 
institutionalized as Figure 4.1 below shows.  
 
                                                          
30 Such a scheme however, was not new by any means. Although it had originated in the mid 1960s, 
the proliferation of plants in various manufacturing categories made the inbound industries one of the 
most important sectors in the export oriented industrialization strategy to be promoted during the last 
two decades.    
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Figure 1. Trade Balance of Mexico, 1980 - 2003
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Source: Figure based on Mexican central bank data. November 2003. 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/siteBanxicoINGLES/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.html 
 
Because the incentives of low wages, adequate infrastructure and political stability for 
a broad range of labour intensive assembly industries act as key incentives, the 
attraction of a comparative advantage based on cheaper costs remains.31 Examples 
range from garments and textiles, to automotive, computer and electronic products. 
Therefore, the main features of the inbound industries have not become an 
anachronism. Instead, they have spread beyond the border export promotion zones, 
into other areas of Mexican territory. The problem for low skilled and labour 
intensive mature industrial sectors based heavily on low cost labour is that such a 
comparative advantage can be easily eroded. It is no secret that many countries make 
use of such an economic strategy to attract foreign investment; the portrayal of a race 
                                                          
31 From the United States position, tariff provisions 806 and 807 allowed its firms to receive duty-free 
inputs from the US, and by those means to cover only the Mexican value added tax share (Gereffi, 
1996). 
Cheaper ‘maquiladora’ competition from some other countries does not have the preferential access 
which NAFTA provides to the United States as the biggest domestic market in the world. However, 
there is no guarantee that this situation will continue.  
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to the bottom is apt.32 Furthermore, the neglect of the domestic market, while 
favouring the externally oriented firms and sectors, has severely impaired the 
endogenous capacity to deliver growth with equity for a very important share of the 
population, as the Strategic Relational Approach shows in the next part of this 
chapter.  
 
 
MEXICAN OUTWARD ECONOMIC ORIENTATION AT THE EXPENSE OF 
THE DOMESTIC MARKET  
 
The features and profile of the manufacturing sector that has been promoted since the 
early 1980s in Mexico is built on the foundations of the import substitution 
industrialization period, and the creation of export promotion zones for inbound 
industries.33 Since different profiles can be found in the firms working in these 
sectors, it is a task beyond my reach to engage in a detailed discussion of the history 
and characteristics of Mexico’s manufacturing firms.34 For the purposes of my 
                                                          
32 Although it is only one of the criteria used by investors, consider for instance, that in low skilled and 
labour-intensive industries, countries such as China attract a growing share of foreign investment. It 
has been highlighted that due to its oversupply of workers, the labour cost is just a fraction of other 
economies such as Mexico.  
33 It is important to mention that different stages have been identified in the process of import 
substitution industrialization in Mexico. The first phase, or effective stage, lasted from the late 1920s 
until the early 1970s. Villarreal reports dropping import substitution indexes for consumer, 
intermediate and capital goods in the first stage.  This initial phase was followed by a stagnating one 
during the 1970s, when especially during the second half of the decade, the initial trend no longer 
followed a downward pattern, but instead showed a rise in the index for all total manufactured goods. 
This phase is associated with oil mono-exports without deindustrialization. Finally, the last stage could 
be characterized as apparent or recessive, as it showed a stop-go pattern for the import substitution 
index during the 1980s (Villarreal, 1990).  
34 Consider for instance, that the automobiles and autoparts branches are led by transnational 
companies such as Ford, Chrysler, General Motors, Volkswagen and Nissan, and a further of handful 
automotive firms since the late 1990s. There is a similar situation in the electronics subsector, where 
Philips, Daewoo, Acer, IBM, etc., dominate. Oil and petrochemicals present a very different profile 
since Petróleos Mexicanos, (PEMEX) is a State monopoly whose revenues are one of the most 
important income sources for the government. Domestic oligopolies such as Femsa and Modelo 
participate in a leading position in the beverage and brewery sectors respectively; whereas Vitro 
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analysis, helped by the Strategic Relational Approach to identify unobservables, I pay 
attention to the causal relations of the import prone export oriented industrialization 
and focus on some important characteristics of the firms. Even though it is not clear 
that the emphasis on export promotion, and liberalization of trade and investment 
could generate, at best, proper and sufficient conditions for growth and development, 
the efforts of the Mexican government have been oriented in this direction.  
 
The main focus of the liberalization, privatization and deregulation economic 
strategies targeted specific variables, such as the rate of inflation, control of fiscal 
deficits and attraction of foreign investment. Judged with the benefit of hindsight it 
can be said that the implementation of economic strategies aimed at those goals has 
been relatively successful in its own terms. During the last twenty years in Mexico a 
broad and aggregate picture of those variables has been closely monitored. Moreover, 
their performance has even been presented as an outstanding achievement of the 
government commitment to keep the orientation of the economic policies pointing in 
the same direction as they have been oriented so far. For a few years the levels of 
inflation which once reached three digits has been kept to one-digit levels, almost 
matching international standards, especially that of the main economic partner, which 
is the United States of America. Similarly, the levels of fiscal deficit have been 
reduced and kept, within certain margins, under control. The reduction in the levels of 
government expenditure has been consistent with the narrow stated objectives. 
Finally, the attraction of foreign investment has remained one of the top tasks ever 
                                                                                                                                                                      
operates in the glass and derivatives branches. Micro, small and medium size enterprises also play a 
part in a range of different sectors. Capital and technology intensive goods tend to be concentrated, 
albeit non-exclusively, with big firms (Dussel Peters, 1997 and 2000). For non-manufacturing sectors, 
the profile of the companies is also mixed with a handful of conglomerates leading their respective 
branches.    
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since the process of economic restructuring started. Furthermore, the amount of flows, 
both portfolio and direct, which have been pouring into the economy, especially since 
the opening of the North America Free Trade Agreement, provide evidence of 
Mexico’s coherence and consistency. Since the early 1980s, a group of technocrats 
has been responsible, yet unaccountable, for keeping the main economic orientation 
and goals unchanged, despite major shocks, such as the financial mismanagement 
crisis suffered during the mid 1990s.   
    
Unfortunately, a blind eye has been turned to the costs and omissions of the emphasis 
in the economic model and the selected strategies and mechanisms. The modest 
success of the outward orientation of the economy for promoting exports is seen as 
less impressive from any other perspective than a narrow and aggregate one. Moving 
away from positivist assumptions and claims is essential if a more balanced, realistic 
and critical view is, hence, a prerequisite for analyzing multifaceted phenomena. This 
is exactly what the Strategic Relational Approach allows us to do, as will be clear 
below. Keeping the rate of inflation low, controlling the fiscal deficit, and attracting 
foreign investment flows, targets reactivating rates of economic growth, leaving aside 
equity concerns and redistribution. Either the neglect or the oversight of the domestic 
market and of the variables directed towards social sectors, have relegated these in the 
economic agenda, and hardly any attention is given to them. For the latter, 
employment, domestic demand, wages, the labour market, and savings only fit the 
model when considered as variables which may impact adversely upon the inflation 
rates. They are, however, important and related to the reactivation of the domestic 
market, which has suffered as one of the crucial factors omitted in strategies to 
promote external resources at the expense of domestic ones. There need not 
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necessarily be a contradiction, nor a trade off, since the promotion of economic 
growth in a more equitable way will consider domestic conditions (Romer, 1986 and 
1990).35   
 
Since equity and redistribution cannot be left to the imperfect and incomplete market 
domain, because it tends to concentrate wealth, the results of such actions have been 
high social costs, welfare reduction and an increase in poverty. The importance of this 
cannot be overstated, for material conditions such as health provision and ideational 
ones such as education and training are key components for forming and 
strengthening human capital formation. In other words, labour’s skills and education 
could be used and oriented towards the acquisition, absorption and innovation of 
technological advances in a range of economic activities, such as manufacturing. In 
this sense, Romer, among others, has pointed out that aiming for growth requires 
large stocks of human capital (1990). No wonder the most important asset for an 
economy are the profiles and qualifications of its population. Furthermore, it is also 
crucial for attracting Foreign Direct Investment flows. It is precisely regarding these 
pressing issues that the role which must be played by State policies in facilitating the 
generation of endogenous growth conditions cannot be rivalled by any other agency. 
The problem lies in the proper articulation of the policies and strategies which will 
foster rates of economic growth with a more equitable face. Since focusing only on 
the attraction of investment, or promoting any given profile of labour, is never a 
                                                          
35 Taking technological innovation as a core part of his model, Romer suggests that endogenous 
changes in technology provide incentives for continued capital accumulation and long-term growth 
(1986 and 1990). For him, the qualifications and skills of the labour force would facilitate the use of 
technology as a vital factor for fostering economic growth. The qualitative features of the labour force, 
or making use of economists’ jargon, human capital are important as they cannot be replaced by simply 
aggregating big numbers of people. The process must not be undertaken in isolation. On the contrary, 
he suggests that integration with the world markets would contribute towards reaching growth goals 
(Romer, 1990).  
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necessary, nor a sufficient condition for reaching that aim, the real challenge lies in 
the articulation of the linkages of economic activities. The difficulty of achieving a 
balanced emphasis on the complete chain of products and services is something which 
needs to be overcome. If the domestic market is to be reinvigorated, the economic 
links need to be integrated so as to recreate the dynamics domestically adding value to 
the process (Dussel Peters, 2000). Hence, the integration of economic links 
encompasses the whole process from the original inputs up to the final marketing and 
consumption, together with the impact on production, employment, wages, 
technology creation, and learning processes, among others. 
  
It is important to stress emphatically at this point that the promotion of the domestic 
market and attention to endogenous conditions are by no means contradictory or 
opposed to international and transnational links, relations, compromises, 
commitments and flows. I am not proposing to subject the latter to the former at all. 
What I argue, using the Strategic Relational Approach is the need to reassess and re-
evaluate politically, socially and economically the role, participation and integration 
of the commodification experience in Mexico. This is because there is a strong need 
for a set of strategies which deliver better and more balanced living conditions for the 
society as a whole. Concern over the rising levels of inequality and concentration of 
wealth and income does not come out of the blue. Since the 1980s different 
programmes aimed to target specific sectors have worked as palliatives. Furthermore, 
they have been used as political instruments, leaving the roots of the problems 
unaltered. During the last two decades, administrations have come and gone, without 
any substantial and serious commitment to combating the factors that affect the 
growing polarization, and widening of the gap between the better-off and the worse-
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off (Székely, 1998; Kelly, 1999; Damián, 2001). Needless to say, this is a great 
deficiency of the economic restructuring which has even been praised beyond the 
country’s borders. Adopting a middle to long-term perspective, the re-evaluation of 
the economic guidelines which have led the outwardly oriented economic model 
would take the form of a more inclusive socially oriented agenda. For this to happen, 
the recognition that economic activities are socially embedded remains crucial, as is 
the acknowledgement of its contingent and open ended character.     
 
Reinvigorating the domestic market, and facilitating the conditions for endogenous 
development is, therefore, necessary to provide an economy with a more balanced 
profile in Mexico. There is a need to generate economic incentives for the absorption 
of and innovation in technology, while strengthening the relevance of highly skilled 
and efficient labour within the economic activities (Dussel Peters, 1997). The links of 
the productive processes, on the one hand, and the formal and informal institutions, 
on the other, together with the domestic and international sectors and markets are 
crucial for articulating networks which would deliver a more equitable outcome in the 
long term. Additionally, paying more attention to the endogenous features of 
economic activities and sectors could help to provide a more diversified character to 
the economy. This might reduce or avoid entirely a heavy dependence on specific 
markets or sectors. Having highlighted the low priority which the domestic market in 
Mexico has been given, a trap where endogenous equitable growth conditions are 
increasingly difficult to promote, I now need to turn to some of the countertendencies 
and contradictions which operate within the outward oriented economic model. 
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ENEMIES WITHIN THE MODEL: DISENTANGLING THE EXTERNALLY 
ORIENTED GROWTH AND DOMESTIC INEQUALITY DICHOTOMY 
 
The emphasis on manufacturing and the structural change undertaken in the Mexican 
economy are far from ideal as a closer examination makes evident. Leaving inbound 
industries aside, it is important to analyse, evaluate and challenge the conventional 
wisdom of the outwardly oriented economic model. Note that it is somehow 
misleading to talk about the manufacturing sector exports in general, because in 
reality only a few sectors and firms are responsible for much of the volume and value 
of the exports. Not all of the manufacturing sectors are high exporters. Moreover, for 
those who are, there is a tendency towards concentration, with polarizing effects on 
employment and wages. Of special concern is a pattern of weakening and losing 
backward productive links with the endogenous market. Not only are the high export 
sectors and firms having a poor level of integration with the domestic economy, but 
also they make no contribution or have no spillover effects on economic growth, 
technological innovation, employment, and know-how (Dussel Peters, 1997). It is 
also important to bear in mind that the increase in growth since the trade liberalization 
programmes started and the rise in manufacturing exports, especially to the United 
States, have a big intra-industry trade component in sectors such as the automobile, 
spare parts and petrochemicals, which are amongst the most dynamic. Since the 
biggest share of labour is concentrated in the micro, small and medium firms, their 
disarticulation with the most dynamic ones spreads very few, if any, gains to a 
broader social base. The lack of links with big firms shows no association between 
exports with rising employment and growing Gross Domestic Product (Dussel Peters, 
1997 and 2000).       
 222
 
The increasing levels of polarization between the export oriented branches and 
companies on one hand, and the domestic oriented firms and sectors on the other, 
distance themselves from each other, as the widening gap between domestic demand 
and export performance indicates. For instance, Dussel Peters reports a heavy 
concentration of Mexican exports by a small, albeit highly exporting group of firms 
with a low impact on employment. Consider, for instance, that maquila exports shared 
45 % of total Mexican exports in 1998, while the main foreign and national exporting 
firms held 44 %. Those impressive numbers contrast with their share of employment 
in Mexico. Inbound industries’ firms account only for 2.7 %, while the main 
exporting firms, both foreign and national, absorbed 3.5 % of Mexican employment 
during the year (2000).   
 
The most dynamic branches, in terms of exports, of the manufacturing sector include 
automobiles, electronic equipment, household appliances, machinery and electric 
equipment, textile industries, soft drinks and flavouring, apparel, cleaning and 
cosmetic preparations, fats and oils, corn milling, non-electrical machinery, 
transportation equipment, wheat milling, pesticides and fertilizers, metal furniture, 
and food for animals (Dussel Peters, 2000).36 Not only do those branches account for 
the biggest and most dynamic exporting subsectors of the Mexican economy, but they 
are even more important as importers as well. The current account and the trade 
                                                          
36 Other relevant manufacturing industries, albeit less dynamic in terms of exports are steel and iron, 
glass and products, meat and milk products, metal products, chemicals, plastic products, basic 
inorganic chemical, basic petrochemicals, electrical equipment,  ceramics, tobacco, leather and 
footwear, cotton, wool and synthetic textiles, lumber, plywood. The least dynamic manufacturing 
exporters include fruits and vegetables, food products, beer and malt, motors and autoparts, paper and 
paperboard, sugar, medicinal products, plastic resins, synthetic fiber, cement, alcoholic beverages, 
wood products, structural metal products, rubber products, non-ferrous metals, coffee, jute, rough 
textiles, petroleum refining, and printing (Dussel Peters, 2000). 
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balance have seen their deficits increase, though temporarily attenuated in the 
aftermath of the mid 1990s financial crisis. The export oriented model, due to its 
strong links with foreign markets, but also due to disincentives in the productive 
sector such as the rapid import liberalization, overvalued exchange rates and low 
domestic investment, neither created, nor consolidated endogenous growth 
conditions. I contend that the problem with the institutionalization of the current 
economic model is falling into a path-dependency trap, if it is to be carried on with 
the strong deficiencies which I have pointed out. In other words, further disincentives 
for the endogenous economic activities could only deliver a vicious circle of 
deteriorating conditions to which the markets could only offer increasing rates of 
commodification.  
 
Even though relatively successful in their own terms, the export orientation of the 
Mexican economy puts additional pressure not only on the ‘social variables’ by 
delaying the attempt to address social demands, but also on variables which are 
important for the viability of the outward orientation of the economic model itself. 
The relative control over the reduction of inflation rates and fiscal deficits, along with 
increases in foreign investment flows, savings rates, and foreign trade, particularly the 
rise in manufacturing and inbound industries exports as core sources of growth and 
concentration on trade with the United States, contribute towards other issues, 
perhaps not so obvious at first glance. Contrary to official discourse, the exchange 
rate since the 1994 financial mismanagement crisis has not been allowed to float 
freely. In reality, the Mexican Central Bank has systematically and continuously 
intervened in the exchange rate through several mechanisms (Dussel Peters, 2000). 
The point is relevant, since the attraction of foreign investment and the inflation 
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control obsession have contributed towards keeping the real exchange rate relatively 
overvalued (Calva, 2000). Even if an adjustment or devaluation of the exchange rate 
is undertaken, it will only be a matter of time for the appreciation of the currency to 
start afresh. Manufacturing and inbound industries which have benefited from a 
relatively strong peso since the late 1980s, have contributed to overvaluation of the 
real exchange currency. One of its most serious facets, the appreciation of the 
Mexican currency, was a factor in triggering the mid 1990s financial crisis. 
Paradoxically, the emphasis of the economic restructuring model generates 
disincentives for exports to function as the growth pillar of trade liberalization, as a 
result of exchange rate policies. This is especially the case when overvaluation of the 
exchange rate and high real interest rates turn against the manufacturing sectors 
(Dussel Peters, 2000; Calva 2000).   
 
The Strategic Relational Approach abstract framework can be useful for illuminating 
specific observations such as those regarding the Mexican economic sectors and 
activities. Consider that, for Mexico, the high concentration of manufacturing exports 
in a limited set of firms has been characterised by an even higher rise in imports, 
which accounts for growing volumes of intra-industry and intra-firm trade. In other 
words, commodities not only are traded within the same industries, but in some 
particular cases even within the same firms. This is particularly important in capital 
intensive branches where transnational corporations participate, especially in 
automobiles, autoparts, electronics and machinery subsectors. Similarly, inbound 
industries are responsible for a large share of intra-industry trade. The export oriented 
industrialization tends to feature an even stronger import orientation as the 
manufacturing sectors in Mexico follow a tendency towards further specialization in 
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products which are also increasingly imported (Dussel Peters, 2000). These patterns 
only weaken to a greater degree, but even worse, they deter the creation of forward 
and backward value added linkages, crucial for the reinvigoration of the domestic 
market and the facilitation of endogenous equitable growth.    
 
Since the 1980s, the patterns of social inequality and polarization have seen the 
accentuation of Mexico’s uneven income distribution and the rise of poverty in 
general. It is a pressing issue, where social exclusion and high levels of relative 
inequality have steadily risen in a parallel fashion, as high capital and financial 
concentration also make few beneficiaries. The liberalization of economic activities 
has even worsened the conditions of the ‘lost decade’ of growth and development 
since the early 1980s (Székely, 1998; Kelly, 1999; Damián, 2001). As the population 
increases, the lower share of employment for poor families and the creation of jobs 
with health insurance and social security lags far behind the demand, dramatically 
reducing the number of options for job seekers. No wonder there is a rise in the 
informal sector and growing numbers of immigrants, especially illegal workers to the 
United States; they have become irrefutable evidence of commodification for an 
increasing number of Mexicans (Calva, 2000).37 Furthermore, remittances sent from 
the US to Mexico are one of the most important foreign currency and capital inflow 
sources for the latter country at the aggregate level. More importantly at the agency 
level, the money which migrants sent to their families becomes in most cases a 
significant income source due to the wages and salaries disparity between the sides of 
                                                          
37 The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), embraces and points towards the free 
movement of capital and goods among the signatories. Needless to say, no free labour mobility is 
considered, especially for poorly qualified people. Nevertheless, migrants often seem to find holes on 
the otherwise most heavily patrolled border of the world, between Mexico and the United States. 
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the Rio Bravo. Hence, another quite crude expression of the processes of 
commodification in Mexico takes place when the richer and more developed market 
works as an economic magnet, despite the formal and informal series of deterrents 
and disincentives against illegal migration to the United States. Lack of proper 
economic opportunities enhances the attraction of better salaries on the northern side 
of the border. This becomes especially acute for a smaller and more neglected 
Mexican domestic market with quite weak, and for the most vulnerable social sectors 
and virtually non-existent social security systems. However, illegal workers face 
additional difficulties in that their irregular migratory status makes them ineligible for 
welfare and social protection where they are. Thus, increasing their income level turns 
out to be their route to modify their unpalatable economic status and conditions; they 
fall into a vicious circle of increasing their degree of commodification to secure better 
conditions of living, which would otherwise be difficult to reach.       
           
Since the liberalization of economic activities has failed to generate adequate jobs, the 
unsolved challenge of absorbing the growing numbers of workers into the formal 
labour market remains a huge challenge over the coming decades (Székely, 1998).38 I 
argue here that the creation, development and strengthening of economic linkages 
between the inward looking and outward looking economic activities requires efforts 
to orientate policy towards meeting the employment demand both in quantitative and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Regarding the demography of the latter, a country historically forged by immigrants,  it reveals a 
growing share of the ‘latino’ population as a key tendency in its evolving demographic profile, where 
‘black’ and ‘asian’ people are also on the rise, in contrast to the declining ‘whites’.      
38 Official figures in Mexico fail to capture an accurate estimate of employment, unemployment and 
sub-employment. A loose definition of economically active population takes all those above twelve 
years old who had worked for at least an hour for a monetary income, other retribution, or even for no 
payment at all. Bearing in mind this definition, official figures report 52 % as the economically active 
population in 1990 and 57 % in 2001; whereas the open unemployment rate is said to be 2.8 % and 2.4 
% respectively, for the same years. During 1995, the year after the Mexican financial crisis erupted, 
open unemployment rose to 6.2 %, while the economically active population was reported to be 55 % 
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in qualitative terms. Overemphasizing manufacturing industries as the core sector of 
the economic model has failed to deliver jobs, since liberalization is neither 
associated with trade, nor specifically with exports (Dussel Peters, 2000). The low 
generation of employment, in which poor conditions are also a pressing concern, has 
meant that wages have fallen both in real and relative terms, making living conditions 
difficult for a big share of the population as households tend to rely heavily on 
employees’ wages. Most importantly, economic activities not associated with the 
export orientation of the economy, such as construction, trade, restaurants and hotels, 
education and services have been overlooked as employment generators (Dussel 
Peters, 2000).    
 
A few hundred manufacturing firms and the inbound industries account not only for 
the export push, but also for the deepening of net imports. Such trade deficits have 
been financed through foreign investment, which in turn, has been one of the factors 
behind portfolio inflows and the uncertain strategies of firms. Since one of the reasons 
for increased importance of transnational corporation intra-industry and intra-firm 
trade is that needed parts, components and processes from national suppliers are not 
available in the domestic market, these high exporters have to import their required 
inputs. In some cases the failure to satisfy technological, quality and organizational 
standards cannot be overcome easily by the micro, small and medium size enterprises. 
Due to their asymmetry, especially when compared with the Mexican firms, some 
transnational corporations have pursued different business expansion strategies. Two 
of them stand out: either they have merged with domestic firms, or they have bought 
up smaller ones (Dussel Peters, 2000).  
                                                                                                                                                                      
of the total of Mexican working people (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, 
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The worsening conditions for endogenous growth are not only a result of the 
emphasis on the current outward economic strategy. Some historical factors have also 
played a role in affecting the domestic context. Consider for instance the 
renegotiation of the foreign external debt and the negative capital transfer during the 
1980s. Additionally, the high priority given to the control of inflation, on one side, 
and the structural adjustment, on the other, have affected the exchange rate, adding 
overvaluation pressure to the macroeconomic conditions. On top of the increasing 
dependence on foreign investment and exports, the domestic banking sector bailout 
which ended up in foreign hands some years later, are not conducive to integrating 
and strengthening the forward and backward linkages of the commodity chains which 
the domestic market requires (Dussel Peters, 2000). Therefore, there is an 
unquestionable need for the support and creation of subcontracting mechanisms on 
the economic and productive activities side, whereas the small, micro and medium 
size firms which are mainly oriented towards the domestic market need to take full 
advantage of factors such as education, technological innovation and development, 
and financial instruments and credit. If the recovery of the domestic market, and the 
aim of a more equitable and sustainable economic growth is to be fulfilled, stronger 
governmental efforts and attention need to be directed towards the generation of 
adequate, proper and quality employment. Moreover, increasing the supply of 
qualified labour for quality jobs cannot ignore the rising cost of wages in real terms, 
as the low cost jobs offer no realistic and sustainable solution in the medium and long 
term (Székely, 1998; Kelly, 1999; Damián, 2001). Therefore, a better integration of 
the Mexican economy on higher value added commodities and services chains 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2002. Anuario Estadístico de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos).   
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requires an urgent reassessment of the priorities of the economic model. Quality and 
equitable growth and development cannot take place without reinvigorating the role 
and context of domestic economic actors.              
 
Crucial to the reinvigoration of the forward and backward economic commodity and 
service chains linkages, is the proper organization of clusters of innovation aiming to 
stimulate progress. Institutions play a role of extreme importance for linking the 
production capacity of the economic sectors with their technological capability. My 
use of the Strategic Relational Approach claims that attention needs to be paid not 
only to the formal and informal markets, on the one hand, and non-market 
institutional frameworks, on the other, but also to the interactions and the 
characteristics of the economic networks within which public and private agencies 
interact. Therefore, national innovation systems should be oriented to a heavy 
promotion of linkages among firms, both, foreign and domestic, micro and 
transnational alike, and universities and research centres; in short, all the public and 
private actors involved in the innovation processes (Cimoli, 2000). The challenge is 
not to be avoided if the poor organization and connection of economic activities 
which inhibit the process of innovation is to be overcome, as it is hindering growth 
with equity in Mexico. Innovation in economic processes, activities, goods and 
services, contributes to the inventive and original side of ‘creative destruction’; this is 
vital if the economic cycles are to be kept in motion. What is needed is a decisive 
articulation of policies which do not place the domestic market second to the external 
market. What is also needed is an industrial policy which promotes an economically 
stronger articulation among firms and participants in the commodities and services 
chains; to generate equitable endogenous growth; to orientate coordinated efforts 
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towards innovative steps in economic processes and activities; and finally, a strong 
political will for a better and brighter future ahead.39      
 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
Ever since the late 1970s the Mexican economy has faced a range of many different 
facets of Schumpeterian ‘destruction’, which unfortunately have not been adequately 
balanced by equally strong ‘creative’ pushes. Leaving aside a short sighted strategy 
based on the comparative advantages of geographical proximity to the United States 
and low cost labour is merely the prerequisite for aiming at and reaching a qualitative 
improvement in living standards. It is imperative to avoid falling into a path 
dependent vicious circle of neoclassical economic orthodoxy which, even though 
relatively successful in its own narrow terms, falls far short of delivering sustainable 
and equitable progress at the national, and especially at the individual level. The need 
to create stronger and more sustainable linkages and cluster connections among the 
economic actors is something which Mexico cannot afford to ignore. A more 
comprehensive and coherent model, attentive to the social embeddedness of economic 
                                                          
39 Alternatives exist, however, as the role of a long-term industrial policy, redistribution and welfare 
provision can be led only by the State. Important tasks ahead need not be delayed as the qualitative 
transformation for a more equitable future includes: a) decreasing the vulnerability of the Mexican 
economy to external markets, i.e., relying less on short term portfolio investment flows among others; 
b) adopting an exchange rate policy with reference to balanced external accounts excluding inbound 
industries; c) articulating consistent links between industrial policy and trade policy, where the latter is 
not subordinated to the former; d) promoting and facilitating endogenous conditions for financing 
economic development, increasing domestic savings and investment rates, and reducing financial 
external dependency; e) implementing a domestic industrial policy orientated towards easing 
productive non-speculative economic activities; f) not keeping sound public finances and inflation 
rates under control in isolation, while strengthening fiscal reform and tax collection; g) reassessing the 
importance of welfare, employment and income distribution, where investing in human capital must 
not be postponed; h) putting into practice sustainable regional integration policies which are 
environmentally sustainable, and which aim to decommodify the commodity status which nature has 
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activities is required to re-orientate both the means and the ends of the contemporary 
commodification experience. We need to think of alternatives to replace the current 
import-prone export-oriented strategy. Alternatives which encourage a proper 
articulation between domestic and external markets, and where the endogenous 
conditions deliver more equitable rates of growth and development for the population 
needs must be considered more seriously than they have been so far.     
 
It must be clear by now that the Strategic Relational Approach reading of the process 
of economic transformation in Mexico has highlighted crucial causal relations, 
regular without being law-like, in the country’s commodification experience. By 
taking a balanced account of the situated economic agents in context, and the material 
and ideational factors, I have highlighted the most acute problems in the socially 
embedded economic networks, which are otherwise considered totally isolated from 
their context. Regarding the industrial disintegration between a handful of highly 
exporting firms and most of the Mexican firms and groups, it is important to bear in 
mind that quite a high number of medium, small and micro enterprises are mainly 
oriented towards the domestic market. It is precisely to the domestic market that scant 
attention has been given. For a relatively large number of cases, this market has not 
totally recovered since the 1980s, where the companies which account for the biggest 
share of the economically active people face difficulties in financing their operations 
through the Mexican financial system (Székely, 1998).40 Since international financing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
been given and which has so far been taken for granted; and i) increasing not only the efficiency and 
efficacy, but also the accountability of all government agencies (Calva, 2000).   
40 The financial liberalization in Mexico failed to open credit availability for the biggest share of the 
population. At the same time that the richest firms and individuals expanded their credit options and 
resources, the liquidity constraint has affected a vast majority of the citizens and enterprises. For the 
disadvantaged sectors, credit scarcity has represented further constraints to avoid the social cost of 
reorientation of the economic model; while the richest deciles have been provided with better 
opportunities to protect their income, assets and capital (Székely, 1998). 
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is beyond their reach, high domestic interest rates and credit ineligibility further 
disarticulate the spread and dissemination of productive non-speculative activities. 
Consider, for instance, that as a consequence of the formal economic constraints, the 
rise of the informal sector and the growth of the black market, particularly since the 
1980s, has not been checked. As long as the incentives for remaining there outweigh 
what hundreds of thousands of people could get in the formal markets, the problem 
will not be sorted out. Immigration shares to a great extent the same origin, as the 
vertical implementation of liberalization and privatization strategies has thrown 
people out on the streets, and left peasants with no work to do. It is no secret that the 
open unemployment statistics fail to capture the massive increase in the informal 
sector and black market on the one hand, and of the high numbers of immigrants 
principally to the United States, on the other. This is, undoubtedly, a critical issue in a 
country where no unemployment insurance or reliable safety net exists to attenuate, 
compensate or alleviate economic displacements. There is, therefore, the need to 
provide welfare, grant protection from the markets and reverse the commodification 
status, either intentionally or unintentionally, so far embraced by the Mexican 
government.       
 
For an important number of Mexican manufacturing industries and firms, improved 
management efficiency has not been accompanied by innovative techniques or 
procedures, leaving it to price and market signals to steer the direction of the firms. 
Based on the ‘self-regulatory’ and ‘self-adjustable’ market assumptions that mainly 
price signals should be followed to guarantee the optimal allocation of resources and 
technological upgrading, the critical result has been a careless lack of effort in the 
creation of networks between firms (Cimoli, 2000). This is of the utmost importance, 
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as the creation, development and strengthening of linkages critically impinge on the 
economic performance and competitiveness of the firms. Furthermore, the links 
within economic actors such as firms within a sector, and between sectors, on the one 
hand, and within the institutions, on the other, may impact and have spillover effects 
which go beyond any specific economic transaction.     
 
Weak levels of cooperation which characterize the manufacturing, and especially the 
inbound industries, are responsible for the poor diffusion of innovations within 
economic networks. The loss of articulation of the dichotomy between a handful of 
outward oriented firms, and a vast number of micro, small and medium size firms 
inwardly directed cannot be disregarded. In addition, the intense dependence on 
foreign technology makes ‘maquiladoras’ to support and to stimulate networking 
activities with foreign firms and institutions. Needless to say, this reinforces 
knowledge and technological innovation, mainly in the United States, but also in 
other countries. The dependence on imported capital goods and equipment has not 
only prevented, but also has been used to replace the learning capability which 
otherwise have accumulated in specialized domestic suppliers (Cimoli, 2000). Since 
innovative technology can be bought, used, adapted, improved and created, the 
challenge ahead of substantially improving the sectoral innovation clusters embedded 
in a framework of particular competitive relationships and institutional linkages must 
not be postponed.   
 
The problem of leaving technological learning and innovation as a response to price 
and market signals lies in the fact that it does not provide any clear incentive for 
articulating science and technology policies aimed at specific purposes with properly 
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defined goals. Therefore, in such cases the results are badly addressed programmes. 
Clearly, adopting such a risky selection shock-strategy condemns not only the 
individual firms, but also all the agencies involved in the processes, or linked to the 
sectors, to lag behind the international frontier. Even a simple concern to catch up 
increases the difficulty if the emphasis is merely on management modernization and 
competitiveness, following a narrow governmental policy, and an equally short 
sighted management vision. In order to avoid the stagnation of technological 
innovation and increased commodification, efforts and incentives need to be 
orientated towards the re-articulation and re-strengthening of domestic linkages, to 
promote endogenous equitable growth conditions. If this is to happen, local economic 
networking activities must be drastically improved, both in terms of quality and 
quantity, and the production system and technological capabilities enhanced. For 
instance, the present low technological opportunities and the research and 
development efforts have to be improved. There also needs to be an improvement in 
the organizational and institutional response. Additionally, not only must foreign 
direct investment flows be orientated towards contributing more significantly to local 
technological activities, but also the linkages among scientific sectors and local 
institutions have to be reinvigorated (Cimoli, 2000).    
 
Crucial for these steps will be the replacement of the labour-intensive low skilled 
strategy by one which promotes and reinvigorates ideas, knowledge, science, 
technology, research and development. In addition, specialization in the mature 
technology traditional activities, which faces increasing quantitative international 
competition, will have to be abandoned in favour of a more cooperative approach to 
diffuse technological and scientific innovations through networking. The 
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development of human capital, where technicians, engineers and scientists play a core 
part, must not be abandoned or left to the imperfect and incomplete market forces. 
Since the governmental policies and the efforts of management to make use of 
modernization and competitiveness have proved inadequate for catching up at the 
international technological and innovation frontier, increasing the sectoral innovation 
within clusters could clearly be a more decisive step towards that goal. Furthermore, 
education, training and specialization on the side of human capital and local 
networking on the relational side could help to re-orientate the efforts to this 
direction. Most importantly, from my point of view and relying on the Strategic 
Relational Approach, this would not only be a market driven process, since economic 
activities would be subsumed within a broader social context. There is a great need to 
put into practice long term industrial policy initiatives, with the decisive and 
qualitative involvement of the government. All the different stages of the process 
have to be reviewed, not only those to do with exchange. The idea is to domestically 
reinvigorate and balance all the links in the productive chains, if the current economic 
strategy in Mexico which has shown vital shortcomings and lack of proper 
articulation is to be addressed and corrected (Cimoli, 2000).    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Repoliticising the Social Processes of Change 
 
 
 
FOREWORD 
 
It has been stressed throughout this thesis that the Strategic Relational Approach is a 
powerful theoretical tool for analyzing the processes of change. It has also been 
argued that it is able to trace the contingent and open ended nature of the processes 
where strategically situated actors relate to, and interact with, each other within a 
strategically selective context. The processes of non-violent change which concern us 
are suffused with the uncertainty, uneasiness and contingency experienced by the 
agencies, both individual and collective, facing and shaping windows of opportunity 
and constraint in their interactions. 
 
The cascade of minor, iterative and cumulative changes shaped by trends and counter-
trends make the changes unfold in an incremental, albeit punctuated way. As was 
argued in Chapter One, the trajectory of the State can be traced in its market 
preferences, but also in its socio-political preferences. The latter could be associated 
with welfare concerns and corporatism, whilst the former could feature a more 
utilitarian role for the State where social policy is second to economic policy. 
Additionally, particular emphasis has been placed on the processes of 
commodification to provide a theoretical background to the analysis, and to make 
reference to the experience of a developing economy as well.     
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As thus far demonstrated, weak endogenous institutional links, on the one hand, and 
poor patterns of technical innovation, on the other, neither of which take into 
consideration the socially embedded character of economic activities, have delivered 
poor and inequitable growth in Mexico during recent decades. It is therefore 
necessary to analyze the political features of the current processes of social change. In 
this chapter, by making use of the distinctiveness of the Strategic Relational 
Approach, I engage in a theoretically informed analysis of the processes of social 
change, of which political autonomy and democratization are key components. 
Particular emphasis is paid to restoring a key role to political actors in shaping and 
influencing the course of events in which they are themselves strategically situated. 
The role of the State as a social relation within the described dynamics is, therefore, 
under scrutiny in this chapter.    
 
The argument delivered in this chapter proceeds in the following way. Considering 
the social character of dialectical interactions, and the need to re-politicise what are 
presented as economic imperatives, I contend that institutional turns cannot 
necessarily guarantee the goals they are oriented to, due to the open-ended processes 
of change, where agents’ interactions bring uneasiness, unpredictability and 
uncertainty. Emphasis is placed on a theoretical discussion of the role and 
characteristics of the State, particularly as a fluid socially embedded site of political 
practices which continually reconfigures itself in order to secure the conditions for 
wealth creation and capital accumulation. After a brief discussion of regulation 
theory, I focus on the suggested transition of ideal types from a Keynesian Welfare 
National State to a Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime. Then, I take each 
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of the highly stylized suggested features in turn and compare them with the atypical 
Mexican case. The aim is to demonstrate that the theoretical and analytical power of 
the Strategic Relational Approach is not limited to Eurocentric ideal types. It can also 
deliver powerful insights and perspectives in other contexts and without falling into 
functionalist views. Since my concern is the processes of change, I stress the 
importance of the role played by the situated agents to internally appropriate the 
processes and to endogenously reproduce the tendencies and countertendencies at 
play. Finally, I highlight the relevance for networking practices of common strategic 
agendas where the interactions among agents within the defined context are crucial in 
orienting the efforts toward relevant objectives.                
 
 
APPROACHING SOCIAL PROCESSES, CHANGE AND THE STATE 
 
The punctuated evolutionary character of all social processes cannot be satisfactorily 
studied by focusing exclusively or mainly on the role played by institutions. 
Important as they truly are, the path-dependent character which perspectives such as 
rational choice institutionalism tend to present is unsatisfactory. In addition to the 
structurally determinist and functionalist analysis of change thus far, discussed in 
Chapter Two, another deficiency is the conflation between the persistence of 
institutions on one side, and their permanent character on the other (Cammack, 1992). 
For instance, it is not rare to find claims suggesting that the whole trend, plus the 
individual moves, towards trade and financial liberalization, the privatization of 
government enterprises and the lowering of regulatory frameworks, are crucial 
because they ‘lock in’ mainly economic reforms. Specifically, it has been argued that 
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key non traditional gains for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
include improved market access for all members, shelter from new protectionism in 
the United States, and credibility, with lock-in, effects for the economic reforms in 
Mexico (Panagariya, 1999b). Such statements and assertions reveal a rather poor 
understanding of the political character of interactions, of the social dynamics of 
change, and of the socially embedded actions of situated agents within a strategically 
selective and non-determinant context.1        
 
Consistent with the attempt to “bring the State back in” to comparative and historical 
studies, I have been focusing on social change, and also on key roles and 
characteristics of the State as a social process. In so doing, I have also analysed causal 
relations and distanced my analysis from the claim that it reveals law-like regularities. 
I am also aware of the danger of generalization based on Eurocentrism and the 
insensitivity towards historical differences and the individual features of many cases 
and experiences throughout the world, where the levels of development vary 
significantly. Nevertheless, consistent with my research project, it is necessary that I 
move beyond the consideration of the State as a set of organizations which display 
different degrees of effectiveness in exercising their autonomy, profile, intervention 
mechanisms and capacities (Evans, Rueschmeyer and Skocpol, 1985).   
 
Attempts have been made to deliver comparative and historical studies of different 
States from different continents. Moreover, the focus on the State as a configuration 
                                                 
1 The sequences of interrelated changes which occur within or embrace open social systems not only 
bring aggregate results, but also acknowledge the possibilities and capabilities of changes yet to come 
(Sztompka, 1993). For the individually situated agencies within a non-determinant context face various 
stages that succeed and overlap each other in time. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that all 
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of organizations has been oriented towards viewing the State as a set of institutions, 
emphasizing social control, authoritative decision-making and the implementation of 
policies (Grindle, 1996). The problem is that, without acknowledging the socially 
embedded character of the interactions which continuously shape the processes of 
change, no analysis leaves room for the uncertainty and unpredictability associated 
with the dynamics of open social systems. Furthermore, an additional difficulty with 
analytical perspectives of this sort is that they tend to overemphasize the persistence 
of institutions as if they were permanent, granting primacy to structural and 
deterministic views and concerns over the management of macroeconomic policies 
(see Grindle, 1996; Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen, 2001; among others).       
 
The central role which the State plays in economic and political affairs is crucial for 
the argument presented here. Prioritizing a narrow emphasis on economic 
restructuring without addressing adequate redistributive policies has contributed to 
accentuating patterns of inequality all over the world (Vreeland, 2003). The 
assumption that, once the institutional framework is in place the population can find 
ways to grow when authorities open new business opportunities, has not materialized 
for a big share of the population in Mexico. As presented in Chapter Two, both 
market and government are failure prone, as imperfect information, incomplete 
markets, inefficiencies and disruption affect them both. The public and private sector 
follow contrasting rationales. Economic and non-economic objectives are crucial for 
the former, whereas profit seeking represents the main goal for the latter. 
Acknowledging that markets are neither ‘self-regulating’ nor ‘self-adjusting’ makes 
evident the role which government intervention must play, especially for 
                                                                                                                                            
those variations tend to affect, albeit to different degrees, the relationships and interactions among 
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redistribution purposes (Stiglitz, 1989, 1994, and 1998b). The expansion of social 
protection from the markets, as Polanyi suggested, represents a vital component of the 
social dynamics which non-synchronically accompanies market expansions (1957). 
There is a clear need for the government to play an active role in the implementation 
of redistributive policies and welfare provision which would, in turn, enhance a more 
efficient market allocation of resources. Not taking this into account increases the 
main risk of leaving markets to allocate resources on their own. This in turn would 
result in increasing the concentration of wealth in a few hands, and so dramatically 
widening the gap between them and the worse-off sectors of society. Such economic 
polarization is a market failure which leaves governments with the vital task of 
addressing social needs, delivering welfare levels and conditions, providing adequate 
goods and services and facilitating competition. These last issues are not by any 
means incompatible with any government’s capabilities, because increasing levels of 
market competition are, in turn, provisions against public failures, as rising incentives 
help to attenuate them (Stiglitz, 1991, 1998a, 2002).       
 
A number of analytical efforts to approach social processes, the nature of change and 
the dynamic features of the State have proved unsatisfactory. Examples include elite 
theory, new institutionalism and rational choice theory, amongst others. Due to the 
inadequacy of synchronic analysis and comparative statics for such tasks, my 
preference is clearly for diachronic analysis.2 Even though there is quite an abundant 
literature on the State, social processes and social change, not enough attention has 
                                                                                                                                            
material and ideational elements within specific time and space fixes.  
2 While synchronic analysis ‘freezes’ the object, focusing on relations at a specific time, comparative 
statics compares and contrasts ‘snapshots’ conducted at different times. Neither is capable of grasping 
the complex and often unpredictable outcomes which emerge from a multiplicity of never-static 
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been given to acknowledging the fluid dynamics and self-constituting dialectical 
interactions between them. Since limited space and scarce resources do not allow us 
to engage in a deeper revision of them all, and since I need to make (even more) 
explicit where I stand, it is to the Strategic Relational Approach analysis to the State 
that the next section is committed.   
 
 
A STRATEGIC RELATIONAL APPROACH TO THE EVER-CHANGING STATE 
 
The State is one of the major subjects and objects of study in political science and 
related disciplines. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that approaches 
which emphasize political control and means of coercion over a population confined 
within certain territorial limits have earned a classic status in the broad spectrum of 
social sciences in general (cf. Weber, 1979). Since proponents of the Strategic 
Relational Approach have pursued systematic and detailed literature surveys and 
theoretical analysis of the State, it is on their research that this section builds. In Re-
Stating Social and Political Change, Colin Hay presented a brief critical survey of the 
literature in addition to an analysis of second post Second World War Britain (1996). 
Bob Jessop has written The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods (1982), 
State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (1990b), and The Future of the 
Capitalist State (2002).3 Whilst the second not only discusses a range of different 
sources on the State at the same time as making a seminal contribution, the third one 
                                                                                                                                            
factors. Thus, diachronic analysis is more adequate than either to emphasise the process of change over 
time, as it allows us to trace and chart the interaction of multiple causal relations (Hay, 2002c).  
3 In addition to a large number of journal articles and book chapters.  
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advances the debate by moving beyond his original position and presenting 
theoretically informed ideal-types.    
 
Clearly, where the provision of institutional foundations for the market is prioritized 
over more socially inclusive political agendas, the State is more than a market 
friendly “partner, catalyst and facilitator” of economic activities (World Bank, 
1997b). For moving beyond a structural and deterministic position influenced by 
neoclassical economics and positivism requires agencies to take into consideration the 
role which they play in building the processes of change, as I have argued in Chapter 
Three. 
 
Since the State is part of a social context, it must be seen from a broader perspective. 
Even though it might be considered in isolation merely for analytical purposes, the 
dynamic and complex social relations which continuously re-shape it make it a site, 
generator and product of strategies. For the formation of path dependence, these 
strategies for making future choices are built on past ones, and in this they favour 
some strategies over others, deploying specific features of strategic selectivity which 
are never neutral (Jessop, 1990b).    
 
Additionally, the State is an extremely complex institutional ensemble and a site of 
political practices and struggles. Moreover, its organizational unity and cohesiveness 
of purpose have no pre-given form or unity, because the encapsulation and balance of 
a wide range of forces, networks, situated agents in context and strategically selective 
contexts makes it a moving entity. Thus, the State changes shape and appearance due 
to the environmental and conditional forces which act upon it (Jessop, 2003). For the 
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purposes of this argument, I am neither leaving aside the juridical, geopolitical, 
military, bureaucratic organization, economic, and various other dimensions; nor am I 
omitting other debates, as clearly there have been important contributions to the 
field.4 Rather, I am interested in stressing the dynamic, socially embedded, political 
and relational character of the processes which the State is ‘made’ of.      
 
For the Strategic Relational Approach, the State is “…an ensemble of socially 
embedded, socially regularized and strategically selective institutions, organizations, 
social forces, and activities organized around (or at least actively involved in) making 
collectively binding decisions for an imagined political community…” (Jessop, 2002, 
6 and 40). It is in such a fluid and evolving system, where the series of dynamic and 
complexly interwoven processes and practices features conditional and relational 
characteristics, that the exercise of power takes place. 
         
The never-ending and ever self-renewing processes of State formation and re-
configuration, due to the relational character of power exercised by situated agencies 
within strategically selective contexts, make up what is perceived as State power. 
Since societies cannot be organized and coordinated from a single centre because 
power is never external to social relations, it has been argued that the State has no 
power of its own. Rather, it is the continuous exercise of interactions which builds a 
complex social relation reflecting changing forces in specific combinations (Jessop, 
                                                 
4 References are numerous and differ in their theoretical emphasis. Valuable contributions include 
Bartelson, 2001; Barzel, 2002; Boyer and Drache, 1996; Cerny, 1990 and 1995; Evans, Rueschemeyer, 
and Skocpol, 1985; Germain, 1997; Grindle, 1996; Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen, 2001; Helleiner, 
1994; Hirschman, 1970; Jessop, 1990b and 2002; Ikenberry, 1992; Krasner, 1984; Kratochwil and 
Ruggie, 1986; Martinussen, 1997; Ohmae, 1990 and 1996; Ruggie, 1982; Schumpeter, 1996; Stiglitz, 
1989, 1991; Strange, 1996; Weber, 1979; Weiss, 1998; Wendt, 1992, and 1999; Williamson, 1990; 
World Bank; 1997b; among others.   
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1990b).5 Furthermore, the institutional ensemble mediates the relations reflecting the 
balance of broad societal forces and specific State apparatuses (Jessop, 2002).   
 
It is for the State that the rule of law and the legal character of the bureaucracy and 
governmental apparatus provide an administrative matrix. This in turn exercises legal 
monopoly over the means of coercion. On top of this, the opening, maintenance and 
restoration of the conditions for wealth creation and capital accumulation are 
undoubtedly vital among the features of the State (Jessop, 1990b and 2002). They are 
important not only for providing a playing field for the private sector and economic 
activities, but also for the public sector, since tax collection and the role of money 
function as economic matrices of State activities (Schumpeter, 1996).    
 
It is precisely the concern to secure the conditions for wealth creation and capital 
accumulation which provides the key functions of the State. Such emphasis on 
accumulation objectives over legitimation goals disregards any concern for equity. 
This becomes more evident when key practices which aim to secure that broad goal 
make use of the fictitious commodification of land, labour, money and knowledge.6 
The socially embedded character of the economic activities entails the recognition of 
the contentious boundaries drawn by neoclassical economics.7 Moreover, it is the 
                                                 
5 According to Jessop’s view, power is reinforced through the mobilization of support for policies and 
through the monopolization of the means of coercion (1990b).  
6 In the Schumpeterian and Polanyian sense discussed in this work, this grants some protection from 
the socially embedded markets which are neither ‘self-regulating’ nor ‘self-adjusting’. However, the 
last fictitious commodity of knowledge was not considered by either Polanyi or Schumpeter. The 
argument is simply that, as intellectual property rights are a pragmatic private appropriation of 
knowledge, they provide the basis for monopoly rents and national competitiveness (Jessop, 2002).    
7 For an excellent discussion about the problems of neoclassical economics as an asocial and 
ahistorical science concerned more with the mathematical modelling of arbitrary assumptions than with 
providing explanations of economics in the real world, see Lawson, 1997 and 2003. He identifies 
persistent tensions and incongruities between theory and practice due, among other things, to an 
uncritical acceptance of positivism. His proposition of adopting a richer realist ontology of social open 
systems is shared in this thesis, as has been discussed in Chapter Three.  
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promotion of suitable conditions for the production, distribution and exchange of 
goods and services that also needs to be attentive to issues such as the articulation of 
the interlinked processes, the legal order and property rights. It is necessary to be 
aware of all of these general functions of the State in relation to the market, if we are 
to successfully address the social and political repercussions of favouring general and 
particular conditions for profit-oriented and market-mediated activities (Jessop, 
2002).  
 
Given that the State is such a ‘polyvalent and polycontextual phenomenon’, the shape 
and appearances which it takes can be process-traced and used as a proxy for 
accounting for the social processes of change. It is important to recall that, even 
though wars and military conflicts are important factors of externally-imposed 
changes, my focus is oriented towards pacific processes which tend to follow patterns 
of punctuated evolution. I have argued in Chapter Two that the processes of social 
change need to be internally appropriated and endogenously digested by the agencies, 
both individual and collective, if they are to become part of the dynamics in motion 
within open systems. Since the realm of the State and the form of the State change 
through history, the patterns of punctuated evolution of the State have something to 
tell about the features of social change. Thus, the central and mediating role of the 
State cannot be easily disentangled from social changes (Hay, 1996).         
                                                                                                                                            
Regarding the disarray of neoclassical economic ‘theory’, Lawson points out that it is “…widely 
interpreted as a body of substantive thought that, amongst other things, focuses upon individuals rather 
than collectivities; upon exchange activities rather than production or distribution; upon optimising 
(maximising or minimising) behaviour rather than satisficing or habit following; upon conditions of 
perfect competition rather than oligopoly or monopoly; upon structures facilitating constant (or 
decreasing) returns to scale rather than increasing returns; upon presumptions of perfect knowledge 
and foresight or ‘rational expectations’ rather than uncertainty or ignorance; upon end-states, fixed 
points, or equilibria, rather than processes in time; upon functions (utility, cost, preference, profit) that 
are well behaved (where appropriate, convex, differentiable, fixed, well ordered over all the arguments, 
etc.) rather than otherwise” (Lawson, 1997, 86-87). 
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For such State centrality, patterns of continuity and change continuously re-shape the 
contexts within which the State, as a situated agent, undergoes trends and 
countertrends of evolution and transformation. Despite the numerous tendencies and 
countertendencies of globalization which have been identified and discussed in the 
academic literature, the centrality and importance of the State has not been 
dramatically challenged.8 The State retains a key role in economic, political and 
ideological functions. Consider, for instance, the centrality and importance in the 
uninterrupted management of political linkages. Contrary to claims that the 
capabilities of the State have been eroded, or that they are currently facing erosion, no 
great retreat, at least to the radical extent that had been announced, is yet observed. 
Rather, what has been maintained is a crucial capacity for maintaining social cohesion 
and the maintenance of sovereignty (Jessop, 2002).  
 
Clearly, with the benefit of historical hindsight, it is easy to see that some other actors 
have risen in importance and complemented some of the traditional functions and 
roles of the State. None, however, has totally substituted the key and central role that 
the constantly restructuring State plays in its various realms and dimensions. None 
has even dared to attempt such a thing. The State as a social process has suffered 
historical transformations, but it has been and remains a crucial actor in the socially 
embedded political and economic processes which entail social change. As already 
discussed in Chapter Two, these open system characteristics bring uneasiness, 
uncertainty and unpredictability.   
                                                 
8 Early claims about a globalization era in which markets supplant the Nation-State as the primary 
economic units have been convincingly discredited (Hay and Marsh, 2000; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, 
and Perraton (1999).   
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The continuous patterns of change and continuity brought about by social processes 
interact in such a dialectical way that presents trends and countertrends at the same 
time. For instance, three trends have been identified regarding the restructuring of the 
State. They are the denationalization of the State, the destatization of politics and the 
internationalization of policy regimes (Jessop 2002). Those trends are, in turn, 
matched by countertrends which include an increased scope in the articulation and 
primacy of spatial scales in addition to the national level, an augmented role in ‘meta-
governance’, and the contestation of forms and implementation of international 
regimes (Jessop, 2002). 
 
Regarding the first of the listed trends, the ‘hollowing out’ of the State represents on 
the one hand, a denationalization of the State, with the re-articulation of political and 
economic organization. On the other hand, the displacement of tasks and 
responsibilities upwards, downwards and outwards can be observable at the local, 
regional, national and supranational levels (Jessop, 2002). Second, the always 
contentious redrawing of the public and private divide, where the complementary 
roles played by the market and government in addressing each other’s failures, such 
as imperfect information, incomplete markets, inefficiencies and disruptions, must not 
be overlooked (Stiglitz, 1989 and 1998a). Since this topic has already been addressed 
in Chapter Two, suffice it to say that the State plays a role in correcting market 
failures (i.e. in the distribution and allocation of resources). Due to the centrality and 
key role of the State, it also facilitates the current enhancement of openness and 
competition. In addition, the extra levels of competition which markets bring at the 
same time tend to raise the incentives for efficiency and attenuate public failures such 
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as bureaucratism and ‘red tape’. Third, the internationalization of policy regimes has 
been associated with the rising significance of networks of different kinds which have 
favoured alternatives for self-organization (Jessop, 2002; Castells, 2000a and 2000b). 
 
One of the most significant countertrends of the restructuring of the State reflects the 
increased scope of, and the number of interactions among, spatial scales. It is argued 
that even though the national scale is the predominant one, the countertendency 
portrays emerging actors and networks which also operate at the local, regional and 
supranational levels (Jessop, 2002). The second countertrend complements the first 
one, as an increased number of both individual and collective agencies coordinate 
their efforts through exchanges, command and dialogue. As the degree of complexity 
and interconnection among market actors, State actors and networks increases, so 
does the likelihood of failure. Neither markets, nor hierarchies, nor heterarchies are 
exempt from information failures, incompleteness, inefficiencies and disruptions. 
However, it is the State that plays the principal role in the governance of the different 
modes of coordination. Hence, it is the State which plays an increased and decisive 
role in ‘meta-governance’ (Jessop, 2002).9 Similarly, the third countertrend matches 
and complements the previous two because the forms and implementation of 
international regimes are not guarantees of failure free governance. On the contrary, 
international regimes are incessantly contested in both their shape and the way in 
which they are implemented (Jessop, 2002). Thus, the State is a central player and 
sometimes a referee in a wide variety of regimes. Therefore, it “…must be not only an 
object but also an agent of regulation…” (Jessop, 1990b, 315).  
 
                                                 
9 The term of ‘meta-governance’ was originally suggested by Hay. 
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REGULATION THEORY AND THE STRATEGIC RELATIONAL APPROACH        
 
In this section, I make clear that Jessop’s analysis of the State could be considered an 
attempt to remedy what was perceived as a weakness of regulation theory.10 
Embarking on a discussion of such a theoretical perspective is a task which clearly 
exceeds the aims and goals of this research. However, in order to provide a theoretical 
context for the ideas I am discussing, a few concepts must be briefly presented here.  
 
Regulation theory emerges from Marxism, especially taking off from Althusser’s 
work. Seminal work of this theoretical perspective was presented by Aglietta, Boyer 
and Lipietz among others.11 Even though its various exponents give differentiated 
weight to various analytical concerns, as the different schools can be distinguished, 
they appear united by a broad common agenda. Regulation theory pays attention to 
“…the changing forms and mechanisms in and through which the expanded 
reproduction of capital as a social relation is secured…” (Jessop, 1990a). Such forms 
and mechanisms include, among others, norms and legal frameworks, modes of 
calculation, strategies and procedures, networks and institutions. The theoretical and 
analytical lenses are rooted in realist ontology and take off from the tradition of 
historical materialism. At the same time, the various regulation schools tend to differ 
on issues such as the historical periodizations they present, the directions in which 
                                                 
10 Jessop’s early 1980s work predates his interest in Regulation Theory. In contrast, his publications 
from the 1990s onward make references to this theoretical perspective. Thanks to Colin Hay for 
pointing out this difference. 
11 In addition to some other titles and journal articles, Aglietta published A Theory of Capitalist 
Regulation: the US Experience, Lipietz wrote The Enchanted World: Inflation, Credit and the World 
Crisis, and Boyer’s publications include The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction. 
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they have orientated their research efforts, their definitions of the object(s) of 
regulation and the conclusions which they deliver (Jessop, 1990a).           
 
Making use of a broad understanding of the economy, not only reduced to relations of 
exchange, but also focusing on relations of production and to a lesser extent 
distribution, exponents of regulation theory have contributed interesting, albeit 
controversial, analytical distinctions, approaches and conclusions.12 For instance, to 
help those scholars proceed with their analyses, they have coined concepts such as 
Fordism and post-Fordism, for which differentiated sorts of labour, modes of 
economic growth, modes of regulation and social organization can be identified 
(Jessop, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and 2002; Storper and Scott, 1992; Hirst and 
Zeitlin, 1992).  
 
On the one hand, Fordism is understood as an accumulation regime based on patterns 
of mass production and mass consumption, not only of consumer goods but also of 
services in a largely autocentric national economy. Fordism is named after Ford, who 
first mass-produced the ‘Model T’, and became, first, the emblematic entrepreneur, 
then the corporate leader of the automotive industry. It is associated with urban and 
industrial wage earning societies which have made use of collective bargaining and a 
Welfare State. Those characteristics have been associated with the immediate post 
World War II era in advanced economies, mainly in Northern Europe, Canada and the 
United States. However, historical specificities aside, the geographical extent of the 
Fordist accumulation regime seems to be confined to advanced Anglo-Saxon 
                                                 
12 Still, the fact that for regulation theory relations of distribution are not emphasized as strongly as are 
the relations of production and exchange, does not diminish the importance of its analytical framework 
and contributions. 
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economies and North Western Europe (Jessop, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and 2002; 
Storper and Scott, 1992; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1992).  
 
In contrast, post-Fordism is an accumulation regime which relies on the development 
of flexibility and innovation in information and communication technology, focusing 
more on what is now labelled the knowledge based economy. In addition to flexible 
machines and systems, the workforce is preferred to be a flexible one as well, 
subordinating social policy to self-induced economic and international constraints. 
Although the name gives no hint, the post-Fordist accumulation regime is supposed to 
be a transitional one, somehow incomplete and not fully valid as a new phase of 
capital accumulation. This is because the link with Fordism is supposed to be far from 
automatic and mechanical, because patterns and elements of continuity and 
discontinuity can be identified (Jessop, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and 2002; Storper 
and Scott, 1992; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1992). Furthermore, it is not clear whether such a 
stage of the also called ‘new economy’ has expanded or connected densely and 
comprehensively enough in every continent to deserve the title of a regime. Clearly, 
those characteristics embrace only a handful of specific sectors in selected economies 
which, as a consequence, suggest a much more limited geographical coverage.  
 
Some of the practices, strategies and links have selectively spread, however. Since the 
1960s, some of the most developed economies, in order to overcome the slowing 
down in productivity, have sent some of their industrial and manufacturing activities 
abroad, mainly to Latin America and South East Asia. The problem is that it has been 
a partial and segmented articulation with technological restrictions. As a result, it has 
not delivered an endogenous virtuous cycle, but has enhanced external dependency 
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and subordination to the leading economies. In addition to the problems of unequal 
income distribution and sustainable practices, the incapacity to widen and develop 
domestic markets endogenously has anxious consequences which cannot be ignored, 
as shown in Chapter Four. Because links with the external markets tend to truncate 
the articulation of the domestic markets, patterns of social exclusion in ‘peripheral 
Fordism’ have become a major problem (Dussel Peters, 1997; Peck and Tickell, 
1994).13  
 
A caveat needs to be introduced at this point. I need to stress that, in this research, I 
am not claiming an association with any specific accumulation regime, either Fordism 
or post-Fordism. Since I have been making an effort to define, situate and trace 
processes of change and processes of commodification, the use of the broad 
categories of regulation theory, such as accumulation regime or regulation regimes, 
do not guide the orientation and emphasis of this research. Nor is it my aim to 
prejudge any issue. By making use of the Strategic Relational Approach I am able not 
only to uncover crucial causal relations of processes of commodification, but I can 
also provide a broader political agenda which enhances the importance of 
strategically situated agents to promote change.    
 
 
THE TRANSITION FROM ONE IDEAL TYPE TO ANOTHER IDEAL TYPE 
 
                                                 
13 The import-prone export-oriented industrialization in Mexico has been put set in motion by an 
authoritarian government. The aim is to promote the inbound industries for the local assembling of 
export goods. However, as already discussed in Chapter Four, such a strategy is far from 
unproblematic. The outwardly oriented industries account for a small share of labour and a big share of 
imports and exports, whilst the domestically oriented firms account for the most significant share of 
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Consistent with the claim that importance needs to be granted to ideas as they inform 
and contribute towards shaping the material sphere, in this section I favour an 
ideational emphasis as I provide an example and discuss a proposition. In order to 
stress the evolutionary extent of social processes, Jessop developed two highly 
stylized ideal types in a remarkable theoretical exercise. One crucial issue to bear in 
mind is that his proposition focuses on types which could be associated, albeit 
imperfectly, with a handful of advanced economies, particularly Anglo-Saxon and 
Northern European ones. He downplayed the consideration of different national 
experiences. Arguing that the main characteristics and dynamics of the State as social 
processes have not been eroded, and that the functions the State performs, although 
modified, have not suffered a general retreat at all, he engaged in stylizing the 
imaginative kinds. Keeping the core elements of the State in place, the changes which 
can be observed correspond to features of the ideal types (Jessop, 2000 and 2002).  
 
There are many contrasting views regarding these issues. Consider, for instance, one 
for which the modification of the external environment and the internal conditions are 
to be channelled by institutions, leading to a ‘process of structuration’ (Cerny, 1990). 
The role of institutions helps the dynamic organizational mix of markets and public 
actors which is oriented towards the consolidation and development of different states 
with analogous but specific structures throughout the world. In so doing, it helps the 
prioritization of economic activities over social and political activities and directs the 
                                                                                                                                            
labour (cf. Dussel Peters, 2000 and 1997; Fajnzylber, 1990). The next chapter discusses key 
characteristics of the Mexican political system and the democratization experience. 
 256
move from a Welfare State to a Residual State via a Competition State (Cerny, 1990, 
1995, 1996a, and 1996b).14  
 
The Competition State is presented as a carrier of the financial and monetary 
imperatives which makes use of institutions for allegedly shaping economic 
production and exchange activities. Clearly, this is not a point of view shared in this 
research, because it assumes that the State is much more than a mere vehicle of 
financial orthodoxy, as argued by Cerny (1993a, 1994). Neither does finance work as 
the ‘infrastructure of the infrastructure’, nor is the State’s main goal the pursuit of 
increased levels and forms of commodification along the lines of private industry. 
Furthermore, the State does not resemble a mere firm for promoting a relatively 
favourable investment climate for transnational capital, and it does not have powers 
of its own which tend to shrink in the face of economic and financial imperatives 
(Cerny, 1990). On the contrary, as should be clear by now, I contend that 
deterministic, functionalistic and structural explanations are at best misleading and at 
worst, inaccurate.      
 
                                                 
14 For Cerny, the Welfare State’s main purpose is to intervene, taking certain activities out of the 
market place by delivering them socially, decommodifying them. In so doing, it fails by overloading its 
functions and capacities. This failure is tackled by the Competition State which withdraws levels of 
protection and takes all economic activities to the market place, while eroding the boundaries between 
the public realm and the private realm which tended to be more sharply defined at the previous stage. 
The commodified and commodifying role which the Competition State plays for its own sake and for 
the promotion of competitiveness between national, industrial and financial activities within the 
relatively open world economy allegedly levels the playing field by strengthening transnational links 
and making network webs of interdependence deeper and denser. In short, the Competition State is 
forced by the imperatives of international competition to prepare the ground for a more radical stage. 
The Residual State is supposed to subordinate its key civic, public and constitutional functions to its 
commodification tasks. Its priorities include sticking to the inherited agenda originally drawn by its 
competitive sibling. Instruments include the lowering of regulatory frameworks, privatization of 
government assets and enterprises and the liberalization of trade and investment flows. The Residual 
State’s functions and associations become increasingly problematic as its authority, legitimacy, 
policymaking capacity and implementation face insidious erosion and weakening (Cerny, 1990, 1995, 
1996a, and 1996b).     
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Returning to the main line of enquiry, Jessop argues that an ideal type of the 
Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS) has been partially eroded and tendentially 
replaced by one of a different kind, namely a Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national 
Regime (SWPR). Let me explain briefly what the profiles of those ideal types are. 
Both highlight the orientation of economic policies and social policies, and more 
precisely the subordination of the latter to the former. At the same time, they stress 
the primacy of the territorial or geographical scale at which they operate, and the 
means used to compensate for market failures.  
 
For the first ideal type, namely the Keynesian Welfare National State, the label 
‘Keynesian’ comes from the delivery of infrastructure to provide the means for the 
mass production and mass consumption of goods and services, while aiming for full 
employment and demand management. This set of economic policies is presented as 
supportive of an expansion of welfare rights, mainly at the national level. In addition, 
the State is faced with the task of compensating for market failures (Jessop, 2000 and 
2002).     
 
For the second ideal type, the SWPR, the label ‘Schumpeterian’ comes from the goal 
of achieving an increasing degree of mainly technical innovation and economic 
competitiveness which would help expand the use and spread of communication and 
information technologies in the so-called knowledge-based economies. Such concerns 
are placed on the demand side of the open economies. In addition, the subordination 
of social to economic policies is stronger in this type, as welfare rights come under 
attack and there is downward pressure on the ‘social wage’, which stresses the 
workfare character of social policy. Moreover, the post-national label is used to 
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denote the rise in importance of some other geographical and spatial scales to the (still 
central) national one. Similarly, the growing importance of networks for the 
compensation for market failures is presented as the emergence of regimes where the 
State operates in ‘meta-governance’ matters (Jessop, 2000 and 2002).   
 
The transition from the ideal typical stylized terms of the Keynesian Welfare National 
State to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime is said to occur, taking 
into consideration capital accumulation and wealth creation through the mediation of 
market and non-market social relations. This incomplete and imperfect transition is 
undertaken while the conditions which reproduce and maintain the fictitious 
commodification of land, money, knowledge and labour are kept in place (Jessop, 
2002).   
 
What is striking is that a mere handful of cases can be associated with the first ideal 
type. Likewise, a very small number can match the features of the second one. 
Needless to say, neither all the features associated with the KWNS, nor all the 
characteristics of the SWPR, could be associated with the social processes of change 
and commodification which occupies us in this piece of work. The Mexican case to 
which I have been referring does not match either highly ideal stylized type. 
Nevertheless, the use which can be made of them is enhanced and improved by 
moving away from the whole set of ideal types and their full-picture presentation, 
towards a sharper and clearer individual and disaggregated picture.  
 
The functionalist rigidity and lack of flexibility which appears at first glance in both 
the KWNS and the SWPR could be dramatically reduced if each of the features of the 
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ideal types were considered as nouns rather than adjectives. That is, I aim to take each 
of the characteristics in turn, without putting them into any straitjacket which would 
reduce the nuances of the subjects and objects under scrutiny. More importantly, the 
lack of choice that the transition from one ideal type to the other seems to convey 
could be overcome by reinvigorating the role played by agency. Such a move allows 
us to eliminate restrictions and rigidities, at the same time that the spectrum of 
available and viable choices for the agencies significantly widens.       
 
 
BEYOND AN IDEAL MATCH 
 
What I do in this section is not only to take into account the material transformations 
of the contexts, but also the ideational factors interwoven in the social, political, and 
economic processes of change within contemporary Mexico. In particular, I select the 
eight ideal type features suggested by Jessop, and look for match and consistency 
with the punctuated evolutionary trend of the Mexican processes. At first glance this 
might seem to be an odd choice, as neither the conception of the Keynesian Welfare 
National State nor the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime, were 
formulated with Mexico in mind.15 On the contrary, the highly stylized characteristics 
of both ideal types stress distinctive aspects to which a very small number of cases, 
largely Anglo-Saxon and Northern European, have made the transition. Although they 
do not describe concrete realities, they provide an undeniably consistent theoretical 
                                                 
15 When discussing the different variants of the Keynesian Welfare National State and some of the 
problems of the North America Free Trade Agreement, there is a very brief reference to Mexico as a 
country affected by the dominance of capital from the United States (Jessop, 2002). Similarly, 
regarding Regulation Theory, the Mexican experience is considered as a peripheral variant of Fordism, 
where its main feature is that some export commodities are locally assembled (Peck and Tickell, 1994).  
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and ideal benchmark against which to assess the very condition of action which is the 
ability to formulate strategies. As such, they could be of great help to further imagine 
and crystallize alternative routes and courses of action which are open to policy-
makers in Mexico. This is because the value of theory and ideal types is, among other 
things, to inform and enrich the debate, not to close it down. As I have argued in 
Chapter Two, ideas have a mixed causal and constitutive impact on material and 
ideational outcomes (Watson, 2000; Hay, 2002c, and 2000b).  
         
First of all, regarding the sets of economic policies and ideas, I cannot catalogue the 
Mexican experience as typically Keynesian. The economic policies and strategies 
which were originally implemented in post-revolutionary Mexico preceded the spread 
of Keynes’ ideas, and much preceded the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).16 Decades later, such national strategies 
and experiences informed the theoretical construction of the latter (Calva, 2000). 
Regarding the former, full employment, the cornerstone of Keynesian policies, was 
never reached. Nor was complete demand management implemented, nor did the 
efforts to deliver infrastructure reach an optimal stage in the economic history of the 
country. However, it is impossible to deny Keynes’ influence and the importance of 
his ideas was felt in government and academic circles, especially during the 1950s 
and 1960s (Babb, 2001). Although there was never a perfect ideal match, the 
stabilizing development strategies and import substitution industrialization, which I 
have referred to in Chapter One, had hints of his thought. For instance, Keynes’ idea 
was relevant that the State has a role to play in guiding the propensity to consume and 
the inducement to invest. Similarly, there was a gradual degree of socialization of 
                                                 
16 Keynes’ work was an influence on ECLAC economists, and government officials alike.    
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investment, where the key issue was not so much concern for ownership of the means 
of production in guiding economic policies as the delivery of proper conditions for 
economic activities, much as Keynes had argued for (1964).17   
 
Nonetheless, there is an important difference which should be considered. Both 
Keynesianism and the development ideas associated with ECLAC advocated a strong 
role for the government in economic affairs. Yet, the approaches differed in their 
suggested strategies. First, the development policies implemented in Latin America 
were not identical to Keynes’ recommendations for aiming at the ‘aggregate volume 
of output corresponding to full employment’ in the industrialized nations. Second, 
Latin American policies opted for a more selective strategy as they focused more on 
the promotion of activity within particular economic sectors. Perhaps more 
importantly, as Keynesianism acknowledged the economic differences between 
developed and developing economies, it provided a theoretical justification for the 
latter to pursue different policies from those of the former (Babb, 2001). 
 
However, a Schumpeterian characterization of Mexico is even more problematic, 
especially when the term is used as a synonym for innovation. I have already devoted 
substantial parts of Chapters Three and Four respectively, to the discussion of 
Schumpeter’s conception of ‘creative destruction’, and the disquieting lack of 
innovation characteristic of Mexico’s manufacturing economic activities. Therefore, I 
am here in a position to say, without further argumentation, that the distinctive set of 
Mexican economic policies does not match the ideal type suggested by Jessop. 
                                                 
17 In his own words “…(i)t is not the ownership of the instruments of production which it is important 
for the State to assume. If the State is able to determine the aggregate amount of resources devoted to 
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Schumpeterian thinking is not unknown, but the contemporary orientation of 
government economic policies has paid little attention to facilitating and promoting 
innovative combinations which would help, or set the foundations for a knowledge 
based economy. Scant attention has been paid to the quality of industrial insertion and 
linkages in Mexico, where there is a concerning lack of cluster connection among 
economic activities (Cimoli, 2000). The weak endogenous links between domestic 
firms and amongst economic sectors need to be reinvigorated in order to revitalize 
and strengthen the domestic market, while gaining a better position abroad (Dussel 
Peters, 1997 and 2000). If the goal of the absorption, development, incorporation and 
innovation of technology is to be achieved, particular sectors and activities need to be 
targeted as beneficiaries of industrial policy programmes (Fajnzylber, 1990).  
 
Regarding social policies, Mexico has never had a Welfare State comparable to those 
of European or Anglo-Saxon countries. Although basic welfare is provided, safety 
nets tend to be unreliable and imperfect, especially for the social sectors which need 
them most. Nevertheless, the concern for delivering protection from the market has 
not been completely absent. What Mexico has had is corporatist practices for the 
political engagement and control of social groups. These delivered initial 
improvements in education, sanitary conditions and standards of living on the whole, 
albeit mainly in urban areas (Reynolds, 1970; Hansen, 1971; Lustig, 1998). As 
suggested in Chapter One, decommodification practices were second to a concern for 
political stability, the attraction of investment and the cushioning of social pressures 
and demands.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
augmenting the instruments and the basic rate of reward to those who own them, it will have 
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Yet, the current emphasis on labour market flexibility and the subordination of social 
policy to economic imperatives in Mexico prioritizes a workfare strategy which, 
sadly, is closer to the Schumpeterian ideal type than the welfare counterpart (Dussel 
Peters, 1997 and 2000; Cimoli, 2000). Again, as the previous chapter focused on the 
commodification processes in Mexico, there is no need for further elaboration. Suffice 
it to recall, for example, that one of the crudest aspects of workfare is to be found in 
manufacturing inbound industries, where, in a big proportion of cases, workers’ low 
qualifications and low skills, along with additional incentives, are taken as 
competitive advantages (Gereffi, 1996; Gereffi and Korzeniewics, 1994; Gereffi and 
Wyman, 1990). Needless to say, such a race to the bottom strategy is extremely 
problematic, as it accentuates and reinforces the patterns of inequality already 
discussed.      
 
Even though the relative primacy of the national scale for the delivery of social and 
economic policies and programmes has seen modifications in Mexico, this is not the 
same thing as saying that it has been overtaken by the importance of other levels. 
Clearly, throughout the years there have been changes, and the emergence of local, 
regional, international and transnational agendas must not be ignored. Nevertheless, 
the primacy of the national scale is undoubtedly fundamental for core issues. As 
regards the nation, variations, debates and changes through history have contributed 
to its contested and continuous metamorphic nature. Nearly two centuries of turbulent 
independent history and a tendency toward ‘imposed unity’, on the one hand, and the 
challenge of traditional ideas and patterns to the nation and its interests, on the other, 
continue to influence the perceptions among Mexicans of their nation (Morris, 1999). 
                                                                                                                                            
accomplished all that is necessary…” (Keynes, 1964, 378). 
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Nationalism has not only followed sentiments and attachments which tend to be 
identified with a national identity, but also the role played by ideas, discourses and 
ideologies in the definition of national interests cannot easily be separated from 
courses of action, policies and strategies of a nationalist tone (Krauze, 1997a and 
1997b). The interrelationships among identity, interests and policies feature social 
embeddedness and determinants which dialectically affect and are affected by 
dynamics of change, via the promotion of changes in identity, interests and policies 
(Morris, 1999).    
 
Something similar happens with the role of the State. Within ever-changing 
strategically selective contexts, the Mexican State has been, and will continue to be, a 
central actor, albeit one who does not always act consistently. Public and private 
participation in a variety of different regimes does not necessarily mean the 
irreversible erosion of the State, because they are not zero-sum games. Moreover, as I 
have argued in Chapter Two, following Stiglitz, both market and government are 
failure prone, as information asymmetries and imperfections, inefficiencies and 
disruptions affect them both (1989, 1991, 1998b). Self-organization is not failure free 
either, and therefore provides no guarantee for any sort of compensation. Considered 
in this light, and as more a complementary option, the importance of regimes for 
addressing market and government failures should not be overstated.  
 
As can be seen, Mexico does not fit the aggregate stylized types, and does not even 
match most of the individual features suggested for the Keynesian Welfare National 
State or for the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime. Still, this should not 
deter us from making use of the Strategic Relational Approach. Nor that this should 
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be considered as a weakness of this approach, for it is not. This is an approach which 
is capable of suggesting ideal typologies, but which also allows us to explore causal 
relations in a variety of processes, such as the commodification which I have been 
paying attention to. Others, such as political autonomy and democratization, could be 
considered as well. For the Strategic Relational Approach is a powerful tool and 
properly equipped for process-tracing. It could be used either to trace the process 
from one ideal type to another, or for the investigation of specific historical moments 
and trajectories, as I attempt here.18 As I am concerned to enrich my theoretical and 
empirical analysis, I must give further attention to the strategies, mechanisms and 
factors which play a role in shaping the social processes of change. This is precisely 
what I do in the next section. 
 
 
MAKING CHANGE HAPPEN: ‘PARTICIPATION AND OWNERSHIP’  
 
The social processes of change are internally appropriated, and punctuated in its 
evolutionary trends and countertrends, as has been discussed in Chapter Two. By 
making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, I have been trying to emphasize the 
dynamics and processes of change over time. In so doing, I have also been making 
references to the Mexican experience in my attempt to trace and chart the interactions 
of causal relations. Without making any claim of law-like regularity, I have been 
aware of the complex, open and unpredictable dynamics and outcomes of multiple 
                                                 
18 Hay, in Re-Stating Social and Political Change, traces the evolution of the British State, citizenship, 
crisis and Thatcherism (1996). Furthermore, Jessop himself has also pursued similar tasks in various 
publications. Globalization has been subjected to critical scrutiny as well (i.e. Hay, 2000a, 2000b, 
2000c, 2001, 2002b, 2002c and 2003c; Hay and Marsh, 2000; Watson, 2000 and 2003b; Watson and 
Hay, 2003). 
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factors. The dynamic and never static character of actors and the situations and 
conditions which surround them constitute a necessary reference for the formulation 
of strategies in context. As the deployment and putting into practice of those 
continuous strategic calculations reflect enhanced knowledge of the changing 
environment, it comes as no surprise that change often cumulates incrementally. 
Thus, the patterns of punctuated evolution are not alien at all to the social processes of 
change which I am inquiring into (Hay, 2002c).     
 
The internal appropriation of the open and complex system and interplay of situated 
agents in strategically selective contexts is dialectically influenced while it influences 
numerous factors, at the same time absorbing and re-shaping endogenously the social, 
political and economic processes. Since all change in social systems is inextricably 
related to agency, the interactions pursued by actors in networks of links of different 
sorts are of remarkable importance. However, these links are not equally important, 
nor do they reach all the other parts of the open and complex systems in the same 
way. There are clearly variations in the quality, strength and reach of the links 
between different actors and within the various networks woven by them (Dark, 
1998). 
 
The processes of change are articulated by means of altered relationships and patterns 
of interaction, where specific historical and geographical contexts cannot be stripped 
of the actors situated within them. By cumulatively building the processes, with their 
dialectical tendencies and countertendencies, the windows of opportunity and periods 
of restraint deliver wanted and unwanted outcomes. The articulation of the processes, 
however, is not only due to the medium-term persistence of the structure, but also to 
 267
the complexity and systemic contingency which is triggered by the actor’s 
intentionality (Dark, 1998). Thus, it is the internal appropriation and the generation of 
endogenous and favourable conditions which make agencies own the changes, 
thereby acting according to them and socially constructing new patterns of 
interaction.  
 
Stiglitz has argued that ‘participation and ownership’ are crucial for catalyzing 
‘society-wide’ change as it aims towards the core objective of development. Since for 
him the latter entails the ‘transformation of society’, where effective change cannot be 
imposed from outside, active participation in the processes increases the degree of 
ownership of the actors. If this is to happen, the motivated and participative agencies 
which become involved and make changes their own complement the role of 
institutions and incentives towards the transformation of society (1998c). In so doing, 
and by virtue of their ‘participation and ownership’, the endogenous social dynamics 
of change depend on the crucial role of agencies to bring indeterminacy and 
uncertainty into the processes. 
 
Acknowledging that institutions might be a necessary, but never a sufficient, 
condition for change, as institutions are also objects of change themselves, it is 
important to be aware that the probability of collapse might also arise. As the 
complexity of the systems and processes rises, so does the likelihood of change, for 
which efficient information processing and exchange is vital in order to respond to the 
challenges posed by a feasible catastrophe (Dark, 1998).19 However, problems of 
                                                 
19 Dark argues that the maximum point of growth in an open and complex system is quite close and 
immediately prior to the point of catastrophe. Although his theoretical claim is oriented towards long-
term change, its validity provides insight into shorter and medium-term processes as well. Furthermore, 
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asymmetry and incomplete information tend to be more the rule than the exception, as 
I have already discussed (Akerlof, 1970; Spence 1973; and Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976). Incomplete and asymmetric information is quite common for both public and 
private actors, and has direct consequences on the courses of action which they 
choose to take. Hence, this poses a significant challenge for, as risks increase, 
opportunities for innovation also increase, which potentially can transform and 
produce new systems and feed new trends and countertrends.  
 
Acting in a dialectical fashion, the tendencies and countertendencies may make some 
trends and countertrends emerge as others decline. As the succession of processes are 
historically situated chains of events which follow contingent sequences, the 
dominance of some options or courses of action may be explained in the way in which 
they are socialized and internally appropriated. Clearly, one of the main and basic 
strategies is the formation and consolidation of both formal and informal networks. 
They may vary in the degree of specialization, specific characteristics and the aims 
which they pursue. Nevertheless, the allegedly horizontal negotiated consent which 
they tend to put into practice, along with the flexibility which allows them to adapt to 
different scales, makes networks an ideal mechanism of dialogue and spread or 
socialization of the objectives which they are oriented to reach. It is, therefore, 
necessary that we have a look at the importance of networking in the following 
section.     
 
 
CREATING AND OPENING CHOICES BY NETWORKING 
                                                                                                                                            
he characterizes long-term changes as contingent and contextual, but trans-historical and cross-cultural 
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The uncertainty and unpredictability exercised when actors communicate, exchange, 
or engage in any other form of contact, can never be exactly reproduced over time. 
Nor can the strategically selective contexts. Therefore, it is impossible to entirely 
reproduce the social, political and economic phenomena. Even though some similar 
patterns may be identified, there is neither any agent nor any structure which can 
guarantee or determine the course of events in its entirety. Both are capable of 
transforming each other, as they are not static and each has the capacity to make space 
for creating change. However, as I have already argued in Chapter Two, it is the 
power immanent in all social relations which makes agencies capable of influencing, 
promoting and achieving changes. One of the strategies for socially spreading the new 
patterns of interaction, or of disclosing and popularizing preferred courses of action, 
is by developing networks. Furthermore, by networking, either formally or 
informally, on a broad range of issues, the relational character of the interaction helps 
the dynamics to become an endogenous part of the actors, contributing in this way 
towards the internal appropriation of change. Hence, networking provides the means 
for flexible and inter-organizational responses to changing circumstances. Moreover, 
networking entails the formulation and implementation of strategies in action. The 
courses of action, in turn, yield direct effects and strategic learning to the actors, who 
need to deal and adapt themselves to the intended and unintended consequences (Hay, 
1998b).       
 
Networks of many different sorts are historically recurrent and familiar organizational 
strategies throughout the world, which reach different degrees of complexity in 
                                                                                                                                            
within series or cycles of roughly four hundred years (Dark, 1998).   
 270
different societies, cultures and institutions. Due to their flexibility and practicality 
and the recognition of agendas which are of mutual or complementary importance to 
their members, the networks operate as modes for coordinating collective action (Hay, 
1998b; Hay and Richards, 2000). Easy horizontal implementation is to the network’s 
advantage, as it allows its participants to formulate and operationalize strategies 
which deliver not only the immediate direct effects for which the network was 
originally created, but also strategic learning. Furthermore, as some issues or 
objectives may be of greater interest or of more crucial importance, the formation of 
strategic alliances can be used to push the common agenda forward, and this may 
work to the benefit of its constituent parts. It is precisely this relational character and 
the simplicity of forming, evolving, transforming, and terminating networks which 
gives them their flexibility to changing states of affairs. Hence, common strategic 
agendas for an incredible variety of issues can be established by networking (Hay, 
1998b; Hay and Richards, 2000).   
 
Even though some networks may have broad goals and objectives, networks can also 
operate under specific and clearly defined objectives and strategies. I need to make it 
clear that I am not interested in networks themselves, but rather in the possibilities of 
creation and transformation which networking brings to situated actors.20 The 
motivation, intentions, recognition and identification of core issues are crucial 
preliminary steps in the formation of a network and, more importantly, in the 
instrumentation of networking practices and actions. Plausible as it may seem at first 
                                                 
20 Networking flexibility makes it ideal for effective responses and adaptation to changing social, 
political and economic contexts. Since networks are never static and invariant structures, they aim to 
facilitate social interaction, and in so doing they are not exempt from being used as aids for the 
relational character of power, where vertical imposition is ruled out. This will be no surprise, as neither 
networks, nor networking practices, follow hierarchies (Marsh, 1998).  
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glance, networks are not the same as structures and should not be conflated with 
them. For, once the recruited members have moved into action, networkers resemble 
more collective actors than self-interested individuals. Yet the common agenda which 
motivates collective action does not limit or constrain the evolution and 
transformation of the original objectives, as is to be illustrated in the following 
chapter. Networking practices by the member parts tend to dictate a realignment and 
if necessary, partial modifications, exhaustion, failure or even termination. These 
processes take into account both the intended and unintended effects of networking, 
and the strategic learning which results from the practices and action of networking. 
Similar to the simple way that a network can be created, it can also be terminated. 
Once the goals have been reached, transformed, or unfulfilled, networking loses 
momentum and the network is either changed or terminated. When there is a lack of 
common issues networks become unviable and networking impossible, because it is 
the identification and agreement of a common strategic agenda which is necessary for 
unleashing networking operations and practices (Hay, 1998b; Hay and Richards 
2000).  
 
A contrasting view is provided by Castells, who argues that networks privilege the 
power of flows over the flows of power. As he considers that networks have become 
the emblematic social structure of the contemporary age commanded by information 
and communication technologies, he tends to conflate them with social structures 
(2000a and 2000b). According to his account, networks do not present a flexible and 
adaptive character as they tend to be ‘programmed’ and can turn off any ‘non-
compatible node’. Furthermore, the experience of being part of a network is allegedly 
more important than what it can deliver to its members. Sadly, he includes no 
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recognition of the importance of networking as a vehicle for the promotion of change. 
The identification of networks with structures leads him to portray an orientation of 
the ‘network society’ whose main reference is cultural, which hardly refers to, or 
makes contact with the material and natural bases of existence (Castells, 2000b). The 
problem is that such a stage cannot be generalized to any great extent, however 
influential the networks are, beyond small and localized groups in developed and 
developing countries alike. This depiction nevertheless, is not shared by the biggest 
share of the population of the world, who, make daily use of numerous sorts of 
networks on a regular basis, whether they have a state of the art technological 
character or more traditional forms of interaction.    
 
Regarding one of the important objections against networks, it has been argued that 
they deal poorly with issues of limited inclusion and exclusion. It is true that the reach 
of possibilities for transformation through networking cannot be spread beyond 
certain limits. Clearly, some benefits cannot be directly reached by those agents who 
are not included or take no direct part in networking practices. Still, at this point it is 
important to stress that I am proposing the alternative of networking merely as a 
complement to market failures and government failures. I do not claim that the latter 
should be replaced by the former. In fact, networking can complement other forms of 
governance such as markets and hierarchies, and in so doing the problem of network 
exclusion can be addressed. I contend that over-reliance on one form of governance 
alone is problematic. However, getting the balance right among governance 
mechanisms is not easy either, and varies significantly depending on the particular 
circumstances in which the situated agents in context find themselves.    
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Nevertheless, one of the main arguments in this thesis is the immanence of power in 
all social interactions, which helps the situated agents in context to influence the 
conditions that surround them. Networking can be considered a vehicle of 
transformation, since it can be used as a flexible option for spreading and reaching, 
albeit with varied impacts, the shared agenda which originally triggered the formation 
and practices of the network itself. Even though the agenda may have suffered 
alterations affecting not only its membership, but also the strategically selected 
courses of action to take, this could be considered as evidence of the power 
interactions between agents. Its orientation and strength may vary, but the exercise of 
power by situated actors delivers changes, as I have stressed in Chapter Two. With 
this in mind, and before sketching an agenda for contemporary Mexico in the light of 
the processes of commodification it has undergone. I use Chapter Six to discuss some 
features of the political system in the country as well as the salient political processes 
of increasing political autonomy and democratization.        
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The capacity of the Strategic Relational Approach to identify and trace causal 
relations proves useful in exploring the deeply political character of the social 
processes of change. Since the approach is able to acknowledge the relations between 
material and ideational elements, on the one hand, and those between the structural 
and agential elements on the other, it provides plenty of room to scrutinize the 
tendencies and countertendencies which build the processes up. Bearing in mind the 
centrality of actors in influencing the conditions which surround them, it comes as no 
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surprise that crises can be studied for more than the destruction they leave behind, as 
they can display a reorientation of strategies and the setting of goals, and can 
therefore, create new opportunities for transformation.    
 
Taking this into account, the State as a polycontextual and polyvalent phenomenon 
cannot be disengaged from the socially embedded context in which it is situated. 
Since it is concerned with maintaining and reproducing the conditions for capital 
accumulation and wealth creation, it cannot ignore a concern with legitimation 
imperatives. Thus, it keeps a central place and plays a crucial role which no other 
actor can assume. Failure prone, as are markets as well, due to asymmetric 
information and inefficiencies, the State can still remedy distributional shortcomings 
and can be helped by increasing incentives for efficiency. The fact that institutions 
tend to persist without becoming permanent reflects the State’s dynamic and fluid 
shape and appearance, which responds and is responsible to changing environments 
and conditions. Nonetheless, the socially embedded political and relational character 
of the State processes as they continuously renew and reconfigure themselves, 
originates in relational power interactions amongst situated agents in context, rather 
than being merely an aspect of the power of the State. Therefore, the State cannot 
erode its power, for it is not its own.  
 
Jessop’s suggestion of highly stylized ideal types of the transition from a Keynesian 
Welfare National State to a Schumpeterian Workfare Post-national Regime is rooted 
in Regulation Theory. The types focus on the subordination of social policies to 
economic policies, the geographical or territorial scale of operation and the means 
used to compensate for market failures. According to his account, for these moves to 
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occur, the restructuring trends of the State will include the denationalization of the 
State, the destatization of politics and the internationalization of policy regimes. They 
are matched by countertrends, such as enhanced room in the articulation of the 
primacy of scales in addition to the national, the augmented role of the State in ‘meta-
governance’ and the contestation of forms and implementation of international 
regimes.  
 
What I contend, beyond the features of those ideal types, and the imperfect match 
with the Mexican case, is that the strength of the theoretical utility of the Strategic 
Relational Approach opens up research avenues for process-tracing. Such processes 
emphasize political economy issues, such as commodification experiences, or socio-
political issues, such as political autonomy and democratization, and cannot be 
decontextualised from their spatio-temporal placing.  
 
Furthermore, the Strategic Relational Approach enables us to explore the never-static 
dynamics which become endogenously incorporated and internally appropriated, 
making change not only possible but also feasible. Since institutions are a necessary, 
but never sufficient condition for social change, the uncertainty, uneasiness and 
unpredictability which actors’ interactions bring into the processes clearly affect the 
final outcomes in punctuated evolutionary fashion. I have preferred diachronic 
analysis which emphasizes the process of change over time and is different from 
comparative statics, in which the comparison takes the form of contrasting snapshots 
from ‘frozen objects’ conducted at different times. In this respect, Cerny’s and 
Jessop’s accounts of change more closely resemble comparative statics than 
diachronic analysis.  
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Nonetheless, making use of the theoretical tools of this approach, I have been able to 
identify that one of the main strategies for the appropriation and spread of change is 
networking. This is not a small issue, for it is capable of creating and opening choices 
for the situated agents who take part in the networks. For networking to succeed, it is 
necessary for there to be a common strategic agenda which may guide the interaction 
of the members and serve as a guiding reference for evaluating progress, realignment, 
failure or success. Networking does not mean limited contact among specific groups. 
On the contrary, networking can be developed within networks and across groups of 
different kinds, presenting alternatives courses of action and expanding the windows 
of opportunity for those involved. Its character may be economic, bureaucratic, 
industrial, electoral, and so on, depending on the core issues agreed and identified in 
the strategic agenda by the agencies.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
Social Change in Mexico: Enhancing the Agenda of Reform 
 
 
PROLOGUE 
 
As was shown in Chapter Four, the implementation of the new economic agenda in 
Mexico has been prioritized over conditions of equity and democracy. For instance, 
democratization and the setting of checks and balances to presidential discretion was, 
and has always been, relegated to a secondary place behind perceived or self-induced 
market imperatives, such as reducing public deficits and lowering inflation rates. 
Judicial reform ranked a distant third. The first of the three agendas, namely the 
economic restructuring, has been associated with the market axis of analysis 
presented in Chapter One, whereas the second and third agendas, which are 
democratization and political autonomy, have been associated with the power axis of 
the analytical map also in that chapter. Thus, the analytical distinction allows us to 
understand the significance of the schedule of the reforms as they were put into 
practice.1 
 
                                                 
1 In the mid and late 1980s there was a more or less widespread perception that one crucial difficulty 
for the restructuring of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR, as attempted by 
Gorbachev, was that the transparency policy, namely glasnost, and the transformation policy, 
perestroika, were together put into practice at the same time. It has been argued that the synchronized 
and parallel implementation did not allow for the economic changes to take place and consolidate, as 
they were immediately politically challenged and undermined. The lesson to be learnt, according to 
some officials and analysts, was that the reforms should have been attempted in sequence; granting the 
economic restructuring priority over the political openness (Centeno, 1994). Thus, democracy would 
have been sacrificed in the name of social, political and economic stability. 
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Regarding the Mexican experience on the economic front, the two most important 
economic crises suffered by the country during the last decades have been very 
different in nature, origin and impact. The 1982 crisis had macroeconomic fiscal 
mismanagement at its root; whereas a dozen years later, although the fiscal deficits 
were under control, financial mismanagement brought harsh consequences. We do not 
need to examine this here, as the mid 1990s crisis is to be examined in Chapter Eight. 
Moreover, both crises had international causes and impacts, but the structural 
economic adjustments were mainly absorbed domestically.  
 
The aftermath of the early 1980s crisis has been characterized as the lost decade of 
economic growth in Latin America, and Mexico was by no means an exception. Years 
of low economic growth and constrained domestic markets, among other factors, 
contributed to further lower the standard of living of large shares of the population 
(Dussel Peters, 1997 and 2000; Székely, 1998). Following the crisis of the mid 1990s, 
the recovery was not as long and painful as it had been in the 1980s, partially due to a 
more favourable international context. Judged by the respective amounts of their 
economic rescue packages, the 1995 crisis was more than ten times greater in nominal 
value (Lustig, 1997a and 1998; Adams, 1997).2 Both reform packages made use of 
extraordinary resources and were not exempt from controversy, since the means to 
make use of them and the guarantees provided were unconventional, to say the least. 
Whereas this chapter discusses the 1982 crisis, Chapter Eight deals with the 1994-
1995 crisis. 
                                                 
2 Still, if a comparison between the mid 1990s financial crisis bailout and the debt crisis rescue 
package of the 1980s is to be made, the constant value amount of the former was roughly seven times 
greater than the latter. 
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The financial crisis which unfolded in 1994 was tackled with a concern to avoid de-
railing the orthodox economic agenda, making sure that the structural adjustment 
under way would not be abandoned, as it was a perceived condition of external 
support. In contrast, the 1982 fiscal and debt crisis was used as an opportunity to 
modify the political and economic agenda of the administration entering office in the 
same year. It represented a moment of decisive intervention to change the trajectory 
and the role which the Mexican State was playing at the time as a direct actor in 
economic activities. For example, this was manifested in the divestiture of 
government owned enterprises, which grew disproportionately during the 1970s 
(Rogozinski, 1998). The fact that the new agenda could be implemented owed much, 
among other factors, to the vertical character of the political system. This allowed a 
technocratic elite to pursue the economic transformation first, thereby postponing the 
political transformation. In short, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be affirmed that 
the importance of the early 1980s’ reform lay in the fact that a historical transition 
moved the orientation of the Mexican economy away from decommodified economic 
activities to a stronger emphasis on market orientation. This made commodification 
via processes of deregulation, liberalization and privatization the main governmental 
concerns. Hence, the government seized the opportunities presented by the crisis. It 
has been suggested that these tendencies may be traced in the upper right quadrant of 
the theoretical map of the first chapter. 
 
It is important to note that detaching actions from the values and ideas which 
accompany them de-contextualizes the conditions under which those courses of action 
are undertaken. By using the Strategic Relational Approach one can remain aware of 
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the orientation of the phenomena and processes under scrutiny. In other words, 
present behaviour is controlled by the subjectively assessed meaning and desirability 
of an anticipated future. Yet, the fulfilment of specific goals is not solely driven by 
their objective likelihood (Whitehead, 2002). Situated agents in context play the 
driving role, without determining the process. Thus, the normative, transformative 
and persuasive components of the processes of democratization cannot be omitted 
from the analysis, as is often the case. Long-term open-ended processes of 
commodification and democratization, where unforeseen circumstances and 
unintended side effects are analyzed, preclude teleological explanations. I am not 
claiming inevitable patterns of convergence, advocating the end of history, or aligning 
myself with utopian closures. On the contrary, rather than pursuing functionalist and 
deterministic views, I present and highlight what I perceive as the main patterns and 
orientations. Needless to say, the processes of social change hardly follow law-like 
regularities, nor do they deliver identical outcomes, as they are charged with 
contingency and unintended consequences.      
 
The argument presented in this chapter and sustained by the Strategic Relational 
Approach, by emphasizing features of both structure and agency, and the material and 
ideational dimensions within specific time and space locations, is divided into eight 
different sections. Firstly, the analysis opens with a theoretical discussion about 
democracy, the meaning of a democratic transition and its consolidation. Sui generis, 
some key characteristics of Mexico’s political system and government are also 
presented, such as the central role of presidentialism and the former ruling hegemonic 
party. Grasping those factors is of the utmost importance, as it allows us to gain 
insight into what the contemporary democratization process means, for it has often 
 281
fallen victim to an authoritarian concern for stability in that country. It is contended 
that the meaning of democracy is not restricted by any means to the exercise of free 
and competitive elections (Levy and Bruhn, 2001). Important as they truly are, they 
are just a mean, albeit one which cannot guarantee totally, of reaching more 
egalitarian outcomes. In order to provide an adequate contextualization of the 
strategically selective, but never determining, contexts within which democratization 
processes take place, I explore the early 1980s’ economic crisis as a crucial moment 
for intervention. Taking it as a milestone, this was the period from which the Mexican 
economic restructuring experience took off. Within this context the political reforms 
have been implemented at a very slow pace, especially if compared with the rush and 
sense of urgency associated with the economic agenda. Taking into account all these 
elements, I stress the importance of networking not only for increasing the degree of 
political autonomy of the situated agents in context, but also for strengthening 
democratic practices. Finally, after analyzing an agenda of transformation suggested 
by the World Bank, I sketch the participatory relevance of networking for enhancing 
the relevance of a more inclusive, democratic and equitable common strategic agenda.       
 
 
DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES: AN ENTERPRISE WORTH EMBRACING  
 
González Casanova lucidly stated in the early 1970s that the meaning of Democracy 
in Mexico is not narrowly defined to electoral issues. Rather, such a form of 
government implies quite strong shared meanings which go beyond the polls, to the 
extent that people share culture, income, and power. He also saw a relationship 
between the shares as a prerequisite for development, which not only entails 
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economic growth but also the redistribution of the national product and which in the 
end represents a transformation of society (González Casanova, 1970). Thus, equity 
and liberty are perceived as key components of democracy. It does not come as a 
surprise that for Mexican people the exercise of freely voting in elections, in addition 
to decisive steps towards economic well-being and respect for the rule of law, is 
considered as a means to achieve a political model which can ameliorate historical 
levels of inequality (Camp, 2003).    
 
Even though such statements were made several decades ago, the broad challenge of 
democratization still stands. The Mexican authoritarian regime ruled by strong 
presidents, elected from a hegemonic party, suffered nominal discontinuity in 2000 
(Camp, 2003; Levy and Bruhn, 2001). However, in narrow electoral terms, the 
transition to democracy in Mexico, important as it undoubtedly is, represents no 
culmination of the broader process of democratization. On the contrary, the fact that 
the first half of the Mexican revolution motto of ‘effective suffrage, no reelection’ 
was shamelessly ignored, while the second one was revered, delivered quite a sui-
generis political locus in the country. There is no doubt that such a scenario must be 
transcended if the aim is to move from the rule of legality to the rule of law and to 
achieve a more democratic and egalitarian society.        
 
In Sartori’s words “(w)hat democracy is cannot be separated from what democracy 
should be. A democracy exists only insofar as its ideals and values bring it into 
being…” and sustain it (cited in Whitehead, 2002, 20).3 Clearly, this is another neat 
                                                 
3 Quoted in Whitehead’s Democracy. Theory and Experience as a ‘deontological concept’ where 
democracy can and should be integral to the meaning of the term. Giovanni Sartori’s influential 
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example of the impact of ideas as causal and constitutive of material outcomes, which 
the Strategic Relational Approach is properly equipped to identify and handle. 
Furthermore, it is evident that there is a normative element in the literature on 
democracy. This normative position in turn, goes beyond necessary but insufficient 
procedures of public decision-making and accountability undertaken by citizens to 
elect and hold representatives accountable, and the operative principles under which 
regimes function. Thus, it cannot leave aside the ideas and values which are the non-
material elements of democracy (Whitehead, 2002). Both academic literature and 
political discourse have praised it for promoting values of relativism and tolerance. 
Hence, democracy rests on the faith in society that making use of good judgement for 
pacifically electing representatives is second to no other form of government. 4  
 
Moreover, because the State is the basic precondition for citizenship, which in turn is 
needed for democracy, it has been asserted that the centrality of the role of the State 
remains unchallenged because no other agency is in a position to grant citizens’ rights 
and enforce their obligations.5 Since democracy in the real world cannot be detached 
either from the State or from its experiences, their contextual variability, fluidity and 
contestability makes efforts to pursue democracy part of the dynamic open-ended 
processes. Nonetheless, the literature on transitions to democracy and democratization 
                                                                                                                                            
account of democracy was presented in his book Democratic Theory, and later further expanded in his 
Theory of Democracy Revisited.   
4 Normative commitments are far more common that is usually acknowledged; the preference for ‘self-
adjusting’ and ‘self-regulating’ markets being another example. The system of ideas, values and beliefs 
by which the spread of the market economy is presented is normative, although it is seldom explicitly 
acknowledged as such. A leading economist succinctly put it this way: “I believe in trade and openness 
in processes: they contribute to a more open, democratic society. For me, these are values in their own 
right” (Stiglitz, 1998c, 92).   
5 State and nation must not be conflated. The nation, for instance, relies mainly on the resources of 
collective psychological identification of the people who are part of it. However, the nation’s lack of 
autonomy, agents and rules fall short of the State’s organizational characteristics, though the former’s 
nationals might or might not be identical to the State’s citizens, as the State and the nation are clearly 
linked and could historically overlap (Linz and Stepan, 1996).   
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has paid more attention to a restricted concept which revolves around issues such as 
electoral competition, political participation and civil and political liberties (Diamond, 
Linz, and Lipset, 1990).6 Those issues might also include the celebration of 
undemocratic pacts, and the mobilizations of a resurrected civil society, but perhaps 
more importantly, they include the convocation and holding of competitive elections 
as key ways in which to pacifically exit an authoritarian regime (O’Donnell, 
Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). In this regard, a transition to democracy is 
considered complete when the winner of free and competitive elections holds office in 
government. For, it holds open contestation above the right to win control of the 
government; which represents only a step towards a consolidated democracy (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996).7 
 
In the process by which such a stage is reached, namely a consolidated democracy, 
the crucial importance of agency has been acknowledged (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and 
Whitehead, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996). There is hardly any doubt that domestic 
factors and actors play vital roles in democratically oriented tasks. Yet, this is not the 
same thing as saying that they are isolated from external influences (Whitehead, 
                                                 
6 Factors which are considered to play a role in the transition to democracy and democratic 
consolidation include the legitimacy and performance of the government holding office, the political 
leadership of some key actors, the country’s political culture, the social structure and the levels of 
socioeconomic development, the strength of associational life, the roles of the State and the society, the 
adequacy of political institutions, the existence of ethnic and regional conflict, the involvement of 
military men and factors present in the international arena (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, 1990). Even 
though these factors are considered to contribute towards democratic stability, in the case of Mexico 
Levy described a pattern of contingent convergence, as they became part of a complex system of stable 
civilian rule without democracy (1990).  
7 According to Linz and Stepan the conditions which can facilitate the consolidation of democracy 
include the development of a free and lively civil society to associate and communicate; the existence 
of a relatively autonomous political society capable of taking part in free and inclusive electoral 
contestation; the pre-eminence of the rule of law to ensure guarantees of civil liberties; the State’s 
apparatus to operate bureaucratic norms usable by democratic leaders; and the so-called ‘economic 
society’ capable of participating in institutionalized markets (1996). 
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1996).8 Situated in context as the agents who take part in the processes clearly are, the 
efforts associated with democratization must be understood as a mainly open-ended 
endogenous process. More precisely, as democratization favours abiding by the rule 
of law, reaching agreements and promoting a more inclusive participation in political 
affairs, the dynamics of the trends and counter-trends in question tend to be 
characterized as a complex, long term contingent process of social construction not 
exempt from internal tensions (Whitehead, 2002).     
 
Regarding the Mexican experience, the increased levels of political autonomy which 
agencies develop, both individually and collectively, contribute towards continuously 
reshaping the conditions surrounding them. For such dialectical interaction, the 
movement and orientation towards an outcome which is neither fully stable, nor 
entirely predetermined in its sequences, nor in its time-frame, delivers uncertainty, 
unpredictability and uneasiness to the actors involved. Nonetheless, the transition 
process from authoritarianism to democracy and the democratic consolidation in 
Mexico are subjected to reinterpretation and revision by the society in question.9 It is 
                                                                                                                                            
In addition to a democratic regime and the authoritarian regime which concerns us in this thesis, it has 
been suggested that some other regime types include totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism and sultanism 
(Linz and Stepan, 1996).   
8 On top of international aspects of democratization such as contagion, control and consent, a relatively 
new element now present in the international context is the existence of conditionality from 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World 
Trade Organization. There is no doubt that they have acquired additional responsibilities which exceed 
their original mandates. As clauses and recommendations touch upon areas of policy-making, 
depending on the specificities of the case, their influence may not determine a democratic outcome, but 
they are still a factor that must on no account be ignored nowadays (Whitehead, 1996 and 2002).  
Moreover, the European Union holds democratic clauses in its membership eligibility criteria for the 
countries which are considered as candidates to join the EU. In a slightly different context, the 1997 
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between Mexico and the 
European Union included human rights and democracy as one of its 29 cooperation sectors. In trade 
related matters this agreement laid the basis for the Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the 
European Union which entered into force in 2000 (Zabludovsky, 2001).    
9 It has been argued, with the benefit of historical hindsight, that the Mexican revolution could be 
understood as a step forward in modernising the Mexican authoritarian State. It did not destroy the 
authoritarian characteristics of the previous political system, but merely modernized them. The 
Porfiriato, the dictatorship which, from the last quarter of the 19th century up until 1910, was the 
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an open-ended socially constructed project which overlaps with some other trends 
such as the commodification trends that I have discussed in Chapter Four.10   
 
One of the biggest challenges for the transition to democracy and the democratic 
consolidation in Mexico lies in the informal rules which prevent individuals from 
properly sticking to the rule of law. Clearly, legality is never a sufficient condition for 
democratization when the rules can be easily bent, for this prevents the contenders 
from conducting their interactions in accordance with the logic of democratic 
institutions. Though the original partial and selective moves were initiated and 
controlled by the government, it still responded to popular pressure from below. 
Therefore, the process cannot be reduced merely to an affair for the elite (Harvey, 
1993). The next section engages in a closer exploration of the specific characteristics 
which have made Mexico’s government and political system such a distinctive case. 
 
 
KEY FEATURES OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT 
 
                                                                                                                                            
regime against which revolutionaries fought in the very first stage of the conflict, emptied the ballot of 
content and significance. Therefore, the revolutionary cry for ‘effective suffrage, no re-election’ 
echoed deeply and powerfully in Mexico at the time, as it still does nearly a century later. Despite an 
advanced set of rules incorporated into the 1917 Constitution, expedient government actions and social 
inertia ended up adapting authoritarian features of past regimes to a contemporary context, 
institutionalizing them in the former ruling hegemonic party and the presidential powers (Meyer, 
1977).  
10 One of the key international factors which have continuously favoured to the civilian 
authoritarianism in Mexico has been support from other governments, especially the United States 
(Aguayo, 1998). For them, a stable regime has been much more important than their democratic 
credentials, as their wholly mixed record on the support of democracy evidences. Regarding the 
Mexican experience, the non-democratic nature of its political system provides significant historical 
examples in which a so-called concern for geo-strategy and stability has been privileged over 
democratic values. The northern neighbour never made public any policy or strategy towards the 
transition to democracy in Mexico, or towards a democratic consolidation there (Mazza, 2001).   
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Building on the theoretical arguments presented in terms of the Strategic Relational 
Approach in Chapter Five, it can be said that networking has historically been a very 
common social and political practice in Mexico. It has been exercised both through 
formal and informal channels. It has continuously contributed towards directly and 
indirectly re-shaping the social and political landscape there. Yet, the specific 
characteristics of presidentialism and the former ruling hegemonic party have played 
decisive roles and imprinted features of crucial historical importance.  
 
What is without any doubt the most remarkable aspect of the processes of 
democratization and increasing political autonomy is the fact that it has avoided to a 
great extent another major armed confrontation in Mexico, similar to that of the early 
20th century revolution. Yet, it is a fiction that the reshaping of institutions to make 
them more tuned for political competition, democratic practices and federal exercise 
have been undertaken without resorting to the use of force.11 Though far from clean of 
casualties, confrontation has been, however, institutionally channelled. The political 
system did not collapse or break down and nor did the actors and the context remain 
unaltered. All this was accomplished because of the rising importance of political 
parties, the judiciary and the electorate, which have also contributed towards shaping 
                                                 
11 Ignoring protests and overlooking repression have been widely used by the government and 
international counterparts as a tactic, especially during the 1940s and 1950s. For instance, popular and 
union movements in the late 1950s, which were repressed and where hundreds of workers were 
incarcerated, were dismissed as unimportant. Likewise, peasant and guerrilla movements have 
struggled not only against an authoritarian civilian regime but also against oblivion. In a country where 
deep and intense inequalities exist, it comes as no surprise that the number of discontents is not small. 
Yet, social rebellion was suffocated not by attending its demands but by State coercion and discursive 
indifference to violence. Additional historical examples are the late 1960s and early 1970s students’ 
massacres. Guerrilla uprisings and the slaughter of peasants further evidenced the brutal suppression of 
dissidents. Blood-stained electoral frauds were also part of the mechanisms to hand. The very first 
reaction against the Zapatistas in the mid 1990s was repression; negotiations and an uneasy truce 
followed (Aguayo, 1998).     
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the trends towards democratization, activating checks and balances to the executive 
and extending further the degrees of political power and autonomy.    
 
Without attempting to present a historical account of Mexican presidentialism, the 
bureaucracy, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Spanish acronym PRI), there 
is a need to recall briefly what was analytically presented in Chapter One. There it 
was argued that in addition to the commodification tendencies, there have also been 
political trends which can be traced along an analytical ‘x’ axis, as presented in 
Figure 1.2 of the chapter. Making use of the Strategic Relational Approach I 
suggested there that when historical and social processes cut along the political axis, a 
moment of crisis and decisive intervention can be identified on either pole. As I 
associated this with the punctuated evolution of the State in Mexico, I found that 
transformative outcomes such as the 1910 revolution on the negative end, and the 
early 1980s crisis on the positive end, meant the opportunity for new social, political 
and economic trajectories. Thus, for the political scales in the diagram in Chapter 
One, the negative end represents political constraints and the positive end is 
associated with opportunities and tendencies leading to political autonomy; while, for 
the economic scales, the positive one alludes to commodification and the negative one 
concerns decommodification trends.   
 
Regarding the Mexican experience, what happened in the aftermath of the violent 
struggle was that government policies oriented towards socio-political preferences, 
developed political corporatist practices of control, and made initial attempts to 
deliver basic welfare. In contrast, from the early 1980s on, market preferences were 
ranked at the top of the agenda, and the role of the State was justified in utilitarian 
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terms in a relatively stable, albeit contested, fashion. In short, it is my argument that 
patterns of political constraints are to be found on the two left quadrants of the map 
used for tracing the punctuated evolutionary trajectory of the State. In contrast, 
different degrees of political autonomy can be found in the upper right and lower right 
quadrants (see Figure 1.2 and Table 1.1 in Chapter One).    
 
It is important to bear in mind that the concentration of power and primacy of the 
Mexican President, subordinating the legislative and judiciary, on the one hand, and 
the governments of the States, on the other, responds to extremely important historical 
reasons. It is beyond the scope of this work to examine carefully all its phases in 
history. Suffice it to say that after the armed confrontation of several different factions 
in the revolutionary period, there was a need to confront decisively the domestic and 
international constraints. Imposing authority and legitimacy over diplomatic 
decisions, and also over strong men or ‘caudillos’, required unity and strength if 
different sorts of threat were to be faced. By regaining political control this way, the 
Mexican President has historically made use of both formal and informal mechanisms 
which, in turn, have contributed towards shaping the contemporary political arena. It 
is a process in the making, however: one that has evolved through different phases 
and has adapted and transformed itself, making use of all available resources.     
 
Historically, both Mexican presidentialism and the PRI as the former ruling 
hegemonic party have exercised concentrated political power.12 The President has 
been the major and centralized decision-maker in that country, subordinating and 
benefiting from a weak judiciary and Congress ever since the different stages of the 
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Mexican revolution came to an end. The main real formal limit of the power exercised 
by the President has been the length of presidential incumbency, as it is limited to a 
six year term without any re-election possibilities. However, as a crucial situated 
agent in context, the President has continuously influenced and been influenced by 
the changing strategically selective context he finds himself situated in. It is not my 
purpose to engage in a historical discussion here; rather, I concentrate on key 
characteristics of the contemporary period from the milestone of the early 1980s to 
the present day. In particular, I focus on the increasing degree of political autonomy 
granted by the spread of the exercise of relational power, which has made changes 
more noticeable.  
 
Ever since it was created, the PRI has had a symbiotic relationship with the 
government, especially with the President.13 Despite its different incarnations, its 
main goal had always been to provide a national base of political support for the 
government, and to prevent a major political opposition coming into being, by 
incorporating threats and threatening the actors caught in different corporatist webs 
and entangled in bureaucracy (Hansen, 1971; Levy, 1990; Levy and Bruhn, 2001). 
                                                                                                                                            
12 For a theoretical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of presidential and parliamentarian 
systems, and their contrasting conduciveness to democracy, see Linz, 1990.  
13 President Calles founded the National Revolutionary Party (Spanish acronym PNR), in 1929. It was 
a civil institution, crucial for making the transition from a military to a civil constituency in the post-
revolutionary period. Not only did it gather different groups and factions identified with the Mexican 
revolution, but it also delivered some political arbitrage that facilitated the move from the rule of 
‘caudillos’ to the legality of institutions. A few years later, in 1938, President Cárdenas modified the 
structure of the party and changed its name. The Party of the Mexican Revolution (Spanish acronym 
PRM), adopted a sectoral structure to dilute the strength of regional leaders. In addition to the military, 
there were popular, labour and peasant sectors. Perhaps more importantly, the unwritten and informal 
autonomy of the six year presidential term became a watershed in Mexican politics, when President 
Cárdenas expelled former President Calles from the country. The second time that the former 
hegemonic ruling party changed its name was in 1946, when the current label of Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (Spanish acronym PRI), was adopted along with some internal modifications 
(Medina Peña, 1995; Krauze, 1997a; Hansen, 1971).   
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Such a strategy of political engagement and control worked remarkably well for 
several presidential terms.  
 
By engaging and controlling interest groups and channelling their demands through 
quasi-governmental institutions, the PRI served the presidency from 1929 until 2000, 
when it lost the presidential elections for the very first time. Being a key component 
and subject of the political system in Mexico, the role played by the former ruling 
hegemonic party in the process of political liberalization and democratization 
contributed towards shaping the patterns of continuity and change there as well. Still, 
one issue which should not be overlooked is the fact that the PRI also served as an 
arena where negotiations among diverse economic actors and their respective agendas 
took place. The selection of strategies was not randomly chosen, and responded to 
political challenges. Hence, governments’ financial policies were channelled to 
deliver economic benefits to specific groups, networks and constituencies in exchange 
for renewed political support. Threats to the party’s dominance were addressed by 
supporting the interests of those actors on whom the political survival of the former 
ruling hegemonic party depended (Kessler, 1999).14  
 
Corporatism and the former ruling hegemonic party delivered political stability 
mainly by controlling actors and their interests, as they were not represented but 
cooped up. This blurred the separation of powers, as the legislature and judiciary 
                                                 
14 For example, threats from the ‘left’ as social instability and changes in the political contexts during 
the 1970s, were followed by ones from the ‘right’ during the 1980s by the business sector. From the 
late 1980s the challenge for the PRI was to recast its social bases and to regain electoral trust and 
credibility. A few years later, from the mid 1990s on, priorities moved to the bank bailout and the 
assertion of legislative power (Kessler, 1999). In each and every stage, material and economic 
resources were provided to groups which somehow threatened the party’s political dominance. Since 
the former ruling hegemonic party lost the presidency in 2000, and can no longer make open 
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were, in practice, subordinated to the executive; while the federal system was, in 
practice, heavily centralized and the states’ governors similarly depended upon the 
presidency (Casar, 2002). It is under such political subordination and the agenda of 
the dominant party that the judicial and the legislature provided sources of 
legitimation which permitted the dominance of the rule of legality, or a flawed rule of 
law, at least as operative discourse (Domingo, 2000).   
 
Putting the political agenda second after the economic and financial agenda, the 
processes of political liberalization and democratization since the early 1980s have 
moved at a slower pace than the economic reforms. The political reforms have not 
been treated as rigorous self-induced enforcement mechanisms but the economic 
reforms have. However, more gradual and controlled though the processes have 
undeniably been, there have been some key changes which point towards increased 
political autonomy and de-concentration of power. Clearly, the need for independent 
checks and balances to limit the arbitrary exercise of presidential discretionary power 
has turned to the use of formal institutions (Elizondo Mayer-Serra and Nacif 
Hernández, 2002a; Ward and Rodríguez, 1999; Domínguez and Poiré, 1999). 
Insufficient as they have been so far, they still have contributed towards putting in 
motion the dynamics of respecting guarantees and abiding by the rules, however 
imperfect, in more careful and consistent ways. Yet institutional details such as these 
cannot guarantee the success of the policies or the achievement of the goals towards 
which they are oriented. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that sometimes they aim 
to facilitate dynamism, mobility and innovation, does not stop them at other times 
from favouring stagnation, atrophy and the status quo. In short, institutions are never 
                                                                                                                                            
discretionary use of economic and financial resources, the current scenario has brought an end to the 
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neutral and their impact is heavily dependent on the use which situated actors make of 
them within strategically selective contexts.15     
 
It is important to bear in mind that there was a relevant paradox in the Mexican 
political system. The former ruling hegemonic party delivered continuity, though not 
homogeneity, by different means. These included the capacity to access to and 
succeed in power in an institutionalized fashion, while displaying and implementing 
an expansion of the population’s political support (Serrano, 1998; Elizondo Mayer-
Serra and Nacif Hernández 2002b). Not only were these strategies flexible enough to 
tolerate and set limits to a different kind of political participation, but they were also 
strategically selected to encourage the concentration of power which the President 
relied on.  
 
It was precisely this concentration of power that in turn allowed ample room for 
discretion and manoeuvre to the President. Facing neither real opposition, nor an 
effective system of checks and balances, presidential initiatives often led to 
unsustainable and inconsistent policies. Consider, for instance, that since the 1970s 
the push for changes promoted by the executive led to a serious rise in government 
debt and public expenditure, soaring levels of inflation, huge devaluations of the 
currency and the nationalization of the banks. Regarding the political realm, the 
                                                                                                                                            
former period.     
15 Consider for instance that the Constitutional prohibition against re-election has the unintended 
consequence of detaching politicians from their constituencies, exerting incentives for short-term 
planning and weakening the monitoring, transparency and accountability of those holding office. No 
re-election also contributes to cycles of incomplete and unsuccessful projects, as the tendency to abort 
programmes and policies and replace them with ones imprinted with a distinctive seal that breaks with 
or differentiates them from the previous administration are a common and widespread practice (Ward 
and Rodríguez, 1999; Mitchell, 2001). However, one important issue to bear in mind is that the length 
of the terms varies. Presidential, state governors, and Senate terms are six years; while Deputy and 
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Mexican political system has not been exempt from pressures to democratize, to 
provide a level playing field, and to deliver political autonomy for an increasing 
number of actors. A watershed in the transition to more democratic conditions was the 
1968 student movement, demanding the defence of constitutional reform, rooting out 
corruption and encouraging the development of democracy. The brutal massacre at 
Tlatelolco, in Mexico City, would forever symbolize the government’s repression of 
dissidents. A few years later, the desire and efforts to revitalize the student movement 
were shattered with another brutal repression on Corpus Christi Day (Hellman, 1978; 
Aguilar Camín and Meyer, 1993; Aguayo, 1998; among others).16   
 
The authoritarian strategic selectivity, in a path-dependent way, did not allow the 
efforts to democratize Mexico’s political agenda to flourish; they were postponed 
time and again on the name of stability. The economic difficulties of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s were, in turn, narrated and discursively appropriated by the 
government. It is, therefore, imperative that, before engaging in a deeper scrutiny of 
the political autonomy in that country, I give an overview of the 1982 economic 
crisis, as it represents not only a milestone in the contemporary history of Mexico, but 
also a strategically selective context within which the setting of the agenda for 
democracy was systematically delayed. Additionally, I also examine the tangled webs 
of the period woven by technocrats and the finance sector. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
other positions are held for three years. Re-elections on a six-year term would mean twice as much 
time for those in office, the equivalent of four three-year terms in other countries.    
16 The memory of repression is very much alive, as the ‘dos de octubre no se olvida’ Mexico City 
graffiti recall the 1968 October Tlatelolco massacre. The Corpus Christi massacre happened in June 
1971.   
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MOMENTS OF CRISIS AND INTERVENTION: THE ECONOMIC 
RESTRUCTURING  
 
One crucial international factor which needs to be taken into account for the genesis 
of the commodification experience of Mexico’s economic restructuring is the 
changing role of the United States. What used to be one of the principal capital 
exporters and creditors since the end of the Second World War, during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, it found itself unable to sustain its financial and productive superiority 
and became a net importer of capital. The main reason for this qualitative change was 
the need to finance both its trade and fiscal deficits with external credits (Gilpin, 2000 
and 2001). In the second half of the 1970s, the United States started to have a 
negative balance of trade, due to an increasing quantity of imported goods into its 
economy. The second half of the 1980s saw a further increase of imported goods, 
which after a short recovery has spiralled uncontrollably since the early 1990s. The 
urge to consume imported goods has not been matched by the growing number of 
exports, widening the trade deficit every year to levels never reached before. Hence, 
capital investment in the stock markets has served as an important financing source 
for the US trade balance deficit. 
 
The direction of capital flows and the function of the transnational banking system 
was substantially altered as a consequence of financing US trade and fiscal deficits by 
external credits. While rises in interest rates aimed to attract increasing volumes of 
capital inflows, the magnet of US markets and financial instruments delivered a more 
attractive financial profile for capital flows and the transnational banking system, 
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which hardly any other economy, especially in the developing world, could compete 
against (Dussel Peters, 2000).   
 
Within this international context, macroeconomic mismanagement was the root of the 
1982 economic crisis.17 In order to finance expansionary policies, the Mexican 
government during the previous decade had made use of international credit. Since 
the economy at that time depended heavily on oil exports, problems arose when the 
international oil price dropped in the early 1980s, placing Mexico in a position where 
it could no longer sustain its external debt, mainly to banks from the United States 
(Lustig, 1998). The involuntary moratorium on the external debt triggered the 
devaluation of the peso. The aim of this was to generate a balance of trade surplus. As 
an international debt crisis unfolded the government nationalized all banks operating 
in Mexico. Domestically, the exchange rate of the peso soared from 25 per US dollar 
to more than 1500 five years later. Internationally, within a year from 1982, more than 
                                                 
17 For the purposes of this thesis it has been stressed that since the late 1970s, but particularly since the 
early 1980s, a crisis milestone implied a decisive moment of intervention in the processes of social 
change in Mexico. Even though the reorientation of economic priorities has been evident, it is not the 
same thing as to say that a rupture with past models, policies and programmes happened overnight. 
Rather, the new emphasis was based on previous achievements, and some overlapping, as 
countertendencies to a main trend also coexisted. This is clearly evident in the case of the economic 
reforms in Mexico since the early 1980s’ debt crisis. Although the import substitution industrialization 
was criticized and singled out as the core of the economic problems in the country, from an historical 
perspective it was the pillar of Mexico’s modernization process through industrialization (Villarreal, 
1990). At first glance it may appear that in historical terms the inward looking and the outward looking 
economic strategies are opposed to each other; nevertheless, in reality they have played a more 
complementary role than is generally recognized.  
It is important to recall that, helped by the Strategic Relational Approach framework, it was in Chapter 
One that the import substitution industrialization model was identified as more or less parallel to the 
strong presidentialism and corporatism’s political engagement of the period, in the historical trend of 
the processes of structural change in Mexico. The economic strategy could also be considered as part 
of a political and social consensus which had the objective of protecting the domestic industrial 
structure, facilitating a specialization in manufacturing commodities through different forms of State 
intervention. The specialization of the model was in the production of consumer and intermediate 
goods provided by domestic private firms; while transnational corporations concentrated in relatively 
more advanced manufacturing branches.  
The problems were that a ‘truncated’ pattern of industrialization developed which was heavily 
dependent on imports and also on external financial resources, mainly from agriculture and tourism. 
The situation was aggravated during the 1970s as import substitution industrialization was carried on 
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a dozen other economies were experiencing the same type of fiscal and foreign debt 
crisis, spreading economic stability concerns throughout different latitudes (Adams, 
1997).18  
 
During the summer of 1982 an emergency loan of US 4.55 billion dollars was 
arranged and led by the United States government and the International Monetary 
Fund, in which commercial banks agreed to reschedule the Mexican debt. For the 
financial assistance of 1982, the US Department of Agriculture provided a loan in 
exchange for a guaranteed purchase of surplus maize resulting from its agricultural 
policy. An oil credit guarantee was more problematically agreed between the two 
governments. After offering a low price for the prepayment of Mexican crude oil for 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, the US Department of Energy proposed that the 
Mexican government should pay an initial transaction commission. Even though the 
final agreement conditions were not disclosed and they have been kept secret, the 
interest rate was close to 38%, more than twice as much as the market interest rate at 
that time. The US Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department complemented the 
financial resources from the United States, whereas some other developed countries 
did the same through the Bank of International Settlements (Lustig, 1997a). In short, 
the rescue package proved more satisfactory to the US government and to the banks 
as well, as the latter avoided collapse. It has been argued that their survival depended 
on keeping Mexico afloat (Adams, 1997). Although all loans were fully paid the year 
after, the scarce funds allowed only for a comparatively slow recovery, imposing high 
                                                                                                                                            
external borrowing and dependent on petroleum. Despite direct support and indirect subsidies, the 
dependence on intermediate and capital goods was not overcome (Dussel Peters, 2000).     
18 During the early 1990s, the Mexican government changed the currency, replacing one thousand old 
pesos by a ‘new peso’. The use of this label was only temporary, as the adjective ‘new’ was dropped 
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social costs on the Mexican population, since the losses of the crisis were socialized 
(Lustig 1998; Dussel Peters, 2000).19  
 
Following the 1982 crisis and throughout the decade, neither external conditions, nor 
domestic ones were favourable to the compelled adjustment of expenditures, output 
reorientation and the search for ways to foster growth. High real interest rates, 
unfavourable terms of trade and scarce credit made for an adverse international 
context. During this period, Mexican international trade surpluses were used to pay 
the interest on foreign debt, since it was difficult to attract investment. This situation 
translated into a net resources transfer from Mexico to international lenders which 
precluded stabilization and renewed growth. The domestic conditions were no better 
either, because the crisis was absorbed domestically: the fall in real incomes and the 
rise in poverty levels provide evidence of the deterioration of social indicators. On top 
of that, rampant inflation, increasing capital outflows and decreasing international 
reserves further complicated the scenario (Lustig, 1998).  
 
The implementation and adaptation of different strategies aiming to attract trade and 
investment flows became a self-induced priority for the government in office at the 
time. The moment of decisive intervention was seized at the international level and at 
the domestic level in order to impose a new trajectory on the orientation of economic 
policies and the role of the State. The 1980s witnessed significant changes as 
                                                                                                                                            
shortly afterwards, and the former denomination of the peso replaced the transitory label. It is 
important to bear this episode in mind, especially when dealing with current value data.  
19 It is important to acknowledge, however, that events such as the 1985 earthquake could not be 
anticipated at all, but had an undeniable impact which further complicated the challenge of economic 
restructuring. Moreover, the international context was no better either, as the declining international 
price of oil constrained this important source of income for the Mexican government afterwards.  
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governmental efforts were channelled towards opening up the economy.20 Crucial for 
those purposes was the change in the industrialization model, as the new priority 
became an export oriented strategy which had a core component in the inbound 
industries originally concentrated along the border with the United States, which later 
spread to some other regions of the country. So were the programmes of divestiture of 
government owned enterprises, and the liberalization of formerly protected economic 
sectors. A key element consisted in central bank autonomy. This aimed to attract 
portfolio investment. Thus, there was a clear emphasis on increasing commodification 
as the trajectory of the State traced in Chapter One and Four showed.  
 
Nonetheless, contrary to some expectations, the depressed real wages translated into 
economic recession rather than rapid restructuring. One of the issues illustrating the 
social embedded character of the markets in the Mexican experience is that the 
economic adjustment costs were internally absorbed without any serious political or 
economic disruption. Undoubtedly, the unique cohesion and control of the PRI, as the 
former ruling party’s corporatist practices and mechanisms, were instrumental for the 
acquiescence of the labour force in accepting drastic cutbacks in wages.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that throughout the long process of economic 
restructuring a major concern was to reduce State intervention and regulation. As this 
was done, the openness of investment opportunities and the building of business 
confidence required substantial legal and institutional modifications. The change in 
                                                 
20 At this point it is important to recall that the Mexican President’s discretionary power to decide the 
extent of government participation in economic activity was reduced by a constitutional reform 
introduced after the early 1980s’ economic difficulties. Not only did the legal reform define which 
sectors were reserved for the public sphere, but it also provided guidelines for its participation, albeit 
not exclusiveness, in priority sectors. As further events demonstrated in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
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economic orientation and governmental policies gained increasing external support. 
The selling of several formerly government owned enterprises, including banks at a 
later stage, the strengthening of the economic partnership with the United States and 
the returns in the stock exchange, were all perceived abroad as favourable changes. 
As a response to the attraction of new foreign investment, some capital returned to 
Mexico. Within these contexts of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government of 
the United States supported the decision of some international economic 
organizations in favour of its southern neighbour. For instance the International 
Monetary Fund facility was extended in 1989. Likewise, the International 
Development Bank increased its lending, while the World Bank facilitated a 
substantial amount during the period (Lustig, 1998). Attempts were made to tackle 
additional economic difficulties throughout the 1980s, such as the balance of 
payments crisis in 1985 which further devalued the Mexican currency, by contracting 
the fiscal and monetary policies, while accelerating trade liberalization as part of the 
stabilization and structural reform (Lustig, 1998). 
 
It was also during the late 1980s that Mexico was taken as a ‘pilot case’ for external 
debt restructuring, due to its heavy dependency on international banks. To begin with, 
the 1986 Baker Plan introduced, for the first time, a contingency financing clause and 
the possibility of automatic relaxation of fiscal targets, should growth rates be less 
than anticipated. Expectations were not matched because the negative transfers of 
domestic resources characteristic of the decade continued to hinder the economic 
recovery, despite efforts to reverse them. Three years later, the Brady Plan took 
Mexico as the first country to sign clauses of debt and service reduction of medium 
                                                                                                                                            
constitutional reform in practice has legitimized the government’s decisions to withdraw from almost 
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and long-term debt with commercial banks. Neither plan could help Mexico to attract 
capital and investment on the scale required for recovery (Lustig, 1998). In order to 
reverse the negative transfer of capital there was a need for a reduction in the 
international debt service, the encouragement of capital repatriation and the attracting 
of new foreign investment. Without them no efficiency, equity and productivity could 
occur. 
 
Despite economic restructuring, the efforts to stabilize the economy did not translate 
into the sustained growth which had been anticipated. Crucial domestic elements in 
the economic restructuring were the government-led pacts agreed with some 
corporatist sectors. Aiming to reduce inflation, they brought a de facto freeze on 
prices and wages. Following price realignment a freeze was implemented. Keeping 
the fiscal deficit under control and strengthening external accounts was also 
important. Like the privatization efforts, the reforms emphasized efficiency, 
regardless of an asset’s ownership. Changes in name and various renewals did not 
alter their basic characteristics.21 Concerns about inflation were behind the strategies 
of these pacts, as wages and prices had to be kept under control, especially after 
                                                                                                                                            
all but the strategic sectors, as already presented out in Chapter Four (Lustig, 1998).  
21 Originally named the Economic Solidarity Pact (Spanish acronym PSE), it was later renamed the 
Pact for Economic Stability and Growth (Spanish acronym PECE) and renewed several times. The 
pacts’ main features were first, the demand management component via fiscal primary surplus and the 
contraction of credit supply; second, incomes policies to break inertial inflation and stabilize 
expectations; and third, structural reform, paying attention to fiscal deficit control, trade liberalization 
and the divestiture of public enterprises (Lustig, 1998).  
For an assessment of the most recent official programmes for poverty reduction and social 
development see the World Bank report Poverty in Mexico. For instance, CONTIGO is analyzed as a 
conceptual framework, and as a set of programmes that are particularly concerned with poverty 
reduction. As a conceptual framework CONTIGO recognizes multiple dimensions of poverty and the 
complementary domains of public action, including human development, income generation, physical 
asset accumulation and social protection. As a set of programmes, it embeds the framework within an 
understanding of well-being and poverty over the life cycle of individuals and households (World 
Bank, 2004).   
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inflation exceeded 160% in the mid 1980s. Restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
were, therefore, oriented towards the restoration of price stability.     
 
A more decisive push was provided by some other institutional changes. The 
proposal, launch of negotiations, and the ratification of the North America Free Trade 
Agreement provided an institutional framework for strong economic and commercial 
trends already under way. Needless to say, these tendencies have further deepened 
and accentuated since NAFTA first started operations in 1994. The trade agreement 
between the United States, Mexico and Canada would have not been possible for the 
Mexican side had it not engaged in the series of economic transformations which 
sought to match the market orientation and ‘fundamentals’ of the other members, 
especially the United States throughout the 1980s. In short, it evidences a clear 
pattern of strategic selectivity operation. Originally the United States of America and 
Canada signed a Free Trade Agreement in 1988. From this, the Mexican government 
took the idea of proposing a similar scheme to the United States. Shortly after, 
Canada was incorporated into the negotiations as well.  The main focus of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement is directed toward trade and investment flows. Due to 
the huge size and leverage of the US economy, it represents the main and 
disproportionate source of foreign trade and direct investment in Mexico. NAFTA has 
clearly deepened and accentuated those trends.22 Since NAFTA took off, European 
and Japanese investment have comparatively decreased their share in Mexico. Despite 
governmental efforts to attract investment from some other parts of the world, the 
tendency towards concentration has grown further. Regarding trade liberalization, not 
                                                 
22 The United States’ trade is more diversified with its main partners, namely, Canada, Mexico, China, 
Japan, and the European Union. Collectively, and individually in some cases, important growing 
deficits are being run on behalf of the US.  
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only have trade barriers been converted into tariffs, which in turn have gradually been 
reduced, aiming for the full liberalization of goods and services trade among the three 
countries; but also the initiative towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas is said to 
be the next step for a hemispherical elimination of barriers to trade and investment. 
 
 
TANGLED TECHNOCRAT AND FINANCIER WEBS IN OPERATION  
 
Having examined the characteristics of the infamous Mexican macroeconomic and 
fiscal mismanagement crisis, it may be helpful to have a look at a key development of 
the economic landscape at that time, which ended up proving critically important 
years later. The financial sector in Mexico became another source of mismanagement 
during the 1990s, due to over-reliance on inadequately regulated short-term capital 
flows. In this section I concentrate on the interaction between private and public 
agents. In so doing, I focus on the impact of the strategically selective context on the 
actor. 
 
One of the elements which should not be overlooked when analyzing the 
contemporary processes of social change in Mexico is the professional profile of key 
government officials and decision-makers and the networks which they weave. Since 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, top government decision-makers in Mexico, 
especially those dealing with the economic agenda, received a neoclassical economic 
training in Ivy League universities in the United States.  
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Well known examples of top economic policy making positions held by technocrats 
include former President Salinas de Gortari, from Harvard University, and former 
President Zedillo Ponce de León, from Yale. Former Minister of Finance, Aspe 
Armella, studied at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology MIT. Former Minister 
of Trade, Serra Puche, went to Yale, as did the former Central Bank Director, 
Mancera Aguayo. Regarding the Fox’s administration, the Central Bank Director, 
Ortíz Martínez, graduated from Stanford, and the Minister of Finance, Gil Díaz, 
qualified in Chicago (Camp, 2002; Babb, 2001). Such training was in many respects 
similar to their counterparts in international organizations and even US officials 
(Camp, 2002 and 2003; Centeno, 1994; Torres Espinoza, 1997; Babb, 2001). 
 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the characteristics of the process of economic 
restructuring in Mexico match the general guidelines and concerns of international 
financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
For example, the concern to reinvigorate economic activity so as to resume rates of 
economic growth which the ‘Washington Consensus’ originally aimed to tackle, 
could be identified in the profile of policy recommendations and economic 
prescriptions those organizations presented in their strategies during the 1980s and 
early 1990s. Interestingly, since the second half of the 1990s the ‘market friendly’ and 
institutional agenda has become even more discernible as the economic advice and 
programmes have presented an institutional turn. Since I am not paying attention 
exclusively to the material realm, the impact which ideas have is one of the major 
analytical lines of this thesis (Watson, 2000, 2003b; Blyth, 1997 and 2002). The 
changes in assumptions, agendas and ideas characteristic of paradigm shifts are also 
part of the processes of commodification under scrutiny.  
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It is not an exaggeration to say that the international financial organizations were co-
participants in the economic restructuring experience of several countries, although 
they would not admit co-responsibility.23 Due to an adverse context associated with 
the external debt crisis, Mexico reached a point at which it became chronically 
dependent on financial resources and advice from the Bank and the Fund, as 
alternative private sources of credit were cancelled. The emphasis of the financial 
restructuring programmes and the IMF’s letters of intent pointed emphatically to 
macroeconomic stabilization and inflation control. However, it is important to note 
that the characteristics of these documents reflect evolutionary political advice and 
aims, as they also incorporated a range of issues different from the original economic 
agenda. For instance, the initial concern to lower inflation and correct balance of 
payments imbalances, addressed in 1982, saw an increased scope of the agenda as 
other issues such as strengthening the banking system and the privatization of 
government owned enterprises, were also included in the last documents as well 
(Fischer, 1997; Letters of Intent and Memorandum of Economic Policies, 1999 and 
2000; Rosas, 1999). The letters of intent signalled specific stages of the current 
punctuated evolutionary processes through which the Mexican economy has moved, 
but also the new character and concerns of the institutional agenda. Even though the 
insights about the relatively new emphasis on institutions discussed here focus on the 
World Bank, they can also be extended to the International Monetary Fund. In 
addition to the technical and economic terms in which the letters of intent are agreed, 
there are additional elements such as political will and trust, which affect the decision 
                                                 
23 It is this unaccountability aura which has been heavily criticized in Bretton Woods organizations. 
Therefore, it has predictably become one of the banners of anti-globalization campaigners, critics of 
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of governments to engage in an International Monetary Fund programme (Vreeland, 
2003).    
 
If the first Letters of Intent were oriented more towards the use of macroeconomic 
policies to reactivate growth, as the ‘Washington Consensus’ pointed out, the last 
ones evidenced the institutional turn discussed through this thesis, as Chapter Seven 
shows. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund exerts a degree of leverage that 
might influence, although in neither an overbearing nor a deterministic way, the 
orientation of certain policies, even without any specific reference. Unsurprisingly, it 
has been found that IMF borrowing is related to the opening up of economic 
processes in emerging markets, especially favouring capital inflows (Minushkin, 
2001b). Economies which depended on international financial organizations in 
general and the Fund’s loans in particular, during the 1980s and 1990s, are more 
likely to implement financial liberalization measures. The more dependent the 
economy is on foreign investment, the deeper and wider the opening of domestic 
financial markets (Minushkin, 2001b).  
 
However, this does not mean that agencies have no room for manoeuvre and taking 
their own initiatives. On the contrary, the financial liberalization of the Mexican 
financial markets, first initiated in the late 1970s, was mainly a domestic process in 
which some diversification was sought to counterbalance the leverage of the banking 
sector. The provision of financial non-banking services and products was encouraged, 
although the process could not consolidate as it was halted by the eruption of the 1982 
debt crisis. Nevertheless, technocratic networking developed, strengthening its 
                                                                                                                                            
the World Bank and those of the International Monetary Fund (cf. Chossudovsky, 1998; George and 
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position and gaining influence. While the banking sector was nationalized in the 
aftermath of the crisis, some non-banking financial sectors were not. By the end of the 
decade, they played a key part in promoting and resuming an endogenous initiative 
for the liberalization of financial services. The brokers’ preferences, however, were 
not for a full and indiscriminate liberalization. Moreover, on the Mexican side, 
foreign participation in the domestic market was prevented, and even the negotiations 
of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were beneficial, as the 
Mexican financial sector was granted provisions and a long liberalization schedule 
(Minushkin, 2001a, and 2002). Clearly, financial sector preferences were taken into 
account, whereas some other sectors could not get such privileges. What this episode 
evidences is the role which agencies play in shaping the tendencies and 
countertendencies of the processes they take part in and hence the importance of 
networking. Yet, one of the unintended consequences of the mid 1990s financial crisis 
was that it completely altered the context and conditions which had previously 
prevailed. Nowadays, foreign investors are taking over Mexican banking and 
financial organizations by buying shares in them.  
 
Having spelled out the economic conditions of the Mexican milestone of the late 
1970s and early 1980s, it is necessary to examine in further detail what the efforts 
towards democratization have delivered, as they have not been running at the same 
pace as those for economic restructuring.  
  
 
MOMENTS OF CRISIS AND INTERVENTION: SLOW MOTION POLITICS 
                                                                                                                                            
Sabelli, 1994 among others).    
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As already discussed with the application of the Strategic Relational Approach in 
Chapter Four, the milestone of the early 1980s is associated with the commodification 
experience of economic structural adjustment and the modification of the trajectory of 
State policies since then. Economic details aside, not only did they mean seizing an 
opportunity to re-orientate the economic agenda and trajectory of the policies, but 
they also triggered, albeit relatively slowly, the gradual constraint and control of 
presidential discretion and excesses by opting for institutional guarantees. However, 
the restoration of trust and credibility in the economic reform took much longer than 
originally expected. The failure to attract enough foreign investment, on which the 
outwardly oriented economic model depends, led to a deepening and a widening of 
the original move. The lost decade of economic growth of the 1980s was followed by 
a similar disappointing performance in the 1990s. From the second half of the 1980s 
on, strategies included heterodox economic stabilization and adjustment policies and 
plans such as the Baker Plan and the Brady Plan. Even the North America Free Trade 
Agreement is considered to ‘lock in’ economic reforms. Despite the fact that the 
financial crisis was much bigger in the mid 1990s than in the early 1980s, trust and 
credibility did not take very long to restore. Crucial in this respect was the rescue 
initiative supported by international financial organizations and led by the United 
States government to protect its own interests (Lustig, 1997a and 1998; Adams, 
1997).      
 
The political system in Mexico, which has played a central role since the early 20th 
century, took steps towards the promotion of stability in policies and the rule of law. 
Because the Mexican government tried to exercise leverage and control over the 
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degree of openness to avoid altering the status quo, it has been characterised by some 
analysts as a stable civilian rule without democracy, or even a semi-democracy (Levy, 
1990; Levy and Bruhn, 2001). 
 
An important organizational innovation, the creation of the Federal Electoral Institute 
(Spanish acronym IFE) in the early 1990s and its gradual consolidation as an 
impartial authority have contributed to reshape the electoral and political landscape in 
Mexico (Serrano, 1998; Domínguez and Poiré, 1999). Due to their close links to the 
President and the former ruling hegemonic party, the organizations which preceded 
the IFE served mainly to legitimize frauds and control opposition, as they hesitantly 
paved the way for political liberalization. For instance, the 1977 Federal Law on 
Political Organizations and Electoral Process retained close government control. 
However, it gave some room to liberalizing procedures for recognizing political 
parties, introduced a few changes in electoral procedure and extended for the first 
time access to the mass media for political parties. Although further reforms in 1986 
were also directed by the government, they allowed a modified proportional 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies, and gave more freedom, information and 
exposure to alternative positions (Levy, 1990). Yet, despite legalistic reforms the 
rigged presidential elections of two years later evidenced the gap between the spirit of 
the law and its observance.   
 
In addition to allowing the Federal Electoral Institute to act as a body independent of 
the executive to deal with elections, modifications in the regulation of party finance 
and a more diverse and inclusive evolution of congressional politics were also of key 
importance for levelling the field for all contestants. Furthermore, even before the IFE 
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was established, the political and electoral landscape had suffered important changes. 
Not only has it been debated that the winner of the 1988 presidential election did not 
sit in the presidential chair, but also that the former ruling party had lost the capacity 
to make constitutional changes on its own.24 Even though the PRI controversially held 
the presidency for two more terms until 2000, it did not win two thirds of the lower 
chamber seats, making political alliances and coalitions necessary. The government’s 
main move was to approach and negotiate with the conservative National Action 
Party (Spanish acronym PAN), which ended up winning the presidency twelve years 
later. The left-wing coalition entering this election, which challenged the government, 
founded, albeit with some modifications, the Democratic Revolution Party (Spanish 
acronym PRD). Nowadays, it is regulated that no political party can occupy two 
thirds or more of the places needed for constitutional reforms (Elizondo Mayer-Serra 
and Nacif Hernández, 2002a).  
 
At the turn of the 21st century, divided federal congresses, alternating governors, 
states’ congresses, and municipalities amongst the main political forces, namely PRI, 
PAN, and PRD, have become a common scenario. There is increasing room for 
political autonomy in Mexico. Such an important trend is supported by stronger and 
more independent institutions which have moved away from the heavy concentration 
of presidential power and discretion. Since a democratic and representative rule is 
better exercised by federal practices which aim to provide non-centralized 
                                                 
24 Former Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid admitted in his memoirs that the 1988 election was 
rigged. As the PRI candidate was losing badly to the opposition leader, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, the 
government rather than reporting what the results were, argued that the computer system tabulating the 
votes had crashed. Furthermore, without any official ballot count the PRI declared himself a winner 
and even received a congratulatory note from the government of the United States. In 1991, a Congress 
dominated by the PRI and the PAN ordered the ballots of the 1988 presidential election to be burned, 
destroying the only hard evidence of the fraudulent elections (Aguilar Camín and Meyer, 1993; 
Aguayo, 1998; Fernández de Castro and Domínguez, 2001). 
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representation, the decentralization of state governments has allowed them to regain 
political autonomy and, in some cases, to innovate in public policies (Ward and 
Rodríguez, 1999; Domínguez and Poiré, 1999). Moreover, the asynchronicity of 
elections for states, congresses and municipalities increases the likelihood of 
juxtaposition and different combinations of political membership at the different 
levels of government (Elizondo Mayer-Serra and Nacif Hernández, 2002b).  
 
Nonetheless, the increasing room for political autonomy and the transition to, and 
consolidation of, a narrow concept of democracy is not exempt from difficulties. 
Clearly, electoral reforms are just means, never an end, in the construction of a more 
egalitarian democracy. Risks such as granting privileges to political parties or any 
other actor, at the expense of not properly strengthening the citizens’ formal capacity 
and resources to exercise their rights, and to demand transparency and accountability 
must be avoided. For no political franchise is more valuable or important than the 
goal it aims to achieve, especially in a country where democracy with equity is badly 
needed.  
 
Even though the consideration of an independent judiciary has historical roots which 
go back as far as the 1857 Constitution, the fact that the legal system is influenced by 
the political context has heavily conditioned the degree of judicial independence. This 
is because the current 1917 Constitution, sticking to a rule of legality, rather than to a 
proper rule of law, has historically determined the judicial system and its organs such 
as the courts, especially in its relationship with the President. Clearly, maintaining a 
low political profile in order to avoid conflicts with the executive, all in the name of 
political stability, meant that alignment was achieved through strategies which bound 
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the judiciary to the presidency, therefore limiting the principle of separation of 
powers (Domingo, 2000). Yet, it is important to note that such a scenario was 
achieved without upsetting the constitutional order. If political liberalization and 
democratization has been subordinated to the economic priorities, which have 
resulted in increasing commodification, then reforms to the judiciary rank third in 
turn, subordinated to political considerations.  
 
Still, there has been a pair of Constitutional reforms during the mid 1990s which 
could serve as preliminary steps towards an increasing degree of democratization and 
political autonomy for the political agents. Firstly, the 1994 reform tightened criteria 
for the selection of candidates to the Supreme Court, stressing specialization and 
experience and at the same time detaching them from political profiles. Since the 
same year, two-thirds of the Senate have to be elected from a list of candidates 
presented by the executive. As life tenure was changed, individuals were appointed to 
the Supreme Court for a fifteen-year fixed term. Moreover, the judicial budget no 
longer needs approval from the President. Secondly, the 1996 reform extended the 
review powers of the Supreme Court to some electoral matters.25 It is now possible to 
rule on the constitutionality of electoral laws at a federal and state level and 
jurisprudence has started to develop relating to inter-government and intra-
government relations. Additionally, the establishment of a collegial citizen counsellor 
body in charge of the management of the electoral processes of the Federal Electoral 
                                                 
25 The nature and scope of judicial review powers is based on the ‘amparo’ suit, which has worked as 
the main legal tool to contest the legality or consistency of laws, resolutions and judicial decisions with 
the 1917 Constitution. However, the main characteristic of the ‘amparo’ suit is that it protects only the 
plaintiff, or person who brings or appeals the legal action, without leading to the abrogation of the law 
or act in question (Domingo 2000).   
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Institute has strengthened its independence (Domingo, 2000; Ward and Rodríguez, 
1999; Domínguez and Poiré, 1999).  
 
Nonetheless, important as these reforms certainly are, there is no guarantee that the 
enhanced political profile of the Supreme Court translates into a better administration 
of justice. The impartial and predictable protection of rights and enforcement of rules 
is still an unfulfilled goal, as is the binding of all actors to place effective limits, 
checks and balances within the discretionary exercise of power of the executive in 
Mexico. The next section focuses on the importance of networking, whose crucial 
constitutive element, namely common and complementary agendas, will be discussed 
and initially sketched in the final parts of this chapter. 
 
 
NETWORKING INVOLVES MUCH MORE THAN TECHNOCRATIC WEBS 
  
The rise of a group of neo-classically trained economists during the last three PRI 
presidential terms of the 20th century, in which the last two even held office, has been 
the subject of a number of different analyses (Centeno, 1994; Camp, 2002; Babb, 
2001). Although the composition of the cabinet of the next administration tended to 
be more diversified, it still preserved some positions for professionals with the same 
profile. It is striking that postgraduates in economics from Ivy League colleges in the 
US have not delivered the most efficient solutions to some of the key problems and 
issues for the contemporary Mexican agenda, as illustrated in Chapter Four. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that their contribution tends to be more symbolic 
than functional, as they earn approval and respect from the international and financial 
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community, whose concern is in no way polarization, nor the rising rates of domestic 
inequality (Babb, 2001).  
 
‘Technocrat’ is a term used to describe, among others, professional individuals with 
expertise in the techniques of neoclassical economics, who have served in the 
Mexican public administration since the 1970s, and who have made use of 
institutions, networks and ideas to direct economic policies undemocratically. 
Benefiting from political stability, electoral bureaucracy mechanisms and the vertical 
authoritarian features of the political system, they paradoxically sought to reduce the 
economic functions of the State, while seeking to diminish the economic influence of 
politics. Working as a cohesive elite with interlocking networks of patron-client 
relations, they opted for the centralization of power within a group of State 
institutions to control their resources and impose their views, especially on economic 
affairs, from the top of the government departments down to the different social strata 
(Centeno, 1994).   
 
It is important to bear in mind that one of the key technocratic features which have 
been highlighted is the fact that those individuals climbed the bureaucratic ladder, and 
even held key government posts, such as the presidency, (i.e. like Salinas and Zedillo) 
without ever previously holding a democratically elected position. Crucial for such 
stages was the blurred boundaries between the former ruling hegemonic party, the 
bureaucracy and the presidency in which technocratic networks were entangled (cf. 
Centeno, 1994; Camp, 1997, 2002, 2003; Torres Espinoza, 1997; Babb, 2001; 
Williams, 2001; among others).   
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Since my concern is not with networks themselves, but with networking, as has been 
stressed in Chapter Five, it is important to acknowledge that the relational interaction 
among actors in open and complex systems cannot be limited to particular 
constituencies. Rather, networking activities are also able to connect across a wide 
range of groups relying on formal and informal strategies. Important as the linkages 
within groups undoubtedly are, there seem to be some key actors who play crucial 
roles.  Mentors in groups such as the politicians, intellectuals, the clergy, the military 
and business in Mexico have played vital roles for recruiting members, broadening 
contacts and expanding the reach and leverage of the network while introducing 
aspirants to the social practices (Camp, 2002). As networking practices are not 
restricted exclusively to professional profiles, personal ties and informal contacts may 
be helpful for reinforcing networking practices and, for the actor him or herself, for 
influencing opportunities at every step.  
 
Still, networking should not be understood only as a government or elite resource. 
There are also grassroots networking initiatives which cannot be omitted from any 
serious analysis. Consider for instance the indigenous peasant uprising of 1994 and 
the transformations it has been through ever since. They have clearly been through a 
transformative exercise of networking. Not only have the Zapatistas changed from a 
guerrilla to a social movement, but they have also modified their revolutionary 
discourse. By the time they peacefully marched to Mexico City in 2001, their original 
confrontation strategies had been left behind. The fact that the San Andrés Larraínzar 
Accords were not put into practice, and the indigenous rights proposal was not backed 
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by the Congress either, does not defeat the validity of the causes or their agendas.26 
By networking across several different groups they have become part of a broader 
movement which is helping to push for a more egalitarian society. Such a task is one 
that moves forward, and is not constrained by the militarization and the changes in 
Chiapas, but one that is open and more inclusive at the national level and which 
mutually recognizes a common agenda in Mexico.     
 
Both elite and grassroots networking is reflected in policy outcomes in two different 
ways. There are direct effects that can be easily attributed to some specific 
networking practices, such as the technocratic features discussed above, on the one 
side; and there are indirect effects for even the same and different processes on the 
other. Since networking functions as a vehicle for collective action, it is inaccurate to 
assert that the narrow electoral concern for transition to, and consolidation of, 
democracy in Mexico has been a government concession. For this is simply not the 
case. A great many grassroots organizations and movements have historically 
oriented their efforts toward this goal. Therefore, in such a common enterprise they 
must be credited with partial and indirect contributions as well. However, the still 
unfulfilled broader challenge of building an egalitarian democratic society cannot stop 
at electoral reform. As a target of collective action, numerous partial and indirect 
contributions are needed if the goal of a more equitable democracy in Mexico is to be 
achieved. 
 
                                                 
26 The San Andrés Larraínzar Accords on Indigenous Rights and Culture were signed in 1996 by the 
Zapatistas with two intermediaries, the COCOPA (Spanish acronym of the Commission of Concord 
and Pacification) and the CONAI (Spanish acronym of the National Mediation Commission). The 
significance of those accords is that they laid the groundwork for changes in indigenous rights, 
political participation and cultural autonomy, previously overlooked in the Mexican political agenda. 
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In Chapter Five I argued, making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, that the 
never-static nature of networking opens up possibilities for further elaborating and 
updating a common agenda which delivers, or at least is expected to deliver, benefits 
to the actors who actively take part in it (Hay, 1998b; Hay and Richards, 2000).27 In 
so doing, the situated agents in contexts are capable of building different sorts of 
coalitions and alliances. Forging these around mutual objectives captures a range of 
strategies of collective action for their execution or fulfilment. But the same is also 
true for their termination, failure or realignment. As either successful or failed 
attempts are put into practice, the relational character of power immanent in social 
interactions, reflects that the interactions among actors do not represent a zero-sum 
game, for the gains of one agent do not necessarily mean the loss to another.  
     
It should be clear by now that the processes of commodification, on one side, and the 
current trends towards political autonomy and democratization, on the other, are 
currently under way, albeit not free of countertendencies and contradictions. What I 
find interesting is the fact that the dynamics identified with the political axis of the 
theoretical map presented in Chapter One, represent social and political challenges to 
the economic priorities. However, embryonic the stage which these trends have 
reached so far for a Polanyian ‘second movement’, there is no reason to deny the 
possibility that they might gather momentum and strength over time. The shaping of 
the context and the setting of political institutions are important steps towards 
increasing degrees of political autonomy, which open up windows of opportunity, 
                                                 
27 Bearing in mind that networking practices could be of great help in complementing and 
compensating for market failures and government failures, it is still not my argument that networks 
should replace markets and hierarchies as modes of coordination. Moreover, the shortcomings of 
network exclusion could be compensated, in turn, by the other two forms of governance. The main 
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though these are not free of any constraint. Still, those institutions need to be put into 
operation. They could only be put to work mainly by interacting agencies, where the 
exercise of power is a relevant and unavoidable feature. In the event that the 
institutions are used to meet the networkers’ common or complementary agenda, their 
utility rises. In the event that they are not suitable for the task ahead, it becomes 
obvious that they are never a sufficient condition for the social processes of change. 
This is why it cannot be taken for granted that institutions alone guarantee the 
attainment of any objective themselves. As they depend on the use which situated 
actors make of them, institutional failures should not come as a surprise, because they 
are always dependent on the use, or misuse, made of them by their operators.       
 
As an increasing number of social and political actors, both individual and collective, 
are able to make their voices heard, to play loyally and remain within institutional or 
organizational limits, the room they are given is all that constrains their ability and 
capability to influence the contexts that surround them. Nonetheless, opting for an 
exit should the agents’ strategic goals not be reached, or cannot be reached from 
within, has become an increasingly powerful strategy which widens the spectrum of 
possible outcomes and viable strategies (Hirschman, 1970).28  
                                                                                                                                            
point is to avoid over-relying in only one mode of coordination, because the strengths of one 
compensate for the weaknesses of the others, as already discussed in the previous chapter.    
28 In contrast to the agreement and setting of a common or complementary agenda, useful for 
identifying the best networking direction to go to in order to reach consensual objectives as presented 
here, there are alternative views of the purpose and characteristics of alliances and coalitions. 
Mainstream International Relations, rooted in positivist positions, suggest the existence of threats as 
the main reason for coalition building and alliance creation. Whatever exercise of voice, loyalty or exit, 
the formation of coalitions and alliances for networking purposes can be oriented towards the weaker 
side or the stronger side. In either case, the decision lies in the situated agents in each particular 
situation, the pursued agenda and the preferred strategies. In the first case, balancing against a 
prevailing threat or group could represent an option for being on the safe side, as it avoids being 
dominated by stronger or more powerful actors or groups. In the second case, alignment with the 
source of danger where the stronger side prevails, which could be preferred for either defensive or 
offensive reasons, is also known as ‘bandwagoning’ (Walt, 1995). It is in the last case that depending 
 319
 
The mutual or complementary strategic agendas which the networks aim to serve 
reflect the constant motion and dynamics, at the same time that networking plays a 
role in the dialectical transformation to which the actors refer for elaborating their 
agendas. This mutually constitutive influence opens up a wide range of possibilities 
from which wanted and unwanted outcomes may arise. Networking across various 
groups increases the uncertainty, uneasiness and unpredictability of the outcome. 
Furthermore, the capability for delivering changes lies in the hands of the actors and 
selecting strategies constitutes a crucial issue if their common or complementary 
agendas are to be met. Therefore, the exercise of power by situated actors within a 
strategically selective context delivers the capacity for change (see also Chapter 
Two). The importance of this cannot be highlighted enough, as it means the capacity 
to influence not only current situations but to effect potentially deeper, wider and 
more consistent future transformations.  
 
Normative as these statements appear to be at first glance, they nonetheless, raise 
awareness about the importance of the identification of agendas or core issues which 
must be fulfilled. On the basis of these Strategic Relational Approach theoretical 
considerations, and with the backup of the arguments presented in this thesis, it is 
time to present two contrasting agendas for Mexico to which I now turn in the next 
sections of this thesis.  
 
 
DÉJÀ VU: INCREASING COMMODIFICATION  
                                                                                                                                            
on the conditions granted for access and cooperation amongst the members may enhance the degree of 
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Regarding the international context, the relationship between the World Bank and 
Mexico has evolved through different phases. Initial contact and relations go back to 
the late 1940s. However, it was not until nearly four decades later, due to the set of 
economic reforms undertaken by the Mexican government during the last quarter of 
the 20th century, that it became one of the most important borrowers of the bank. The 
World Bank’s membership is conditional on prior joining of the International 
Monetary Fund. Both international financial organizations’ loans and conditions exert 
influence on many aspects of investment, institutional development and public policy. 
 
During the first twenty years of its loans, Mexico made use of sectoral adjustment 
funds for electric power supply and irrigation projects. The influence on the design of 
economic policies dramatically increased from nothing during the 1980s as a 
consequence of the debt crisis, and the structural adjustment programmes 
characteristic of the period, which included debt reduction, trade liberalization, the 
design of poverty programmes, and deregulation (Urzúa, 2000). The financial crisis of 
the mid 1990s inaugurated another era, in which the World Bank’s role and influence 
moved towards institutional advice, consistent with the latter’s agenda. Such 
emphasis on institutions is further discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
 
The concept of the State, and the agenda which the World Bank promotes in 
accordance with the orientation of the post Washington Consensus, are specified in 
detail for specific cases. In Mexico’s contemporary circumstances at the turn of the 
21st century, diagnoses and policy recommendations tend to orientate towards 
                                                                                                                                            
control of some actors over others.  
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ratifying the commodification efforts currently under way. Because the World Bank 
agenda summarises the orientation of the trends currently observable and because it 
also matches the self-induced priorities of the government, it deserves careful 
analysis. Still, in this section I am not arguing that the World Bank dictates what the 
Mexican government should do, or should refrain from doing. Bearing this caveat in 
mind, and because of the close relationship between the latter and the Bretton Woods 
organizations, the recommendations need to be analyzed through the Strategic 
Relational Approach. The World Bank’s development agenda for Mexico stresses the 
following five points: a) to consolidate macroeconomic gains, b) to accelerate growth 
through enhanced competitiveness, c) to reduce poverty through human capital 
development, d) to balance growth and poverty reduction with protecting natural 
resources, and e) the achievement of those goals by means of an efficient, accountable 
and transparent government (Giugale, Lafourcade, and Nguyen, 2001). 
 
There is nothing new in the World Bank’s agenda for Mexico. The economic 
priorities of sound macroeconomic management and the need to strengthen its 
structural fiscal position by means of a comprehensive tax reform are no novelty. It is 
also argued that the removal of exemptions, the management of public sector 
liabilities and the purge of government finances need to be accompanied by a 
countercyclical fiscal policy which would place Mexico in a better position to 
consolidate the macroeconomic gains (Giugale, Lafourcade, and Nguyen, 2001).  
 
Similarly, the recommendation for increased competitiveness for the financial sector, 
infrastructure and the rural economy point towards sustainable long term accelerating 
rates of growth if achieved through foreign markets. It is important to point out that 
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back in the mid 1980s some of the economic indicators caused anxiety. For instance, 
the fiscal deficit reached approximately 15 % of Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product, 
while inflation soared to over 160%. At the turn of the 21st century, these 
macroeconomic variables no longer represent a problem. Both of them, the fiscal 
deficit and the inflation rate, are under control and match international standards. 
Regarding the financial sector, the advice is to strengthen and deepen the reforms to 
ensure stability and soundness. Private funding and better regulation, we are told, are 
required for specific sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, gas and oil, 
water supply, and highways. Furthermore, the financing of infrastructure services is 
supposed to put more emphasis on operational efficiency and pricing without 
overlooking public and private finance. The constitutional amendments and the new 
legislation provide the legal framework for the privatization of ports, railways and 
airports, although an independent transport regulator is needed.  
 
Mexican agriculture has faced drastic reforms such as trade liberalization, subsidy 
elimination, the constitutional reforms of land tenure and a new programme of land 
titling. This last item is problematic. Not only do increased levels of poverty affect 
one fifth of the labour force, causing it in turn to generate only a small share of 
Mexico’s GDP, but also open competition with the North America Free Trade 
Agreement is due in 2008. The rural sector seems to be in an unfavourable position to 
compete with the United States’ agricultural sector, which enjoys heavy subsidies. 
However, the World Bank’s orthodox recommendations for the rural sector focus on 
the liberalization of grain subsectors, the establishment of regulatory frameworks, and 
an increase in the efficiency of the public support programmes (Giugale, Lafourcade, 
and Nguyen, 2001).   
 323
 
Important as all those recommendations are, they clearly emphasize macroeconomic 
gains and growth as the goal of development. Development of equitable growth, 
however, is not merely an economic concern. It is a more complex and multifaceted 
issue than it would appear at first glance, as the seminal work of Schumpeter made 
clear (1934). As discussed in the opening section of this chapter, González Casanova 
pointed out that people sharing income levels, culture and power are basic necessary 
conditions for achieving the goal of democracy. Furthermore, the equitable 
distribution of costs and gains, the growth of national accounts, and the rise in living 
standards, all refer to moral and political dimensions as well (1970). The dimension 
which is defended in this thesis is the political relevance of all collective social 
activities, independently of their organization and categorization. Therefore, the all 
encompassing spectrum of politics which the Strategic Relational Approach adopts 
reveals that the perception of economic imperatives is by no means irresistible, but 
highly political and open ended.  
 
It has already been discussed in Chapter Four, above, that the sharing of income has 
been problematic, especially since the early 1980s, in which the orientation of a new 
economic model was accentuated. The gradual outward orientation of the economy, in 
addition to the emphatic implementation of liberalizing economic sectors and also the 
deregulating of economic activities, has contributed to polarize the wealth distribution 
in Mexico.29 Moreover, it is crucial to stress the importance of the widening income 
                                                 
29 The unequal income distribution in this country is by no means a novel phenomenon, and it is not 
exclusively due to neoliberal reforms or to the commodification process. Even though it has been 
present in all the different historical periods and stages ever since the nation gained independence from 
the Spanish crown in the early 19th century, it clearly goes beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in 
the historical research and analytical treatment of this particular topic. For a discussion of the widening 
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distribution gap during the last decades (World Bank, 2004). Unevenness has 
accentuated the process of making the worse-off the most vulnerable sectors of 
society. The unequal concentration of wealth in the richest deciles of the population, 
in the context of the deterioration of the poorest ones, has gradually made evident 
there is an increasing need for a governmental role regarding redistributive policies.  
 
The problem with the commodification strategies is evidenced in the social costs 
currently facing some sectors of the Mexican population, as already analyzed by the 
application of the Strategic Relational Approach in Chapter Four. It is a cause of 
concern that there is an increasingly uneven distribution of wealth among the social 
groups and the economic sectors to which they are related. The widening gap between 
the better-off and the worse-off reflects an unfulfilled promise of recovery of real 
wages and the already large and expanding informal sector (Williams H., 2001; 
World Bank, 2004). What is considered to be the most important part of the World 
Bank agenda is the consolidation of macroeconomic gains and the promotion of 
growth through enhanced competitiveness. However, such priorities have adversely 
impacted upon labour. More importantly, social and environmental concerns are not 
top of the agenda, since they are considered secondary to the first two points of the 
World Bank’s development agenda for Mexico. The World Bank argues that crucial 
to the development of human capital is the quality of the public provision of 
education, health, social protection and other human capital forming services so as to 
close the gaps in social protection. The provision of security, the building of 
opportunity and the promotion of empowerment represent a challenge ahead. Broad 
social policies for security, health, education, job training and housing require the 
                                                                                                                                            
income gap in the context of contemporary commodification processes in Mexico, please refer to 
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Mexican government to play a decisive role. A similar case can be made about the 
increasing commodification which the environment is going through. It is becoming 
urgent first to stop, and second to reverse the mining exercise which has been 
depleting natural resources. According to the World Bank the removal of subsidies, 
the clarification of property rights and decentralization efforts are required. An 
evaluation of the environmental situation by the government is a relatively easy task, 
especially if compared with the challenge of providing adequate incentives to stop 
environmental degradation without affecting communal preferences and structures 
(Giugale, Lafourcade, and Vinh, 2001). 
 
The reduction of poverty levels and the protection of natural resources cannot be 
achieved simply by following a market rationale, since redistributive efforts are 
needed in order to counterbalance the tendency towards concentration which markets 
often evince if left on their own. It has been argued that there is a need for the 
government to intervene and to play a decisive role in balancing market 
imperfections, as discussed in Chapter Two. The challenges ahead for 
environmentally sustainable practices are not merely economic in nature, as indeed 
they never have been. They are also social and political, due to the fact that markets 
are embedded in broader socio-political structures.  
 
A strong political commitment and deep institutional coordination is required if the 
protection of natural resources and poverty reduction are to be seriously addressed. 
Since these areas neither have an immediately profitable impact, nor are they prone to 
the spectacular raising of revenue as some speculative activities are, the role which 
                                                                                                                                            
Chapter Four.   
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the government plays is, thus, crucial for redistributing resources in a more balanced 
way. There is no argument that special attention needs to be granted to the most 
vulnerable sectors of society. Yet, experience shows that palliative policies which 
target only specific groups or small sectors have not achieved anything but delaying a 
proper solution to the polarization problem. They will not do anything more than this, 
unless a change in the priorities and their matching strategies provides adequate levels 
of protection, based on the idea that exchange relations are not to dominate.30 
Overlooking production and distribution relations depreciates the value of labour and 
praises overvalued exchange transactions in the final stages of economic activities 
(Watson, 2003b). Therefore, a more balanced attention is needed to all the different 
phases of the provision of goods and services. An approach in which the natural 
resources are neither unsustainably extracted, and in which labour is not perennially 
condemned to low-wage and low-skill tasks, requires to place equivalent incentives 
on each part and component of the whole economic cycle. At the same time, it clearly 
needs to place disincentives on the emergence of inequalities and on the overvaluation 
of partial activities as if they were disconnected from the rest, for they are not. In 
short, costs and gains need to be equally shared and their value must be better 
balanced throughout the whole process.     
 
 
                                                 
30 According to the World Bank the building of an efficient, accountable and transparent government is 
the last priority for the Mexican development agenda. It becomes evident that the commodification 
emphasis stresses commercial and financial imperatives and scrutinizes the fiscal and macroeconomic 
performance of the government. There have been, however, some criticisms of the way in which 
decentralization has been carried out, as it has been argued that a proper model is not clearly defined. 
Furthermore, the judicial system is plagued with inadequacies and in need of a major overhaul; and 
decisive initiatives and actions are also required to reduce the incidence of corruption in the 
governmental sphere. Propelled by the imperative of reducing costs and increasing efficiency levels, 
the orientation of the recommendations points to a less centralized type of government.  This in turn 
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PRELIMINARY SKETCHES FOR AN ENHANCING AGENDA OF REFORM 
 
Due to the historical characteristic of the federal level having primacy over the state, 
the concentration of power in the Mexican President and the former ruling hegemonic 
party, plus the subordination of the legislature and judiciary, it is not surprising that 
networking in Mexico has been primarily political and concerned with specific 
policies. Still, this is not the same as saying that we should dismiss the utility of an 
approach which focuses on networks and the transformation capabilities of 
networking operating beyond such a realm. On the contrary, as I have shown in 
Chapter Five, key for the operation of networks and the functioning of networking is 
the identification of common and complementary agendas. It is not restricted by any 
means to the character of partisanship or policy. Since networking is such a flexible 
strategy, network formation could bring up unintended economic issues, or affairs of 
any other nature of relevance to the situated actors.  
 
Authoritarian regimes typically leave a difficult economic legacy due to their lack of 
accountability and democratic deficits; since one of the effects of democracy and 
political autonomy is that, in a sense, they make uncertainty more likely, the transition 
to, and consolidation of, democracy set up the likelihood, without determinism, of 
further transitions (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, 1986). A crucial one, if not 
the most important one, goes beyond the making of citizens, and concerns the 
reduction of polarizing inequalities and the provision of equal benefits to the 
population from the goods and services generated by the society. Such a fundamental 
and ultimate objective, normative as it is, constitutes in itself a highly desirable goal 
                                                                                                                                            
aims to facilitate increasing private decision making, while government intervention would only be in 
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whose attainment should suffer no further delay. Although the road for such a 
Polanyian ‘second movement’ is very likely to be full of unpleasant surprises and 
difficulties, it is an enterprise worth embarking on, rather than leaving the attainment 
of a better world to chance.  
 
The processes of political liberalization and the struggle for democratization are by no 
means a novel phenomenon in Mexico. The current processes and dynamics owe 
much more to opposition, whether formally organized or not, than is officially 
acknowledged. The historical gestation has been lengthy and not exempt from risks, 
difficulties and challenges (Aguayo, 1998). Opposition threats have triggered changes 
in the former hegemonic ruling party, the electoral procedures, institutions and 
practices, and even in the reach, transparency and accountability of the executive. The 
costs of legitimacy have contributed to undermining the conditions and viability of 
the former symbiosis between the Mexican President and the former ruling 
hegemonic party. Incomplete and unfinished as these trends still are, they deliver a 
vivid example of the power of agencies to influence the strategically selective 
contexts in which they are situated. For the Strategic Relational Approach, the ever-
changing dynamics in motion provide a spectrum of different possible outcomes. For 
example, the last two terms of the PRI in office saw opposition parties win an 
increasing number of seats in the lower chamber. They became the majority during 
the last few years, along with an increasing number of governors from opposition 
parties, including the one in Mexico City.31 As PAN succeeded in overtaking the 
former ruling hegemonic party in the struggle for the presidency in 2000, it is 
                                                                                                                                            
regard to public goods (Giugale, Lafourcade, and Nguyen, 2001).   
31 Since the very first time that democratic elections were held for the post in 1997, the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática (PRD) has held office. 
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currently facing similar scenarios of divided government and juxtaposition at all 
levels. 
 
Nevertheless, those scenarios tend to be more democratic, representative and 
inclusive than the seven decades of PRI rule, as they make use and push for 
increasing political autonomy and the further spread of relational power immanent in 
social interactions. Historically shifting from induced consensus to compromise and 
negotiation is not an easy and unilinear process; it varies spatially and temporally. 
What is important, however, is to orientate the efforts, constraints and opportunities 
which increase the level of political autonomy in order to capitalize on shared 
governance. Achieving such a goal, with an increasing capacity to attract and 
incorporate as many actors from civil society as possible into the decision making 
process, would be critical in forging a more consistent, solid and strong process of 
democratization in Mexico. The opportunity has yet to be taken.    
 
Without pretending to deliver a prescription of economic policies or a programme of 
what I perceive ought to be done, I want merely to draw some very broad and 
tentative sketches for action in Mexico, which I consider must not be postponed any 
longer. As been suggested in Chapter Four and the present chapter, there is no need to 
present specific policies of reform or to prescribe substantive alternatives. Still, 
making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, it is possible to restore agency and 
the causal constitutive role of ideas to the analysis of otherwise structuralist and 
deterministic processes. Therefore, what I can do is to sketch a few non-hierarchical 
suggestions to reinvigorate the role of actors and ideas for broad areas of reform 
which could be discussed and included in a common and strategic agenda for Mexico. 
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Networking could help make the agenda for a more equitable social, political, and 
economic scenario real, both as an enhanced whole and in its individual and 
constitutive elements.32 Disaggregation into smaller and complementary agendas 
could increase the likelihood of the viability and success of the whole enterprise. 
Needless to say, the following points neither constitute a government programme, nor 
are they policy prescriptions and must not be considered as such.33 Rather, consistent 
with the argument presented through this thesis, I also maintain broad trajectories of 
reform perspectives in the propositions presented below. 
            
1. Bear history in mind. Historical experiences are crucial for understanding 
where we stand, and are of great help in identifying where we want to go. 
They help in bringing consistency to the agenda. Historical lessons must not 
be ignored for the sake of short-term goals. The perspectives and insights 
which history brings cannot be replaced in any form or sense.     
2. Aim for endogenous equitable growth. Keep sound public finances in sight, 
and a long-term consistent implementation of progressive economic 
environmentally friendly policies, attentive to their social impact.  
                                                 
32 In some cases networking has been associated with corruption. This can be the case if the members 
of the network set such an objective in the agenda. However, corruption can be eradicated with 
transparency, accountability and the sharing of information. Therefore, the importance of the agenda 
for networking practices and potential is vital, as it orientates the efforts of the participants in the 
network. The capacity and feasibility for transformation which this mode of governance can deliver 
make it an optimal complement for markets and government, due to the transformative powers which 
the members of the network can infuse in it. Since there is always a risk of failure, networking 
dialogue cannot guarantee success, but neither can hierarchic command or decentralized and anarchic 
exchange.     
33 I am grateful to Matthew Watson for discussing and providing insight into the relevance and 
presentation of the agenda. For sketching what the tasks ahead are, see Aguayo, 1998; Calva, 2000; 
Dussel Peters, 2000; Domingo, 2000; Giugale, Lafourcade and Nguyen, 2001; González Casanova, 
1970; Moctezuma Barragán and Roemer, 2001; Stiglitz, 1998c; and World Bank, 2004; these among 
others, were useful references.    
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3. Broaden democratization. The concept is by no means limited to electoral 
affairs. As an open-ended process it delivers windows of opportunity for a 
more inclusive and egalitarian society, economy and political life. 
4. Articulate domestic economic activities without subordinating them to 
international imperatives. Domestic market activities must be reinvigorated, 
not only to reduce dependency and vulnerability on foreign markets, but also 
to promote endogenous conditions for growth with equity.   
5. Protect the environment. Sustainable economic activities are not mining 
practices where the environment may be used as a site for the assimilation of 
waste and pollution. It is not only necessary to stop the depletion of natural 
resources, but also to reverse the current environmental degradation now in 
progress.    
6. Forge strong and sustainable commodities and service chains, strengthening 
forward and backward economic linkages between firms and within sectors. 
Industrial policies which foster exporting goods and services not based on low 
skill and low wage assembly chains are needed. They must add value and 
strengthen the complementary articulation within firms and sectors and across 
the economy.     
7. Promote further political autonomy. Facilitate the conditions for greater 
degrees of autonomy, paying particular attention to decentralized finance and 
regulatory frameworks, would help to empower actors. This is a prerequisite 
for a more balanced social, cultural and political representation.  
8. Create and strengthen quality clusters of innovation. Encourage and facilitate 
the creation, development, acquisition, selection, and adaptation of sensible 
technology which would serve and enhance added value market niches.  
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9. Set and operate further checks and balances to the excessive discretionary 
exercise of power of the President. Even though there have been some steps 
taken in the separation of powers among the presidential, the judicial and the 
legislative government branches, it is still an unfinished task.    
10. Develop human capital. Reinvigorate the potential and capabilities of 
individuals. Health, nutrition, education and training guides and facilities 
should be available through the whole territory, paying attention to regional 
and local needs and resources. Social learning which could be scaled up would 
be optimal. 
11. Make public and private posts and management accountable and transparent. 
If the problems of imperfect information, incomplete markets, inefficiencies 
and disruptions are to be tackled, both public and private sectors could benefit 
from less corruption. Adequate incentives for a career in the civil service are 
required to terminate the hijacking of the agenda for electoral constituencies 
and patronage practices. An independent judiciary is vital. 
12. Rescue social policies from their subordination to economic policies. Improve 
the quality of jobs and eliminate sub-employment and unemployment. 
Promote adequate welfare provision and policies which aim at reducing the 
income distribution gap and target the most vulnerable social sectors.  
13. Move away from the rule of legality and encourage enforcement of the rule of 
law. The abolition of privileges and exemptions that undermine the letter and 
the spirit of the law, pointing towards a credible and independent judiciary, 
must not be postponed.  
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14. Facilitate conditions for improving domestic saving and investment rates, 
lower dependency from international financial flows, avoid economic and 
financial crises with recessionary impacts and improve the fiscal system.    
15. Set independent judicial and legislative branches. Make the rapid progress 
which is crucial for delivering stability on the social and political front, and on 
the economic one as well. Respect for property rights and political 
representation would be of great benefit.  
16. A long-term vision for a more egalitarian society is required. Getting 
consistency between the broad objectives and the specific policies and 
strategies is vital. Setting goals must not be subordinated to a short-term 
agenda. Clearly, the latter cannot dictate the former.  
17. Reduce dependency on imported capital goods and technology. There must be 
no delay in formulating the strategy for an efficient and integrated industrial 
policy which help the production of capital and consumer goods for the 
domestic market. 
18. Facilitate broader and more representative political participation by society. If 
actors have the freedom to choose among different options for making their 
voice heard, intending a loyal transformation from inside, or challenging from 
outside when exiting, the exercise of political autonomy could serve to forge 
feasible options ahead.   
19. Maintain consistent and sound non-inflationary economic policies. Keep 
sustainable and equilibrated external accounts with an exchange rate 
favourable to productive economic activities. Inbound industries and financial 
speculation must not guide such policies.    
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20. Encourage the decentralization of public administration and economic 
activities. Foster real federalism, targeting the correction of regional 
inequalities. Policy design, supervision and implementation must pay more 
attention to the specific need of the states, municipalities and areas.  
21. Make use of a pragmatic trade policy reflective of industrial policies which 
promote balanced and domestically articulated markets and firms. Aim to 
reduce inequalities and foster economic activities and sectors which influence 
and impact on outcome, investment, employment and income.  
22. Acknowledge the democratic challenge posed by differences. It is not enough 
to legally recognize social and political differences. Accept that cultural and 
economic differences matter to individual and collective actors. Therefore, it 
is crucial to move away from passive acknowledgement to more proactive 
strategies to avoid a scenario in which intended inequalities worsen. 
23. Build consensus, but never impose it. An inclusive approach which seeks to 
enhance participation and the social ‘ownership’ of projects, goals, policies 
and institutions could increase the likelihood of their success if grass-roots 
opinions and concerns are properly included. 
24. Build transparency. Clear information disclosure is a public good and is vital 
for the identification of key issues which could encourage and enhance 
broader participation from society. It is also crucial for eliminating corrupt 
practices.   
25. Set the vision of a broader democratic transformation, where the elements of 
the transformation are not confused with the objectives. Spelling out, 
monitoring and updating the details of preferred strategies and participation, 
help to improve the feasibility of those visions.  
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26. Encourage social ‘ownership’ and participation. They are key ingredients for 
political and economic transformations. Institutions and incentives can 
complement strategies, but no element on its own is sufficient. 
27. Opt for inclusive strategies, where public sector, private sector and all 
members of society play a role, as there are incentives for them all to take part. 
Adequate sets of incentives could encourage wider participation. 
28. Democracy and development mean a transformation of society. None of them 
can be reduced to merely technical adjustment, as broader perspectives require 
strategies and policies which match tasks with means. 
29. Consolidate democratic practices. Do not sacrifice them in the name of 
stability. What to do becomes more relevant when the ways of how to do it 
transparently serve the purpose at which they are aimed.  
30. Consistency in the aims and coherence in the strategies are crucial for 
reaching the objectives in an inclusive fashion. Successful partnerships could 
excel in networking as a flexible mechanism aiming for further social, 
economic and political inclusion. 
 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
The Strategic Relational Approach differs from competing analytical frameworks in 
the weight which it gives to material and ideational elements, and also to the situated 
agency within a strategically selective context in spacio-temporal placings. Due to its 
realist ontology, it does not incur into deterministic and functionalistic descriptions of 
regularities in its analysis. Rather, it acknowledges the open-ended nature of social, 
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political and economic processes, as it does with further possibilities of 
transformation which have been discussed here regarding social change in Mexico. 
The above points can be considered an example of the ample room for manoeuvre 
which exists and the unfinished tasks ahead.  
 
As must be clear now, the use of the Strategic Relational Approach, enables us to 
argue that the processes of democratization and transition to democracy cannot be 
narrowly confined to electoral terms. Important as the ballot box is, the notion of 
democracy defended in this chapter is a normative one which favours notions of 
equity, social inclusion and participation. It is also one where ideals and values must 
play a causal constitutive role for bringing them into being. Such an enterprise is not 
merely an elite concern but entails a broader transformation of society.    
 
After having discussed features of presidentialism, its symbiotic links with the former 
ruling hegemonic party and the corporatist practices of political engagement and 
control mainly concerned with stability, I discussed the need for a system of checks 
and balances in Mexico. However, according to the theoretically informed perspective 
defended here, no matter how important institutions are in limiting the President’s 
discretion, they are by no means neutral and their impact depends on the use which 
situated actors within context make of them.  
 
The application of the Strategic Relational Approach also allowed us to see that the 
early 1980s’ moments of crisis and intervention seized an opportunity to embark on a 
trend of economic restructuring in Mexico, from which the current process of 
commodification took off. Technocratic and financier networks did not limit 
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themselves to ‘technical’ issues and agreements. Rather, economic activities and 
policies were shown to be embedded within larger broader contexts as the differences 
between the banking and the non-banking sector during that period of time made 
evident.   
 
Since the turn in economic restructuring is very significant and political indeed, the 
self-induced priority it was given contrasts sharply with the slower pace at which 
political and judicial reforms have been enacted. Nevertheless, there is increasing 
room for political autonomy in Mexico, and for stronger and more independent 
institutions that are not subject to presidential discretion. My theoretical lenses 
allowed me to see that moving away from the subordination to the executive, 
however, along with qualitatively changing from the rule of legality to the rule of law, 
are still incomplete and unfulfilled tasks. 
 
The Strategic Relational Approach contends that networks as a coordinated mode of 
governance can complement markets and hierarchies. Yet, they must not be conflated 
with structures. The sui generis configuration of the political system in Mexico 
provided a specific context in which technocratic webs were entangled among the 
former ruling hegemonic party, the bureaucracy and the presidency. This, in turn, 
allowed members of those webs clearly to take advantage and benefit from the 
Mexican authoritarian system.   
 
Furthermore, according to the application of the theoretical perspective adopted here, 
networking opens up possibilities for social, political and economic transformation. 
Key for the orientation of such efforts are the elaboration and updating of common 
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strategic agendas which set the goals and guide the efforts towards which the 
members contribute. As networking practices are socially embedded and rely on 
formal and informal strategies, it must be highlighted that they should not be 
understood as a merely government or elite resource.  
 
In this respect, the agenda for increasing commodification, as has been suggested by 
the World Bank, is insensitive to the fact that markets are embedded in social and 
political structures, and that building an egalitarian and democratic society is a 
complex and multifaceted issue, and thus has fallen short of its recommendations. If 
in addition to the consolidation of macroeconomic gains and the acceleration of 
growth, the reduction of poverty and balancing of growth supported by an efficient 
and accountable government are to be reached, there is a great need to broaden the 
scope of the narrowly conceived and economically driven agenda.  
  
Building on the analysis based on the application of the Strategic Relational 
Approach, some preliminary sketches for an enhancing agenda to secure a broader 
and more equitable social, political, and economic transformation were presented. 
Highly desirable goals as they truly are, nevertheless, no point of the suggested 
agenda should be conflated with specific government programmes or policy 
prescriptions. The sketched aims only point towards broad trajectories of reform, and 
must be complemented by more specific objectives if they are to be reached. To sum 
up, the challenge ahead is to re-politicize in an inclusive fashion the process of social 
change in Mexico.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Globalization, Regionalism and the Post Washington Consensus:  
Challenging the Logic of Inevitability 
 
 
FOREWORD 
 
So far, the argument presented in this thesis has focused on the theoretical 
particularities of the processes of social change currently under way in Mexico. 
Emphasis has been placed on the situated agent in context, in order to stress the 
importance of the actors in the processes, as they dialectically influence, at the same 
time as being influenced by, the conditions which surround them. In addition to the 
material circumstances, the role of ideas has also been stressed within specific 
historical moments and geographical limits. Being able to trace different trajectories 
of reform, which, in turn, are concurrent with tendencies and countertendencies at 
play, has proved beneficial for stressing the socially embedded dynamics, where 
power interactions contribute towards the contingency of open ended systems which 
do not follow deterministic law-like regularities.  
 
The philosophically consistent, theoretically informed and empirically grounded 
claims which we have made forcefully show the strong explanatory power of the 
Strategic Relational Approach. It clearly allows us to highlight the importance of 
relationships which are not amenable to direct observation. Even though this approach 
is capable of delivering a complex account and explanation of social, political and 
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economic phenomena, I am not claiming that it is only through its lenses that complex 
explanations can be delivered. The Strategic Relational Approach is, however, 
extremely useful for the purposes of process-tracing, as should be clear by now. Then, 
it is precisely for such a purpose that there is still one more task needing to be 
undertaken to provide a critically comprehensive analysis of the processes under 
scrutiny. This chapter is devoted to the broad material and ideational international 
strategically selective context which has influenced, but never determined, the pace, 
scope, and depth of the contemporary social, economic, and political transformation 
in Mexico. Clearly, the international contexts and dimensions cannot be ignored, and 
need to be carefully scrutinized.  
 
Hence, the main topics of this chapter include a critical examination of broad material 
and ideational contexts such as globalization, regionalism and the two different 
generations of reform promoted by international organizations. Making use of the 
Strategic Relational Approach, the opening section briefly examines the globalization 
processes and the phenomena associated with it. Particular emphasis is laid on a 
critique of the widespread belief that the unstoppable forces of international supply 
and demand are the ones commanding the allegedly inevitable global trends. Such a 
misleading notion, based as it is on the prioritization of social relations of exchange, 
is further discussed in relation to contemporary tendencies and ideas of regional 
economic integration and multilateralism. Economic exchanges are unquestionably 
important, but it is crucial not to think of them as the only force in play and, therefore, 
the only programme to be met. For, exchange relations in general, and trade and 
investment flows in particular, are submerged in a broader social context and can 
never fully represent a much bigger, complex, and dynamically changing socio-
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political mosaic that has never been, and will never remain, the same as it is now. As 
a way of coping with the uncertainty of the social processes of change, there has been 
an emphasis on institutional reforms to complement the economic restructuring of 
developing countries. Yet, the deficiency of the post-Washington Consensus lies in its 
inattentiveness to the pivotal role played by actors, its recommending a deterministic 
notion of convergence and, its assumption that abstract economic equilibrium will 
deliver growth with equity. It is difficult to believe that this will happen, as the second 
generation of reforms assumes that if equitable growth has not been reached, it is 
because of the incompleteness of the undertaken adjustment, rather than bad advice. 
Without further delay a critical analysis of globalization is presented below.          
 
 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS MARKET DRIVE DELUSION 
 
It has been suggested that the anonymous and unstoppable forces of globalization 
push decisively towards a convergence of market oriented economic policies, against 
which resistance is futile because it reaps no fruits at all. This is the hyperglobalist 
position (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, 1999; Hay and Marsh 2000). 
Hyperglobalists also contend that, in such a world, the role played by the State 
becomes increasingly irrelevant because of the arrival of a new global age of a 
borderless world (Ohmae, 1990 and 1996). Moreover, it is even argued that, 
consistent with the overwhelming economic dictates, power is being diffused in the 
world economy, leaving the State no option but to retreat (Strange, 1996). Appealing 
as this may seem at first glance, it is highly problematical to portray an increasingly 
interconnected world where different flows of various natures such as migration, 
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technology and information, trade and investment, images and ideas have blurred all 
the boundaries. The inaccuracy of the hyperglobalist portrait of neoliberal policy 
convergence, Welfare State retrenchment and footloose capital cannot explain the 
emergence and consolidation of economic regions and trade blocks which not only 
present national and regional variations, but also diverge from the suggested 
orientations (Hirst and Thompson, 1995 and 1996; Berger and Dore, 1996; Boyer and 
Drache 1996; Weiss, 1998).  
 
Nevertheless, empirical scepticism, most welcome as it is, cannot decipher the 
complex interactions of the phenomena associated with globalization. We must also 
focus at the conceptual level on the conflation between tendencies and 
countertendencies which make up the processes of globalization and the differentiated 
impact on various contexts of specific actors and phenomena. Crucially, we must hold 
open the possibility that, if contingent convergence exists, it has much to do with the 
undiminished capabilities of actors (Hay, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, and 2001; Hay and 
March, 2000; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton, 1999). In other words and in 
agreement with Hay, agency needs to be restored to processes, of which globalization 
is but one example. Equally importantly, it is also vital to acknowledge the highly 
political character of allegedly economic compulsions (2002b, 2002c, 2003c).    
 
As should be clear by now, the Strategic Relational Approach is capable of analyzing 
the complex configuration of causal logics in which material and ideational elements 
interact and are used by the situated agents in context. Globalization, in this respect, is 
no different and, therefore, it must be understood and assessed as the continuous 
reconfiguration of multidimensional processes, where a range of distinct social 
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phenomena occur in specific spatio-temporal fixes and are conditioned by specific 
actors. Contrary to many hyperglobalist discursive claims, globalization is never a 
structured, ahistorical, single condition against which no alternatives can be offered. 
Regarding this presumption of inevitability, Watson attempts to suggest why the 
political discourse of globalization is often presented as an economically driven 
homogenizing force. To do so, he focuses on its roots in orthodox neoclassical 
economic theory. According to him, the General Equilibrium model can be 
considered as a precursor of the globalizing assumption that markets are unaffected 
by institutional differences and social determinants, as markets are presented as 
intimately linked at all points of time and space (2003b). Without remembering that 
the assumptions of such analytical models are unrealistic, and the fact that 
equilibrium is only a property achieved within the model, it has been used in an 
ideological fashion, prescribing political and economic courses of action. Economic 
jargon and technicalities of the model aside, the reconstruction of a pure exchange 
economy under conditions of perfect competition is invoked in simplistic and 
misleading portraits of globalization, establishing popular frameworks of mental 
habits which have spread beyond academia (Watson, 2003b).  
 
The problem with the inapplicability of the General Equilibrium model is its 
mismatch with reality, as it is with most of the mathematically minded orthodox 
neoclassical models which are based on abstract assumptions, positivist ontology and 
deductivist inferences (Lawson, 1997 and 2003). Chapter Three has discussed the 
problematic issues of positivist ontology. Suffice it to say that it is prone to 
deterministic analysis in social science because of the impossibility of conducting 
closed system experimentation. Unlike natural science, the social sciences revel by 
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their lack of experimental control the inexactness of their findings. Equally 
problematically, deductivism makes inferences from the general to the particular, 
formulating laws in terms of constant conjunctions which are simply considered to be 
universally valid. Moreover, another critical issue with the equilibrium models in 
particular, and mathematical modelling in general, is that they are incompatible with a 
focus on the intentionality of actors. Not only is this issue not considered but, the 
assumption that there is only one rational course of action and, therefore, only one 
‘rational choice’, denies the capability of any agent to decide which alternative to 
take. By ruling out the significance of actors’ intentionality, indeterminacy is injected 
into the processes, but this in turn is the only mechanism which guarantees that the 
conditions of equilibrium are not violated (Lawson, 1997 and 2003). Because the 
Strategic Relational Approach is built upon a realist ontological and epistemological 
position, its distinctiveness allows it to acknowledge the open nature of social systems 
where the situated actors in context interact and exercise power relations with each 
other, opening up possibilities for transformation, as shown in Chapter Two.  
 
Following Polanyi, I have presented the argument that economic activities are 
submerged in broader social relations, and that they are not reducible to exchange 
transactions. Production and distribution are also key components of economic cycles 
and processes (1957). Furthermore, it has also been argued that the artificial 
commodification of labour, money, land and knowledge, provides a context which is 
biased toward certain political outcomes. It is upon the commodity myth that many 
contemporary economic trends are based, namely, the idea that money should be 
supplied by self-adjusting mechanisms, the creation of labour markets, and the 
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promotion of free trade (Polanyi, 1996).1 Such economic delusion has been forcefully 
defended by orthodox neoclassical economists, who, by emphasizing market 
exchanges as dominant transactional modes, have paid little attention to issues of 
production and redistribution.2   
 
For the embeddedness of economic activities within broader social contexts, it 
becomes clear that economic actions are nothing but varieties of social actions which 
are socially situated. It comes as no surprise that institutions of all kinds have the 
common denominator of being social constructions (Granovetter and Swedberg, 
1992; Granovetter, 1996a, and 1996b; Swedberg, 1996 and 1994). Therefore, 
regarding this ideational dimension, market exchanges can be considered as social 
constructions which tend to reproduce the idea originally suggested by Adam Smith 
that it is the propensity of man ‘to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another’ 
(Swedberg, 1994; Smelser and Swedberg, 1994). Despite the fact that there was a 
historical absence of the motive of gain, those assumptions laid the foundations for 
the contemporary emphasis on exchange relations. These, of course, are relations 
which orthodox neoclassical economists have historically and repeatedly taken for 
granted or defended as beyond question. It is such assumptions of the propensity to 
exchange that feeds the delusion that globalization is merely market driven. It is also 
one which has had enormous material impacts ever since it was formulated, hence 
                                                          
1 Polanyi does not mention knowledge as another fictitious commodity. For him, commodification 
takes place when man and nature are considered to be available for sale, and when the operation of 
markets for land aim to extract rent from it. Likewise, the market for labour produces profits in the 
form of wages, and interest is considered the gain which can be obtained from money markets (1957). 
All these considerations are discussed in Chapter One of this thesis.   
2 Benefiting from an anthropological perspective, Polanyi argues that there are important ways in 
which an economy has historically been organized, such as reciprocity, redistribution, exchange and 
householding. All of these organizing principles of behaviour follow social arrangements and make use 
of different patterns such as centricity and symmetry, autarchy and market. For some ancient societies, 
 346
contributing towards shaping the world we live in. As the contemporary concern for 
trade and investment flows rises, it is important that I turn to the discussion of 
multilateral and regional ideas and scenarios in the following section.        
 
 
MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM TRENDS 
 
Nowhere else but in the works of orthodox neoclassical economists on regional or 
preferential trade areas are the emphatic assumptions that relations of exchange drive 
the social process so blatantly evident. Since Viner wrote about trade diversion and 
trade creation in the 1950s, the debate has evolved through different phases 
(Bhagwati, 1999; Panagariya, 1999a; Serra, et al, 1997; Mansfield and Milner, 1999, 
and 1997).3 The original issue discussed was trade creation, or welfare improvement, 
among members of a regional or preferential trade agreement, which encourages the 
production of goods where costs are more competitive. Thus, it shifts imports from 
inefficient to efficient sources. Conversely, the trade diversion issue shifts imports 
from an efficient source to an inefficient one. Moreover, it assumes that the gains for 
a country come from a reduction in the partner’s trade tariffs, otherwise welfare is 
reduced. On top of that, the protection against outsiders is considered to be relative to 
the size of the external trade barriers.4 Hence, the country which liberalizes most is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the reciprocal and redistributive practices in particular were organized to guarantee order in production 
and distribution (Polanyi, 1957, 1992 and 1996).   
3 Viner’s influential publication was entitled The Customs Union Issue. His emphasis focused on the 
immediate effects of market integration, and was deemed as a ‘static time-path analysis’. In contrast,  
‘dynamic time-path analysis’ is deemed to pay more attention to trade creation and trade diversion 
effects through time (Bhagwati, 1999; Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1999; Bhagwati, Greenaway, and 
Panagariya, 1998).  
4 The issue of the external trade barrier is significant, as there are important differences which need to 
be taken into account. The members of a free trade area individually set and maintain their own 
external tariffs, whereas, in a customs union, there is a stronger harmonization, as members apply a 
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deemed likely to face a loss, considering that benefits can only come in the form of a 
preferential access to a partner’s market, whereas by granting the partner a similar 
access to its own market the country might be hurt.  
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that not only may trade flows face diversion or 
creation, but also investment flows may face similar conditions (Serra et al, 1997). 
Neoclassical economists contend that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade play 
mutually supportive roles. They argue, in particular, that growing trade and FDI flows 
allow specialization and a more efficient production of goods, the reason being that 
both trade and investment benefit from an increased functional mobility of capital and 
technology supply.5 As with trade, the legal and institutional arrangements on 
investment are covered in multilayered rules which encompass diverse approaches 
and rules, at the national, bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral levels (World 
Trade Organization, 1996).6 Yet, regulatory frameworks aside, it is evident that FDI is 
                                                                                                                                                                      
common external tariff on goods imported from outside countries. A deeper stage of integration is 
reached at the Common Market level where additional internal factor movement includes not only 
goods and services, but also capital and people, within the area defined by the member States 
(Bhagwati, and Panagariya, 1999). A monetary and economic union, such as the European Union 
(EU), requires a greater degree of harmonization of economic policies to set a common currency 
amongst the members. Even though the Euro has not been adopted by all the members of the EU, 
analysts consider it may merely be a matter of time before all the 15 members of 1995 adopt it. For the 
10 brand new members recently admitted in 2004, though, it might take longer.  
5 Foreign Direct Investment takes mainly the form of assets acquisition by an investor in a host 
country, with presumably the intention of managing these assets. It is important to highlight that the 
asset might be a firm, a parent, or an affiliate, or a subsidiary. The investment can take different forms 
such as equity capital, reinvested earnings or even the borrowing and lending of funds between main 
firms and affiliates (World Trade Organization, 1996).   
6 The different layers of legal frameworks include specific bilateral treaties; the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development investment instruments; the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade instruments such as the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS); regional agreements such as the North America Free Trade Agreement and the European 
Union; and even domestic organizations and multilateral agencies (Serra et al, 1997). 
A contrasting approach to the contemporary convergence criteria and push for harmonization was the 
Calvo Doctrine. This was named after an Argentinean diplomat, who argued that jurisdiction in 
international investment disputes lies with the country in which the investment is located. Thus, the 
investor has no recourse but to use the local courts and remedies, and must waive diplomatic protection 
from their home countries (Serra et al, 1997). Formulated in the mid 19th century, a period of time in 
which the relatively newly independent Latin American countries repeatedly faced threats, military 
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highly concentrated amongst the most developed economies of the world, which 
cluster in three main regions. They are Western Europe, particularly European Union 
members, North America, especially the United States, and East Asia, mainly Japan 
and China. Even though there has been an increase in the volume, value and 
frequency of Foreign Direct Investment outflows and inflows among specific 
developing economies, the biggest share remains clearly concentrated in the triad 
(Mansfield and Milner, 1999, and 1997).  
 
Since the 1980s, trade liberalization in developing and developed economies alike has 
been accompanied by private investment liberalization. Although regional and 
preferential trade agreements do not necessarily harm non-members, they are not 
regarded as necessarily benign either. The association between trade and investment 
flows is presented as mutually supportive (World Trade Organization, 1996; Serra et 
al, 1997). Similarly to the creation vs. diversion arguments about trade, investors 
‘create’ when they choose to invest in a partner country when otherwise they would 
have invested at home, or not invested at all. Yet ‘diversion’ is said to happen when 
investments in a country displace investments somewhere else (Serra et al, 1997). 
Therefore, the attraction of trade and investment flows, which has been one of the 
fundamental objectives of economic restructuring in developing countries and of 
regional and preferential trade areas consist of components of the same package of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
interventions and wars against foreign States, it aimed to provide a legal shield against extraterritorial 
regulations from the foreign countries which tended to oversee the host national laws and rules.  The 
Calvo Doctrine would prohibit the use of diplomatic intervention as a method of enforcing private 
claims before local remedies have been exhausted. Clauses of the doctrine can be found in 
constitutions, treaties, statutes, and contracts, as they are used chiefly in concession contracts; they 
attempted to give local courts final jurisdiction and to obviate any appeals to diplomatic intervention. 
Narrower in scope than the Calvo Doctrine, from which it grew, the Drago Doctrine, formulated by 
another Argentinean, maintained that no public debt should be collected from a sovereign State by 
armed forces or through the occupation of its territory by a foreign country.   
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reforms which contribute towards building the commodification process already 
discussed in Chapter Four.  
      
The delusion of market inevitability is manifested in various other guises. No wonder 
that, in keeping the underlying assumption that exchange relations drive social 
processes, exponents of neoclassical orthodoxy have discussed whether regional or 
preferential trade agreements constitute building blocks or stumbling blocks in the 
creation of a multilateral trade order. Universal free and open trade is meant to be the 
ultimate goal, not only for governments, but also for international society. In strictly 
normative terms, the proliferation of trade agreements since the 1980s is perceived to 
be inherently discriminatory, as it is feared that they detract from true liberalization 
and, therefore, fragment the world trading system (Bhagwati, and Panagariya, 1999; 
Panagariya, 1999a).   
 
Yet, making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, it is possible to see that such an 
unfortunate outcome is unlikely to ensue. It is necessary to take into consideration 
that different levels of negotiation, i.e. regional and multilateral ones, are not strictly 
speaking opposed to each other as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) make evident.7 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Following those doctrines, some Latin American countries delayed entering international investment 
agreements until the 1980s. However, ever since, they have been to accept international arbitration to 
resolve disputes between investors and governments.     
7 As part of the Bretton Woods agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
meant to be a temporary accord until the proposed International Trade Organization came into force. 
Since the United States Congress failed to ratify this organization, the GATT as a multilateral forum 
for tariff negotiations had become the primary international trade agency based on the principles of 
non-discrimination, reciprocity, transparency and fairness, epitomized in the Most Favoured Nation 
clause. Five decades and various increasingly complex negotiation rounds later, the GATT became one 
of the key pillars of the World Trade Organization, which, in addition to trade in goods, also included 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for the service sectors; regulations for Trade in 
Intellectual Property Rights, involving patents, brands, designs, etc.; a dispute settlement mechanism 
which encourages members to settle their differences by consultation; and the Trade Policy Review 
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Regarding the trade of goods, the exception to the Most Favoured Nation clause is 
GATT’s article XXIV, which entails permission to set customs unions and free trade 
areas. Even if it provides that duties and other regulations are not to be increased or 
made more restrictive than the ones previously in effect, it has been the subject of 
interminable controversy. Furthermore, part IV, added in the mid 1960s to benefit 
mainly developing countries, along with the enabling clause of the late 1970s, has 
also been criticised on the basis of inconsistency, controversy and overlapping which 
violates the letter and spirit of the accord.8 In addition to goods, the GATS article V 
on trade in services requires countries to refrain from raising the overall levels of 
barriers beyond the levels in existence prior to the agreement. It also provides for 
arbitration between parties (Bhagwati, 1999; Panagariya, 1999a; Serra et al, 1997).     
 
The main difference between the regionalist momentum of the 1950s and 1960s and 
the one in operation since the 1980s, reveals key players in the economic processes. 
Of these, only the European Economic Community of the time, later reconstituted as a 
monetary and economic union, and the European Free Trade Association successfully 
emerged. Despite the fact that there were many attempts amongst developing 
countries to forge regional and preferential trade agreements, a large number of them 
were not fully operational. At this time, the United States preferred to follow 
multilateral moves, pushing for concessions within the GATT rounds. This position 
                                                                                                                                                                      
mechanism which periodically scrutinizes the transparency of the members’ trade policies; among 
other provisions. The idea behind the WTO as a more comprehensive organization reflected the 
dynamic character and growing complexity of international trade, which, in some cases, was 
completely absent and beyond the regulatory capabilities of the former GATT.  
Nonetheless, there is one important issue to bear in mind. The Most Favoured Nation treatment must 
not be confused with total universalism, as it applies to members only. Thus, inclusive as it is, it falls 
short of being universal.    
8 GATT’s part IV and the Enabling Clause granted one-way partial tariff preferences from developed 
States to developing States; whilst the latter were also given the right to exchange two-way partial 
trade preferences (Panagariya, 1999a).  
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has changed with the revival of regionalism as the US has become actively involved 
in negotiating regional and preferential trade agreements, albeit without abandoning 
the multilateral commitment to the Most Favoured Nation principle, and by means of 
this strategy aiming to benefit from any reduction in trade barriers.9 Because the 
United States is such a big market, it comes as no surprise that it has truly 
international and relatively diversified trade and investment partnerships throughout 
the world (Mansfield and Milner, 1999 and 1997). In addition to the European Union, 
Japan, China, some other South East Asian Economies, the North America Free Trade 
Agreement members, Canada and Mexico are amongst their most significant trade 
partners.       
 
Economic exchanges, typically exemplified by trade, are regarded as forces which, if 
open, deliver growth. Therefore, there is supposed to be a great incentive for most 
economies of the world to completely open their markets, although there is no 
conclusive evidence of this (Rodrik, 1999). Furthermore, ceteris paribus it is argued 
that such openings work as an integrating force bringing economies together. In this 
respect, it is sometimes associated with the idea of integration. Nevertheless, 
integration is not merely an economically driven phenomenon, a point which will be 
further discussed in Chapter Eight. With the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to 
observe that, in historical terms, free trade has been the exception rather than the rule. 
Protectionism has been a pervasive feature of the world economy, where the 
                                                          
9 The controversial trade policy of the United States has historically been unilateral. Discretionary acts 
were empowered by regulations such as Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, which granted the 
provision for retaliation against foreign practices which ‘unreasonably’ restricted US exports. 
Moreover, the Omnibus Trade Practices Act of 1988 strengthened the 1974 Section 301 by introducing 
the Super 301 and Special 301 provisions. However, the World Trade Organization mechanism for 
settling disputes and the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights reduced the scope for the 
application of the above mentioned provisions (Panagariya, 1999b). The Trade Act of 2002 currently 
regulates trade related issues of the United States.   
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champions of liberalism abroad restrict access to some of their specific and valuable 
markets and niches.10  
 
Along with market concerns, there have also been experiences of policy driven 
regional integration with various mixes of motives in the European Union, the North 
America Free Trade Agreement, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, etc. The 
Strategic Relational Approach allows us to see that limiting the explanation of 
contemporary regionalism to exchange relations can be quite misleading and provides 
a partial and deterministic picture.11 For, it is the argument presented in this thesis 
that economic activities must not be considered in isolation, only leading the social 
processes. On the contrary, economic activities are part of these processes, because 
they are submerged in a broader social context. Although they are crucially important 
factors to take into account, this is not the same thing as saying that we can reduce our 
analysis of social and political processes to purely economic terms, as we run the risk 
of falling into deterministic accounts.  
 
Amongst the extra-economic reasons presented by orthodox neoclassical economists 
for developing economies to pursue international trade and investment agreements, 
some of the political issues highlighted include security, bargaining power, 
cooperation and ‘lock in’ effects (World Bank, 2000a). Regional integration schemes 
deliver enhanced security to members, because growing international trade exchanges 
                                                          
10 For instance, agriculture has historically been one of the most complex and contentious cases in the 
GATT negotiation rounds. Some of the issues which nowadays tend to be associated with the trade 
agenda such as labour standards, human rights, the environment, and national sovereignty are not 
exempt from controversy, as such broadening issues are perceived as unacceptable penetration and 
expansion into domestic economies (Gilpin, 2001). 
11 It must be stated clearly that the approach selected in this thesis is not the only one capable of 
delivering complex explanations. Yet, due to the balanced assessment of a range of variables and 
factors, for the purposes of process-tracing, it constitutes a superb option.  
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are perceived to reduce the risk of military conflict between partners. Additionally, 
trade blocks are deemed to enhance bargaining capabilities which, in a collective 
negotiation with the developed economies, could enable them to reach fairer 
reciprocal deals.12 Arguably, the terms of competition and economies of scale should 
have a positive effect on lowering prices and improving the terms of trade. Still, this 
is only on the proviso that there are perfect ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-adjusting’ 
markets. Orthodox views have recommended channelling the political impetus for 
trade blocks currently visible in developing economies into new associations with 
developed economies.13 Complementing this view, it is worth taking trouble to ensure 
that as many agreements as possible are compatible, in order to avoid and reduce 
uncertainty among partners and investors (World Bank, 2000a).     
 
Moreover, some additional political advantages of pursuing trade blocks are that 
benefits may spill over from exchange relations to issues where there might be more 
scope for cooperation and mutual gain, relying on mutual trust. Finally, another 
political advantage considered of relevance regards the perception of commitment 
from countries which have embarked on economic restructuring. By joining trade 
                                                          
12 For the World Bank, an association featuring neighbouring countries is preferred, rather than a cartel 
(2000a). The former follows a more traditional format based on geographical proximity. For the latter, 
members may combine to control production and to avoid competing with each other, like the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Even though the bargaining capacities of this 
organization are not as strong nowadays as they used to be in the late 1970s and early 1980s, their 
leverage is still of concern, as oil is still the main energy resource throughout the world.     
13 Whereas an association amongst developed economies discriminates against developing countries, 
benefiting those members within the block which are the closest competitors at the expense of 
developing countries; a trade block integrated by developing economies helps its members to compete 
against the developed countries, which happen to be normally the highest income countries in the 
block. The World Bank claims that due to comparative advantages, North-North blocks result in 
increasing degrees of convergence, as they help these countries within the block to discriminate against 
their closest competitors from the South (2000a). Yet, regarding a South-South association, the 
outcome is the opposite, namely divergence within the blocks formed by developing economies. What 
happens is that by discriminating against the North, middle-income countries gain market share at the 
expense of the poorer members. Therefore, the advice for both developing and emerging economies, 
points towards concerted multilateralism and open access to membership of the main blocks of 
developed economies (World Bank, 2000a).    
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blocks and schemes of regional integration, it is argued that the economic adjustments 
could be locked in, inducing the countries involved to adhere to the new orientation of 
economic policies (World Bank, 2000a). As should be clear by now, what this means 
in most of the cases is the promotion of less intensive regulatory frameworks for 
economic activities, converting non-tariff barriers into diminishing tariffs, liberalizing 
trade and investment flows and implementing the privatization initiatives of 
government owned enterprises. Furthermore, those economic adjustments are now 
presented as incomplete and in need of being matched to institutional reforms. I focus 
on this institutional turn after the following discussion about the dynamic and open 
ended character of the regional social processes which sharply contrasts with the 
frameworks of closed system which are static and unrealistic.      
 
 
THE POLITICAL CONTINGENCY OF REGIONAL SOCIAL PROCESSES  
 
The assumption that the openness of an economy is correlated to its rate of growth is 
not backed by any conclusive evidence. Not only is there a weak association between 
trade barrier levels and long term growth, but it is also contingent on some 
complementary policies and institutions (Rodrik, 1999). Moreover, the concern for 
equity is non-existent and the systematic neglect of the role and capabilities of 
agencies renders neoclassical economic orthodoxy controversial and unrealistic, as 
stressed throughout this thesis, and supported by the Strategic Relational Approach.  
 
Even though it is important to highlight the significance of investment and 
macroeconomic policies, the claim that the more open an economy is the greater the 
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rates of growth, is contrary to the empirical evidence of the lost decade of economic 
growth in Latin America and some other regions of the world. It is no secret that such 
inconsistencies have systematically been ignored by neoclassical economists. In 
addition, the series of economic and financial crises which have occurred since the 
1980s have been seized as opportunites to restructure economies. In particular, they 
have been the premise for the introduction of a new ‘free market’ orientation, as 
defended originally by the Washington Consensus and, currently, by the post 
Washington Consensus. The controversy arises because, in many cases, the 
imposition or induction of detailed economic prescriptions on legitimate governments 
has gone beyond theoretical consistency or empirical evidence. However, there does 
seem to be a stronger association between an economy with strong rates of economic 
growth and the ability to attract trade and flows of Foreign Direct Investment (Rodrik, 
1999).   
 
Nonetheless, to leave aside issues of governance and accountability by privileging 
alleged market imperatives is problematic and irresponsible. A key deficiency of the 
former structural adjustment programmes, which themselves are externally induced 
and vertically implemented from the top of society to the bottom, lies in the failure to 
give consideration to the participation of social groups. Within a democratic decision-
making process, the decision to submit to external disciplines runs the risk of being 
counter-productive, especially if unsatisfied domestic conditions and demands are 
relegated in order to meet other demands or objectives. Subjecting economies to an 
alleged market discipline, which constrains without determining the orientation of 
public policies, raises problems of democratic governance, because financial markets 
and actors are empowered over other social constituencies (Rodrik, 1999). Needless 
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to say, such a course of action is unaccountable, therefore undemocratic and 
unacceptable, both in terms of economic efficiency and for societal outcomes. As 
already discussed in Chapter Three, a former uncritical acceptance of neoclassical 
economic axioms is transformed into a domestic self-induced political priority. Since 
openness guarantees neither growth nor equity, the orientation of economic policies is 
clearly a political decision, because of the submersion of markets in larger social and 
political systems.   
 
Without diminishing the importance of economic activities and exchanges, it is clear 
that they are not the only factor which explains the second wave of regional and 
preferential agreements. For regionalism, geographical proximity and contiguity are 
quite as important as the cohesion of the region. The latter can be understood in 
historical, social, economic, political, organizational, and even military terms. Since 
the limits of a region do not necessarily need to coincide with national boundaries, 
their multidimensional character is something which must not be overlooked (Fawcett 
and Hurrell, 1995; Mansfield and Milner, 1999 and 1997). As with globalization, 
regionalism is a process always in the making, in which tendencies and 
countertendencies interact, led by situated agents in context. Rather than being 
contradictory to international, global, transnational or national trends, regionalism is 
symbiotic and successfully coexists with other dynamic and open ended processes, 
such as local agendas, at the same time as it contributes towards their never ending 
modification. Therefore, regionalism is never an organizing principle for any system, 
because it constitutes only one of many pillars supporting an evolving international 
order.   
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Making use of the Strategic Relational Approach, we can see that regionalism has 
been a process originated from within society. It is a process from within and from 
below the particular regions themselves, indeed, much more so than has been 
acknowledged hitherto. It has allowed a significant role for agencies to engage and 
develop their own varieties of social, political, military, regulatory and economic 
environments, trends and counter-trends. One of the reasons for such dynamism lies 
in the comprehensive multidimensional processes by which social, political, economic 
and cultural formal and informal networking has developed. They are, clearly, in 
many important respects, not necessarily following their own governments. Consider 
the example of migratory trends; despite government efforts to halt the flow of 
migrants, to those who aspire for a higher living standard these trends are stronger 
and more numerous than the official disincentives to migrate.    
 
Perhaps more accurately, an incredible spectrum of networking practices has been 
actively engaged in leading and shaping the processes. The flexibility of formal and 
informal networks has reached and impacted upon the levels of political cooperation 
among governments, as well as on the ostensibly ‘self-regulating’ and ‘self-adjusting’ 
market in many cases, by moving and adapting faster than they have. Thus, 
networking cannot be discounted in any serious analysis of governance. Examples 
abound. Non-governmental organizations, pressure groups and religious cults, rely, 
among other resources and strategies, on networking practices to spread the reach and 
impact of their agendas.  
  
The dynamics of various dimensions, such as culture, security, economic policies and 
the political regime, are not only inherent in the processes of regionalization, but also 
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cause multi-level interactions. If issues closely associated with such dimensions, such 
as security, development and ecological sustainability are to be tackled, there is no 
way that the ill-equipped market driven delusion can face them. There is clearly 
political room for manoeuvre to decisively act in favour of crucial values, goals or 
agendas. Hence, the transformative capacity of the situated agents in context is 
undeniably crucial in the power interactions which continuously shape the social 
processes of change, at the same time as they are affected by the conditions which 
surround them.14  
 
The characteristic degrees of regionness can be identified in geographic units within 
certain time spans (Hettne, 1999). The geography of natural physical barriers provides 
the areas where the relations between social groups can be organized in a range of 
different fields. They include, but are not limited to, culture, the economy, polity and 
the military. The interactions within society act as windows of opportunity and 
constraint where there is room for manoeuvre in communication, values, and agendas 
for the acting subjects. Hence, it is possible to identify current and prospective 
material and ideational conditions over which the transformative capacity of agency 
can be exercised. For instance, it has been argued that developmental regionalism, so 
long as it takes place within a large enough geographical area, allows viable economic 
practices with adequate resource management and effective articulation. Such a 
scenario, which additionally enjoys social stability, credibility, a peace dividend and 
                                                          
14 Limited space prevents me from further expanding on important areas here. For instance, the fact 
that the emphasis of the present work is on the non-violent punctuated evolutionary processes of 
change does not mean that military and security concerns are considered irrelevant. On the contrary, 
they clearly add a different dimension to the processes, as the multilayered interactions with them show 
distinctive features. 
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ecological sustainability is, therefore, a goal worth fighting for (Hettne, 1999; Hettne, 
Inotai, and Sunkel, 1999 and 2000).  
 
Sadly, despite discursive and marketing strategies, a comprehensive approach 
attentive to specific social and political conditions is not the sort which is promoted 
by international organizations. Bearing in mind the leverage which these 
organizations have, the recommendations they make, the goals they aim for, the 
methods they use and the orientation of their policies, in a number of cases they tend 
to follow doctrinaire mandates, rather than tailoring appropriate suggestions. The 
controversy surrounding the second generation of economic reforms for several 
countries, which are either currently undergoing or have undergone structural 
adjustment programmes in the past, is of relevance. Due to the fact that they aim to 
emphasize the role of institutions as complementary tools for market mechanisms, 
they leave untouched key unrealistic and inconsistent assumptions and methods. 
Paying specific attention to the case of the World Bank, the next section analyses and 
illustrates the ostensible friendliness of ‘self-adjusting’ and ‘self-regulating’ markets 
alongside institutional frameworks, as they have been identified as exemplifying the 
influence of the post Washington Consensus.    
   
 
ADDING FRIENDSHIP AXIOMS:  MARKETS IN NEED OF INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEMENTS 
 
The World Bank, as one of the most important international organizations engaged in 
helping member countries reach higher levels of development, has been heavily 
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criticised for the inadequacy of its recommendations and the ‘one size fits all’ recipes 
for its member countries. The ‘market friendly’ approach which this organization 
promotes is by no means unproblematic, as discussed in Chapter Three. Consider, for 
instance, the recommended strategies for matching the State’s role to its capabilities, 
on the one hand, and the advice to raise the State’s capabilities by reinvigorating 
public institutions on the other. We are told that the main task of the State is to find 
ways to narrow the gaps between the demands placed by its different constituencies 
and its ability to undertake and promote efficient collective action (World Bank, 
1997b).  
 
Using the Strategic Relational Approach, it becomes clear that the World Bank’s 
recommended strategy to match the State’s role to its capabilities is oriented towards 
commodification processes. It induces certain specific courses of action for the 
governments to operate as complements of markets, as it explicitly gives a recipe for 
delimiting actions, specifying omissions and advising on strategies. For the World 
Bank, the top priorities for developing economies include achieving and maintaining 
macroeconomic stability, the attraction of private investment, economic consistency 
among governmental policies, and the aim on investing in infrastructure and social 
services. Furthermore, it recommends establishing a foundation of law and protecting 
vulnerable sectors of society and the environment. In so doing, it not only gives 
economic advice but, most importantly, it also adds a more explicit political 
dimension to its recommendations (World Bank, 1997b).15 
                                                          
15 In order to reach the aim of raising the State’s capacity to undertake and deliver efficient collective 
action by reinvigorating public institutions, the World Bank believes that abiding by the rule of law is a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for reaching the goal of sustainable development. The 
provision of openness, transparency and incentives to follow the rules and keep arbitrary action in 
check aims to avoid the ‘lawlessness syndrome’. The recommended reforms for the macroeconomic 
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Even though the World Bank pays attention to the role and potential of human 
agency, the difference is that there seems to be more emphasis on channelling or 
orientating the actors’ capabilities towards economic imperatives. In this view, the 
inculcation of market oriented rationality habits could be considered as a core element 
of the unitary actor profile which is attentive to the institutional framework, on the 
one hand, but also of the State’s set of strategies, on the other. Since economic 
rationality needs to be constructed, as it is not naturally given, the induced 
performances of the rational unitary actor legitimise the construction of positivist 
philosophical positions and the stance of neoclassical economic orthodoxy. 
Institutional reforms, such as the ones undertaken for the implementation of structural 
and sectoral economic adjustment programmes, are constructed as vital components 
of the context in which agencies are situated. Furthermore, the modification in the 
role of the State aims to reinforce the creation of economic rationality, inducing the 
making of ‘homo economicus’ within an institutional environment (Williams, 1999).   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
policies focus on exchange rates, fiscal and trade policies, whereas the reforms in the institutional 
structures pay attention to regulation, social services, finances and infrastructure (World Bank, 1997b). 
The message that the State should act as a ‘partner, catalyst and facilitator’, at the same time that it 
needs to reinvigorate the public institutions which provide the foundations of the markets, makes the 
World Bank adopt a structural perspective on the fluid dynamic of the processes of social change. 
Since it is contended by the Strategic Relational Approach that economic transactions and activities do 
not take place in static conditions, the social and political embeddedness of markets bring uneasiness, 
indeterminacy and contingency to the processes. Chapter Three argues, among other things, that the 
capacity for change lies in the way in which policies are implemented, because agencies have a role to 
play. The denial of their power to embark on and undertake processes of social change, undoubtedly, 
promotes, either openly or covertly, inaction, passive behaviour, submission and acceptance of the 
status quo. Although important as a macro-economic stable environment might be in the supposed 
justification for the attraction of trade and investment flows, social and political particularities need to 
be taken into account as well. This is not the same thing as saying that the context in which market 
players are situated determines the final outcome of each transaction. Rather, the point being stressed is 
that collective and individual actors alike have the potential to influence, promote and achieve changes, 
as already discussed.  
 362
In addition to the dissemination of the World Bank’s structural view of the State, it 
places a heavy emphasis on the scope and importance of institutional reforms. From 
this perspective, it comes as no surprise that the set of formal and informal rules in a 
society which shape human interaction are crucial for economic performance (North, 
1990a).  According to the World Bank, the State should match its institutional 
capabilities and actions, if it is to provide a consistent implementation of policies. 
Moreover, it further contends that institutions and governments can play a role in 
ameliorating and narrowing technical knowledge gaps and information asymmetries, 
which is crucial for improving development and standards of living.16 Since it is 
acknowledged that institutions matter as one of the core elements of an inclusive 
social process which is responsive to changing circumstances, they are crucial for 
various tasks such as governance, negotiation, coordination and regulation (World 
Bank, 1999). Highlighting not only policies, but also processes, institutions are 
perceived by World Bank officials to be fundamental prerequisites for the 
achievement of sustainable economic development.17  
 
                                                          
16 We are told that know-how gaps and information problems could at least be improved or even 
solved by a focus from both institutions and governments on quality verification, monitoring and 
enforcing performance, ensuring disclosure and dissemination, and facilitating the acquisition, 
absorption and communication of knowledge (World Bank, 1998). Thanks to Matthew Watson for 
clarifying that one of the sources of this claim is Romer’s work on endogenous growth theory (cf. 
Romer, 1986, and 1990).   
17 The organizational leverage which international organizations display in the promotion of their 
‘market friendly’ and institutional agenda cannot be ignored by developing countries. Consider, for 
instance, the World Bank’s recommendations for building effective institutions. They include the 
advice to render complementary existing institutions, human capabilities and technologies. It is also 
recommended that successful innovation can help institutions work, even if some innovation efforts 
may not be successful. Additionally, flows of open information and trade are regarded as fundamental 
for connecting market players, while the promotion of competition among jurisdictions and diverse 
actors such as firms and individuals is highly ranked as well (World Bank, 2001). The picture we get 
from this is that institutional design is relevant for firms, government and society, and being a channel 
of information about market conditions, goods and participants is an important function for the State to 
perform. Another relevant issue is the definition and enforcement of property rights and contracts. 
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However, important as these arguments are, they leave out one important detail. They 
fail to recognise that institutions themselves cannot guarantee any specific outcome at 
all. No-one considers that the role played by agencies is crucial for the achievement 
of economic, political and social goals. It is explained in Chapter Two that institutions 
are never a sufficient condition for change, as they need to be processed 
endogenously by the situated agents in context. Furthermore, whatever the character 
of social change, in its economic, political and cultural dimensions, they must become 
part of the actors, either as individual or collectively. Only by endogenously 
digesting, internally incorporating and reproducing the dynamics of change can actors 
contribute to the ongoing tendencies and counter-tendencies featured in all social 
processes. Since power is immanent in all social interactions, the capability for 
transformation is not structurally determined by institutional features. Where a 
qualitative social, political or economic transformation is required, the political 
character of power as a core factor of change needs to be taken into account.  
 
Influential and important as international organizations are, their opinions are 
formulated with the assumption that the existence of a profit rationale is sufficient for 
all social activities. Even though it is no doubt important for private firms, when it 
comes to the public sector, concerns other than economic objectives are relevant. As 
has been discussed in previous chapters, according to Polanyi, the expansion of 
markets and economic activities creates the need for a guarantee and expansion of 
social protection from the markets (1957, 1992, and 1996). It has also been discussed 
that, for Schumpeter, the cyclical fluctuations which foster the continual emergence of 
new economic and social forms are never exclusively economic (1934, 1954, and 
1996). Unlike labour and land which are naturally given, money and knowledge are 
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socially produced, but have also been commodified. In so doing, they are incorporated 
into a discursively induced trend modelled on asocial and ahistorical assumptions and 
axioms.18    
 
With the benefit of hindsight after various decades of monitoring and evaluating a 
range of different experiences associated with the processes of economic 
restructuring, the World Bank has attempted to incorporate political and social 
insights into its analysis, as the last series of its reports shows. For instance, without 
downgrading the importance of ‘economic fundamentals’, the inclusion of social and 
political insights for attacking poverty emphasise the promotion of economic 
opportunities, the facilitation of empowerment and the enhancing of security for the 
worst off. This is an issue which should not be postponed any longer. Nevertheless, 
the World Bank affirms the role of institutions and their interactions with some other 
social and political factors, such as their power to help in reducing the vulnerability, 
lack of voice, power and representation that feature in poverty scenarios (World 
Bank, 2000). The World Bank, echoing the claims of many neoclassical economists, 
has stressed the ‘creative’ side and potentiality of institutions as helpful devices for 
achieving stronger rates of growth and, supposedly, of development as well. 
                                                          
18 For instance, it is assumed in World Bank reports that sustainable economic development requires 
institutions. There is also recognition that no explicit guarantee exists that institutions themselves 
would deliver not only growth but equity as well, despite the usefulness of institutions for making clear 
what the rules of the game are. Not only are the sets of formal and informal economic rules never 
formulated on perfect information, but they are put into practice in incomplete markets, where they are 
confronted by inefficiencies and disruptions. Following Stiglitz, I have explored in Chapter Two the 
common character of market and government failures. Contrary to the assumption that minimal 
governments can do no harm, it becomes evident that due to their weaknesses, they can do no good 
either. Rather, it has been explained that government intervention complements the distributive failures 
of markets, just as the latter delivers more efficient non-strategic goods and services. On the one hand, 
as market competition increases, it raises incentives which contribute towards the attenuation of public 
failures. On the other hand, due to its central role in economic activities, the State’s monopoly of the 
power of compulsion facilitates the satisfaction of social needs and the enhancement of openness and 
competition (Stiglitz, 1989, 1994 and 1998b). Furthermore, as discussed in Chapters Five and Six, 
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However, scarce attention has been paid to the ‘destructive’ side of institutions if they 
are poorly implemented and inadequately organized. Making use of the Strategic 
Relational Approach, it becomes evident that weak institutions are not neutral with 
respect to their surrounding social and political contexts, as they tend to favour 
specific sectors and constituencies. Furthermore, the iterated repetition of poor 
institutional practices not only hurts people who do not benefit from any privilege, but 
also due to its path-dependent character, it increases the degree of difficulty which 
challengers encounter when they attempt to break the inertial and harmful formal and 
informal rules and practices.19 Nonetheless, its Bretton Woods sibling, the 
International Monetary Fund, sticks more firmly to ‘self-adjusting’ and ‘self-
regulating’ assumptions in its work.  
 
However, it would be unfair not to recognize that there has been an evolutionary 
lesson with regard to development processes for the World Bank. Originally, the 
emphasis was put more on growth, whereas nowadays equity concerns have 
broadened the agenda. The emphasis on institutions is now reflected on the post 
Washington Consensus which was built upon them. It is precisely to the institutional 
perspective presented and promoted by the Bretton Woods organizations and the 
Washington Consensus that I now turn in the next section of this chapter, where I 
                                                                                                                                                                      
networks can compensate for market and government failures as well, as this mode of governance, 
comparatively speaking, puts more emphasis on redistribution than the other two.   
19 The mutually reinforcing international development goals which the World Bank wants to see 
achieved by 2015 include the promotion of gender equality, primary and secondary school enrolment, 
and health services, along with a reduction of poverty, infant and maternal mortality rates and the rate 
in the loss of environmental resources (World Bank, 2000). After decades of lost economic growth and 
development and pervasive deterioration of living standards, not only in the least developed countries, 
but also in some of the emerging countries, the goals appear harder to achieve than originally expected. 
The implementation of some current economic policies, de-contextualised from the rest of social and 
political processes, tends to favour a concentration of economic profits in a few hands, as historical 
processes all over the world illustrate. It is no secret that the unequal redistribution of wealth has 
reached dramatic proportions in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin-America, where I have paid 
special attention to the Mexican experience in particular.    
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engage in an exploration of the first generation and second generation of economic 
reforms in Latin America, as perceived and promoted in Washington.            
 
 
MACROECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: STILL MISSING 
SOMETHING 
 
The economic reforms which have been implemented in Latin America since the early 
1980s have been discursively constructed as a response to the international debt crisis. 
However, for the purposes of the argument regarding economic restructuring, it 
should be mentioned that the 1982 crisis is considered as a milestone, having its 
origins in the oil crisis which, with some other events, preceded it in the 1970s, as 
discussed in Chapters One, Four and Six. The international debt problems were 
regarded by neoclassical economists as mainly insolvency difficulties. Therefore, 
other neoclassical economists, working within the Bretton Woods organizations, 
pushed for structural adjustment programmes where economies were perceived to 
have failed, while pursuing import substitution industrialization programmes. Since 
major banks in the United States were mainly affected by the insolvency of some 
Latin American economies, finding themselves unable to redeem their international 
debt, the Federal Reserve applied pressure to prevent damage to the US banking 
system and to prevent the crisis from spilling over to other debtors. Using a case by 
case approach, the pragmatic renegotiation of debt rescheduling was followed by the 
implementation of different strategies such as the Brady and Baker plans and the 
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modification of International Monetary Fund conditionality.20 The former, for 
instance, focused mainly on structural adjustment, placing particular emphasis on 
stringent reforms aiming to achieve balance of payments adjustment. IMF 
conditionality started to expand from macroeconomic concerns to agendas which 
came to be known as the Washington Consensus and the second generation of 
economic reforms.  
 
Even though the promotion of prosperity is considered to be the main goal of the 
International Monetary Fund, by confining itself to neoclassical economic models 
which tend to focus solely on observed factors, its performance has fallen short of its 
goals and its modus operandi remains controversial. It has been argued that political 
will and trust from the IMF’s members are key factors in the selection of loan 
candidates, as well as in assessing their performance (Vreeland, 2003). In some cases, 
reaching an economic agreement with the International Monetary Fund can provide a 
government with an external justification for imposing domestic economic reforms, 
shifting the blame for austerity to the Fund. In this way, unpopular policies are tied to 
external conditionality, increasing degrees of leverage and raising the costs for 
national constituencies of rejecting them. Since the responsibility for the 
implementation of the economic programmes lies with a government which reaches 
an agreement with the IMF, there is always room for manoeuvre to decide what 
policies to adopt, with what severity and when (Vreeland, 2003). Thus, the role of 
agency remains crucial, despite discursive allegations to the contrary.    
 
                                                          
20 The 1985 Baker plan was followed by the 1989 Brady plan and, some years later, for the low income 
countries, by the 1996 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, launched by the World Bank and the 
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The IMF programmes discourage growth, worsen inequity and hold a mixed record 
on the promotion of stability. The implementation of their agreements by a number of 
countries shows patterns of deceleration of economic growth and increasingly 
inequitable redistributions of income, benefiting the better-off at the expense of the 
worse-off (Vreeland, 2003). Typically, stabilization and economic adjustment 
programmes, as designed by the IMF, have historically tied loans to different sets of 
conditionality. Furthermore, the fact that the International Monetary Fund only 
reaches agreements with Ministries of Finance in member countries bypasses the 
approval of some other branches of the government, as no ratification is required ex 
ante.21 Yet, in agreements with the IMF, the required policy changes are made ex post 
and the resources which are lent to the member countries are made available over the 
course of the agreement, but only if the observed policy changes are considered to be 
sufficient and satisfactory. The pragmatism of these mechanisms means that 
ratification or the approval of other branches of the government, if required for 
specific policy changes laid out in the agreement, need be of no concern to the 
International Monetary Fund. It is only the executive of the country which needs to 
deal with them (Vreeland, 2003).                  
 
The Washington Consensus has been associated with the ideological agenda of 
neoliberalism for which such economists as Friedman and von Hayek were noted,  
along with the economic programmes implemented during the 1980s and associated 
                                                                                                                                                                      
International Monetary Fund. At the turn of the 21st century, some grass-roots campaigns were aiming 
for complete debt relief or forgiveness for the least developed economies.  
21 The International Monetary Fund’s formal accountability follows a vertical chain of command which 
is out of reach of the populations where the restructuring programmes are put into practice. A handful 
of countries control nearly half the votes, with the United States having a veto power over decisions 
which require a significant majority (Vreeland, 2003). In practice, however, the IMF is easily 
influenced by the preferences of international financiers. Such a non-official mechanism is, in turn, the 
target of incisive criticisms.   
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with Prime Minister Thatcher in the United Kingdom and President Reagan in the 
United States. The label was originally intended to describe a set of economic policy 
reforms and instruments that reached a certain degree of agreement among officials at 
the United States Congress, international financial institutions such as the IMF, the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, economic agencies of the 
US government, the Federal Reserve and think tanks (Williamson, 1990). However, 
the consensus was acknowledged as one for countries other than the United States to 
follow. The main goal of the Washington Consensus was the reactivation and 
promotion of economic growth in Latin America, precluding any concern for 
redistribution.22 The set of economic policies became guidelines for the governments 
of the region to implement, providing another example of the causal and constitutive 
role of ideas which impact upon and transform the material realm.  
 
In practice, some points such as financial liberalization were eagerly implemented, 
whereas others such as tax reforms fell short of the original aspirations.23 
                                                          
22 The policy instruments considered included: a) the elimination of fiscal deficits, b) the redirection of 
public expenditures towards primary education, health and infrastructure; c) the broadening of the tax 
base; d) positive but moderate interest rates; e) the use of a competitive exchange rate to induce growth 
in non-traditional exports; f) progressive replacement of qualitative trade restrictions by decreasing 
tariffs; g) abolition of foreign direct investment barriers; h) privatization of government enterprises; i) 
deregulation for the entry of firms and competition and; j) provision of secure property rights 
(Williamson, 1990).   
23 A key controversial aspect of the implementation of the Washington Consensus was the emphasis on 
financial liberalization. Attracted by the promise of higher rates of productivity and growth, 
governments in different latitudes embarked on a series of reforms of their financial sectors. The 
advice to free markets from ‘financial repression’ was supposed to work in economies with imperfect 
capital markets, by increasing the demand for money, which would help expand the monetary system. 
The rise of expected returns no higher than interest rates would deliver more efficient bank lending 
(McKinnon, 1973). In order to achieve a consistent process of economic liberalization, it was argued 
that the first steps should be oriented towards fiscal control and sound government finances with a 
broad tax base. This would help the government avoid inflation. Furthermore, it was also stressed that 
the privatization of public enterprises would be more beneficial the more mature and well developed 
was the fiscal system in existence. Following from this logic, a core feature of the opening of domestic 
capital markets was meant to be substantial real interest rates, after inflation rates were brought under 
control and fiscal deficits eliminated. Parallel to the liberalization of domestic finance, the 
recommendation went, runs the liberalization of trade, converting non-tariffs into diminishing tariffs. 
They were, in turn, taken as prerequisites for the last stage of liberalization of the foreign exchange. 
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Nevertheless, the overall results for the Latin American economies after years of 
implementation of economic restructuring are still highly disappointing even today. 
Not only have the desired rates of economic growth not been reached, but even 
negative rates have been delivered in some years since the 1980s. Although 
acknowledging that adverse circumstances, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, 
which are beyond any human control, had affected the region as a whole and some 
countries individually, the sustained growth promise remained still unfulfilled even 
for the better off economies during their comparatively best periods. Moreover, an 
unintended consequence seems to have been the dramatically widening income 
distribution gap, which has made the region in general, and some countries in 
particular, quite polarized.   
 
The original expectations of the ten points of the Washington Consensus were that 
capital inflows and export growth would promote the development of labour intensive 
sectors. As such expectations fell short in reality, poor institutional design was 
singled out as the main culprit. Following the language of the markets, a growing 
demand has been heralded for institutional reform in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. As a response to trends of financial integration, stronger and better 
institutions are considered to be critical for macroeconomic stability. Such an 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Once domestic capital markets were fully liberalized, or liberated from any ‘repression’ for borrowing 
and lending, and price levels stable, free international capital mobility could be permitted (McKinnon, 
1991). Those broad and general guidelines for the optimal order of economic liberalization were put 
into practice in the emerging markets during the final two decades of the last century. Still, in some 
cases, they failed and led to spirals of crisis. It is not my argument that the above listed 
recommendations inevitably entailed economic catastrophe. The causal and constitutive role of 
reckless financial liberalization had a critical unexpected consequence after the severe financial crisis 
which adversely impacted beyond the financial sectors in countries such as Russia, Brazil, Argentina, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Mexico during the late 1990s and the early 21st century. 
Nowadays, even former proponents of financial liberalization make a plea for more prudential 
practices in various forums. Enthusiastic advocates of the idea of liberalizing capital markets in 
developing economies from any ‘financial repression’, have subsequently recognised that prudential 
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approach aims to reinforce and maintain the macroeconomic adjustments which most 
countries in that region have gone through during recent decades. Accordingly, it is 
stated that institutions matter because they constitute a set of “…formal and informal 
rules and their enforcement mechanisms that shape the behaviour of individuals and 
organizations in society…” (Burki and Perry, 1998, 11). Their relevance for the sake 
of stability is highlighted.  Nonetheless, stability, in turn, is perceived as irremediably 
threatened by technical and political challenges in the region, where information and 
enforcement problems are significant. The post-Washington Consensus is nothing but 
the promotion of legal, technical and political convergence, where the optimal 
scenario would be that laws, regulations, constitutions and contracts on the formal 
side would harmonize with informal practices based on trust, ethics, values and 
political norms. As a result, all these formal and informal institutions are supposed to 
determine the efficiency and existence of both markets and organizations. Regardless 
of their public or private character, they are expected to provide clear, widely known, 
coherent, universal, predictable, credible, properly and evenly enforced rules (Burki 
and Perry, 1998). The recommendations do not stop there, however. Some guidelines 
even suggest empowering beneficiaries from institutional reforms and compensating 
losers, at the same time as building political support for prospective reforms and 
providing incentives to keep the reforms on track. Needless to say, such a grand 
vision of predictable certainty is extremely unrealistic, as it insists on deductivist 
modes of inference and positivist closed systems assumptions which do not match 
reality, as is argued throughout this thesis.       
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
financial regulations should be observed for economies in the contemporary ‘dollar standard game’ (cf. 
McKinnon, 2002).   
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Orthodox neoclassical explanations for the poor economic results and benefits in the 
countries where the first generation of economic reforms was put into practice tend to 
focus on improper and incomplete implementation. From the same perspective, it is 
also argued that the original emphasis, mainly on economic growth, was too narrow 
and, therefore, needs to be complemented by completing the economic restructuring 
and by pursuing a second generation of institutional reforms. Along with such 
packages, the new agenda includes provisions to reduce the likelihood of crisis and 
social equity concerns (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003).  Reforms which are 
expected to be completed include the deregulation of labour and product markets, 
further trade reforms and the privatization of State owned enterprises, reduction of the 
informal markets, and access to developed markets via the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), as well as the proposed, and still under negotiation, Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). For this orthodox neoclassical view, building the institutional set 
of reforms includes the modernization of the political system, features of the civil 
service, the judiciary and the financial sector.    
 
Even though I cannot say that there has been a dramatic shift in the economic agenda, 
the current emphasis on institutions is presented as an attempt to broaden the narrow 
concern for economic growth. The theoretical lenses of the Strategic Relational 
Approach allow us to see that equity was never a priority for the Washington 
Consensus. This is a claim in line with similar critiques addressed to the Washington 
Consensus (Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003). Despite some acknowledgement of the 
importance of institutions to achieve growth and equity, without taking into account 
the social embeddedness of markets and economic transactions, it seems that the 
initiatives and proposals are not strong enough to achieve sustainable and equitable 
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rates of growth. Though it has one of the most unequal distributions of income and 
assets of the world, the objective of reducing poverty and improving equity without 
sacrificing growth in Latin America is now discussed in international organizations, 
government bodies and academia, as a new and overriding objective. For most of 
those economies, the 1980s and 1990s were clearly decades of economic restructuring 
and disappointing results, especially as regard economic growth, poverty reduction, 
income distribution and social conditions. The challenge of building more visibly just 
societies via concrete economic instruments is one to which no small number of 
analysts channel their professional efforts.24 Not only has it been acknowledged that 
poverty and inequality act as deterrents to growth, they also strengthen and reinforce 
undesirable patterns of polarization and misery. For the second generation of 
economic reforms, some of the institutional economic tools for social equity which 
are now promoted keep the emphasis on economic efficiency, such as maintaining 
fiscal discipline, lowering subsidies to rich people for higher education and reducing 
tax evasion. Additional concerns include keeping an eye on equity issues, such as 
more public spending on social safety nets, protecting workers’ rights and tackling 
discrimination practices (Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001).  
 
Yet, issues that are beyond the reach of domestic economic and institutional reforms 
are trade barriers on commodities and manufactured goods from developing 
economies, as encountered in the biggest and more profitable markets of the world. 
For instance, protectionism against textiles and agricultural imports in the United 
States and the European Union tend to aggravate patterns of poverty, reinforcing 
inequality in countries whose main exports cannot gain and benefit from access to 
                                                          
24 cf. Kuczynski and Williamson, 2003; Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001; Burki and Perry, 1998; and 
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developed markets. Therefore, the reduction or preferably the elimination of support 
policies in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
markets would shift production towards lower cost producers in the developing 
economies and would constitute a step towards a more equitable situation in these 
countries (Birdsall and de la Torre, 2001). These demands are by no means new.25 
They have been on innumerable negotiating tables and, even now, constitute an 
unsolved and, therefore, sensitive issue in trade talks between the United States and 
the European Union. Particularly sensitive in this respect have been subsidies and 
protectionism in sectors such as agriculture, steel and labour intensive services. It is 
no secret that market access is crucial for the outward orientation of economic 
practices and institutions in developing countries.  
 
The Strategic Relational Approach is able to identify the problem: that the 
institutional agenda and reforms, if either poorly implemented or put into practice in a 
way which reinforces existing patterns favourable to inequality, would make such 
goals unattainable. Concisely stated, the danger is that the aim of sustainable and 
equitable growth will not be achieved. Constant repetition of commodification 
practices can only deliver increased commodification, no matter what the change in 
discourse and rhetoric is. If the economic practices, conditions and institutions are 
changed and oriented to serve more equitable purposes, then this could only be 
considered as a preliminary step. As has been shown in Chapter Four, the 
implementation of economic strategies and the use of outwardly oriented economic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
World Bank reports of the last few years among others. 
25 Several negotiation rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later 
turned into the World Trade Organization (WTO), have discussed features of protectionism. Similar 
agendas have been debated in talks within the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and also in an increasing number of regional and bilateral contexts.   
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policies have favoured polarization, de-linking the domestic supply of inputs for 
exportable manufactured goods in contemporary Mexico. Moreover, since a handful 
of firms account for a significant share of the northbound and southbound flows of 
products, their overall impact on the labour market is quite low (Dussel Peters, 1997 
and 2000). If the second generation of economic reforms is to be successful, a much 
stronger and more decisive emphasis on the domestic market must not be delayed, 
certainly if it is to deliver endogenous growth conditions. The risk of 
overemphasizing labour flexibility and inflation targeting is that this does not create 
as many high quality jobs as are needed, nor is it likely to do so in the future either. 
For, an insufficient number of new positions with negative wages in real terms cannot 
deliver sustainable endogenous equitable growth.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Since the processes associated with the inevitability of globalization are patently not 
market-driven, it is necessary to acknowledge the highly political character of 
allegedly economic compulsions. The conviction that the political discourse of 
globalization is an economically driven homogenizing force can also be found in the 
General Equilibrium model. Neither the globalization discourse nor the General 
Equilibrium model acknowledges the institutional differences and social determinants 
of markets, because they are presented as homogenous and convergent.  
 
Based on these unrealistic assumptions nevertheless, the closed system properties of 
the model are used to prescribe political and economic courses of action. The problem 
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of the inapplicability of the mathematically oriented orthodox neoclassical models lies 
in the mismatch between theory and practice, non-realistic assumptions, positivist 
ontology and deductivist inferences. They tend to be asocial, ahistorical, reductionist 
and deterministic and at the same time they rule out the significance of actors to inject 
indeterminacy and uncertainty to the processes.   
 
The concentration of trade and investment flows amongst Western Europe, East Asia 
and North America and their regional arrangements provide a more differentiated and 
more complex picture than the allegedly homogenizing forces of the market do. 
Different spatial scales such as global, regional, national and local are not 
incompatible between them, nor are they incompatible with the significance of actors 
in shaping the conditions which surround them. In this sense, international institutions 
such as GATT / WTO reflect such situations in their frameworks. Furthermore, 
regional blocks have strong political features which are extra-economic and include, 
but are not limited to security, bargaining power, cooperation and ‘lock in’ effects. 
Not only are regional processes political and contingent, but they also originate from 
within society. They originally start from within and from below the particular 
regions themselves. 
 
As noted above, there is no conclusive evidence that the degree of openness of an 
economy is correlated to a strong rate of growth. However, the latter tends to work as 
a magnet for attracting trade and investment flows. For many countries, the uncritical 
acceptance of neoclassical axioms has been transformed into domestic self-induced 
political priorities. By promoting increasing degrees of openness in economies 
through capital inflows and export promotion and, being unaware of equity issues, the 
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Washington Consensus failed to fulfil the promise of greater rates of growth. Even 
when the emphasis on financial liberalization, along with the rest of the first 
generation of economic reforms, was in place, without their results matching the 
expectations of economic growth, the post Washington Consensus focused more on 
institutional reforms.  
 
The second generation of reforms aims to correct the improper and incomplete 
implementation of economic restructuring by reforming the institutional frameworks 
of developing countries. The post Washington Consensus strategies include 
modernizing the national political systems of developing countries, along with 
features of their civil service, their judiciary and their financial sector. Provisions to 
reduce the likelihood of crisis and social equity concerns exist as well. The post 
Washington Consensus strategies also consider the lowering of regulatory 
frameworks for labour and product markets, further trade liberalization and 
privatization programmes, the reduction of informal markets, and increasing market 
access to developed markets.    
 
The importance of institutions for tasks such as governance, negotiation, coordination 
and regulation has been highlighted as one of the flexible elements of social processes 
capable of dealing with changing circumstances. Nevertheless, institutions are in no 
position to guarantee any specific outcome at all, unless they are considered as a tool 
which the situated agents in context might employ. Institutional reforms are not 
neutral, as they display a strong political character which can have positive and 
negative impacts. Rather than being considered a goal, they are means on which the 
actors can rely.     
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Situating Mexico within Non-Deterministic Contexts 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Having discussed key structure and agency issues, as well as the material and 
ideational features of the international context, here I pay more attention to the 
strategically selective circumstances which affect, without necessarily determining, 
the social processes of change in Mexico. Building on the argument presented in 
Chapter Seven, which analyzes a broad panorama of the contemporary international 
context, the emphasis in this chapter is more on the regional scope, although it is by 
no means limited to it. The utility of the application of the Strategic Relational 
Approach for the contextual conditions of that country is that it can deliver important 
insights as well, as we shall see.  
 
Relying on the Strategic Relational approach, in this chapter I discuss those elements 
of the material and ideational international context which are of direct relevance to 
the development experience in Mexico. It opens with a section on the relations 
between the United States and Mexico. Such a myriad of complex and multifaceted 
interactions, history and potentialities, has been, and will remain, of the utmost 
importance for both countries. Then I move towards analyzing the punctuated 
evolutionary economic trajectory of some emerging markets, which is followed by a 
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critical examination of the mid 1990s financial crisis. Despite the severity of the 
crisis, the orientation of the economic policies remained on track. The next part 
focuses on the North America Free Trade Agreement, which has unquestionably been 
successful in its own terms. Trade and investment flows have increased, and the ad-
hoc dispute settlement mechanism has been operating in cases presented by each 
member. Yet, there are immense numbers of things that NAFTA cannot 
accommodate, as it has been narrowly conceived only as a trade agreement, albeit an 
expanded one. Those omissions are of key relevance and must be brought into the 
spotlight along with the relative successes of the agreement if a serious and informed 
discussion is to take place about the prospects of deepening NAFTA. Likewise, the 
current negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas would mean widening 
its scope and membership. These are some of the key issues which have been present 
in the strategically selective context for the social processes of change in Mexico in 
the last few decades. There are also crucial challenges ahead. If there has been room 
for manoeuvre in the past experiences, there is a good chance that there will be more 
room in the future.  
 
 
THE ASYMMETRIC AND DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MEXICO 
AND THE UNITED STATES 
 
The relationship between Mexico and the United States has experienced significant 
changes as it has moved through different historical phases. Ever since their early 
independent days, the degree of importance of the bilateral relationship has ranged 
from conflict to cooperation, as the opening chapter of this thesis suggested. Even 
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though I concentrate on the contemporary period, the weight of the past and the 
historical memory for both sides cannot be completely neglected. Equally 
importantly, the already large, but still widening, range of interactions has been 
informed by ideas, perceptions and myths which account for key unobserved factors 
(Aguayo, 1998).1 They all have also played a causal constitutive role in material 
outcomes, as I hold throughout this thesis.  
 
Using the Strategic Relational Approach, it becomes evident that the asymmetries 
between Mexico and the United States have been key constant variables which 
permeate all the different facets of their relationships. Contrasting availabilities of 
resources, military might, political organization and practices, diplomatic strategies, 
sets of values, cultural characteristics, and so on and so forth, which in the past were 
considered reasons for keeping a certain distance, over recent decades have been 
overtly endorsed as opportunities not to be missed. The different combination of 
elements of consent, coercion and hegemony present in the international system can 
be easily found in the annals of the relationship between the US and Latin American 
countries. Nonetheless, the contemporary period has tilted towards a range of 
methods and strategies to convince Latin America that it is in its interest to actively 
collaborate with the United States, as the scope of shared and similar objectives is 
increasing. Epitomizing the exercise of hegemony has been the US obsession with 
                                                          
1 For instance, Aguayo argues that myths, such as the exceptionalism of the United States which sets 
them apart from the rest of the world, are completely inaccurate and misleading. Similarly, the claim 
that whatever course of action the US takes has only positive repercussions in the international arena is 
clearly discredited. So is the assumption that corruption and inefficiency are pervasive for the public 
sector, but absent from the private realm (Aguayo, 1998). 
However, the misperception of Mexico as an insular, passive and nationalistic country could not be 
farther from the truth. Likewise, the identification of common interests between Mexico and the United 
States does not mean that divergent points of view are out of the question. Taking for granted that the 
orientation of Mexican foreign policy is only guided by principles such as self–determination, non-
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political and economic stability beyond its borders. Features of international regimes 
in some cases were considered secondary as long as they did not threaten the interests 
of individual countries. Such was the case for the former ruling hegemonic party 
which held office in Mexico for seven decades, as already discussed in Chapter Six.2  
 
Ever since the end of the armed phases of the early 20th century Mexican revolution 
there has been an evolving pragmatic understanding between the governments on 
either side of the Rio Bravo.3 Such pragmatism reflects the asymmetries and the ideas 
which each holds of the other. As they inform the courses of action taken and the 
strategies adopted, they yield a causal constitutive role in the material world. The role 
played by intangible elements such as ideas, information, perceptions and even myths 
in the complex and multilevel interactions between the United States and Mexico 
have been mainly, but not exclusively, used to maintain the relationship, not exempt 
from touches of hegemony, and also to maintain the established order (Aguayo, 
1998).   
 
As regards the democratic credentials of the former one party rule in Mexico, the 
United States did not worry unduly about the other’s diplomacy. Mexico’s political 
and economic stability represented a concern for the US, regardless of how good or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
intervention in domestic affairs and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, portrays an idealistic approach 
which neglects its increasing degree of pragmatism (Aguayo, 1998).       
2 Another example is the one provided by Chilean history. On September 11th in the early 1970s, 
Allende, a democratically elected president, was overthrown and killed by the local military, with the 
support of the United States government. Pinochet went on to implement an economic programme 
more in tune with US priorities, and ever since has been portrayed as an example for countries 
embarking on economic restructuring.     
3 The roots and original impulses of the pragmatic understanding between the United States and 
Mexico can be traced back to the late 1920s. After the re-elected President Obregón was assassinated 
in 1928, Dwight Morrow’s US ambassador to Mexico supported Calles and reached a high level of 
understanding with him. During the late 1920s, Calles made important concessions to US oil 
companies in exchange for Washington’s support in preserving his regime’s nationalistic image. 
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bad its democratic model was. The principles which guided the Mexican foreign 
policy of non-intervention, self-determination and peaceful resolution of conflicts 
were not a cause of anxiety to the US, as the latter perceived the former to be 
frequently at odds with them only in matters of secondary importance. Regarding 
more important issues, some United States Department of the Army declassified 
documents stated that “…in case of war… (or any other critical situation) Mexico 
would be an ally of the United States…” (Aguayo, 1998, 56).4 
 
The unwritten rules of the pragmatic understanding evolved after the Second World 
War on commitments to mutual support, established around shared interests. Further 
formal agreements between the two countries have been inspired by the informal and 
pragmatic understanding typified by former Mexican President Calles and former US 
Ambassador Morrow. Although it was never formalized in treaties or protocols, it 
became a tool of the utmost importance for the discreet resolution of differences. As 
the relationships have moved through different historical phases, the pragmatic and 
flexible understanding between the two governments has undergone gradual 
modifications. One of them has been the sometimes overt and sometimes covert, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Although the oil industry was later expropriated in 1938 by Cárdenas, the pragmatic orientation of the 
relationship remained and strengthened over time (Aguayo, 1998). 
4 Nonetheless, in a recent case, the US did not get the unconditional support that it wanted in its self-
proclaimed crusade against terrorism. Holding a temporary seat at the United Nations Security 
Council, Mexico, along with some other countries, did not back the United States’ initiative to attack 
Iraq in 2003. Minor diplomatic skirmishes followed.  
There is no room here for engaging in a discussion about this conflict, which has extremely complex 
historical, geo-strategic, military, religious, energy and political connotations. Suffice it to say that the 
recent open military involvement of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, in its self-proclaimed 
crusade against terrorism, was originally justified on the basis of faulty intelligence and too little 
evidence. Its closest ally, the United Kingdom, was also unable to defend the case for going to war. 
However, this was not an impediment to seizing more direct control over oil and gas resources from 
the region, despite its disclaims to have done otherwise. Those actions are radically transforming with 
unforeseen consequences not only the US relations with the Arab countries but with the whole world. 
In addition to the significance of the energy resources of that region, the US military involvement, 
along with the thorny issue of its overt and covert support of Israel in its conflict with Palestine, 
infuriates nations in this Islamic region, which may yet have serious consequences.  
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support of the US elite in pursuing the economic and political stability favourable to 
their interests in Mexico. In particular, it has supported the latter’s civilian rule 
without democracy (Aguayo, 1998; Mazza, 2001).    
          
Needless to say, the pragmatic understanding between the governments is not limited 
to the adoption of flawed models of government, nor to the increases both in the 
volume and value of economic transactions. Due to the asymmetries between Mexico 
and the United States, when there has been an exercise of coercion from the latter, the 
former has little defence. Regarding security issues, with a small number of armed 
forces and weapons, the pragmatic foreign policy succeeded in preventing Mexico 
from signing a military accord with the US, and from entering the continental military 
alliance embodied in the Rio Pact.5 Yet, the deployment of this strategy during the 
Cold War period faced modifications in the light of changing circumstances. A former 
security strategy of abnegation has been abandoned for a bandwagoning scheme. The 
first one entailed eschewing alliances with any rival of the United States and pursuing 
no foreign policy interests, which in turn, might be perceived as a threat by the latter; 
albeit with little cooperation. The second one has increased the degree of cooperation 
with the US over security issues such as drug trafficking, at the same time as it 
tolerates its unilateral actions and breaches of the bilateral scheme. The current 
strategy also considers building up a military capability to advance joint goals in 
combating narcotic gangs, which are almost unilaterally designed (Domínguez and 
Fernández de Castro, 2001).  
 
                                                          
5 Officially known as the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance. 
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It does not surprise anybody that the alliances which have been forged over drug 
trafficking respond more to US concerns.6 Taking for granted that supply creates its 
own demand, the United States has pursued unilateral moves to ‘certify’ countries in 
their induced fight against drug trafficking. This has, in turn, raised strong criticisms, 
as the US is by such means advancing the extraterritoriality of its jurisdiction without 
full prior negotiation.  
 
Due to the fact that the United States deems international security issues to be highly 
significant, the strategy of bandwagoning is considered to be less cost effective for 
Mexico than the preceding one of abnegation (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 
2001). At the dawn of the 21st century, the US crusade against terrorism is having 
serious repercussions throughout the world which go beyond the scope and aims of 
this thesis.7 Nonetheless, it has already become, and it is likely for some time to 
remain, a strategically selective contextual factor and key referent in the relations of 
the United States with the rest of the world. Therefore, it affects Mexico without 
determining its courses of action, as happened during the period of the Cold War.  
 
                                                          
6 Operations such as Intercept, Condor, Intercept II, Safeguard, Gatekeeper, Casablanca, Thunder, etc. 
have meant an increase in the influence of US activity within Mexico (Domínguez and Fernández de 
Castro, 2001).  
7 After the 2001 terror attacks, terrorism has recently been added to the United States’ security agenda 
against drug trafficking. These two concerns have also been added to the original security agenda of 
Mexico, namely the US itself. The lowering of barriers to facilitate the flow of trade in goods and 
services, as well as investment, have contributed towards making it easier for illegal exchanges and 
transactions to occur. Hence, issues such as drug trafficking and migration, both legal and illegal, have 
profited from reductions in transaction costs which, in turn, have been facilitated by political and 
economic cooperation and institution building (Domínguez and Fernández de Castro, 2001). Still, as 
drug traffickers mainly act as suppliers to the biggest drug market in the world, the efforts to eliminate 
and suppress them in other countries have been as costly as they have been unsuccessful. Much worse, 
it denigrates nations due to the US ‘certification’, which is, in turn, conditioned to a great degree by 
non-drug considerations. As long as the incentives to get a share of such a profitable market exist, the 
only result is that more powerful and better organized cartels emerge to fill and to create vacuums left 
by former ones. Such a promotion of specialized cartels bears a high domestic price beyond the US 
borders. Not only does it contribute towards escalating violence to levels previously unheard of in 
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Tied by geographical proximity, the incessant and dynamic formal and informal 
networks on both sides of the border move faster than, and do not necessarily follow, 
government preferences and official discourses. Making use of the Strategic 
Relational Approach, it is possible to see that the levels of inter-societal cross-
penetration taking place cannot be reduced to economic relations of exchange or 
political issues headed by the respective governments. The multiple layers of identity 
are the incontrovertible evidence that there are very strong social processes and 
dynamics which in its rich and ever-transforming trends and counter-trends narrowly 
defined free trade agreement is unable to capture. Intergovernmental cooperation has 
formalized and institutionalized what is in fact the leading role of the situated actors 
in context, significantly contributing towards changing the conditions surrounding 
them.      
 
Due to the traditionally fragmented nature of the US policy, where different agencies 
deal simultaneously with sometimes overlapping and contrasting agendas and 
priorities, Putnam has suggested that, regarding international negotiations, there 
seems to be a trade-off between the domestic and the international dimensions. In 
particular, for a zero-sum game assumption, the importance given to either one level 
or the other means that the strength and impact of a bargaining position abroad could 
entail a weakening of its circumstances at home or vice versa (Putnam, 1988). Yet, 
the reciprocal interactions between domestic and international affairs for bargaining 
within a more centralized system such as the one in Mexico are not exempt from such 
bargaining scenarios. Furthermore, these dynamics at the national and international 
levels cannot be easily contained and are constituted by counter-trends as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
those societies, but it also corrupts officials and profits from unsatisfied demands and impoverished 
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Consider, for instance, the increasing volume and depth of relations between the two 
countries, where the growing complexity and interactions of the multilayered tapestry 
of actors seem to follow patterns of decentralization at all levels. Such patterns 
respond to the rising numbers of actors involved (Domínguez and Fernández de 
Castro, 2001). 
 
The current outwardly oriented economic strategies have enjoyed support and 
encouragement from Washington. Mexican technocratic governments have been 
praised while some big businesses have flourished, trade and investment flows have 
boomed and the income distribution has widened (see Chapter Four). In addition to 
the growing flows of trade and investment inbound and outbound, there are important 
social dynamics which continuously reshape the relationships between the two 
countries. They are neither merely attributable to the governments’ wills, nor are they 
captured by the narrow framework of the North America Free Trade Agreement.  
 
A discussion of these underlying issues is undertaken after a critical examination of 
the features presented in emerging markets, the Mexican mid 1990s financial crisis 
and some crucial unsolved difficulties of its banking sector. For they clearly provide a 
reference for the contextual circumstances where the demarcation between 
international and domestic scenarios becomes blurred. Though economic problems 
they truly are, they provide evidence that they are a constitutive part of broader social 
processes.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
sectors within inequitable and polarized societies.  
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THE INCREMENTAL PUNCTUATED EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC 
TRAJECTORY IN EMERGING MARKETS   
 
Pursuing the promise of economic growth, plus the attraction of trade and investment 
flows, has been presented by international institutions as the only viable option. It has 
also been domestically adopted as a key priority by emerging economies. In so doing, 
appealing to capital inflows has not only focused on Foreign Direct Investment, but 
also on financial investment. Assuming that financial markets are perfectly integrated 
at the international level, and that capital flows can freely move everywhere, the 
design of some financial strategies is supposed to be up to the challenge of borderless 
competition. Nonetheless, it has puzzled some neoclassical economists why capital is 
far less mobile than it ought to be in an ostensible borderless financial market 
(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980). Contradictory evidence to the unrealistic belief in a 
frictionless market exemplifies the inconsistencies of orthodox economics discussed 
above. Economic transactions and exchanges do not operate in a vacuum under 
conditions of perfect information and experimental control. Rather, they occur within 
a wider political context (Watson, 2001b). They are simply a socially embedded part 
of this context, never an independent and isolated component. Making use of the 
Strategic Relational Approach, it has been acknowledged that ideas can have a causal 
impact on the social construction of outcomes. From this, it follows that critical 
analysis must question the match between axioms and facts which tends to pervade 
neoclassical economics and its modelling propositions. For, if global frictionless 
markets do not exist and frictionless exchanges do not take place, then abstract 
economic laws cannot dictate the patterns of transactions. As such, there is a clear 
need to ‘add political dimensions’ to such inconsistent arguments (Watson, 2001b). 
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Perhaps more appropriately, a whole revision and challenge to taken for granted 
issues and assumptions is due. Hence, the role which agencies play is of key 
importance and must not be left out in the name of theoretical parsimony and 
elegance.    
 
Relying on the attraction of investment inflows not only into productive activities, but 
also in relation to financial capital, a range of emerging markets has faced mixed 
experiences of success and failure. In some particular cases, i.e., South East Asia and 
Latin America, periods of expansion have ended dramatically with the eruption of 
crises and the drastic plummeting of financial prices. Since the 1990s, financial crisis 
in emerging markets have exposed the vulnerability resulting from over-reliance on 
investment flows, poor regulatory frameworks and high levels of debt, especially 
short-term foreign currency denominated debt, whether private or public. Although 
there are no specific indicators which would allow a crisis to be prevented with a high 
degree of certainty without incurring false alarms, for some neoclassical economists, 
there exist some conditions which might be perceived to increase the likelihood of a 
financial collapse.8 A sudden shock which might take different forms, such as a drop 
in real activity, or a slowdown in capital inflows, or the deterioration of the terms of 
trade, or a decline in asset prices, could impact upon the domestic banking system, 
                                                          
8 Such a combination of weaknesses as renders economies vulnerable might not be limited to high 
domestic interest rates and the real appreciation of domestic currency possibly contributing to 
overheating the economy and deteriorating export performance, especially if they are combined with 
very low levels of international reserves and massive speculative capital outflows. If, in addition to 
these, there are growing fiscal and current account deficits within a period in which a monetary 
expansion has occurred, the accelerated use of domestic credit could add pressure to the banking 
system following newly implemented financial liberalization and deregulation measures. Furthermore, 
raising short-term financial investment flows in response to high interest rates, which in turn base their 
appeal on the interest rate differential to developed financial markets, demonstrate that relative 
comparative advantage erodes easily when leading international interest rates rise. In a scenario of a 
reversal of financial investment inflows, a high short-term foreign currency denominated debt of either 
public or private holders could further increase the likelihood of a financial shock (International 
Monetary Fund, 1998).   
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triggering spirals of self-fulfilling prophecy crises (International Monetary Fund, 
1998).  
 
It is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the causes, characteristics and 
impact of financial crises in emerging markets. Although three of the most virulent, 
important and dramatic financial collapses have occurred in Latin America, along 
with some South East Asian emerging markets and Russia during the last decade or 
so, the orientation of this thesis prevents me from exploring them in detail.9 As was 
the case with Argentina’s and Brazil’s crises, which both happened after the Mexican 
financial crisis, the functional immobility of financial investment hindered the flow of 
funds into production, due to the increasing disassociation of the productive realm 
and the financial markets (Watson, 1999). The unrealistic assumption of the perfect 
mobility of financial flows, which could be used to compensate for current account 
deficits, proved quite costly in Mexico during the mid 1990s. Hence, the reliance on 
functionally immobile financial inflows and the impeding of investment flows into 
productive activities for those Latin American emerging markets presents a strong 
case for bolstering the regulation of financial markets.    
                                                          
9 Like Mexico a few years earlier, Brazil during 1998 and 1999 faced an overvalued exchange rate 
pegged to the US dollar, sharp losses in foreign reserves and current account and public sector deficits. 
The difference from the Mexican case was that the financial rescue package was timelier in 
comparative terms.  It was put together by the International Monetary Fund which, along with some 
industrial economies, arrived before a collapse; and was offered in exchange for measures to eliminate 
the fiscal deficit. Hence, the impact of the crisis was not as harsh as in Mexico (Weintraub, 2000a).  
In the case of Argentina, suffice it to say that the 2001 declaration of sovereign debt default of over 80 
billion US dollars meant the largest in history so far, followed by a critical renegotiation agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund. On top of an aggressive privatization of government enterprises, 
liberalization strategies aiming to attract trade and investment inflows, and the lowering of the 
regulatory frameworks, Argentina also fixed its currency to the US dollar. Because the ‘convertibility’ 
plan was also endorsed by the IMF, its collapse became a grim display of the risks of such practice and 
policy advice. The fiscal deficits, the poor institutional framework and the weak enforcement of the 
rule of law were identified as the main culprits. However, this offers no consolation in any future 
episode of exceptional severity in social and economic costs (The Economist, various issues). 
Along with Brazil and Turkey, Argentina absorbs a high proportion of the IMF’s lending. This, in turn, 
raises awareness of the urgent need for both restructuring the international financial organizations and 
the regulation of financial markets in a broader perspective.     
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Regarding the Mexican case, it is important to bear in mind that, unlike the 1982 
crisis, the later crisis showed that fiscal deficit problems were already under control. 
Unlike the crises which preceded it, that of 1994-1995 had its origins in 
macroeconomic financial mismanagement. Not only had the attraction of foreign 
investment been relatively more successful for capital inflows than for direct 
investment, but capital inflows were used as a mechanism to balance the growing 
current account deficit at the time (Lustig, 1998; Edwards, 1998; Burki and Edwards, 
1996). The strategy, however, contributed to make the Mexican economy more 
vulnerable to external shocks. One of the reasons that capital inflows responded more 
vigorously to the Mexican government’s policies and efforts to attract foreign 
resources, than direct investment did during the last decades of the 20th century, lies 
in the context in which investors were situated.  
 
During those years, an important share of government expenditures was financed 
through the stock exchange, which delivered profits to both foreign and domestic 
investors. The accumulation of large fortunes and the forging of political alliances 
between some technocratic sectors of the government and domestic financial groups 
rose in importance (Kessler, 1999; Santín Quiroz, 2001). The series of reforms 
implemented in the financial sector in Mexico was supported by such conditions as 
the re-privatization of banks, the expansion and reform of development banking and 
the increasing autonomy of the central bank. All of these institutional changes 
delivered an attractive chance for portfolio investment.10 Nevertheless, aiming for 
                                                          
10 One of the pillars of the reform, namely the expansion of development credit, was ultimately 
reversed as large amounts of funds were not allocated and corruption scandals were made public. 
However, the two tier development banking system was preserved (Santín Quiroz, 2001).    
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increasing levels of efficiency within the financial system, the restructuring of the 
financial sector failed to promote strong and sustained rates of economic growth. The 
Mexican policy reform and institutional arrangements were not merely driven by the 
market, for they aimed to recast political support for the government during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Notwithstanding fiscal discipline, politically motivated 
redistribution did not cease, because it targeted pay-offs to social groups (Kessler, 
1999). 
 
Political contextual considerations aside, during the early 1990s the international 
capital markets were showing relatively small returns compared to the emerging 
markets.11  Although limited space does not allow us to present a comprehensive 
picture of this phenomenon, suffice it to say that, for instance, the lowering of interest 
rates by the United States Federal Reserve from the late 1980s contributed to 
                                                          
11 In addition to the changing international context, domestic political instability affected investors’ 
perceptions and provided disincentives which slowed down the pace of financial inflows into Mexico. 
Not only was 1994 the year that the North America Free Trade Agreement entered into force, but it 
also saw an unexpected indigenous peasant uprising in the Mexican southern state of Chiapas. This 
took almost everybody by surprise when it took place on the first day of January. The Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation’s (Spanish acronym EZLN) demands focused on agrarian and economic reform. 
The Zapatista challenge responded not only to the constitutional reforms of Article 27 regarding land 
tenure, but also added to the disappointment with the government for ignoring the peasants’ demands, 
and for their declining economic status and exclusion from political processes. The armed 
confrontation lasted only a few days. Although most people disliked the original guerrilla tactic, they 
echoed and supported EZLN’s demands. This favourable social context helped the Zapatistas to 
become important political actors in Mexico in the period since they originally made the headlines. 
Even though the Zapatistas and the Mexican government signed the San Andrés Larrainzar accord in 
1996, its failure to implement it triggered a political stalemate which has not been satisfactorily sorted 
out, despite a 2001 constitutional reform aiming to incorporate indigenous rights.    
Another factor which should not be overlooked is the fact that the Presidential elections of 1994 were 
preceded by signs of political instability. The candidate of the ruling party at that time was murdered, 
and so were a senior official of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and a Catholic Cardinal, namely 
Colosio Murrieta, Ruiz Massieu, and the Cardinal Posadas Ocampo, in that order. Especially in 
Colosio’s case, due to the heavy concentration of political power and the president’s leverage in 
Mexico, his assassination was a shock to the political system. In the annals of Mexican history there 
are records of political murders, one of the most notorious being that of President Obregón in the late 
1920s, who breached the no-reelection revolutionary mandate. Although Colosio was not in office 
when he was shot, at that time no PRI presidential candidate had been beaten or had openly admitted 
his defeat at the polls ever since the party was founded. All those events adversely affected perceptions 
of political stability at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the PRI had a more transparent victory than in 
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providing investors with incentives to look for higher rates of return elsewhere 
(Lustig, 1998). Bear in mind that the magnet of US interest rates for capital flows 
cannot be overlooked. Any particular movement, either up or down, influences 
investment allocation decisions, affecting all international markets. This is exactly 
what happened this time. During 1994, the interest rates set by the US Federal 
Reserve rose on six different occasions from 3 %, encouraging the mobilization of 
resources to its capital market, and reducing the incentives to allocate funds in 
emerging ones, such as Mexico’s. Following a more or less cyclical pattern, a few 
years later, by the turn of the 21st century, leading interest rates were slashed again, 
dropping to their lowest historical levels after the stock market bubble burst. Halfway 
through the first decade of the new millennium, concerns about deflation no longer 
seemed to be a risk and the United States Federal Reserve, along with some other 
central banks, started raising leading interest rates again, aiming to reduce a further 
surge in asset prices and debt, since cheap money encourages excessive borrowing 
and speculation. Although these measures target developed economies, the monetary 
policies have international repercussions as well.    
 
Even though the 1994 Mexican crisis was caused by a combination of different 
factors, some of them, such as the rise in US interest rates and the political shocks, 
were beyond government control. Having briefly overviewed some of the contextual 
international and domestic reasons underpinning these events, I now concentrate on 
the economic account of the financial crisis. It did not happen all of a sudden, since 
there was a gestation process which was either overlooked or misinterpreted by the 
authorities. It is important to recall that, the previous year, the Mexican central bank 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the 1988 presidential election, making the 1994 election its latest consecutive win since the party was 
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had been given increased autonomy and new legislation restricted the government 
from borrowing to finance deficits. The growing portfolio investment and the 
competition for capital inflows pointed to an increased need for international 
creditworthiness. As already mentioned in Chapter One, the Mexican central bank 
increased its autonomy, aimed at securing the stability of the peso’s purchasing power 
(Maxfield, 1997). There were also mixed perceptions as international agencies such 
as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s had given Mexico a favourable credit rating 
status before the financial crisis unfolded. The trade and investment patterns 
institutionalized by NAFTA were also favourable. These mixed signals exemplify not 
only how contingent these phenomena were, but also how important the never 
determining selective context was for the involvement and participation of actors. As 
should be clear by now, the Strategic Relational Approach is well equipped to deal 
with uncertainty, unpredictability and uneasiness of the social processes of change. 
The next section focuses on the Mexican financial crisis, and the fact that it did not 
translate into a derailment of the outward orientation of the economic model.  
 
 
THE 1994 CRISIS AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC 
TRAJECTORY IN MEXICO 
 
Chapter Four already examined some features of the commodification processes in 
Mexico. An important part of this has been the initiative and implementation of 
financial liberalization, as it became a cornerstone of the economic strategy for 
attracting foreign investment. Portfolio inflows rose dramatically in importance 
                                                                                                                                                                      
founded more than six decades ago at that time. 
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during the late 1980s and early 1990s and built a momentum which was shattered in 
December 1994, as no adjustment was undertaken by the authorities, who did not 
accept the need for timely adjustment of crucial variables (Weintraub, 2000a). The 
slow levels of growth from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s were, among other 
factors, the result of the Mexican currency appreciation, on the one hand, and the poor 
investment rates and slow productivity growth, on the other. The substantial 
appreciation of the peso in real terms due to a rigid exchange rate was also affected by 
the trade liberalization policies as they shifted demand from domestically produced 
goods to foreign ones. Regarding low investment and productivity growth levels, 
these were affected by a lending boom which, when it slowed down, caused non-
performing loans to accumulate (Lustig, 1998; Edwards, 1998; Burki and Edwards, 
1996). 
 
The volatility of hot money, which led to large investments in Mexican government 
securities in the early 1990s, must not be overlooked. During the last few decades of 
the former one party rule, the financial policy was deployed so as to channel financial 
resources to address the interests of domestic groups on which the government 
depended for political survival. An arguably unintended consequence was that the 
liberalization of the financial sector was seized by foreign and national investors to 
take advantage of the Mexican currency overvaluation. As some domestic and foreign 
investors initiated the run on the peso in late 1994, it has been argued that financial 
actors such as the Weston Forum pushed the Mexican government to further 
overvalue the peso and assume the risk, as this overvaluation would bring additional 
profits to these investors (Kessler, 1999). Participants in the Weston Forum included 
the Fidelity Investment Company, the Oppenheimer Management Corporation, the 
 396
Putnam Funds Management, The Soros Fund Management, the Salomon Brothers, the 
Namura Securities and the Weston Group (Kessler, 1999). However, had the peso 
devaluation been carried out, it is estimated that it could have had an undesirable 
electoral impact for the ruling party at the time. Since this was a politically 
unacceptable outcome for the government holding office, it worked hard to avoid 
such a scenario. Therefore, the political calendar in Mexico delayed the needed 
economic and financial adjustments, in the unrealistic hope and assumption that no 
major changes would occur, hazarding that the government would be able to hold its 
position without facing even minor consequences. This was a crucial mistake. For the 
Strategic Relational Approach, no doubt this constitutes a clear example of the fact 
that even though structures influence agencies, they do not determine the decisions 
which agencies make; since it is the situated agents who are able to shape, in a 
dialectical way, their own contexts.  
 
The lack of democratic and inclusive practices, on the one hand, and hierarchical 
decision-making procedures, on the other, proved an explosive combination for the 
financial problems of the mid 1990s. When the government contrasted the series of 
assumptions which they had held about the performance of economic variables with a 
reality that did not match such assumptions, they were wagering that the situation 
could improve and begin to match their assumptions. Sadly, they were disappointed. 
Since economic decision-making in Mexico has historically featured secrecy and 
verticality, typical of an authoritarian regime, these qualities were routinely exercised 
during 1994. The praised technocratic circle deliberately excluded people with 
dissimilar credentials or points of view to those held by top officials, deliberately 
delaying democratic reforms. They were routinely habituated to the secret top-down 
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elaboration of key decisions, policies and courses of action, displaying arrogance, 
exclusivity, stubbornness and hegemonic control over the general population 
(Weintraub, 2000a). Supported by the hierarchy in the government, the bets that the 
reality would match the assumption of geographical immobility in financial 
investments, and of the power of officials to manipulate the price of the peso, never 
paid out. Thus, the lack of democratic culture and unaccountability were vital for such 
a scenario. The disproportionate bet to preserve the reputation of the leaving 
administration with a record of not depreciating the currency, proved extremely 
costly, risking the stability of the country and affecting the living conditions of 
millions of people (Weintraub, 2000a).      
 
Regarding the economic variables, the level of international reserves in December 
1994 dropped down to six billion US dollars. This amount was perceived as 
insufficient to face thirteen billion US dollars of Tesobono short-term debt due in the 
first three months of the following year. In order to tackle this liquidity problem a 
Mexican currency devaluation, which was followed by a switch to a floating 
exchange rate, triggered a panic response which converted it into a self-fulfilling 
crisis. After a failed attempt, the second financial rescue package of nearly 49 billion 
US dollars was led by the United States government (Lustig, 1998 and 1997a; 
Edwards, 1998; Burki and Edwards, 1996).  
 
Yet, before opting to devalue the Mexican currency, the government made some weak 
moves in the previous months. Since they were neither strong enough, nor oriented in 
the right direction, not only the peso appreciation, but also the slowing capital inflows 
and the increasing current account deficit, did not change significantly. For instance, 
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in different stages, the exchange rate was modified from an original fixed type to a 
crawling peg, then to an adjustable band, which had its boundaries widened just 
before it was allowed to float. However, the downward trend continued and a 
financial crisis loomed. Nonetheless, before this scenario materialized, the monetary 
policy implemented by the government caused nominal domestic interest rates to fall, 
even when external rates were rising and expectations of devaluation were spreading 
(Lustig, 1998; Edwards, 1998; Burki and Edwards, 1996). 
 
It is within this context that investors and holders of Mexican Treasury bonds 
switched to US Treasury bonds, affecting the composition of the government’s 
domestic debt. Within twelve months Mexican Cetes peso-denominated dropped from 
76.5 % in December 1993 to 14.2 % the year after. However, during the same period 
of time, US Tesobonos dollar-denominated rose from 4.8 % to 80.6 % by December 
1994. Thus, a large share of government short-term debt was held by foreigners 
(Lustig, 1998; Adams, 1997). Concretely, it has been said that both direct and indirect 
investments, primarily in pension funds, were tied to the Mexican economy. 
According to some accounts, US residents held up to 90 % of foreign owned dollar 
denominated Tesobonos, worth over 16 billion US dollars. This massive change in the 
composition of the Mexican government short-term debt delayed an adjustment or 
devaluation before the presidential elections of August 1994 took place. The 
government, led by Salinas de Gortari, Mexican president at the time, pretended to 
avoid or postpone a currency depreciation, ruling out the possibility of a timely 
adjustment, which would not have been as costly if the decision had been taken then 
as the crisis which unfolded by the end of the year. Both the Mexican President and 
the Central Bank failed to heed warnings of peso overvaluation and maintained the 
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exchange rate at an unrealistic, artificially high level (Adams, 1997; Weintraub, 
2000a). 
 
Once the financial crisis unfolded south of its borders, the United States government 
at the time assembled a bailout package for Mexico, aiming to halt the run on the peso 
and to restore investors’ and speculators’ confidence by showing assertive evidence 
that there was international support led by the Clinton administration. The main 
components of the 1995 financial rescue package were the US-Mexico Framework 
Agreement for Mexican Economic Stabilization, which was signed on February that 
year; the Medium Term Agreement; the Guarantee Agreement; the Oil Proceeds 
Facility Agreement in Annex A; and the Economic Policy Memorandum in Annex C. 
For the latter, the Mexican government committed itself to comply with the 
International Monetary Fund programme and some additional US Treasury 
requirements (Lustig, 1998 and 1997a; Adams, 1997). A considerable amount of 
detailed economic information had to be provided to the IMF and the United States 
Treasury to help them follow the evolution of the economic recovery. The Mexican 
Central Bank and the government were required to report to the US Treasury on 
account balances, investment trends, inflation projects, money supply patterns, and to 
explain how the resources to cover US guarantees would be repaid (Adams, 1997). 
 
The largest economic aid at that time since the Marshall Plan was agreed by the end 
of January. Not only did it bring the crisis to a halt, but it also prevented the crisis 
from spreading to other international markets. The amount of resources roughly 
 400
matched the Mexican government debt payments due in 1995.12 Since the problem 
was one of illiquidity, not of insolvency, the rescue package also helped to restore 
Mexico’s access to international capital markets quicker than at first anticipated 
(Lustig, 1998 and 1997a; Edwards, 1998). The fact that the loans were repaid ahead 
of schedule contributed to a positive perception of its economic adjustment.   
 
The Oil Proceeds Facility Agreement provided a guarantee for the Mexican 
government to deposit the proceeds of oil export sales by Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX), the government owned oil company, and its subsidiaries in a pass-through 
special account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Adams, 1997; Lustig, 
1998 and 1997a). The legal vacuum on which the strategy guaranteeing oil exports 
proceeds was built complied with the fact that it is explicitly prohibited in the 1917 
Constitution for any foreign exploration and control of petroleum leases in Mexico. 
Nevertheless, there is neither an implicit mention of, nor an explicit restriction on the 
use of proceeds from revenues derived from the export of crude oil and petroleum 
products (Adams, 1997). Thus, the government officials responsible for the 
negotiations seized the opportunity to implement a strategy which took advantage of 
the legal loophole. What this episode represents for the Strategic Relational Approach 
is the inducing, albeit not determining, of conditions which provide some room for 
manoeuvre for agencies to exploit. The importance of this resides in the never static 
                                                          
12 Even though not all of the resources offered in the financial rescue package were immediately 
available, there were enough to tackle the illiquidity concerns that triggered the crisis. Additionally, in 
February 1995, the loans and guarantees offered by the United States government through the 
Exchange Stabilization Fund meant the largest ever use of this facility at the time. Likewise, the 
International Monetary Fund 18-month stand-by agreement was also increased. The unprecedented 
688.4 % of Mexico’s quota meant the largest ever loan, both in terms of its value and as a percentage 
of the country’s quota. A few years later some other emerging markets’ financial problems also 
demanded extraordinary resources from the IMF, exceeding the ones made available to Mexico. 
Typically, the standard IMF loan cannot exceed 100 % of its quota in a year with a cumulative limit of 
300 % (Lustig, 1998). 
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reconfiguration of the conditions in which actors are situated, which can also be 
influenced in turn by the selection of the courses of action which agencies opt for. 
This is further illustrated below. 
 
 
MEXICAN BANKING SECTOR INPUT TO INDETERMINACY 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter Four that the crucial priorities for the processes of 
economic restructuring were, and still are, to liberalize the trade and financial sectors, 
the divestiture of government owned enterprises, the renegotiation of the external debt 
and the fiscal reform. Regarding financial liberalization, the processes introduced by 
the Mexican government at the time pretended to free the system from any ‘financial 
repression’ (McKinnon, 1973 and 1991). However, this became one of the most hotly 
contended initiatives of the administrations of the time, as some years later the sector 
experienced serious trouble and had to be bailed out using public resources. After the 
mid 1990s financial crisis, the rescue package for the banking sector, implemented by 
the Mexican government faced opposition in the Congress. Although auditing 
evaluations have found irregularities which have not yet been satisfactorily explained, 
with the benefit of hindsight some financial mistakes have been identified. A 
fundamental flaw consisted in the lack of adequate and effective supervision which 
should have accompanied the opening initiative. In addition, the banking system was 
not financially sound at the time, as became evident when the crisis erupted.13  
                                                          
13 The origins of the moral hazard problem, for which the Mexican government had to guarantee 
deposits, can be traced back to the reprivatization process undertaken in 1991 and 1992, when the lack 
of adequate prudential regulation and enforcement resulted in a weak banking system which 
constrained monetary policy a couple of years later. Inadequate regulation was perceived as an 
opportunity to expand consumer credit. However, this credit expansion also increased non-performing 
loans and contributed to an increase in the current account deficit and a decrease in private savings 
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For the Mexican case a crucial problem regarding the banking sector bailout has been 
having to deal with incomplete information. This is a pervasive feature of exchange 
relations, which was discussed in Chapter Two through the perspective of the 
Strategic Relational Approach. In Mexico, neither the banks nor the authorities 
disclosed adequate and accurate details of the non-performing loans which had been 
taken out by the government. Invoking banking secrecy laws, banks and government 
officials who were involved in the bailout process have remained silent about the 
profile and amounts of the transactions involved. The secrecy and the way in which 
FOBAPROA (the Spanish acronym of Mexico’s Deposit Insurance Fund) and its 
successor IPAB (Spanish acronym of Deposit Insurance Institute) have been treated 
adds to the suspicion that, in a country where most of the population do not have 
access to credit, public resources were used to convert loans into public debt and 
protect some of the wealthiest individuals and richest firms operating in Mexico who 
otherwise should have gone bankrupt.14 Clearly, the closed, murky and unaccountable 
fashion by which taxpayers’ resources are channelled has become one of the most 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(Lustig, 1998). The lack of experience in managing the nationalized banks in 1982, when they were 
faced with a surge in capital flows, resulted in the mismanagement of the greater liquidity. The 
excessive expansion translated into a credit boom. Still, this happened within the context of less 
rigorous accounting standards than the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries had. This allowed the amount of non-performing loans to grow significantly. 
Moreover, the responsibilities for banking supervision and regulation overlapped among several 
agencies, all of them with little real authority. The Mexican banks’ failure to develop experience and 
expertise in assessing the creditworthiness of the private sector, on the one hand, and the authorities’ 
failure to develop supervision and regulation experience within a market environment, on the other, 
was an unintended consequence of the fact that, during the 1980s, the banking deposits were 
channelled to finance the fiscal deficit. Therefore, there were loose market incentives, which made 
banks and authorities relax their respective credit assessment, supervision and regulation (Lustig, 
1998). 
14 The original deposit insurance agency in Mexico, FOBAPROA (Fondo Bancario de Protección al 
Ahorro), was transformed into the institute called IPAB (Instituto de Protección al Ahorro Bancario), 
whose GDP share reached an estimate of 20 %. Before the latter was created some debt and banking 
programmes were implemented in 1995, such as the temporary capitalization programme for credit 
institutions (Spanish acronym PROCAPTE); in addition to a loan restructuring programme (Unidades 
de Inversión, UDIs); and a bank debtors programme (Agreement for immediate support of banking 
deposits, Spanish acronym ADE) (Huerta González, 1998a; Székely, 1999). 
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unpalatable and controversial issues since the mid 1990s. Two important auditing 
initiatives have been hampered by the banking secrecy laws which do not allow 
disclosure of the sort of information required for supplying details of the names and 
amounts of the transactions involved.15  
 
The impact of the mid 1990s financial mismanagement crisis on the Mexican banking 
market was considerable. However, this is not to say that the banks were dragged 
along only by the crisis. There were some structural deficiencies prior to 1994. The 
main weakness of the banking sector before the crisis unfolded was the overemphasis 
on quantity lending, overlooking the quality of the loans. This crucial fragility of the 
sector made the banks unable to resist the violence of the crisis. The Mexican banks 
had gone through a process of reprivatization in the early 1990s, nearly a decade after 
they were nationalized by the government in the aftermath of the 1982 crisis. 
Nevertheless, the bad loans portfolios were bailed out by the government a few years 
after the banks were divested. Although the rescue converted non-performing loans 
into public debt, it avoided the collapse of the banking system (Adams, 1997). Such 
unpopular a course of action meant a de facto reinforcement of the process of 
commodification which further widened the gap in income distribution, redistributing 
wealth upwards at the expense of the worse-off. 
 
The importance of the financial system cannot be overstated, because it plays an 
intermediating role between economic agents with surpluses and those with deficits 
                                                          
15 First, Mackey, an international accountant, was requested during the late 1990s to audit the banking 
rescue. Because of banking secrecy laws, the auditor could not access all the relevant documents and 
detailed information. Therefore, the report could not exhibit all names and individual amounts of bad 
debts. A few years later, González de Aragón, a congressional auditor, faced similar difficulties of 
incomplete information, as the banking secrecy laws were used again to prevent the investigation 
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and thus determines the efficient allocation of scarce resources. Therefore, the 
divestiture of the banking system in Mexico represented one of the most ambitious 
and important decisions for its economy. The banking sector in that country is heavily 
concentrated in a handful of banks, despite the moderate number of intermediaries. 
On average the sale price of the banks was more than three times the book price, and 
represented a very significant share of the total revenue of the second stage of the sale 
of public enterprises (Rogozinski, 1998). After the most violent, heavy and uphill part 
of the crisis, the adoption of the General Accepted Accounting Principles in 1997 
aimed to harmonise the Mexican banking and accounting practices with international 
standards.16 Since both the financial problems and the banking difficulties discussed 
above occurred within the era inaugurated by NAFTA, it is pertinent to proceed to an 
overview of the key features of the treaty in the following part of this thesis.   
 
 
A NARROW FRAMEWORK FOR BROAD PROCESSES: NAFTA 
 
The trade liberalization and investment attraction strategies undertaken by the 
Mexican government have gone through different stages. Following the 1982 crisis 
and import restrictions, a gradual approach was undertaken, which allowed for the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
accessing relevant information. Nevertheless, these audits exhibited some irregularities and improper 
loans that were reversed by the Mexican government.   
16 Furthermore, the investment regulations were adjusted with the result that foreign companies were 
allowed to acquire not only up to 30 % specified in the 1993 Foreign Investment Law, consistent with 
the 1973 regulation, but permitted them to acquire from 51 % to 100 % ownership of any individual 
Mexican bank. Likewise, the aggregate market share was also augmented from 9% to 25 %, increasing 
the incentives for foreign participation in the Mexican banking and financial sectors (Adams, 1997).  
Unsurprisingly, it did not take long for foreign banks and financial groups to dramatically increase 
their share of the markets. Banking and finance groups went through various processes of merger, 
acquisition, partnership or alliance with foreign counterparts a few years after they were bailed out by 
the government in the mid 1990s. Consider, for instance, the Banamex case with Citigroup; the 
Bancomer case with Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria; the Serfín case with Santander; the Inverlat 
case with Scotiabank; and the Bital case with HSBC, among others.   
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incremental deepening of the reforms which led to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade membership in 1986 and became an important component of the domestic 
economic pacts. They, in turn, paved the way for the North America Free Trade 
Agreement some years later. Import licence requirements were gradually liberalized, 
whereas import official reference prices were incrementally eliminated. Import tariffs 
were reduced stage by stage as the core component of the trade liberalization strategy 
(Lustig, 1998 and 1997b; Hufbauer and Schott, 1993).  
 
It has been discussed at some length in Chapter Four that some of the conditions 
which have facilitated the implementation of the outwardly oriented economic model 
are by no means unproblematic. In the case of Mexico, it has resulted in an import 
prone export oriented industrialization for an important share of the manufacturing 
exporters. For the inbound industries, the benefits included macroeconomic 
stabilization, infrastructure provision, proximity to markets, especially that of the 
United States, labour availability, intra-industry and inter-industry investment and 
trade, satisfaction of quality standards, and just in time delivery, among other things. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of the outwardly oriented economic strategies has 
helped US firms to confront foreign competitors, leaving Mexico a sub-specialization 
in the lower end of the value added commodities chains (Dussel Peters, 2000; Gereffi, 
Spener, and Bair, 2002).  
 
It is my argument that, if the costly social legacy of inequality and polarization of the 
crude implementation of the outward oriented economic model are to be corrected, 
the reinvigoration of the domestic market, on the one hand, and the promotion and 
strengthening of endogenous growth with equity conditions, on the other, call for 
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adequate redistributive policies, along with increased spending on education, health, 
and social infrastructure. A dramatic process of commodification has been the 
consequence of the economic structural adjustment and labour flexibility, either 
intended or unintended, and has meant a drastic decline in real wages for a major 
share of the population, which forced them to look for alternatives to compensate for 
the drops in their total income. The need to seek new or additional income generating 
activities contributed to a growing black market especially, but not exclusively, in the 
main urban areas. Likewise, more family members were sent into the workforce to get 
additional income.  
 
Since the polarization and widening inequalities in Mexico have already been 
discussed, suffice it to say that in contrast to the negative impact of the economic 
constraints for the worse-off social sectors, the liberalization of capital flows allowed 
some of the better-off not only to protect their assets, but also to expand them by 
transferring them abroad (Lustig, 1998). If these problems are to be addressed, there 
is no doubt that the State has an important role to play in Mexico’s future economic 
development. Due to the widespread prevalence of poverty and unsatisfied social 
needs, an enhancing agenda of reform which reassesses the importance of production 
and redistribution must not be postponed any longer. As Chapters Four and Six 
suggest, efforts need to be made to tackle destitution and promote social justice. 
 
Nevertheless, problematic as the North America Free Trade Agreement is due to its 
poor design, the Strategic Relational Approach acknowledges it has been consistent 
and successful in its own terms. Ever since the very beginning, it aimed to eliminate 
trade barriers, to attract trade and investment flows and to provide a dispute 
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settlement mechanism between Canada, the United States and Mexico (Hufbauer and 
Schott, 1993; Lustig, 1997b). It is unquestionable that it has clearly succeeded in the 
narrow terms in which it was conceived. Trade and investment have soared, while the 
ad hoc dispute settlement mechanism has been operated and tested by all members. It 
has also had an impact on the production specialization of some goods and sectors, as 
the growing intra-industry and intra-firm trade flows indicate (Bulmer-Thomas, 
2001a). The development of economies of scale and the promotion of efficiency 
standards are deemed to be key elements in easing economic integration within the 
three countries of North America. No less important, issues and sectors which the 
signatories wanted to ignore in the negotiations were deliberately set aside so that an 
agreement could be reached. Had sensitive issues been included at the very beginning, 
negotiators could have faced stronger domestic constituencies, leading to a 
radicalization of each country’s position at the negotiation table. Thus, the US 
government opted to omit migration, as did the Mexican government with the energy 
sector, and the Canadians with cultural issues. As the relationships have evolved, this 
increases the likelihood that the special status granted by their governments might 
face modifications in the future.         
 
The North America Free Trade Agreement goes beyond the typical free trade area. In 
addition to the multilateral compatibility requirements of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade article XXIV, analyzed in Chapter Seven, a key component of 
NAFTA which makes it a ‘free trade plus agreement’ is its Chapter 11, which refers 
to Foreign Direct Investment. Taking a wide definition of investment, it stipulates 
national treatment to investors from the member countries, and Most Favoured Nation 
treatment for both investment and investors, which must be compatible with 
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international law. There are also specific standards in the case of expropriation and 
losses due to armed conflict or civil strife, along with regulations on transfers and 
environmental matters. More crucially, there are provisions for dispute arbitration, 
where private investors can proceed against members of government (World Trade 
Organization, 1996; NAFTA official text).  
 
Nonetheless, to affirm that NAFTA has been consistent in the narrow terms in which 
it was conceived is not the same thing as to say that there is no room for a critical 
evaluation. For, clearly, there have been some inconsistencies which need to be 
addressed, and the dispute settlement mechanism is a case in point. The mechanisms 
for settling trade and investment disputes, along with countervailing duties and 
antidumping, as well as some other aspects of the agreement, are considered in 
Chapters 19 and 20 of the agreement respectively. Yet, the capability to start a lawsuit 
against any of the North America Free Trade Agreement parties is not exempt from 
controversy, nor is the impact and pace of the ad hoc panel mechanisms. For example, 
the World Bank argues that the panel review mechanisms have had no significant 
impact on US antidumping and countervailing duties against Mexico and Canada. As 
the United States is the most important trading partner for those two countries, it is 
not surprising to find relevant cases there. Commenting on the adequacy of NAFTA, 
the World Bank draws lessons from which the rest of the Latin American countries 
may benefit. Among the ‘findings’ is improving the distorting character of the rules of 
origin, because it represents additional costs to firms wishing to use the preferences of 
their agreement for their exports. Reallocation does not become an option for 
companies based in any of the three countries if they are to satisfy the requirements 
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for exporting the final product to the US free of duty (Lederman, Maloney and 
Servén, 2003).  
 
Regarding the ad hoc mechanisms for settling trade and investment disputes, if the 
lack of a permanent court which would have entailed a permanent bureaucracy has 
been highlighted as a key feature of the treaty, its operation suggests that more needs 
to be done to gain cumulative experience and expertise from non-permanent 
panellists. Furthermore, regarding investors’ disputes, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 allows 
private firms to sue governments for any changes since the agreement entered into 
force. Sensible as these steps might seem at first glance, this provision has backfired 
against some other NAFTA regulations. Specifically, it has been used against new 
environmental rules perceived as potentially harmful, or which could reduce 
investments, and were not in existence when the investors began operations. The 
problem is that the side agreement on the environment encourages a more rigorous 
upgrading of standards. Furthermore, the confidentiality of the court proceedings is 
clearly not the best procedure for dealing with these issues. Hence, there is a clear 
need to modify such practices to make the court procedures more transparent and also 
to narrow the scope of the provisions (Pastor, 2001). Let us next have a closer look at 
some other challenges, as preliminary approximations, which a deepening process of 
integration would entail.        
 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF DEEPENING INTEGRATION: NAFTA IN THE FUTURE 
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The relative success of the North America Free Trade Agreement in its own terms for 
attracting trade and investment flows has significantly grown since the mid 1990s. 
Furthermore, the composition of trade flows features important degrees of integration 
evident in the volume of intra-industry trade. Of all the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries which exchange goods and services with the United States, it is 
Mexico that has reached the highest level of integration into the United States’ 
commodity chains, pointing towards the construction of a single economic space 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2001a). This cannot be exclusively attributed to NAFTA’s success. 
Although the North America Free Trade Agreement did not represent the taking-off 
stage for trade and investment flows among their members, it served to 
institutionalize them. The economic process of trade and economic integration began 
several years before the agreement, as analyzed in Chapter Four. By the time it was 
signed, both the volume and value of intra-industry trade was already high. Moreover, 
the intra-industry trade which can be explained by a combination of product 
differentiation, economies of scale and imperfect competition, could also be extended 
to the service sector.17 Although considered typical of trade between developed 
economies, for the Mexican case intra-industry trade is a reflection of the high 
concentration of dozens of firms which are outwardly oriented. Those companies not 
only export considerable volumes but, at the same time, are also behind even faster 
growing imports. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that subsidiaries of Multinational 
                                                          
17 Intra-industry trade means that exchanged goods have comparable qualities or characteristics and 
could follow two different modalities. The vertical one is considered to be of a severe form and 
consistent with international trade flows, where a difference in factor endowments is the main 
determinant. For this case, a big difference in price between exchanged goods is evident. In contrast, 
the horizontal one entails small differences in quality and prices between the exchange commodities. 
Due to the asymmetries in purchasing power and income between Mexico and the United States, the 
contrasting features, qualities and prices of traded goods reflect vertical intra-industry trade (Bulmer-
Thomas, 2001a).     
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Corporations account for an important share of these transactions, especially in the 
form of intra-firm trade (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001a; Pastor, 2001).      
 
Nevertheless, for the Strategic Relational Approach there can be absolutely no 
argument about the fact that the North America Free Trade Agreement has been a 
catalyst for much more than trade integration alone. Since exchange relations do not 
occur in isolation from other activities and contextual issues, the failures of NAFTA 
relate to its stark omissions. Celebrated as a Free Trade Area in which a developing 
economy has joined two developed economies, it is striking that from the very 
beginning the North America Free Trade Agreement was negotiated as if there had 
been no asymmetries between the countries. Making no mention of the contrasting 
differences in the size and weight of the markets, it takes for granted that economic 
growth mainly depends on trade. Were there perfect competition, we should not have 
to pay attention to issues of monopolistic markets and imperfect information. It was 
neither impossible to sustain the unrealistic assumptions that the levels of economic 
development were similar and comparable; nor that there were no vulnerabilities in 
either member; nor that disparities were non-existent in their societies. Those 
unrealistic assumptions reflected an inattention to the socially embedded character of 
economic activities. Had such factors featured prominently in the negotiations, the 
various consequences of the elimination of trade and investment barriers would have 
been considered. They clearly range from the social to environmental and political 
impacts. The fact that the NAFTA side agreements on labour and the environment 
were partially considered as externalities reflects its narrow design, and unveils a 
challenge to amend its goals and refocus its emphasis and orientation (Pastor, 2001; 
Kingsolver, 2001; Poitras, 2001).    
 412
 
Short-sightedness is also reflected in the belief that it is only the governments of the 
countries that are capable of solving all problems which may arise, acting as leaders 
of their own societies. Likewise, the argument that the economic benefits would 
‘trickle down’ to all social sectors from the ‘free’ market place is deeply ingrained in 
the position of neoclassical economics. Even though analysts praise the economic 
integration associated with the North America Free Trade Agreement, a great many of 
them fail to acknowledge the extraordinary complexity of the process. It is not 
restricted by any means only, or mainly, to exchange relations. The dimensions of the 
social processes clearly exceed the framework of the agreement. There is a process of 
social integration which has contributed towards bringing a historical coalescence of 
the three countries greater than any before (Pastor, 2001; Kingsolver, 2001; Poitras, 
2001).   
 
One of the explanations for the NAFTA framework’s deficiencies, which is present in 
most of the routine contacts, is the lack of a genuine trilateral approach. The sum of 
two bilateral relations, namely the United States–Canada, on the one hand, and the 
United States–Mexico, on the other, does not make a trilateral mechanism (Pastor, 
2001). Even though the Canada–Mexico relationships have recently become of more 
significance, they still constitute the weakest front of the association. Moreover, very 
little progress has been made in forging common policies; this can be attributed to the 
narrow original conception of the North America Free Trade Agreement. Partially 
because of the asymmetry between the US and the other members, and partially 
because of routine procedures which have prevented the recognition that a potential 
community is developing and could be further developed, NAFTA does not in any 
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way represent an integral strategy. In addition to the increasing degree of constant 
interactions, there are high rates of international migration, from which the people 
from Latin America in general, and from Mexico in particular, represent a big share 
of both legal and illegal immigrants to the United States. For a number of them, the 
rising degrees of polarization and widening income distribution at home makes them 
move to a place where they can raise their standard of living. As long as strong 
economic incentives for migration exist, the flow of people cannot be easily 
contained.18 There is a range of issues closely associated with the migratory trends. 
One of them is the importance of those whose remittances represent one of the most 
significant sources of income for Mexico, who has also grown in influence in politics. 
Since millions of latinos are eligible to vote in the United States, at the same time that 
their ineligibility to vote in Mexican elections from afar is being reconsidered, 
political parties from either side of the border are inclined to court them.     
       
A comprehensive trilateral approach would reconsider immigration and income gaps 
as related manifestations of the same phenomenon. So far, most of the issues which 
Canada, the United States and Mexico deal with are considered in isolation from the 
rest, as if they were completely disconnected from their contextual circumstances. 
Such considerations are inappropriate in an extraordinarily complex process of 
integration. The process is currently taking place and is one which can be analyzed by 
the Strategic Relational Approach. If, as some circles have suggested, the North 
                                                          
18 Originally established for migrant workers during the Second World War, the Bracero Program 
permitted Mexicans to temporarily work in the United States, especially in low-skills and low-
qualification activities. Its official ending and governmental abandonment during the mid 1960s had 
the consequence that migration became undocumented (Aguayo, 1998; Domínguez and Fernández de 
Castro, 2001). Despite the US preference for dealing with migration unilaterally, the promulgation of 
new regulations and a range of strategies for tightening control at the border, the flow of people has not 
decreased. The main noticeable change has been the induced selection of the routes which the illegal 
immigrants take.    
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America Free Trade Agreement should be deepened and reinforced, a preliminary 
consideration, especially strong in the Mexican case, but also of relevance in the other 
countries, should be to reduce and eradicate the degree of asymmetry. For the 
deepening of the current situation would also mean deepening the income disparities 
and inequalities. If this scenario is to be avoided in Mexico, there should be no delay 
in articulating and reinvigorating the forward and backward linkages of the economic 
activities, bringing together in a more integrated fashion the import-prone export-
oriented sectors which have a low impact on labour due to the relatively low share of 
the economically active population which they employ and the domestically oriented 
firms in which most people work. Hence, tackling asymmetries is of the utmost 
importance if the experience of integration is to succeed.  
 
Even though the Mexican government has been playing a timid role, by designing and 
implementing programmes which make use of articulated incentives to strengthen the 
inter-sector and geographical links, much more needs to be done. Indeed, stronger 
orientation of productive and redistributive economic activities towards more 
equitable practices requires urgent implementation. As this is a complex issue, 
disarticulated and partial approaches will not do. A consistently long and sustained 
effort is needed: one that is not aborted by the pervasive six-year, or even shorter, 
programmes which every administration puts in practice while in office. A consistent 
and sustained effort, which responds to an enhancing agenda of reform, like the one 
proposed in Chapter Six, requires political will and commitment. Following the 
Strategic Relational Approach, a broader and more equitable social, political and 
economic transformation along the sketched trajectories of reform, which makes use 
of networking practices, could be of great help for redistribution. If put into practice 
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in an open, inclusive and democratic fashion, it is more likely that consistent aims and 
coherent strategies could be developed, where transparency and accountability would 
be vital. Acknowledging that the social processes of change are by no means opposed 
to the idea of integration requires, in turn, recognition of the political character of the 
selected courses of action.     
 
From the perspective of the North America Free Trade Agreement associates, it is 
worth taking into account one of the historical lessons of the European Union. The 
latter’s members openly embraced the goal of reducing disparities and promoting 
development. In so doing they created social cohesion and structural funds which 
were available for the poorest countries and laggard regions (Pastor, 2001).19 The 
main idea of reducing inequalities and lifting living standards in a fair and equitable 
manner has contributed towards building a sense of community which is currently 
developing and gaining ground in the Western European territories. This is one thing, 
among others, which puts the European Union on a different footing from the less 
institutionalized, more restricted and narrowly conceived schemes of integration 
                                                          
19 The case of the European Union is extraordinary in this sense, and its historical experience 
illuminates the process of economic integration. Declaring the goal of reducing levels of inequality 
amongst their members, the main purpose of the European Social Fund was for vocational training and 
shifting jobs, while the European Agricultural Fund gave grants to farmers to help them develop rural 
areas. The European Investment Bank provided loans in lagging regions. After a reorganization of the 
funds and resources was introduced during the mid 1990s, the Cohesion Fund targeted the poorest 
countries.  As increased income for spending on goods and services was made available, it was mainly 
used to improve infrastructure and for education services with the objective of enhancing the 
productive potential of the country where these resources were channelled. The benefits did not stop 
there, however. It was observed that they had multiplier effects because the cohesion funds contributed 
towards encouraging the attraction of foreign direct investment. The Structural Funds provided 
resources for adjustments in agriculture, fisheries and scarcely populated areas, along with regional 
development and social concerns. Lagging regional development, industrial decline, youth 
employment and training for workers were also considered (Pastor, 2001).   
The Mexican government proposed an initiative for the laggard states in the Southern part of the 
country. The Puebla-Panama Plan targets the attraction of investment for infrastructure projects, which 
would, in turn, seek to improve the overall economic situation, and the creation of brand new jobs in 
Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, Guerrero, Oaxaca and Chiapas. 
Moreover, the project goes beyond the borders as it considers the participation of Central American 
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which mainly privilege exchange relations of trade in its pursuit of economic growth. 
Though the EU has also been characterised as an essentially neoliberal project, it 
offers important lessons.        
  
Following the neoclassical economic orthodoxy, it has been suggested that the 
accomplishing of soaring trade and investment flows could further benefit from 
greater reductions in transaction costs. Thus, monetary policies within schemes and 
processes of economic integration are of high relevance. It is unquestionable that the 
dominant currency in the region is the US dollar. The absence of an economy which 
could balance the weight and leverage of the United States in the Americas has led 
some voices to suggest various options for macroeconomic policy coordination and 
currency management. They range from allowing flotation, to pegging currencies to 
the US dollar, or adopting a common currency, or even replacing the national 
currency by the dollar (Pastor, 2001). Flotation is supposed to allow free movement of 
a currency. However, in reality, in many cases such schemes are distorted when a 
currency faces interventions from central banks which make for a ‘dirty flotation’. 
Such is the current situation in Mexico.         
 
The controversy about dollarization is that the benefits of financial stability which are 
conducive to diminishing transaction costs, on the one hand, and a steadier fiscal 
discipline which would lower inflation, on the other, are outweighed by the problems 
that such stability entails (Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003). For a country to 
adopt the US dollar as its national currency would mean sacrificing its seigniorage 
capacity, depriving it of control and the profits from printing its own money. It would 
                                                                                                                                                                      
countries at the same time: Guatemala, Belize, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and 
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also represent the loss of a shock absorber mechanism, especially in times of 
recession and unemployment. Furthermore, it would take the form of a transfer of 
power to the United States Federal Reserve, which sets interest rates only in response 
to business cycles in its own country (Pastor, 2001). If Canadian and Mexican 
districts were added to the US Federal Reserve, the whole monetary policy would 
respond to US business cycles alone, not those of Canada and Mexico. 
 
However remote it might seem today, it might be better in the long-term to work 
towards building a common currency (Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003).20 
What this would mean is the project of forging a monetary union, with a central bank 
which would reflect the importance, weight and power of the members, but at the 
same time would allow some room for decision making and the management by each 
country of its national currency and seigniorage. If this is going to become operative, 
it needs to reflect the wealth of the three economies in a proportional fashion and the 
equivalences of the exchange rates (Pastor, 2001). Sensitive topic as it is, it must be 
addressed with caution in a genuine trilateral networking approach, otherwise it may 
be doomed to failure. It is important to bear in mind that a similar project took 
decades for the European Union to build. It might take even longer on the other side 
of the Atlantic. But in circumstances in which realistic positions are presented at the 
negotiation table, it would represent an opportunity for promoting the well being of 
the people, and also for forging a sense of community. Hence, such a project is 
certainly worth embracing. The complications of overtaking the current shallow 
integration process are most likely to affect both all the levels of society and 
government regulations, policies and programmes. For, if deepening is not going to be 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Panama. Whether the plan fulfils its potential remains to be seen.   
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strictly limited only to exchange relations, the social processes of integration certainly 
require refocusing government policies in an inclusive, realistic, democratic and 
accountable way. Deepening integration is not only about trade and investment flows. 
It is a social, dynamic, open ended process, as the Strategic Relational Approach can 
demonstrate. Therefore, it must be acknowledged as such, and approached 
accordingly, because it might represent an opportunity for ‘double movement’ 
decommodification trends, along the lines discussed in Chapter One (Polanyi, 1957).      
    
Unlike the European Union, the North America Free Trade Agreement signed by 
Canada, the United States and Mexico did not explicitly aim to create a community of 
people from the region. Still, it does not rule out the idea tout court (Kingsolver, 
2001; Poitras, 2001). If this goal is to be incorporated, however, along with the 
explicit promotion of well-being in the population, in order to extend its original 
narrow agenda, it must be tackled in a trilateral fashion by making use of different 
networking mechanisms. It must also recognize the key features of current social 
processes, just as it did with the economic restructuring some time ago. In this sense, 
gradual, step by step approaches, such as the proposals for a migratory accord, or visa 
waivers for Mexicans who cross the border regularly, tend to timidly reflect the social 
dynamic of integration, in which the governments of the region lag behind the 
dynamics and tendencies set in motion by their own societies. 
 
For it is clearly impossible to disassociate the praised benefits of economic 
integration, without realizing that such tendencies are constitutive parts of broader 
social contexts. Important as they are, economic transactions and relations of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
20 Such as the euro which is currently circulating in most of the European Union members.  
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exchange are merely one element in the processes and dynamics of social integration. 
Therefore, NAFTA’s consistency in its stated trade and investment goals does not 
exhaust the broad range of interactions which, in an incremental and punctuated 
fashion, transform the contexts in which actors are situated. Making use of the 
Strategic Relational Approach, it becomes clear that, if social integration is to 
succeed, a long-term goal must be to embed a spirit of inclusiveness, openness and 
reciprocity oriented towards achieving and shaping a sense of community which is, in 
turn, respectful of differences. At the same time, it must seek to rule out unilateralism 
and bilateral tactics, thus making use of common approaches for addressing collective 
problems (Pastor, 2001). Such an agenda must be one which sets a vision of 
transformation and acknowledges that a basic prerequisite is the reduction of 
asymmetries, inequalities and polarization. The objectives must recognize the socially 
embedded character of economic activities, and the urgency of levelling the playing 
field. Complementary aims must be realistic and encourage consistency in actions.  
 
Thus, the enhancing agenda or reform for Mexico, as proposed in the previous 
chapter, is highly compatible and complementary with an agenda which aims to forge 
a sense of community in Mexico, Canada, and the United States as a long-term goal. 
In the short-term, however, the project of a Free Trade Area of the Americas is 
currently absorbing the endeavours of these countries.    
 
 
WIDENING THE NARROW FRAMEWORK MODEL: HEMISPHERIC TRADE 
UNDER THE FTAA 
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Since an Initiative for the Americas was launched by the United States government in 
the 1990s, the project for widening the shallow integration of NAFTA to the rest of 
the Latin American and Caribbean countries has been mostly welcomed in the 
continent.21 Based on the unrealistic assumptions of this treaty, namely, of non-
existent symmetries, the promise of growth and development has attracted interest in 
one of the most unequal regions of the world. Needless to say, the proposed Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) represents a daunting task, which should not be 
restricted to exchange relations alone, and which also exhibits a highly political 
character.  
 
The invitation presented to thirty four democratic governments to consider 
participation in the project seeks to encompass almost the whole of the Americas by 
2005.22 It purposely leaves aside Cuba on the basis of its different socio-political and 
                                                          
21 Yet, it should be borne in mind that the idea of integration in the Americas is by no means new. 
Dating back to the early 19th century when most Latin American countries were gaining independence 
from Spanish rule, Bolivar, the Liberator of South American nations, sketched ideas of integration in 
the form of a subcontinental federation or federative convention, as recorded in the Congress of 
Panama. Although unable to make these thoughts actual, his ideas of supranationalism and integration, 
even if restricted to Spanish American republics, gained notoriety and influence (Collier, 1983). 
Despite the fact that participants in Panama neither addressed Panamericanism, nor Latin American 
solidarity strictly speaking, the Congress is a key antecedent to the Conference of the American States 
of the 1890s, and the birth of the Organization of American States (OAS) six decades later (Mora, 
1960). Arising from Americanist idealism, Bolivar’s efforts remain a source of inspiration in his own 
continent, while lessons have been learned from his failures as well.    
A different perspective is provided by the United States’ foreign policy and Latin American history. 
For the US, a continent where all the nations not only accept, but also embrace the political, social and 
economic principles and practices endorsed by it, has been a historical aspiration.  
The Monroe doctrine formulated in the early 19th century was an isolationist policy. It opposed extra-
hemispheric intervention in the whole continent of the Americas. Nonetheless, it was amended through 
various corollaries and interpretations to allow the United States the discretionary and unilateral use of 
violence to deal with a wide range of scenarios in Latin America and the Caribbean region. Arguing 
against non-colonization, it contained a warning against meddling in Europe and a defence of non-
interference or isolationism. It is a unilateral position based on limited knowledge lacking any 
consistent legal foundation which masks a rationale for US intervention, tailoring its interpretation 
according to a myriad of situations in specific countries, or in the region as a whole. It has been used to 
facilitate pro-US governments wishing to accommodate their economic interests, at the same time as it 
has provided a tool to eliminate those who sought more independent social, political and economic 
paths (Dent, 1999).   
22 They are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
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economic organization.23 The four main interrelated objectives listed in the 
Declaration of Principles of the Summit of the Americas favour the preservation and 
strengthening of the community of democracies in the continent, while also 
promoting prosperity through economic integration and free trade. The agenda is 
complemented by aiming to eradicate hemispherical poverty and discrimination, at 
the same time as seeking to guarantee sustainable development and the conservation 
of the environment.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Santa Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, 
United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela.   
23 Limited space prevents us giving an account of the Cuban revolution.  For the purpose of the 
argument presented here, suffice it to say that as soon as Castro took power, avoidance of the spread of 
communism in the continent became a security and foreign policy concern for the United States 
government. In addition to an economic, diplomatic and political blockade of the island, the US 
supports, both overtly and covertly, other regimes in South America and the Caribbean with a blood-
stained history, invoking doctrinaire reasons for doing so. Nowadays, the memory of repression, 
killings and disappearances remains a thorny unresolved issue in not a few former authoritarian and 
military regimes. Whilst the United States has re-established relations and agreed to trade freely with 
Vietnam, the hostility towards Cuba runs much deeper. It staged one, if not the most critical episode of 
the Cold War during the missile crisis (Allison, 1971). The survival of the regime in the island, within 
such hostile conditions, has meant high costs, evident in the rigidity of its system and its dependence 
on its leader.         
24 The Plan of Action of the Summit of the Americas agreed in Miami lists twenty-three points which 
relate to the broad four objectives of the agenda.  The guidelines for preserving and strengthening the 
community of democracies of the Americas include: 1) strengthening democracy, 2) promoting and 
protecting human rights, 3) invigorating society/community participation, 4) promoting cultural values, 
5) combating corruption, 6) combating the problem of illegal drugs and related crimes, 7) eliminating 
the threat of national and international terrorism, and 8) building mutual confidence. 
The points which relate to the promotion of prosperity through economic integration and free trade are: 
9) free trade in the Americas, 10) capital market development and liberalization, 11) hemispheric 
infrastructure, 12) energy cooperation, 13) telecommunications and information infrastructure, 14) 
cooperation in science and technology, and 15) tourism. 
Regarding the agenda which aims to eradicate poverty and discrimination in the hemisphere, particular 
points focus on: 16) universal access to education, 17) equitable access to basic health services, 18) 
strengthening the role of women in society, 19) encouraging micro-enterprises and small businesses, 
and 20) white helmets – emergency and development corps. 
The last considerations of the plan of action committed to guaranteeing sustainable development and 
the conservation of the natural environment envisage the following partnerships: 21) for sustainable 
energy use, 22) for biodiversity, and lastly 23) for pollution prevention. 
(OAS, SICE, http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministerials/plan_e.asp April 2001). 
The first Summit of the Americas took place in Miami, United States in 1994. It was followed by the 
1998 Santiago Summit hosted by Chile, which, in turn, preceded the 2001 Quebec Summit in Canada. 
The fourth Summit of the Americas was held in Monterrey, Mexico, in 2004. All of them issued 
different declarations. 
 For the time being, it is too early to speculate on whether the project of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas would, in the long run, tilt towards a Community of the Americas.     
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Relying on the Strategic Relational Approach, it becomes evident that it is a daunting 
task because it aims to incorporate in a continental format two of the richest countries 
of the world with some of the poorest and laggard economies, along with some 
middle-income countries. The size of the economies can hardly cover a broader 
spectrum. It goes from the biggest, most developed and most diversified in the world 
to the smallest and most vulnerable to be found. The FTAA aims to be compatible 
within the multilateral framework of the WTO / GATT, and also with the number of 
free trade agreements that the Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
subscribed to not only amongst themselves, but also with trading partners in other 
parts of the world. The widening of this big umbrella seeks also to reach the 
preferential agreements, unilateral preferential arrangements, general association and 
cooperation schemes, while reaching customs unions, and also other bodies of 
regional scope.25 Thus, the Free Trade Area of the Americas is one of the most 
ambitious projects of integration ever attempted. Unlike previous free trade 
agreements and integration efforts, the United States is pushing the initiative forward. 
Nowadays, the US currently operates on three different economic negotiation fronts at 
the same time. It has not abandoned its preference for multilateralism and 
GATT/WTO negotiation rounds. What it additionally does is to put its weight behind 
the FTAA, while also reaching bilateral agreements.26   
                                                          
25 The Latin American Integration Agreement, better known by its Spanish acronym, ALADI, involves 
twenty members. During more than two decades of existence trade and investment flows have been 
low, although members have kept the initiative alive. Regarding the customs unions, the Common 
Market of the South, better known as MERCOSUR, is the strongest, especially if compared with the 
Andean Community, the Central American Common Market (CACM), and the Caribbean Community 
and Common Market (CARICOM). Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay are the four members of 
the leading customs union of the region, MERCOSUR, which was formally established in 1991. The 
Andean Community is built on the partnership of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  
26 Apart from NAFTA, the United States has signed free trade agreements with Israel, Chile, Jordan, 
Singapore and Vietnam. Ratification is pending for the Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA), with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican 
Republic. These Central American countries are not only already highly open and integrated with the 
US, but they also exhibit a high level of dollarization in their economies (Lederman, Maloney, and 
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Nonetheless, one of the problems which, at the time of writing, has hindered the 
negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, is the lack of a fast-track 
authority from the United States to show the rest of the participants a genuine level of 
commitment matching the one which it demands. A fast-track authority is basically a 
mechanism meant to provide certainty to foreign countries negotiating trade 
agreements with the United States.27 It permits only either a positive or a negative 
vote from the US Congress, without allowing any amendments. It therefore 
substantially limits the amount of debate it could face (Schott, 2001; Domínguez and 
Fernández de Castro, 2001).   
 
There is no question that, for the United States, the Free Trade of the Americas is a 
good deal, as it may require only a few changes in its current trade barriers, and legal 
and regulatory frameworks. The burden of the adjustment lies with the Latin 
American and Caribbean economies. The FTAA, it is proposed, will help to avert 
discrimination and offer opportunities for US firms to export and invest in these 
markets. It is expected that the lowering of barriers to trade and investment flows will 
benefit trade, productivity and the income of US workers. Furthermore, it is also 
perceived that the continental project could have spillover effects on the overall 
relations within the region on issues such as drug interdiction, environment, labour 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Servén, 2001). CAFTA merely institutionalizes the strong current pattern. The US has also engaged in 
negotiations with Morocco, Australia and the Southern Africa Customs Union encompassing 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Furthermore, it is very likely that the US 
will increase the number of free trade agreements in the future. 
Regarding the free trade agreements which Canada has signed, they include Chile, Costa Rica and 
Israel. Since the Canadians also play an active part in regionalism, they are currently negotiating with 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, the European Free Trade Association and Singapore. 
Moreover, it seems that CARICOM, the Dominican Republic, and the Andean Community will be 
added to the list in the short-term as well.  
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and education reforms. There is an aspiration that it could promote international 
cooperation among the parties on pressing social, economic, and political problems as 
well (Schott, 2001).   
 
This might strike us as an irony, because the whole negotiation setting assumes that 
there are no asymmetries, and that the promised growth and development would 
trickle down to the members. Therefore, for the Strategic Relational Approach, the 
idea of widening the North America Free Trade Agreement entails widening the 
unrealistic assumptions on which it was negotiated, and under which it is currently 
operating, to reach more countries in the Americas. The incentive for most of the 
Latin American and Caribbean economies rests on the engagement of the United 
States. For a number of them, the US represents one of the most important sources of 
trade and investment flows, the main exception being MERCOSUR and Chile. In the 
former case its priorities are oriented towards the European Union (Bulmer-Thomas 
and Dunkerley, 1999).28     
 
It does not come as a surprise that some of the benefits of the proposed FTAA are 
identical to the ones suggested prior to the ratification and coming into force of 
NAFTA (Weintraub, 2000b). Hence, the suggestion of ‘locking in’ economic reforms 
and the provision of a sort of ‘insurance policy’ against protectionism at home and 
unilateralism abroad are not new at all. It is unlikely to protect all industries against 
unilateral antidumping practices. The Free Trade Area of the Americas approaches 
                                                                                                                                                                      
27 It was introduced by the United States Omnibus Trade Act of 1974 (Domínguez and Fernández de 
Castro, 2001). 
28 Even though MERCOSUR members differ in their particular positions and priorities, they speak 
with one voice in the Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations. Reflecting the relative weight of 
their economies, the two biggest markets in the hemisphere, namely the United States and Brazil, co-
chair the final stages of the negotiations. 
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uneven levels of economic development by making use of the strategy which was 
agreed in NAFTA. Thus, it follows a widened negotiation procedure which 
encourages countries to accept the whole set of common obligations, but makes 
allowance for negotiating different implementation schedules. Since each country can 
set its own external tariffs, they do not necessarily need to stick and bind themselves 
to a certain level, but they can choose what best suits them. The FTAA is presented as 
an indivisible package or single undertaking, where the decision making procedure is 
consensual.     
 
Such an approach, which privileges the outward preference of economic policies, runs 
the risk, according to the Strategic Relational Approach, of further de-linking the 
import-prone export-oriented sectors from the rest of the domestically oriented 
sectors. Similar to Mexico, most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries may 
find that a handful of firms take the full benefit of the FTAA with a small impact on 
the labour force and the living standard of the population. Depending on the degree of 
integration with the US as the most developed economy and hub of the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas, intra-industry trade might increase, as might do intra-firm 
trade. If the worst case scenario of polarization is to be avoided, it is necessary to go 
beyond different tariff reduction schedules, in order to acknowledge the asymmetries 
between the negotiating countries in a more realistic fashion. Although it seems 
remote under current conditions, the hegemony exercised by the United States 
exemplifies features of power analyzed in Chapter Two. Yet, to rule out the 
possibility of a more equitable negotiation and final outcome is to fail to recognize the 
open ended character of the social processes of change. For, power is not only about 
decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping; it becomes evident in all 
 426
social relations where economic transactions are submerged in a broader social 
context (Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 1979, 1977 and 1976; Hay, 2002c; Polanyi, 1957, 
1992, and 1996).       
 
If the small and least developed economies seek to preserve themselves away from 
economic reductionism and deterministic logics, the task ahead for the small 
economies of the region, which amount to close to two-thirds of the negotiators, is 
challenging. The most critical cases are those where the countries are heavily 
dependent on foreign trade and investment and sometimes on one single commodity 
or service, and where they possess an underdeveloped physical infrastructure and a 
poor base of human and technological resources (Schott, 2001). Critical stages of 
commodification, along the lines suggested in Chapter Four, would mean that the 
desirable rates of economic growth and development would not come easily, let alone 
be likely to ‘trickle down’. The situation would be even more serious when 
encouraged by improving ‘readiness indicators’, whereby international vulnerabilities 
might accentuate, becoming more responsive to changes in foreign supply and 
demand, thus affecting movements in foreign capital and the exchange rate market, 
and diverting them from the domestic sector.29 In particular, this is similar to the 
synchronized aggregate economic fluctuations of Mexico with respect to the United 
States. This is likely to occur with a number of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries (Schott, 2001; Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, 2003).   
                                                          
29 Schott proposes a benchmark for making estimates of the relative economic performance and 
capacity to compete of the various Latin American and the Caribbean countries. The ‘readiness 
indicators’ comprise three main indexes. The first one is formed by selected macroeconomic indicators 
such as price stability, budget discipline, national savings, external debt and currency stability. The 
second one considers market oriented policies and reliance on trade taxes as the main components of 
the market indicator. The third one assesses policy sustainability. Finally, the readiness indicator 
reflects the average of the main indexes. According to Schott, the indicators of the region as a whole, 
and for most of the individual cases, have improved since the mid 1990s (2001).   
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The standard advice of strengthening domestic economic reforms, and improving the 
institutional framework to help to create growth opportunities both in new and 
traditional sectors, provides a difficult panorama for the diversification of production 
and for the expansion of employment opportunities. This is because countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean which are interested in joining a process of integration via 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas are left to cope on their own while ‘unilaterally’ 
undergoing a structural reconstitution of their economies. Their commitment to a 
shallow free trade area is not rewarded by acknowledging the urgency for reducing 
the sometimes abysmal inequalities. As the NAFTA model is exported to the rest of 
the continent, so are its omissions, such as the lack of social cohesion funds and 
structural funds. Had such features existed, they would have represented more 
realistic opportunities, and valuable resources for helping the whole hemisphere 
towards achieving endogenous equitable growth and a better distribution of income. 
In the long run, if the FTAA is to reap all those promises of development, its success 
will be heavily dependent on the reduction of inequalities within sectors, societies and 
regions. But it is never too late to readjust the course of action: the sooner, the better. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that the proposed enhanced agenda for reform does not 
surrender international interactions and commitments. What it does is to propose 
more balanced goals and strategies between international and domestic agendas. For 
the Strategic Relational Approach, this by no means reveals the pursuit of radically 
opposite aims, since there is room for enhancing broader and more inclusive 
strategies for the preservation and strengthening of democracy. Similarly, in such an 
agenda of reform, with the socially embedded character of the promotion of 
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prosperity through economic integration and free trade, it is necessary also to be 
attentive and proactive to the eradication of poverty and discrimination. Needless to 
say, this must recognize as a priority the achievement of sustainable development and 
the conservation of the environment too. The pursuit of all these objectives of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas does coincide with the sketched aims which would 
entail a transformation of society, by putting it back in control of the processes. 
However, it is likely that such a collective enterprise would encounter problems in its 
realization. Yet, if adequate strategies are selected, the goals will remain in the realm 
of the possible. Such is the opportunity that can be seized.  
             
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main argument presented here is that the strategically selective context within 
which actors interact does not necessarily determine their courses of action, either 
already taken, or yet to be taken. The Strategic Relational Approach provides a 
powerful theoretical tool for situating the social processes of change. For, the material 
and ideational circumstances in specific geographic and historical limits are also, in 
turn, continuously reshaped by the situated agents in specific spatio-temporal context.  
 
Since the previous chapters emphasized the relevance of the central role played by 
agency, the focus of this one was directed towards the circumstances which surround 
the social processes of change in contemporary Mexico. This is by no means an 
exhaustive chapter containing everything there is to say on the subject. Such is not its 
goal. Rather, it highlights key trends and countertrends which may help us understand 
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and explain the open ended and contingent nature of the socially embedded 
contemporary phenomena under scrutiny. Even though attention is paid to different 
aspects of the international dimensions, key features of the domestic level are also 
analyzed. 
 
The selection of a few broad issues such as globalization, regionalism and the first 
and second generation of economic reforms promoted by international organizations 
presents a broad international panorama composed of non-deterministic dynamics. In 
order to fully appreciate the importance and composition of the process, economic 
reductionism and determinism are left out. The value added by this is a richer, more 
comprehensive perspective which attends to the social, political and historical 
tendencies and countertendencies, whilst they set the stage for the examination of 
issues and agendas which can be considered closer to the Mexican experience. 
Volumes have been filled examining its relationships with the United States, the 
emerging markets and the mid 1990s financial crisis. My emphasis is mainly on the 
discussion of current processes.  
 
I do not stop there, however. Since a realist process-tracing exercise is undertaken 
throughout the thesis, I also hint at the crucial issues that lie ahead. Particularly 
important are the challenges of deepening the shallow process of integration which 
the North America Free Trade Agreement poses, on the one hand, and the widening 
of a hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas, on the other. The Strategic 
Relational Approach shows explanatory power at the regional level, which warns of 
the risk of increasing processes of commodification if the unrealistic assumptions on 
which NAFTA was negotiated are not revised. Although the agreement has been 
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consistent in the narrow terms in which it was conceived, its deficiencies must be 
urgently addressed. It is particularly urgent to incorporate as main goals the reduction 
of inequalities and the forging of a community. Furthermore, the theoretical tools 
which are used here also point to the daunting task which the FTAA represents and 
warn against an uncritical acceptance of unrealistic assumptions by the negotiators, 
which might have future intended and unintended consequences. Increased flows of 
trade and investment for the smallest and weakest economies might not have a strong 
enough desired impact on labour, for it would send more income to the rich and 
polarization might intensify.      
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Relying on the Strategic Relational Approach, this thesis has advanced a critical, 
political, analysis of processes of change, while identifying key tendencies and issues 
of contemporary transformations in Mexico. It has delivered a philosophically 
consistent, theoretically informed and empirically grounded political economist’s 
account of the process of social, economic and political change in the country. 
Providing a balanced perspective between an analysis of the processes and the 
features of their material-ideational dynamics, their structure-agential dimensions, 
within specific spatio-temporal locations shows great explanatory power. 
Furthermore, if we are interested in applying such a theoretical framework to a 
specific case, the identification of milestones is of great use. Hence, the emphasis of 
this thesis is on a theoretically informed analysis in which the identification of 
underlying themes enriches the arguments, without falling into chronological 
descriptions.  
 
Following a process-tracing strategy, commodification trends have been identified in 
Mexico. The insight that the Polanyian perspective delivers, in particular by 
illuminating those Mexican middle-range trends, provides evidence of the explanatory 
power of the Strategic Relational Approach. For analyzing the processes of 
commodification delivers a perspective which extends the analytical focus, while it 
permits a critical examination of the economic and institutional reforms in Mexico. 
To claim that the economic reforms have been consistent in their own terms is not the 
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same thing as to assert that they are unproblematic. Moreover, the analysis of the 
Mexican case illustrates the prioritization of economic goals over social concerns. 
More generally, this is also evident in the emphasis on exchange relations, at the 
expense of production and distribution. The disarticulation between the domestically 
oriented firms, sectors and regions on the one hand, and the outwardly oriented 
counterparts on the other, needs to be tackled if the patterns of inequality and 
polarization are to be addressed. 
 
The application of the Strategic Relational Approach to the Mexican experience in 
this thesis has been informed by accounts of political economists and economic 
sociologists. In particular, Schumpeter and Polanyi argued for a non economic 
determinist analysis. The former’s notion of crises as creative destruction and 
contributions to economic development still remains valid today. Even though the 
latter was mainly referring to the 19th century, when ensuring peace rested upon 
economic organization, the theoretical insight which he advanced has proved useful 
for contemporary contexts as well. However, he explicitly warned against the stark 
utopia of the ‘self-regulating’ markets. According to his view, if historical 
transformations are to succeed, they do not only depend on economic self-
adjustments. Therefore, due to the socially embedded character of human activities, 
the success of both national and international processes of change is dependent on the 
society in which they are embedded (Polanyi, 1957).   
 
This is precisely the reason why social process-tracing can greatly benefit from a 
critical perspective which moves away from neoclassical orthodoxy, as it 
acknowledges the highly political and social significance of the transformation trends 
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and countertrends. Such a view is consistent with and of great use for the theoretical 
position adopted in this thesis. Moreover, it exhibits a promise of analytical insight. 
The restoration of agency over the processes of commodification reveals a broader, 
more dynamic, more inclusive, more social, more political and more democratic 
picture. Nevertheless, neither the discussion nor the analysis should be considered 
definitive, as clearly they are not. The analytical exercise which borrows from 
Polanyi’s propositions is yet to be fully developed and refined. Accordingly, this 
thesis could be considered as a merely preliminary exercise, where the application of 
the Strategic Relational Approach gains in strength and incisiveness for dissecting the 
social processes of change in contemporary Mexico. The potential for further research 
into the underlying themes could make important contributions to Political Economy 
in particular, and to the Social Sciences more generally.  
 
This thesis asserts that the incremental punctuated evolution of the open-ended 
processes can also be identified within the margins of political autonomy and 
constraint. Such is the case for achieving a more democratic and egalitarian society 
which is not restricted to electoral competition and participation. The delay in 
addressing inequities and the scant attention granted to redistribution have precluded 
a more inclusive, democratic transformation of Mexican society. However, if such a 
qualitative improvement is to be gained, it becomes clear that the redesign and 
enhancement of the agenda of reform is a necessary, albeit never a sufficient, step, in 
this direction.  
 
Taking the Strategic Relational Approach, one can recognize the importance of 
power, which is immanent in all social relations and which represents a core factor of 
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change. Moreover, acknowledging the centrality of agencies proves crucial for the 
analysis of unfolding economic and political processes. Accordingly, the design, 
selection and implementation of strategies must be attentive, but not exclusively 
subordinated, to market or to government. As market and government play 
complementary roles, networking could assist in the purposes of redistribution as 
well. From this point of view, the redesign and enhancement of the agenda of reform 
would represent a precious opportunity to create a democratic and egalitarian Mexico. 
Clearly, this is an opportunity not to be missed.   
 
The application of the Strategic Relational Approach to the Mexican case allows us to 
see that the crucial dimensions of democratization, commodification and international 
integration are not limited to the exchange of goods and services between trading 
partners. Clearly, there are also neglected social and political dimensions of the North 
America Free Trade Agreement which have been subordinated to economic 
exchanges. However, it is clear that in the medium and long-term the success or 
failure of the integration trends will depend on the societies in which they are 
embedded. Therefore, it is imperative that the widening disparities between and 
within countries, regions and sectors must be halted and corrected. Such a prerequisite 
would, in turn, reflect the acknowledgment of the socially embedded character of 
economic activities. There is no doubt that in an optimal scenario, inequalities must 
be eliminated or reduced at least, to start moving towards the forging of a community 
in the region. What this would entail is acknowledging the leading role of the social 
and political features of the transformations associated with the processes of 
integration. Distant as this scenario might seem, it is the one which, in the end, will be 
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most likely to succeed, since the societies in these countries are the ones which 
ultimately dictate the success of the processes of change.  
 
In addition to the discussion of crucial material features of the processes of 
commodification, democratization and integration in Mexico, the ideational 
dimensions are key references when applying the Strategic Relational Approach. 
Informative as ideal types can be, they should not rule out the open ended character of 
the social processes of change. They need not be deterministic. On the contrary, since 
contingency and indeterminacy are features of reality, it would clearly be beneficial to 
have ideal types that are flexible enough to recognize the open-ended unfolding of the 
processes. For, the proposition of ideal types can also be used to illuminate the highly 
political character of the social transformations, which are often explained in merely 
deterministic terms, taking for granted unrealistic axioms. Therefore, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the socially embedded character of political and economic 
transformations. Similar to the use of ideas for informing reality, where they have a 
constitutive and material impact on the real world, features of reality such as its open 
ended character and contingency must be recognized in the proposition of ideal types. 
 
The application of the Strategic Relational Approach to Mexico’s experience has 
hinted at interesting avenues for further research which emerge from this thesis. They 
can be divided into two main groups. One is for applied research. The other one is for 
theoretical expansion. The former suggests that it would be a valuable addition to the 
literature to try to ‘operationalize’ the suggested variables for process-tracing. By 
developing a model, or a set of models, which would necessarily incorporate official 
and unofficial indicators and data, the empirical findings could be used, firstly, to 
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contrast original propositions and, secondly, to further inform the theory. The 
objective of this would be to deliver a more detailed and accurate description of the 
phenomena associated with the processes. The findings of theoretically informed 
quantitative modelling and their subsequent application, could illuminate and be 
interpreted for particular cases, while they would also provide references for further 
research. Yet, such a strategy must be followed with particular care not to violate the 
realist ontological and epistemological positions of the Strategic Relational Approach, 
being certain not to claim law-like regularities, and not to over-stretch the deductivist 
mode of inference. 
 
The latter group of further research avenues, namely theoretical expansion, suggests 
that there are middle-range avenues which have not been explored yet. Particularly 
promising is to focus on processes of integration and of regionalization, as they have 
not been fully explored and traced as some other processes, such as globalization, 
have been. Even though this thesis has hinted at the likely trajectory of the process of 
integration in the North America Free Trade Agreement, as well as what the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas might look like, there is still much more that can be done. 
As these two regional agreements unfold --one already formalized while the other is 
currently being negotiated-- they would provide an exceptional opportunity for 
updating developments and tracing their key features and issues.  
 
Furthermore, since the processes of regionalization and integration display relevant 
characteristics, not only can the similarities be contrasted to illuminate experiences in 
other parts of the world, it would also be possible to explore some of the differences 
in more detail. In particular, this thesis identifies some issues and programmes of the 
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European Union which are totally absent from the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and from the proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas. They show 
the lack of a sense of community, and the scanty interest in forging it, on the one 
hand, and the inexistence of cohesion and structural funds, on the other. These are 
telling examples.  
 
Moreover, there is an incredible ample fertile ground which could benefit from the 
sort of theoretically informed process-tracing analysis which the Strategic Relational 
Approach is capable of delivering. Particularly promising is the realm of political 
economy that offers both opportunities and challenges to scholars for contributing to 
the analysis of the dynamic social, political and economic activities and phenomena. 
For, undoubtedly, political economy is a field of study of tremendous significance 
which requires constant analysis, update, and assessment. It necessarily needs to pay 
particular attention to the constitutive role of material and ideational elements within 
spatio-temporal fixes. As this thesis has demonstrated, there is no doubt this is of 
great importance in informing not only particularities of specific phenomena and 
factors, but also in situating the processes in broader social and political contexts. 
Hence, the avenues for further research are so big and promising that they would 
require the sustained efforts and contributions from a vast array of individuals, whom 
it would be a great honour to join.           
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